On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2010

Toshimi Kitazawa
Minister of Defense

The last year of 2009 was a major historical turning point, when the people of Japan saw a change of government. Following the change, we have been carrying out some reviews of issues related to defense. Meanwhile, under the Constitution of Japan, in accordance with the basic principles of maintaining an exclusively defense oriented policy and not becoming a military power that threatens other countries, we will continue to adhere to the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and to maintain the basic parameters of our defense policy of independently building a moderate defense capability while ensuring civilian control and abiding by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

The Ministry of Defense has published a defense white paper every year which details Japan's defense policies and major developments over the previous year involving the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). The white paper, "Defense of Japan," has ensured the transparency of Japan's defense policies and played an important role in enhancing other countries' understanding of, and trust in, our country, while having allowed more people to gain a deeper understanding of Japan's defense policies. "Defense of Japan 2010" is the first one published after the change of government, which I believe will give it an even greater significance than ordinary years.

The international security environment has been undergoing enormous changes in recent years, and the international society faces a variety of challenges ranging from traditional issues between nation states to new threats and diverse circumstances. The security environment surrounding Japan is growing increasingly severe, as evidenced by the North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, the modernization of China's armed forces, and the intensification of military activities by China and Russia.

Japan relies on foreign countries for most of its resources and food, and so the peace and stability of the international society are closely aligned with Japan's own peace and security. In that sense, it is important to strive for international cooperation and collaboration on security issues facing the international society. The SDF successfully concluded replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean which had lasted for about eight years, while on the other hand it has started a new peacekeeping operation (PKO) in response to the large-scale earthquake that struck Haiti in the Caribbean Sea in January 2010. It has also been engaged with ongoing PKOs in the Golan Heights, Nepal, and Sudan. Moreover, its destroyers and P-3C patrol aircraft have been undertaking active operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in Africa to ensure the safety of maritime transport.

Thus, under the environment surrounding Japan which has become increasingly severe, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF continue to evolve on a day-to-day basis while expanding the range of activities further.

In addition, this year marks the 50-year milestone since the conclusion of the current Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are the indispensable cornerstone for the peace and stability of not only Japan, but of the Asia-Pacific region. These are currently expanding out to cooperation for activities at a global scale, such as PKOs and response to large-scale disasters. Since the close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States plays an important role in tackling various security issues, it is extremely vital to maintain and strengthen the ties in the future. In this sense, the realignment of U.S. Forces such as the relocation of Marine Corps Futenma Air Station is a matter of great significance in striving to maintain deterrence and capabilities as well as reducing burdens on local communities. Therefore, the Japanese government is determined to make earnest efforts to meet its goal.

Furthermore, within this year, the Japanese government will revise the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which serves as its basic policy for improving its defense capabilities. For deliberations toward this review of the NDGP, a new advisory panel of experts, "the Council on the Future of National Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era" was established by the Cabinet in February 2010 and the panel submitted a report to the Prime Minister in August. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Defense has already started the study and discussion on the matter under the instruction of the Defense Council. After this, we will also study such issues as security environment awareness, the role of defense capabilities, the organization of the SDF, and the way that the foundation for defense production and technology should be, while giving consideration to how Japan should improve defense capabilities effectively and efficiently in order to ensure the safety and security of the Japanese people.

It is very regrettable that some events, which have severely damaged the people's trust in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, have occurred in recent years. Following this, we have been taking the Ministry's reform forward where any measures of preventing a reoccurrence of such incidents should be considered, but besides that, we have been looking at the reform from the perspective of promoting defense administration effectively and efficiently, taking into account the environment surrounding the Ministry of Defense, and ensuring the effectiveness of civilian control.

From the above, we have made considerable efforts to give a real picture of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in this year's defense white paper, including ordinary activities such as warning and surveillance activities and disaster relief unit dispatches. We have also striven to provide a greater number of materials for the people to think about Japan's defense. Specifically, we have incorporated a greater number of columns and figures than in previous years and explained items plainly which are important for thinking about Japan's security, while covering direct opinions of SDF members engaged in their day-to-day duties and those who have a close relationship with the Ministry of Defense.

National defense will not be viable and ensured without the trust and support of the people. I sincerely hope that this white paper, "Defense of Japan 2010," will be read broadly by as many people as possible and that it will help you enhance your understanding of national defense.

Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan

☐ A Complicated and Uncertain International Security Environment.

Leaders participating in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. (April 13, 2010) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

In March of this year, the South Korean naval patrol vessel *Cheonan* sank. North Korea was strongly criticized by South Korea based on the results of an investigation by the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group consisting of specialists.

Efforts toward nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation have progressed, through the signing of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia, and Nuclear Security Summits.



Recent Chinese Activities in the Waters near Japan

A Chinese navy ship-borne Ka-28 helicopter flying near an MSDF escort flotilla

Chapter 1 Issues in the International Community
Chapter 2 National Defense Policies of Countries

☐ There are a variety of challenges facing security in the international community including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and activities by non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations.

Non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations are still highly active.

- China's international presence is rising.
- China's high and constant increase in defense budget, and further military modernization.
- Advanced equipment appeared at the military parades celebrating the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC, demonstrating the developments of mechanization and computerization in the Chinese military to Chinese people and overseas.

- Activities by Russian navy vessels and aircrafts near Japan are intensifying.

A Russian navy kirov-class nuclear-powered missile cruiser sailing near the Tsushima (Photographed by the MSDF in July 2010)

Russian air force Tu-95 aircraft

- Many Southeast Asian countries have been modernizing their militaries, focusing on maritime and air force capabilities, against the backdrop of economic development and other factors.
- India and Pakistan have advanced the military potential of their ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads

Singapore's Archer-class submarine [Singaporean Ministry of Defence]

Part II The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Review of 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines carried out in 2010

The 9th meeting of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era (August 27, 2010) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

- ▶ The review of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines is an important issue related to the security of Japan. After paying sufficient consideration to the revision, the Government is due to reach a conclusion within this year.
- ▶ To this end, the Government has held the "Council on the Future of National Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era" since February 2010, where discussions have been conducted among experts. In August 2010, the Council held its ninth meeting and submitted a report to Prime Minister Kan.

- ❍ Since the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program was only applicable until FY2009, the policy on the compilation of the FY2010 budget was decided on by the Cabinet in order to build up appropriate defense capabilities in the absence of a Mid-term Defense Program.

Changes in Defense Expenditures Over the Past Ten Years



Notes: 1. Created based on the defense expenditures published by each country.
2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense expenditures each year, with the FY2000 value as 1 (times) (truncated to two decimal places).
3. The definition and breakdown of the defense expenditures of each country is not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as foreign exchange fluctuations and price levels of each country, it is very difficult to draw a comparison of defense budgets or expenditures among the countries.
4. The figures for main EU countries were calculated based on the sum total of the defense expenditures of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. (Since France and Germany converted to the euro in 2002, it was newly calculated with 2002 as 1).
5. See Reference 23.

Trend of Defense-Related Expenditures over the Past Ten Years



Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, or U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community).

Chapter 1 The Basic Concepts of Japan's Defense Policy and Related Issues
Chapter 2 The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability

▶ The Ministry of Defense has also been engaged in discussions on such matters as what the future defense capability should be and so on, by holding Defense Councils and so on, in order to contribute to the Government's deliberations.

Defense Council held on August 11, 2010 (in relation to the agenda on what the defense capability should be in the future)

❍ Main equipment and materials covered in the columns

[Type 10 Main Battle Tank]

◆ New technology used in armor
◆ Improved communication and information transmitting capabilities
◆ Strengthened defense capacity against chemical and other weapons
◆ Equipped with the domestically-produced 120 mm smooth-bore gun
◆ Maximum speed : approximately 70 km/h
◆ Weight : 44 t, 6 t lighter than the Type 90 Main Battle Tank

[XC-2 Next-Generation Transport Aircraft]

◆ Developed as a successor to the domestically-produced C-1 transport aircraft
◆ Greatly improved air transport capabilities (cruising distance and load capacity)
Cruising distance: approximately 6,500 km (when carrying 12 t)
C-1: approximately 1,700 km (when carrying 2.6 t)
C-130H: approximately 4,000 km (when carrying 5.0 t)
◆ Maximum load capacity: approximately 30 t



[22DDH Destroyer]

◆ Central ship for command, communications, and helicopter operation
◆ Capable of carrying seven patrol helicopters and two maritime rescue helicopters
◆ Enhanced functions including transport and medical
◆ Standard displacement: approximately 19,500 t

Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

During North Korea's ballistic missile launch incidents (2009), Aegis ships and Patriot PAC-3s were deployed to prevent missiles falling down into Japanese territory.

Right after a PAC-3 test launch

An SM-3 launched from an Aegis destroyer

Around-the-clock surveillance operations and emergency dispatch (scramble)

▶ Approximately 80% of scrambles by ASDF aircraft in FY2009 (299 times/year), were against Russian or Chinese aircraft

Number of Scrambles in the Last Decade and its Breakdown



Example of Flight Patterns of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean Aircraft Against Which Scrambles Were Directed



First Russian Tu-160 military aircraft spotted near Japanese waters (taken by the ASDF in June this year)

Chinese Y-8 military aircraft (taken by the ASDF in March this year)

Chapter 1 Self-Defense Forces Operations

Response to Natural Disasters

- Response to the heavy rain damage which occurred in summer of last year focused in Western Japan
- Response to the tsunami which occurred off the coast of central Chile in February, 2010

- Response to the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease which occurred in Miyazaki Prefecture in April 2010.

Anti-Piracy Efforts (Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden)

Vice Defense Minister Kazuya Shimba observing the air fleet dispatched for anti-piracy

- Japan relies upon maritime transport for a great deal of food and materials that form the foundation of Japan's survival and prosperity.
- Since acts of piracy are a major threat to public safety and order at sea, Japan needs to respond proactively.

Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

This year has marked the 50th anniversary since the conclusion of the current Japan–U.S. Security Treaty.



Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Gates holding a Japan–U.S. joint press conference (October 2009)

▶ The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements contribute to the peace and development of Japan, as well as the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.

Significance and Role of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa

▶ The stationing of the U.S. Forces in Okinawa — including the U.S. Marine Corps which is in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies and is capable of high mobility and readiness — with its geographical characteristics, contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of Japan and the Asia Pacific region.

▶ In addition to the defense of Japan, the U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa can respond to natural disaster incidents such as the earthquake which wreaked havoc in Java, Indonesia in 2006, due to its high mobility and readiness.

Chapter 2 Strengthening of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Japan–U.S. joint exercises improve the tactical capabilities of both countries

▶ Deepening mutual understanding and communication and enhancing interoperability is vital for Japan and the United States to take bilateral action smoothly.

Swift response to the massive earthquake in Haiti



▶ The SDF initially conducted airlift operations by ASDF C-130H transport aircraft and medical relief as missions of the International Disaster Relief Activities. A PKO engineering unit was also dispatched in approximately two weeks after the request of the United Nations was issued.

Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

From Defense Exchanges to Defense Cooperation

Stage	Examples of Specific Initiatives
Defense Exchanges Defense Cooperation	Strength of Relationship ❍ Student exchange, educational and research exchange, equipment and technology exchange ❍ High level and working-level exchanges between defense authorities ❍ Unit exchanges in each service branch, mutual visits of naval vessels and aircrafts ❍ Goodwill exercises (Example: Japan–Russia Joint Search and Rescue Exercises, etc.) ❍ Various types of cooperation in non-traditional security areas (including joint exercises) (Examples: Cobra Gold, ARF DiREx, Cambodia and Timor-Leste PKOs, cooperation with the Australian Army on-site for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq, cooperation for anti-piracy operations (NATO, EUNAVFOR)) ❍ Agreements on the security of information ❍ Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements ❍ Formulating joint contingency plans, etc. ❍ Joint exercises premised on joint responses (Examples: Japan–U.S. Bilateral Exercises, Japan–U.S. Joint Command Post Exercises, Japan–U.S. Joint Anti-Submarine Exercises, Japan–U.S. Joint Fighter Exercises) ❍ Joint responses in the event of a Japanese emergency

▶ The IISS* Asia Security Summit is an international summit hosted by the private sector, but almost the only one attended by a substantial number of defense-minister-level officials from throughout the Asia-Pacific region (held every year in Singapore).
* The International Institute for Strategic Studies

▶ During the 9th Summit in June this year, in addition to giving a speech, Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa engaged in bilateral defense talks with the defense ministers of participating nations, as well as Japan–U.S.–South Korea defense talks.

▶ The United States and the ROK will conduct a joint military exercise in July 2011. Japan has received an invitation and will dispatch four MSDF officers to the exercise.

Chapter 3 Improvement of the International Security Environment

▶ The Ministry of Defense and the SDF proactively promote security dialogues, defense cooperation, and defense exchanges, while taking part in international peace cooperation activities.

International exchanges by defense ministers (detailed in column)

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Nagashima and ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Tae Young

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kusuda giving instructions at a departure ceremony for dispatching units

▶ Japan–U.S. joint training (ground, maritime, air)

Field training with USMC in Japan (November 2009)

Japan–India Defense Ministers' Meeting (May 2010)

Signing ceremony for the Japan–Australia ACSA (May 2010)

Cope North, Guam (February 2010)

Joint port call commemorating the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (Harumi, June 2010)

Part III Measures for the Defense of Japan

☐ The Self-Defense Forces (SDF) perform their duties with support and cooperation from the local communities and the Japanese people

Recruitment at a Provincial Cooperation Office

A variety of systems in place for recruitment and hiring

▶ Taking into consideration the worsening employment situation, the aging population, the declining birthrate, and other problems, we have been making continuous efforts to secure highly qualified personnel in order to fulfill various duties.

Daily education and training to foster personnel of the SDF

▶ Performing duties starting with the defense of Japan, requires a high level of ability, knowledge, and skill to be maintained among individuals along with a high level of discipline within units. Therefore, we provide them various education and training.

ASDF personnel carrying out flight training exercises on a flight simulator

SDF Public Relations Activities

MSDF Fleet Review

JSDF hands-on tour

▶ The activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF cannot be carried out without the understanding and support of the people of Japan.
The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct positive public relations activities from the perspective of responding to increased public attention to national defense and accountability to the public.

☐ Various cooperation activities by the SDF, including assisting in public welfare

The instant of an underwater mine demolition at Kobe Port

Activity in areas including handling unexploded ordnance and minesweeping

▶ Such activities further deepen the mutual trust between the SDF and the people, and give SDF personnel a sense of pride and confidence in their constant contribution to the life of the people.

Private Sectors Supporting Defense Capabilities

▶ Defense production and technology foundations in Japan play an important role in such areas as acquisition of equipment and materials which can exhibit maximum capabilities, stable, flexible, and efficient supply of acquired equipment and materials to front-line units, and the maintaining of these functions.

A light armored vehicle and development staff from a private company (details in column)

Reform of the Ministry of Defense

▶ The Ministry of Defense has addressed the issue of its reform, including the prevention of recurrence of misconduct, and reorganization of the central structures. After the change of government last year, deliberations are underway for the realization of reform at the Ministry of Defense under the new Government, including reviewing the measures taken in the previous reform.

Columns (Commentary, Voice, Q&A)

▶ 54 columns from not only SDF personnel, but people from friendly nations and from organizations we worked with, as well as questions from youth answered by SDF personnel.

Beginning of operations for an aerial refueling/transport unit (KC-767) (Part II Chapter 2)

Part I Columns:

- Status of Fifth Generation Fighters in Various Countries (Commentary)
- Trends in Military Science and Technology (Conventional Prompt Global Strike) (Commentary)
- KC767 Begins Operations (Commentary) (Part II Chapter 2)

The achievement of the 100th anti-piracy escort in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia (Part III Chapter 1)

Part II Columns:

- Status of SDF Personnel (actual number) (Commentary)
- Type 10 Main Battle Tank (MBT) (Q&A)
- Destroyer Equipped with Helicopters Planned for FY2010 (22DDH) (Commentary)
- First Flight of the Next-Generation Transport Plane (XC-2) (Commentary)
- Achievement of the 100th Escort Off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden (Part III Chapter 1)

Part III Columns:

- Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (Commentary)
- Factors that Allowed Prompt Dispatch to the U.N. Haiti PKO (Commentary)
- Efforts to Improve International Security Cooperation (Voice of an Australian Colonel)
- Japan's Efforts in Response to the Sinking of the Korean Patrol Vessel (Commentary)
- Cooperation in filming "*Saka no Ue no Kumo*" (Cloud Above the Slope) (Commentary)
- Message from a Mayor (Voice)
- Questions from Youth (Q&A)
- Chronology of Japan–U.S. Alliance

Voices of SDF personnel that participated in multilateral exercises (Part III Chapter 3)



MSDF pianist (Part III Chapter 4)

MAMOR

ASDF personnel responding to questions from children (Part III Chapter 4)

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Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

General Situation

1. Trends in the International Community

In the international community today, the international security environment has become complicated and uncertain due to factors such as the rise of nations against the backdrop of economic growth in recent years, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and so forth, activities by international terrorist organizations and other non-state actors, and the danger of fragile nations becoming hotbeds for international terrorism.

The relationships of mutual dependence among nations that have brought stability and prosperity to countries at the same time have negative aspects. These include economic problems and security problems that have arisen in certain countries and regional instability factors spreading across borders throughout the world and affecting other countries. In such relationships of mutual dependence, countries have the common interest of ensuring global and regional peace, stability, and prosperity by building a more stable international security environment. Therefore, it is increasingly important for nations that have a common interest in resolving these problems to cooperate in tackling such problems.

It has been pointed out that in the future the comparative superiority of the United States will decline in terms of the military and other areas, but it seems that it will continue to be the most influential nation in the international community. Meanwhile, the Obama Administration is taking a stance of emphasizing further cooperation with major allies and partner countries in order to ensure peace and stability in the international community.

In the meantime, China and India have established themselves as rising powers with their remarkable economic growth. Russia has recovered from the social and economic difficulties of the 1990s, and its national power is on a recovery track. In the future, the relative international influence of these multi-polar-oriented countries is expected to increase.

These trends should be seen as a great opportunity for international coordination and cooperation. At the same time, since developments in these countries may have a considerable impact on the security environment, these developments, as well as relations of mutual dependence, effects on international and regional orders, and the question of what kind of relations should be forged with these countries, are receiving increasing attention.

2. Major Security Issues in the International Community

The proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as their delivery means, including ballistic missiles, constitute a continued and significant threat to the international community. In particular, the proliferation of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and Iran's nuclear program pose concerns. Also, there are concerns over the acquisition or use of WMD by non-state actors, including international terrorist organizations, against which deterrence works less effectively, and the destabilization of nations that possess weapons of mass destruction.

Meanwhile, triggered by relevant developments such as a speech by President Obama in Prague in April 2009, there appears to be increasing momentum toward aiming for a world that is free of nuclear weapons, and various efforts by the international community are progressing toward nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament through opportunities such as the signing of the new START between the United States and Russia in April 2010, the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, and the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in May 2010.

Globally dispersed cells of international and local terrorist organizations as well as their ideological sympathizers continue to resort to acts of terrorism, and they continue to be a threat to security. Some say that such international terrorist organizations and so forth are using politically fragile nations such as Afghanistan and Yemen as bases for activities and training. Terrorism continues to occur in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Activities in domains that do not have a conventional geographic standpoint, such as outer space and cyber space, have become problems in terms of security. This is reflected in the further progress of military science and technology and the significant advancement of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years. Cyber attacks on information and telecommunications networks can have a serious impact on people's daily lives. As for efforts in the cyber war, countries are moving forward with specific initiatives such as the reorganization of national defense organizations, while paying attention to incidents of cyber attacks on military networks in foreign countries.

Regional conflicts with diverse and complex backgrounds are still present in every part of the world and proactive efforts are being made to manage and resolve conflicts through U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), regional frameworks and multinational forces, mainly in the Middle East and Africa. It has also been pointed out that new factors that influence the global security environment may possibly emerge when competition for energy resources between sovereign states and climate change become more prominent issues in the future.

Ensuring the safety of maritime transportation, which, as the cornerstone of the international distribution of goods, has always been considered imperative, is becoming increasingly important in light of the recent increase in acts of piracy. The international community is making efforts such as dispatching ships and aircraft to cope with acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

Furthermore, it is being suggested that various functions of military forces should be used to deal with large-scale disasters and outbreaks of epidemics such as the new strain of swine influenza.

As seen above, today's international community confronts a range of issues from traditional inter-state relations to new threats and diverse contingencies. These issues could arise independently or in combination. In order to respond to such issues, the roles of military forces are diversifying beyond deterrence and handling of armed conflicts to include a broad spectrum of activities from conflict prevention to reconstruction assistance. Moreover, unified responses that incorporate military as well as diplomatic, police, judicial, information, and economic measures are becoming necessary. Accordingly, each state will enhance its military capabilities while determining priorities in line with its resources and circumstances, and will pursue international cooperation and partnership in security areas in order to appropriately respond to its diversified roles and duties.

3. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific region has been getting more global attention, due to the rapid development of economies such as China and India, resulting in enhanced coordination and cooperation among countries, mainly in economic affairs. On the other hand, this region is considerably rich in political, economic, ethnic, and religious diversity, and conflicts between countries/regions remain, even after the end of the Cold War, unlike Europe. Because of these reasons major changes in the security environment have yet to emerge and long-standing issues of territorial rights and reunification continue to plague the region.

On the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people have been divided for more than half a century, and the faceoff continues between the military forces of North Korea and the Republic of Korea. There are issues concerning Taiwan and the overlapping territorial claims on the Spratly Islands. Japan also confronts unresolved territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima, both of which are integral parts of Japanese territory.

Concerns over North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have grown more serious. In 2006, in response to its ballistic missile launch and the announcement of an underground nuclear test, the international community adopted U.N. Security Council resolutions 1695 and 1718, imposing sanctions on North Korea.

In response to the missile launch[1] in April 2009 and the announcement of the implementation of a second nuclear test in May 2009, the international community strongly condemned North Korea's actions, and Security Council Resolution 1874 was adopted regarding the latter, deciding additional measures. After this, North

Korea launched a ballistic missile in July 2009, announced the successful conclusion of a uranium concentration experiment, and entered the completion stage in September 2009. In November 2009, it announced that it successfully completed the reprocessing of spent fuel rods at the end of August and yielded noteworthy results in making extracted plutonium weapons-grade. The fact that North Korea is carrying out nuclear testing and strengthening its ballistic missile capabilities is a significant threat to the safety of Japan. This cannot be accepted as it is a notable hazard to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and the international community, and there are grave concerns about these trends. In March 2010, the Republic of Korea Navy corvette Cheonan sank in the vicinity of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea. A Joint Military-Civilian Investigation Group, including Korean and international experts, announced in May 2010 that it was due to a torpedo attack by North Korea. Since then, while both the ROK and North Korea initiated concrete responses and other measures, the international community responded by issuing statements which condemned North Korea for its attack and sinking of the Cheonan, including a G8 summit statement and a statement from the President of the U.N. Security Council. Additionally, the United States and the ROK conducted joint exercises in the Sea of Japan. Developments in North Korea are in an unpredictable situation and need to be closely monitored, including the

Fig. I-0-0-1 Major Military Forces in the Asia-Pacific Region (Approximate Strength)



Notes: 1. Source: "The Military Balance 2010" publications of the U.S. Department of Defense and others (actual numbers as of the end of FY2009 are shown for Japan).
2. U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are combined figures of Army and Marine Corps personnel.
3. Combat aircraft includes Navy and Marine aircraft.
4. Figures in parentheses show the total number of major units, such as divisions and brigades. Only divisions are included for North Korea. Military police are included for Taiwan.
5. U.S. 7th Fleet is the number of forward deployment to Japan and Guam.

possible impact on the regime of the health issues of Kim Jong-il and the issue of his successor. North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals is also yet to be resolved. It is a major threat to the lives and security of the Japanese public and its solution will require concrete actions by North Korea.

Many countries in this region have taken advantage of economic growth to expand and modernize their military forces by increasing their defense budgets and introducing new weapons systems.

In particular, China, a major political and economic power with important clout, is gaining confidence in the international community and demonstrating a more proactive stance. It also continues to promote the further modernization of its military capabilities against the backdrop of the continuing rapid growth of its defense budget. China has not clarified the current status of or future vision for the modernization of its military capabilities, and since transparency is not sufficiently ensured regarding its decision-making processes for security and military matters, it has been pointed out that there is a possibility that this could lead to a sense of distrust and misunderstandings in other countries. Furthermore, China is increasing its activities in waters close to Japan. The lack of transparency of its national defense policies, and the military activities are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including Japan, and need to be carefully analyzed. Based on this situation, there is a need for further improvements to transparency regarding China's military, and promoting dialogues and exchanges with China and further strengthening mutual understanding and relations of trust are important issues. Recently, noteworthy events have occurred such as the announcement of the testing of missile interception technologies.

Russia, under President Medvedev, is pursuing its national interests as "a strong nation", and it is developing its military posture in line with its resources against the backdrop of its economic development to date. Currently, it is moving forward with downsizing its troops, reforming its organizational aspects, rebuilding its readiness postures, modernizing its military, including the development and introduction of new equipment, and so forth. Recently, there has been global deployment of its military, navy and air force in particular, including joint training accompanying long-term voyages, anti-piracy activities, and patrol activities by strategic bombers.

In the Far East, too, Russia continues with active operations of its vessels and aircraft.

(See Fig. I-0-0-1)

In the Asia-Pacific region, where a lack of transparency and elements of uncertainty still exist, the presence of the U.S. military remains extremely important in order to achieve regional stability. Japan and other countries have established bilateral alliances and friendly relations with the United States and, accordingly, they allow the stationing and deployment of U.S. forces in their territories.

In addition, recent years have also seen an increase in opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region. Efforts are being made to engage in multilateral security dialogues, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and conferences hosted by non-governmental institutions with the participation of relevant defense ministers, as well as bilateral and multilateral joint exercises. Japan has been hosting the Meeting for Defense Authority Senior Officials at the vice-ministerial level with Southeast Asian countries. Promoting and developing such multi-layered approaches among countries is important to ensure security in the region.

Notes:

1) The government regarded the launch by North Korea on April 5, 2009 as an activity related to the ballistic missile program that violates the U.N. Security Council resolutions, and decided to refer to said launch as the "missile launch by North Korea."

Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 1

Issues in the International Community

Section 1. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Section 2. International Terrorism
Section 3. Trends concerning Cyber Warfare Capabilities
Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts

Leaders participating in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. (April 13, 2010) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

Section 1. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons, or ballistic missiles carrying such weapons, has been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In particular, there still remain strong concerns that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom traditional deterrence works less effectively, could acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.

1. Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 made it clear that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union could take place. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that took effect in 1970 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted nuclear tests in or before 1966[1] from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations[2].

The NPT is currently signed by 190 countries[3]. While some countries that had previously possessed nuclear weapons became signatories of this treaty by abandoning these weapons, India, Israel, and Pakistan still refuse to sign this treaty[4]. There are other countries that have declared the development and possession of nuclear weapons, such as North Korea, which announced it had conducted a nuclear test in October 2006 and May 2009[5].

U.S. President Obama's speech pertaining to aims for a world without nuclear weapons in April 2009, acknowledging that the abolition of nuclear weapons would not be achieved soon[6], expressed his intention to take concrete steps towards the realization of a future world without nuclear weapons, including the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, while maintaining nuclear deterrence as long as these weapons exist. The measures include; the signing of a new, legally binding treaty to reduce and limit strategic offensive weapons to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I)[7] between the United States and Russia; the pursuit of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)[8] by the U.S. government; the announcement of the intention to start negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)[9]; and the start of a new international effort to secure nuclear materials in order to prevent nuclear proliferation to terrorists.

This determination to achieve a world without nuclear weapons was reflected in the U. N. Security Council Summit on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament held in September the same year. The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887 for nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament adopted in the Summit called for the following measures, thereby encouraging efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament; 1) the creation of conditions for a world without nuclear weapons; 2) the establishment of realistic and achievable goals in all three pillars of the NPT: nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy; 3) the early entry into force of the CTBT; 4) the early start of negotiations for a FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament; and 5) the improvement of securing nuclear materials to prevent nuclear proliferation to terrorists.

U.S. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty to replace START I on April 2010. This treaty requires both parties, within seven years after entry into force of the treaty, to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads [10] to 1,550 and to reduce deployed delivery platforms to 700. In addition, the Nuclear Security Summit, held by the United States in April 2010, adopted measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials by each nation to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, the NPT Review Conference held in May 2010 adopted the final document which includes concrete action plans for the future for non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which are the NPT's three pillars [11].

Thus, the international society has begun to take steady, major steps forward toward nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. This direction is welcome, as it contributes to improving the international security environment.

2. Biological and Chemical Weapons

Biological and chemical weapons are easy to manufacture at a relatively low cost and easy to disguise because most of the materials, equipment, and technology needed to manufacture these weapons can be used for both military and civilian purposes. Accordingly, biological and chemical weapons are attractive to states or terrorists who seek asymmetric means of attack [12].

Biological weapons have the following characteristics: 1) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, 2) there is usually an incubation period of a few days between exposure and onset, 3) their use is hard to detect, 4) even the threat of use can create great psychological effects, and 5) they can cause heavy casualties depending on circumstances and the type of weapons [13].

As for chemical weapons, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas, tabun, and sarin [14] in the Iran-Iraq War. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds [15]. It is believed that other chemical weapons [16] that were used included VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds [17].

North Korea is, for example, one of the countries seeking such weapons. The Tokyo subway sarin attack in 1995, as well as incidents of bacillus anthracis being contained in mail items in the United States in 2001 and that of ricin being contained in a mail item in February 2004, have shown that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage if used in cities.

3. Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic missiles enable the projection of heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Once launched, a ballistic missile makes a trajectory flight and falls at a steep angle at high speed, which makes it difficult to effectively defend against the missile.

If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region where military confrontation is underway, the conflict could intensify or expand, and tension in a region where armed antagonism exists could be further exacerbated, leading to the destabilization of that region. Furthermore, a country may use ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or threatening another country that is superior in terms of conventional forces.

In recent years, in addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, attention has been increasingly paid to the threat of cruise missiles, because they are comparatively easy for terrorist and other non-state entities to procure [18]. Although the speed of a cruise missile is slower than that of a ballistic missile, it is difficult to detect when a cruise missile is launched and while in flight [19]. Because they are smaller than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles

can be concealed on a ship to secretly approach a target, and if they carry weapons of mass destruction on their warheads, they present an enormous threat.

4. Growing Concerns about Transfer or Proliferation of WMDs

Even weapons that were purchased or developed for self-defense purposes could easily be exported or transferred once domestic manufacturing becomes successful. For example, certain states that do not heed political risks have transferred weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces and instead intend to compensate for this with weapons of mass destruction. Some of these states seeking weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk, and allow terrorist organizations to be active due to their poor governance. Therefore, the possibility of actual use of weapons of mass destruction may generally be high in these cases.

In addition, since there is a concern that such states may not be able to effectively manage the related technology and materials, the high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states has become a cause for concern. For example, because there is a danger that even terrorists who do not possess related technologies can use a dirty bomb[20] as a means of attack once they acquire a radioactive substance, nations across the world share the concern regarding the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state entities[21].

Pakistan is suspected to have started its nuclear program in the 1970s. In February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, had been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists[22]. It is pointed out that these transfers were carried out secretly using global networks covering Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), then Director-General Mohammad El Baradei, stated that this network reportedly involves more than 30 countries[23].

When then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kerry visited North Korea in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea had admitted the existence of a project to enrich uranium for use in nuclear weapons, pointing out the possibility that North Korea had pursued development not only of plutonium-based weapons but also of uranium-based nuclear weapons. North Korea announced in 2009[24] that it had entered the completion phase of uranium enrichment tests as well as weaponizing extracted plutonium. In addition, it was also pointed out that North Korea had given support to Syrian secret nuclear activities[25].
(See Chapter 2, Section 2)

The international community's uncompromising and decisive stance against the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries engaged in related activities, leading to some of them accepting inspections by international institutions or abandoning their WMD programs altogether[26].

Ballistic missiles have been significantly proliferated or transferred as well. The former Soviet Union exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea, and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess ballistic missiles. In particular, Pakistan's Ghauri and Iran's Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North Korea's Nodong missiles. Libya, which agreed to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, reportedly disclosed production lines for Scud-Cs and other facilities built with technological assistance from North Korea[27]. It has been reported that Ukraine illegally exported cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to Iran and China around 2001[28].

5. Iran's Nuclear Issue

Since the 1970s Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that its nuclear-related activities would be for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, Iran's covert construction of facilities including a large-scale uranium enrichment plant was exposed by a group of dissidents. Subsequent IAEA inspection revealed that Iran, without notifying the IAEA, had been engaged for a long time in uranium enrichment and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons. In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors recognized Iran's breach of compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement.

The international community expressed strong concerns about the lack of concrete proof regarding Iran's claim that it had no intent to develop nuclear weapons and that all of its nuclear activities were for peaceful purposes, and has demanded that Iran suspend all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities through a series of Security Council Resolutions and IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions.

After concluding an accord (the Paris Accord) in November 2004 with the EU-3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), which is working for the settlement of the issue, Iran suspended its enrichment related activities. However, in August 2005, it resumed uranium conversion activities — a prior step to uranium enrichment — and in February 2006, resumed uranium enrichment activities. In response, a special session of the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution to report the issue to the U.N. Security Council, and in March 2006, the U.N. Security Council approved a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. In June 2006, the EU-3, and the United States, China, and Russia (EU3+3) agreed on and presented to Iran a comprehensive proposal, including possible cooperation in the event that Iran sufficiently resolves the international concerns[29]. However, Iran continued its nuclear activities. In response to these actions by Iran, in July 2006 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 demanding that Iran suspend all of its uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The Security Council thereafter adopted a series of resolutions[30] to impose stricter sanctions under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations[31].

The IAEA announced in September 2009 that it had received notification from Iran pertaining to the construction of a new uranium enrichment plant[32]. The United States assesses that the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program[33]. Iran also decided in November of that year to build 10 new nuclear sites, and further announced in February 2010 that it began to enrich uranium from below 5% to near 20%, and that completed the production of the first batch[34]. The IAEA has expressed concerns that these Iranian nuclear development activities may be related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile, and they point out that they have been unable to obtain confirmation that the objectives are peaceful. The Iranian nuclear issue remains unresolved as of yet, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929, imposing additional sanctions on Iran, which continues to enrich uranium despite the Security Council resolutions, was adopted at the U.N. Security Council[35]. The international community, including the U.N. Security Council, continues to pursue a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issue through negotiation.

Section 2. International Terrorism

1. General Situation

The 9/11 attacks that took place in 2001 prompted the entire world to reaffirm the threat of international terrorism, and became the spark that ignited the current fight against terrorism by the United States and other countries.
In the military operation in Afghanistan led by U.S. and U.K. forces shortly after the 9/11 attacks, many of the leaders of Al-Qaeda, who were believed to have directed the 9/11 attacks, and the Taliban, who harbored Al-Qaeda, were killed or captured. However, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Mohammed Omar and the remnants of their respective organizations are believed to still be hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region[36], and the U.S.-led multinational forces, the Afghan, the Pakistani, and other militaries are continuously engaged in clearing operations.

Al-Qaeda maintains its intent to attack the U.S. mainland, and is still considered to retain the capability to recruit, train, and deploy operatives[37]. Meanwhile, some have pointed out that in part because of the loss of top commanders, Al-Qaeda has been unable to orchestrate successful large scale attacks[38].

With respect to the relation between Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, while the Islamic extremism of Al-Qaeda has been spreading throughout the world, the command and control capabilities of the core Al-Qaeda group is believed to be declining. There seems to be no clear command and control structure between the core Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and groups or individuals inspired by Al-Qaeda's ideology, but rather it is a loose network.

Al-Qaeda affiliates that receive advice from Al-Qaeda or those that include "Al-Qaeda" in its name perpetrate terrorism mainly in North Africa and the Middle East[39]; however, it is pointed out that these affiliates have no single format and there are significant differences in the degree of control that the core Al-Qaeda can exert over them[40].

We have also seen in recent years cases where radical individuals and groups who have had no interaction at all with the Al-Qaeda network have adopted Al-Qaeda's ideology and have become terrorists[41]. For example, the group that conducted the Madrid train attack in Spain in March 2004 was inspired by Al-Qaeda ideology. It was judged, however, there was no sufficient evidence of a direct connection between the group and Al-Qaeda[42].

In particular, since the attack on the London transport network in 2005, so-called "home-grown terrorists[43]" have gained attention. For example, some individuals among U.S. Muslims engage in extremist activities. They are thought to be motivated by a combination of personal circumstances and external factors such as grievance over U.S. foreign policy, feelings of alienation, pan-Islamism, and the availability of poisonous extremist propaganda through the Internet[44].

2. Terrorist Attacks around the World

In Yemen, there have been numerous terrorist incidents conducted by Al-Qaeda related cells including the bomb attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the bomb attack on a French tanker in 2002. In recent years there have been suicide attacks on tourists in the Ma'rib in 2007, terrorist attacks thought to be aimed at the U.S. Embassy in 2008, and suicide bomb attacks that involved Korean tourists in 2009. In addition, in April this year, there was a suicide bomb attack that was seemingly aimed at the car of the U.K. Ambassador to Yemen. It is thought that these attacks were conducted by Al-Qaeda affiliated groups, and it has been pointed out that the inability of the Yemeni government to secure and exercise control over all of its territory offers terrorists and insurgent groups, particularly Al-Qaeda, a safe haven[45]. It has also been pointed out that Al-Qaeda has several hundred members in Yemen, and they have grown in strength[46].

Even after a provisional federal government was established in Somalia in 2005, there continued to be no government that effectively governed the entire country, and battles between the radical Islamic group Al-Shabaab and government forces continued. Some of al-Shabaab's senior leaders are thought to have previously trained and fought with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan[47], and they have a certain degree of relationship to Al-Qaeda.

In Algeria, there were a series of terrorist attacks in 2007 targeting the government and army, including simultaneous bomb attacks on government buildings, the attempted assassination of the President of Algeria, a suicide bombing on the barracks of the Algerian Coast Guard, and bombing of U.N. facilities. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)[48] claimed responsibility for these attacks[49]. AQIM has up until now targeted mainly Westerners such as U.S. and French nationals, and kidnappings of Westerners presumably conducted by the said group have been occurring since 2008[50]. In addition to Algeria, in recent years AQIM has also been active in sub-Saharan countries (Mali, Niger, and Mauritania).

South Asia has long been suffering frequent terrorist attacks, and India was hit by a series of coordinated terrorist bombings in 2008[51]. In the Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008, multiple coordinated bombings and shootings occurred in more than 10 places across the city, including hotels, restaurants, and stations, killing many foreigners, including a Japanese national. Pakistan has also experienced a number of terrorist attacks since 2007, including the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto and attacks by armed groups targeting government and security organizations such as the military and the police.

Southeast Asia is still subject to frequent terrorist threats, particularly by Islamic extremists, although some progress has been made in controlling terrorist organizations. Between 2002 and 2005, Indonesia suffered large-scale terrorist attacks, in which the involvement of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), a radical Muslim organization, is suspected[52], and there were simultaneous terrorist attacks on foreign-owned hotels in Jakarta in July last year as well. Meanwhile, Indonesia is making definite progress with their efforts to crack down on terrorists such as the arrests of top JI leaders such as Zarkasi and Abu Dujana, and the fatal shooting of Noordin, a suspect in the simultaneous terrorist attacks on the foreign-owned hotels in 2009. In the Philippines, the communist New People's Army (NPA), the Islamic extremist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are the biggest domestic public security concerns and the government is making a strong effort to respond. The Government of the Philippines regards the NPA as the most significant threat. In addition, they are promoting military cooperation with the United States, conducting the Balikatan exercise every year to cope with ASG, which is allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda.

(See Fig. I-1-1-1)

Fig. I-1-1-1 Number of Terrorism Incidents by Region



Note: Created based on the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center database.

Section 3. Trends Concerning Cyber Warfare Capabilities

1. Cyberspace and Security

Owing to the information technology (IT) revolution in recent years, information and communication networks such as the Internet are becoming essential components across all facets of people's lives. Cyber attacks against these information and communication networks, especially those which are the infrastructure for daily life, have the potential to seriously impact people's lives. As such, cyber security constitutes an important challenge in terms of security for each country.

Types of cyber attacks include data falsification or theft of information via unauthorized access to information and communication networks, the functional impairment of information and communication networks through the simultaneous transmission of large quantities of data, and so on. Internet related technologies are constantly evolving, with cyber attacks growing more sophisticated and complex day by day. The following points could be listed as characteristics of cyber attacks.

1) Attacks can be carried out that do not injure people or objects physically, and without actually coming into contact with them.
2) If they are able to generate hindrances for important information and communication networks then they can inflict enormous damage.
3) Since there are no geographical or temporal limitations, attacks can be carried out at any time and from anywhere.
4) They adopt a variety of different means, such as going through a countless number of computers that have been under control of computer viruses so that the involvement of the attackers themselves cannot be identified. Because of this, it is difficult to identify the attackers based on direct evidence.

For the armed forces, information and communications forms the foundation for command and control which extends all the way from central command to ground-level forces, with the dependence of units on information and communication networks expanding still further due to the IT revolution. Given this dependence of the armed forces on such information and communication networks, cyber attacks are being regarded as an asymmetrical strategy capable of mitigating the strengths of enemies while also exploiting weak points in enemy armed forces. It has also been pointed out that intrusions are carried out into enemy information and communication networks for the purpose of gathering intelligence [53].

Under such circumstances, cyber attacks are rampant against the information and communications networks of the armed forces of various countries [54]. In recent years, an exchange of cyber attacks was deemed to have occurred in the military conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 and in the one between Israel and Hamas in 2008. Additionally, when the Georgia conflict broke out in August 2008, the Georgian Presidential Office, Ministry of Defence, media, banks, and others suffered large-scale cyber attacks. These cyber attacks did not have a major effect on the activities of the Georgian Armed Forces. However, they made it impossible to view websites that expressed the official views of the Georgian government, and are thought to have interfered with some government functions [55]. What is more, cyber attacks also occurred in July of last year against information and communication networks in the United States and South Korea, including those of government agencies such as the U.S. Department of Defense and South Korea's Ministry of National Defense [56].

2. Efforts on Cyber Warfare

Given this magnification of threats in cyberspace, dealing with cyber attacks and ensuring the safety of activities in cyberspace are matters of critical importance for the armed forces of each country, and so efforts on cyber

warfare are being emphasized within defense policies. For example, various countries are taking measures, as exemplified by the new establishment of agencies that oversee military operations in cyberspace, and by regarding efforts on cyber warfare as important strategic objectives within defense strategies.

Based on the Cyberspace Policy Review released in May 2009, the United States newly established the post of Cyber Security Coordinator within the White House to carry out coordination among the relevant government agencies with regard to cyber security policy. In the Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Gates decided to establish the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to oversee operations in cyberspace in June 2009. USCYBERCOM attained Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in May of this year and its full capability is set for October of this year. What is more, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in February of this year listed land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace as "global commons," stating that it is essential to secure access to these global commons. Furthermore, it also defines effective operations in cyberspace as one of six key mission areas for enhancing the capabilities of the U.S. armed forces.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is the supreme decision making body within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), oversees policies and operations concerned with NATO's cyber defense, and has its own cyber defense policy. In 2008 the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) was newly established to conduct research on cyber warfare.

Within the Defense White Paper released last year, Australia stated that it must improve its cyber warfare capabilities. In January of this year the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) was launched under the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) in the Department of Defence.

South Korea established a Cyber Command to carry out planning, implementation, training, and research and development for its cyber warfare capabilities under the Defense Intelligence Agency in January of this year.

Section 4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts

1. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community

The characteristics of regional conflicts recently emerging around the world differ from one to another. They may result from various ethnic, religious, territorial, or resource-related issues, and some are entangled at multiple levels in each region. They also range in form from armed conflict to sustained armed confrontation. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the impact of global-scale problems such as climate change could also constitute a cause of conflict. In addition, human rights violations, refugees, famine, poverty, and terrorism resulting from the conflicts sometimes evolve into international issues[57]. For that reason, it has become increasingly important that the international community discern the character of such complex and diverse conflicts, consider international frameworks and involvements matched to their particular circumstances, and then seek out appropriate responses.

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by rising expectations for the peacekeeping system by the U.N., which up to that time had not functioned adequately, and as a result, many U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKOs) were established. In recent years, efforts through regional frameworks such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) have been formed as a means of dealing appropriately with conflict. Other efforts include peacekeeping operations and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by multinational forces mandated by Security Council Resolutions. Efforts aimed not only at peacekeeping but also at conflict prevention and peacebuilding are also increasing[58].
(See Fig. I-1-4-1)

Traditionally, PKOs have mainly aimed at preventing reoccurrence of conflict by focusing on monitoring of ceasefires and other tasks after a ceasefire agreement has been reached. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the missions now cover a broad range of operations, including civilian activities such as monitoring of disarmament, monitoring of elections and administration, and humanitarian support for return of refugees[59].

However, the environment surrounding peacekeeping operations in recent years has grown increasingly harsh. Since Africa is the main deployment area for PKO missions, and their activities are carried out virtually in the absence of any agreements, they face difficult situations from time to time[60]. Although some of their activities have been vested with strong authority under Article 7 of the Charter of the United Nations[61], there remain issues of securing equipment and materials, ensuring the security of personnel and the capability improvement of forces, all of which are essential for the effective performance of operations in areas with poor infrastructure. As countries in the regions where conflicts occur attempt to carry out voluntary peacekeeping activities such as the AU, the capability improvement of forces is an important issue[62].

2. Present Condition of Regional Conflicts

1. Situation in Afghanistan

The United States together with other countries has continued military operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in and around Afghanistan since October 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. International operations are also under way in the Indian Ocean to interdict terrorists' movements and the proliferation and inflow of related goods, such as drugs and arms, which finance their activities.

In Afghanistan, attacks orchestrated by the Taliban are increasing, which increases instability, and the future outlook does not allow for premature conclusions. The security situation in the southern, southeastern, and eastern parts, which border Pakistan, is particularly worrying. In addition, there have also been terrorist bombings in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, and in the northern and western areas, which were relatively stable and

Fig. I-1-4-1 List of Presently Operating Peacekeeping Operations

Note: According to the United Nations (as of March 2010)

Africa

	Mission	Established Date
①	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991. 4
②	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	1999.11
③	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	2003. 9
④	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	2004. 4
⑤	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	2005. 3
⑥	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)	2007. 7
⑦	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)	2007. 9

Middle East

	Mission	Established Date
⑧	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	1948. 5
⑨	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	1974. 6
⑩	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978. 3

Asia

	Mission	Established Date
⑪	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949. 1
⑫	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor Leste (UNMIT)	2006. 8

Europe/CIS

	Mission	Established Date
⑬	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964. 3
⑭	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	1999. 6

The Americas

	Mission	Established Date
⑮	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	2004. 6

peaceful. Amidst such instability, a number of efforts are being made in Afghanistan by the international community. These include operations to mop-up the Taliban as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), as well as support for the maintenance of security provided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[63], which is led by NATO. There are also Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to improve the security environment and to conduct reconstruction assistance in parts of Afghanistan[64]. In addition, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) provides coordination across various fields, such as politics, reconstruction and development, and humanitarian assistance between the Afghan Government, ISAF, and the relevant U.N. agencies. On top of this, the Afghan Government, with the assistance of the international community, is making efforts to improve the security situation in the country, such as by improving the Afghan National Army and Police[65]. On the other hand, the reconstruction of Afghanistan still faces a mountain of challenges, such as strengthening the rule of law, restoring security, enhancing counter narcotics efforts, and facilitating local development. Therefore, further support from the international community is needed in the future.

UK and Afghan troops hold a shura with local villagers to discuss the Operation Moshtarak which began in February 2010 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. [British Ministry of Defence]

In Pakistan, which borders Afghanistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the bordering area continues to be an important base for Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and a number of other extremist groups. It is believed that this is where, together with the Taliban, Al-Qaeda recruits and trains operatives; raises funds; and plans attacks in Afghanistan, India, and the West in addition to attacks against the United States[66]. Against this backdrop, the Pakistani Government implements terrorist mopping-up operations and other efforts in border areas.

U.S. President Barack Obama announced a review of the strategy taken toward Afghanistan and Pakistan in December 2009, and committed to deploy 30,000 additional troops in the first part of 2010 and to begin the transfer of the U.S. forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011[67]. In addition to such military efforts, the United States will work with partners such as the people of Afghanistan and the United Nations to pursue more effective civilian activities, and carry out efforts through an effective partnership with Pakistan. Furthermore, at the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan held in July 2010, the international community expressed its support for the Afghan President's objective that the Afghan security forces should lead and conduct military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014.

2. Situation in Iraq

Through the efforts to restore public security by Iraq itself together with those of the United States and other countries, the overall security situation has been improving since the latter half of 2007, with reductions in the number of security incidents against Iraqi citizens and casualties of terrorist attacks[68]. This trend has been observed as having essentially continued, even after the withdrawal of units featuring multinational forces stationed in Iraq aside from the United States from the latter half of 2008 through 2009[69].

On the other hand, such improvements in the public security situation remain fragile, and it has been pointed out that gains in the security environment remain reversible and are not enduring and could stagnate or deteriorate[70]. In addition, the influence of neighboring countries has also been noted. In particular, it has been reported that Iran has provided weapons and training for Iraqi militia organizations, and that Syria is the major gateway to Iraq for terrorists[71].

For the stability of the nation, the Iraqi Government has, on its own initiative, implemented political efforts promoting national unity, in addition to security measures. In 2008, the Iraqi National Assembly adopted a number of significant laws: the Accountability and Justice Law, which enables former Ba'ath Party members who were purged from public offices from 2003 onwards to reassume public positions; the Amnesty law; and the Provincial Powers Law. In July 2008, the Iraqi Accord Front (Tawafuq), which had broken away from the government in August 2007, rejoined the government. The year 2009 saw Iraq's first provincial elections since the establishment of the Iraqi constitution, and in March 2010 the second Council of Representatives Election was held. This all represents a certain degree of progress along the political process of realizing national unity in Iraq.

On the other hand, there still are a number of problems. For example, the issue of the status of disputed areas including Kirkuk remains unsolved, and the hydrocarbon draft laws have yet to be adopted.

Regarding the multinational forces stationed in Iraq, many of the contributing countries recalled their forces by the end of 2008, which was the period mandated by Security Council Resolution 1790. Since the beginning of 2009 certain countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia have been allowed to keep forces there based on agreements with Iraq. Contributing countries other than the United States, however, had withdrawn the forces they had contributed to the multinational forces by the end of July 2009 on the basis of these agreements[72]. The United States had also withdrawn its combat forces from urban areas by the end of June 2009 based on its agreement with Iraq[73]. President Obama has stated that the United States will end its combat mission by the end of August 2010 and will withdraw all forces by the end of 2011 pursuant to its agreement.

3. Situation in the Middle East

Between Israel and Palestine, the Oslo Agreement concluded in 1993 marked the beginning of a peace process through comprehensive negotiations; however, the Israelis and the Palestinians subsequently suspended negotiations due to the second intifada that started in 2000 and resulted in reciprocal violence between the two parties. In 2003, the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed on a "Road Map" that laid out a course leading to the establishment of a Middle East peace initiative based on the principle of the peaceful coexistence between the two nations. However, the Road Map has yet to be implemented. On the Palestinian side, the Islamic fundamentalist organization Hamas, which does not recognize Israel and which advocates a continuation of armed conflict against Israel, established a Hamas-led administration in March 2006. The rivalry between Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Hamas has intensified, and in June 2007, Hamas seized the Gaza Strip. In response to this, President Mahmoud Abbas declared a state of emergency for the entire autonomous region and established an emergency cabinet comprising non-Hamas ministers. Nevertheless, the de facto control by Hamas over Gaza continues, and political turmoil carries on. The United States hosted the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, where agreement was reached between Israel and Palestine to endeavor to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008. However, between December 2008 and January 2009, Israel carried out military air raids and ground assaults on Gaza, in response to the rockets fired at Israel from Gaza, resulting in the stall of negotiations. In May 2010, proximity talks between Israelis and Palestinians began through the good offices of the United States, but a peace treaty has yet to be concluded.

Israel has yet to sign peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. Israel and Syria disagree on the return of the Golan Heights which Israel has occupied since the 1967 Arab–Israel War. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is deployed in the Golan Heights region to observe the implementation of ceasefire and military disengagement between the two parties[74].

Concerning Israel and Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) increased its presence following the 2006 clash between Israel and Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim organization[75]. Although there have not been any prominent conflicts since, there are reports that Hezbollah is enhancing its military strength again.

4. Situation in Sudan

In Sudan, a 20-year north-south civil war broke out in 1983 between the Sudanese Government, which is predominantly composed of Muslim Arabs from northern Sudan, and anti-government forces comprising African Christians from southern Sudan. In response to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was concluded between the north and the south in 2005, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), established by UN Security Council Resolution 1590, has been deployed and is conducting truce monitoring activities to assist the implementation of the CPA. In July 2009 the Permanent Court of Arbitration announced its final decision on the boundary line for the Abyei area[76] in the center of Sudan, which was premised on the settlement of the north-south boundary line. A referendum bill on the independence of the south and attribution of the Abyei area was enacted at the end of December 2009. On the other hand, a general election was held in April 2010 based on the CPA. Despite the fact that there were technical problems, boycotts by some opposition parties, and other problems, no major problems with public order occurred during the election period, widespread participation from the electorate was secured, and the voting was largely carried out peacefully. It was announced that as a result of the election, the incumbent President Bashir was elected President of the National Unity Government, while the incumbent President Salva Kiir of the Southern Government was elected President of the Government of Southern Sudan[77].

In the Darfur region of western Sudan, conflict intensified between the Arab government and the African anti-government forces in 2003. The conflict in Darfur has produced a large number of internally displaced persons, which the international community, including the United Nations, regards as a serious humanitarian crisis. After the government and a fraction of the major anti-government forces concluded the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1769 in July 2007, which stipulated the creation of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In February 2010 of the Sudanese government and leaders of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which is the major anti-government force in Darfur, signed the Framework Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in Darfur. While these and other efforts for peace are being undertaken[78], fighting continues to break out between the Sudanese government army and anti-government forces[79].

Furthermore, in March 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur, and again in July 2010, on the charge of genocide. Attention has been drawn to aspects such as the response of the Government of Sudan and impact on peace process, and peacekeeping forces.

5. Situation in Somalia

Somalia had been in a state of anarchy since 1991, but in 2005, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was inaugurated. However, battle raged between the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an Islamic fundamentalist organization, and other groups opposed to the TFG. Ethiopian forces intervened in response to the request from the TFG and eliminated the UIC in December 2006. In January 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was established, and in August 2008 in Djibouti a peace agreement was concluded between the TFG and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), which was formed by the UIC and other groups. In January 2009, ARS leader Sheikh Sharif was elected as new President of the TFG. However, since the area controlled by the TFG is limited to parts of the capital of Mogadishu and the TFG does not yet have control of all the country, there is no prospect of restoring order. Since May 2009, fighting has intensified between anti-government Islamist militia groups such as Al-Shabab and TFG, with encounters occurring between anti-government forces themselves. Amidst such a situation, the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping operation has been sought to replace AMISOM, but since the prerequisites, such as the restoration of public order in Somalia, have not been fulfilled, this has not been realized. In the waters surrounding Somalia, the number of incidents

of piracy and armed robbery increased rapidly in 2008[80]. The Security Council has adopted five resolutions[81] since the summer of 2008, calling on member states to dispatch ships as anti-piracy measures. Against this background, a number of countries have dispatched their ships to the coastal areas surrounding Somalia to undertake anti-piracy missions.

6. Situation in Haiti

The situation in Haiti deteriorated with the 2000 elections, and mobs, organized crime groups, and others opposed to (then) President Jean-Bertrand Aristide caused political and social chaos within the country. In June 2004 the U.N. Security Council established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)[82], which was mandated to ensure a secure and stable environment. Security situation in Haiti was on a track toward recovery. However, the U.N. Security Council decided to increase MINUSTAH's staff by approximately 3,500 people in order to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts in the wake of the large earthquake in January 2010[83]. Various countries are currently carrying out efforts such as rescue operations through the use of landing ships and aircraft carriers, humanitarian assistance activities carried out by medical units and engineering units and reconstruction activities on roads, harbors and communication facilities.

7. Situation in Nepal

In Nepal, armed conflict with the Maoist faction of the Nepal Communist Party has resulted in a significant number of casualties since 1996. As a result of the pro-democracy movement, a new government was formed in April 2006, and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in November between the Nepalese Government and the Maoists. In response to this agreement, the United Nations Political Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) has been deployed in accordance with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1740, and among its duties are to monitor the status of weapons and soldiers.

In April 2008, the Constituent Assembly election was held and the country transitioned from being a monarchy to being a federal democratic republic. In this election, the Maoists won the majority of seats and formed a coalition government led by the Maoist faction in August; however, the confrontation between the political parties continued over the peacemaking process. As a result of opposition to the dismissal of the Chief of the Army Staff in May 2009, the Maoists become the opposition and a coalition government led by the Communist Party of Nepal UML (Unified Marxist-Leninist) was created. As for the peacemaking process, in January 2010 a framework for consultations was established by the leadership of the major political parties, including the Maoists, but there are still many issues to resolve in the process.

Notes:

1) The United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China signed the NPT in 1992.
2) Article 6 of the NPT sets out the obligation of signatory countries to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith.
3) As of June 2010.
4) South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.
5) After North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT in 1993, it promised to remain a member; however it once more declared it would withdraw from the NPT in January 2003. In the Joint Statement adopted after the six-party talks in September 2005, North Korea promised to return to the NPT soon, but after that it announced its two nuclear tests. North Korea's nuclear tests constitute a major challenge to the NPT.
6) President Obama said in that speech that the goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons would not likely be achieved in his lifetime.
7) Because of its expiry on December 5, 2009, negotiation for a follow-up treaty began in April that year.
8) Adopted in 1996, this treaty bans nuclear test explosions in all places. Of the 44 nations that are required to ratify it for the treaty to enter into force, 9 nations have not done so yet (United States, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, North Korea, and Indonesia). The United States participated in the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2009 for the first time in 10 years.
9) This treaty would, by banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (highly enriched uranium and plutonium, etc., for nuclear weapons), prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed nations and limit the production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-armed nations.
10) Warheads mounted on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) (the number of warheads which are actually placed on them is counted) as well as nuclear warheads loaded on deployed heavy bombers (one nuclear warhead is counted for each heavy bomber).
11) Major achievements in the Conference this time are as follows; 1) the agreement on realistic measures regarding the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East (e.g., to support convening an international conference in 2012); 2) the reconfirmation of clear commitment to nuclear disarmament; and 3) it was agreed that the nuclear-weapon states will be called upon to report to the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference in 2014 on progress with regard to concrete nuclear disarmament measures.
12) A means of attacking the counterpart's most vulnerable points other than by conventional weapons of war. (e.g., weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, and cyber attacks)
13) Former Defense Agency, "Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons" (January 2002).
14) Mustard gas is a slow-acting erosion agent. Tabun and sarin are fast-acting nerve agents.
15) It was reported that a Kurdish village was attacked with chemical weapons in 1988, killing several thousand people.
16) It is a weapon whose two types of relatively harmless chemical materials, materials for a chemical agent, are separately filled in it. It is devised so that these materials are mixed by the impact of firing in the warhead, causing a chemical reaction and synthesizing the chemical agent. The handling and storage of this weapon is easier compared to one that is filled with a chemical agent beforehand.
17) Iraq joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in February 2009.
18) In the July 2006 conflict between Israel and Lebanon, it is believed that Hezbollah used a cruise missile to attack an Israeli naval vessel.
19) U.S. Department of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response" (January 2001)
20) Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by spreading radioactive substances.

21) Based on these concerns, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, declaring that all states should refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws to prohibit these acts. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism also entered into force in July 2007.

22) The then U.S. President Bush said in a speech in February 2004: "Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries with components of centrifuges and, in some cases, with complete centrifuges."

23) Statement at a press conference with Japanese reporters (September 29, 2004).

24) Including the June 2009 announcement by the Foreign Ministry of North Korea, the letter from the Permanent Representative of North Korea to the UN to the President of the UN Security Council, and reports from the Korean Central Broadcasting Station. In addition, the United States announced in February 2010, "The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence that North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons." (Annual Threat Assessment, Director of National Intelligence (DNI)).

25) The United .States (DNI Annual Threat Assessment, February 2010) says, "North Korea's assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor, exposed in 2007, illustrates the reach of North's proliferation activities."

26) Extensive behind-the-scenes negotiations began in March 2003 between Libya and the United States and the United Kingdom, and in December 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle all of its weapons of mass destruction and to allow an international organization to carry out inspections. Later, in August 2006, Libya ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol.

27) Testimony of then Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (February 24, 2004).

28) Accusation made by the Deputy Chairman of Ukraine's Parliamentary Committee on Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (February 2, 2005).

29) This urged Iran to suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in exchange for assistance in a civilian-use nuclear power program that would guarantee fuel supply for a light-water reactor, assistance in the export of civil aircraft to Iran, and support for Iran's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), etc.

30) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 adopted in December 2006 (obliging prevention of the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of materials and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and obliging a freeze of financial assets of persons or entities supporting Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems), U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747 adopted in March 2007 (in addition to the above measures, identifies additional persons or entities as targets for having their financial assets frozen, obliges a ban on the procurement of weapons and related items from Iran, and calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer of battle tanks, combat aircraft, missiles, and other such arms or related materiel to Iran), and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1803 adopted in March 2008 (in addition to the above measures, identifies additional persons or entities as targets for having their financial assets frozen, and obliges a ban on the entry of designated individuals into U.N. member states for their involvement in Iran's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities). Furthermore, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1835, calling for compliance with aforementioned Resolutions, was adopted in September 2008.

31) The United States published its assessment as follows: “Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons. In fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” (National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, December 2007; Annual Threat Assessment, DNI, February 2009)

32) The United States pointed out that Iran had initially began the facility with the intent that it be secret, but the secrecy of the facility was compromised, leading them to believe the value of the facility as a secret facility was no longer valid, so they disclosed the facility. (Background briefing by senior Administration officials on the Iranian nuclear facility. (September 2009))

33) Statements by President Obama, French President Sarkozy, and British Prime Minister Brown on the Iranian Nuclear Facility in addition to the above (September 2009)

34) According to an IAEA report in February 2010, Iran informed the IAEA that it would start the “production of less than 20% enriched uranium,” and provided the IAEA with results which indicate that it had enriched Uranium-235 to 19.8% at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant between February 9 and 11. Uranium-235 enriched to 20% or higher is considered highly enriched uranium, and is usually used for research purposes. For use in weapons, the same material is generally enriched to 90% or higher.

35) In addition to measures taken under the resolutions in footnote 30 above, this resolution includes preventing the supply, sale, and transfer of items such as battle tanks, combat aircraft, and missile systems to Iran, designating additional individuals and entities including those connected with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as targets subject to being prevented entry into a State and of asset freeze, prohibiting any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons (including launches using ballistic missile technology), calling upon all States to inspect vessels and aircraft on the high seas with the consent of the flag State, if there is information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited, and prohibiting the opening of new branches of Iranian banks if States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

36) The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism compiled by the U.K. Government in March 2009 points out that the leaders of Al-Qaeda are located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the Pakistan border region. Meanwhile U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that they did not know where Osama bin Laden was, and that it had been years since they have had some good intelligence on where he was.. (Statement made on U.S. ABC TV, December 5, 2009)

37) U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Annual Threat Assessment (February 2010)

38) Al-Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (January 21, 2010)

39) Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, United States (April 2009)
In January 2009 Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) merged to become Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and announced it on their website.

40) The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, United Kingdom (March 2009).

41) Al-Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (January 21, 2010)

42) The verdict of the first trial against the Madrid train terrorist attack (October 31, 2007)

43) While there is no clear definition, “home-grown terrorists” are often defined as terrorists who are generally 2nd or 3rd generation descendents of immigrants to European countries and the United States from Islamic regions, or natives who have converted to Islam. They are inspired by extreme Islamic ideology as touted by Al-Qaeda.

44) DNI, Annual Threat Assessment (February 2010)

45) Testimony by Commander of U.S. Central Command General David H. Petraeus before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (April 2009)

46) Statement by Deputy National Security Adviser John Brennan on ABC TV (January 3, 2010)

47) Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, United States (April 2009).

48) An Islamic extremist organization established in Algeria in 1998 as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). It then changed the name to the current one when it officially joined Al-Qaeda in September 2006.

49) Activities of the anti-government extremist Islamic groups that were active in Algeria in the 1990s are converging.

50) Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, United States (April 2009)

51) In 2008, successive bomb attacks took place in Jaipur (North) in May, in Bangalore and Ahmadabad in July, in New Delhi in September, Assam in October, and bomb attacks and shootings in Mumbai in November.

52) For instance, in October 2002, terrorist bomb attacks in two nightclubs on the island of Bali killed 202 people. In October 2005, terrorist bomb attacks against restaurants and other places on the island of Bali killed 23 people.

53) U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Annual Threat Assessment (March 2009). Furthermore, the Annual Report (November 2009) by the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), a non-partisan advisory committee to Congress, stated that the People’s Liberation Army was stressing attacks against enemy’s information systems to win local wars under informationized conditions.

54) In the Annual Report to Congress by the USCC (November 2009), it was mentioned that in 2008 a total of 54,640 cases of malicious cyber activity against the U.S. Department of Defense occurred, with this number rising rapidly in recent years.

55) U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community (February 2009). This report also assessed that numerous countries, such as Russia and China, have the capability to throw the U.S. information infrastructure into disorder through cyber attacks.

56) Speeches by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen (July 8, 2009) and Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn (October 1, 2009).

57) In April 2007, a panel discussion on the impact of climate change on security was held at the Security Council, in which 55 member and non-member states participated. This shows that the awareness that climate change may have an impact on the security environment is becoming increasingly pervasive.
Furthermore, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 regards climate change as a key factor that will shape the future security environment. It claims that climate change may accelerate instability and conflict by causing water and food scarcity, the spread of disease, and so on.

58) This includes a proposal submitted in October 2007 calling for the enhancement of the U.N. Department of Political Affairs, which is in charge of conflict prevention and such. In addition, the Peacebuilding Commission, which gives advice on consolidation strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, began full scale operations in 2006, and Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Central African Republic are currently on the agenda.

59) The scale of participants in these operations has also seen a remarkable increase. The number of personnel dispatched was temporarily reduced to 12,000 after 1993, while large-scale PKO missions were sent to the Balkan Peninsula and Somalia. However, from around 2000, the number of personnel began to rise again following an increase in large-scale missions mainly in Africa and the Middle East. As of the end of April 2010, 15 peacekeeping operations were being conducted in 115 countries, with about 102,000 participants from around the world.

60) In the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a truce agreement was reached in 2000. In response, the U.N. Security Council set up and operated the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). However, the mission was wrought with difficulties because of persistent sabotage by Eritrea. The mandate of the UNMEE concluded at the end of July 2008.

61) For example, some PKO missions established in recent years are authorized to take all necessary measures to protect civilians, to guard U.N. facilities, and to maintain security.

62) In July 2009 the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support assessed the major political and strategic dilemmas that the U.N. peacekeeping operations were facing and created "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping" to discuss solutions between all those involved. It listed factors such as helicopters and other forms of mobility, logistics and transportation units, information gathering abilities, specialized police, and female personnel as components which U.N. peacekeeping operations crucially lack.

63) Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was established with the principal mission of maintaining security in Kabul and the surrounding areas. Based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510 (October 13, 2003), the ISAF has gradually expanded its area of deployment since December 2003. Since October 2006 the ISAF has been deployed throughout the entire territory of Afghanistan. The ISAF has set up six Regional Commands under the General Headquarters in Kabul, and provides support to the Afghan Government for the maintenance of security. An additional regional command Southwest was established in June 2010 that will become fully operational later in 2010. As of August 2010, approximately 120,000 troops from 47 countries have been dispatched to the ISAF.

64) The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are designed to extend the authority of the Afghan Central Government across the country, and work to improve the security environment and implement reconstruction and development activities. The PRTs are comprised of military personnel and civilian reconstruction assistance personnel. As of August 2010 there are 28 teams active in various parts.

65) As of May 2010, the Afghan National Army has approximately 120,000 members, while the Afghan National Police has approximately 105,000 members. Furthermore, as of July 2010, the goal is to expand these to approximately 172,000 and 134,000 members respectively, by October 2011.

66) FATA as well as Quetta and the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan have been pointed out as critical safe havens for Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and others. U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Annual Threat Assessment (February 2010).

67) In congressional testimony in December 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified that a thorough review of the strategy will be carried out in December 2010 to evaluate whether or not the strategy is working.

68) Effective counter-terror operations by multinational forces and Iraqi security forces, the augmentation of Iraqi security forces, and the rejection of violence and extremism by the people of Iraq could be listed among the factors contributing to this improvement in security. (U.S. Department of Defense Report to Congress, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" (March 2010))

69) In January 2010, the U.S. Forces in Iraq announced that December 2010 was the first month in the history of Operation Iraqi Freedom without any U.S. military being killed in combat.
70) Ibid., Annual Threat Assessment (February 2010).
71) DNI, Annual Threat Assessment (February 2010).
72) In January 2010 the multinational forces stationed in Iraq were reorganized under the U.S. forces in Iraq.
73) In line with this, authority for public security was transferred to Iraqi authorities in the five remaining governorates (Baghdad, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Salah ad Din, and Diyala) in which said authority had not yet been transferred.
74) Military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) are also active within this region.
75) Ibid.
76) The Abyei area was a site of fierce fighting during the north-south conflict. Both the north and the south assert dominion over the area due to the abundance of oil resources located underground there. It has been decided that questions over its attribution will be settled via the referendum in January 2011 (scheduled).
77) In October 2009 the United States announced a new direction concerning the United States' Sudan policy, and stated that incentives and pressure will be determined according to the state of progress of peace.
78) The Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), which is a major anti-government force on par with the JEM, refuses to take part in the peace process.
79) Militia groups from both Sudan and Chad engaged in encounters near the border between the two countries last year. In February 2010 President Bashir and President Deby of Chad held a summit meeting in an attempt to improve relations between the two countries.
80) According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), there were 217 cases of damage by Somali pirates in 2009 (116 in the Gulf of Aden, 80 along the Somali coast, 15 in the Red Sea, 4 on the Omani coast, and 1 each in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea).
81) Resolution 1816 (adopted in June 2008), 1838 (adopted in October 2008), 1846 and 1851 (both adopted in December 2008), and 1897 (adopted in November 2009).
82) Resolution 1542 (adopted in April 2004).
83) Resolution 1908 (adopted in January 2010).

Part I

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Chapter 2

National Defense Policies of Countries

Section 1. The United States
Section 2. Korean Peninsula
Section 3. China
Section 4. Russia
Section 5. Southeast Asia
Section 6. South Asia
Section 7. Australia
Section 8. Europe

President Obama in conference with Vice President Biden, Secretary of Defense Gates, and others
[Official White House photo by Pete Souza]

A Chinese navy ship-borne Ka-28 helicopter flying near an MSDF escort flotilla

Section 1. The United States

1. Security and Defense Policies

The Obama administration was formed in January 2009 and announced its national security policy and defense policy in 2010 by releasing the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in February, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in April, and the National Security Strategy (NSS) in May[1].

Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton announcing the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) [U.S. Department of Defense]

The NSS points out that national interests which the United States pursues are 1) the security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners, 2) the prosperity through a strong, innovative and growing U.S. economy, 3) respect for universal values at home and around the world, 4) an international order that promotes peace, security and opportunity. The NSS emphasizes the necessity of using and integrating all elements of American power, such as military, diplomacy and development, and of cooperating with allies, international organizations and so on, for the purpose of achieving the above national interests.

In addition, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was released in February of this year, notes that the role of the Department of Defense is to protect the United States and its allies, and to maintain and use its military capabilities in order to promote its national interests. The review goes on to indicate that the United States and its allies have the will and ability to exercise the use of force if necessary, and the United States possesses the capacity to act unilaterally if appropriate. In addition, the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.

1. Assessment of Security Environment

The current QDR indicates that the security environment is complex and uncertain due to such factors as wars that the United States is currently fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of emerging countries such as China and India[2], the increase in influence of non-state actors, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and infringements on the global commons — sea, air, space, and cyber space. In addition, conflicts are becoming hybrid in that they are composed of complex characteristics, as the diverse actors that participate in these conflicts use various different means. Fragile states also face concerns of becoming hotbeds for extremism and radicalism, which are causes of conflict.

2. Defense Strategy

In the new QDR the United States lists four priority objectives tailored for this security environment and notes the necessity to balance risk and resources among these objectives.

1) Prevail in today's wars: The greatest priority is prevailing in the fight against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan.
2) Prevent and deter conflict: The United States shall defend itself from direct attack, deter potential adversaries, and foster regional stability while assuring access to the global commons. For this purpose, the United States will work to develop the capabilities of partners and develop the necessary level of forces for itself as well. Moreover, the United States will maintain the lowest level of safe and effective nuclear weapons consistent

with the interests of the United States and its allies to deter attacks on the United States, its allies, and partners until a world free of nuclear weapons has been achieved.

3) Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies: It is necessary for the United States to prepare to respond to diverse contingencies in the event that deterrence fails and adversaries challenge its national interests.

4) Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force: It is necessary to maintain the All-Volunteer Force over the long-term in order to prevail in the current wars and to prepare for the future.

3. Priority Areas for Capability Development

The current QDR indicates the need to enhance military potential in the following six key mission areas in order to implement the four strategic priority objectives.

1) Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home: It is necessary to enhance the necessary posture at home to respond to potential attacks on U.S. soil, as well as to strengthen the cooperative relationships between domestic government-related institutions. For this reason, the United States must take measures such as reorganizing and developing consequence management response forces and enhancing its domain awareness capabilities for land, sea, air, space, and cyber space.

2) Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations: The United States will enhance the necessary capabilities for prevailing in the wars that it is currently fighting. For this reason, the United States will take measures that include increasing its number of rotary wing aircraft, expanding manned and unmanned aircraft systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and augmenting major equipment for special operation forces.

3) Build the security capacity of partner states: In order to maintain a peaceful and stable international order it is important to support the development of capabilities of security forces in partner countries. For this reason, it is necessary to improve language abilities, deepen knowledge on different regions and cultures, etc.

4) Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments: Countries that possess capabilities such as a wide range of sophisticated weaponry are able to demonstrate anti-access capabilities that hinder the deployment of United States forces. It is necessary for the United States to possess the capabilities to protect itself and its allies even amidst these environments. For this reason, the United States must work to improve long-range strike capabilities and to increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture[3].

5) Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction: The United States will establish a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters in sight of eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In addition, the United States will enhance nuclear forensics, while also ensuring the protection of all nuclear materials in order to prevent the transfer of said materials to the hands of terrorists.

6) Operate effectively in cyberspace: The Department of Defense will build an environment in which cyber security is viewed as one of its priority items by developing a comprehensive approach to the cyber space operations. In addition, the United States will train cyberspace experts and centralize command of the Department of Defense cyberspace operations in the newly established U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

4. Force Planning

Following the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have been composed based on the idea of fighting and winning two major regional conflicts[4]. However, the new QDR indicates that the current security environment is more complex than when these ideas were adopted, and that it is no longer appropriate for the United States to determine its military's force structure based on these ideas as the United States must address diverse contingencies. The current QDR points out that the U.S. military force structure is led by the previously mentioned four strategic priority objectives and six mission areas, and, while the United States must possess the capacity to address two

capable nation-state aggressors, it must also have the ability to conduct a wide range of operations[5]. For that reason, the United States must rebalance its forces.

5. Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces

The current QDR requires a cooperative and tailored approach to determine the U.S. global defense posture, reflecting regional political and security dynamics. Moreover, the QDR states the need to consider the five following principles when making decisions about the future U.S. defense posture: 1) forward-stationed and rotationally deployed U.S. forces continue to be relevant and required, 2) the U.S. defense posture will balance the need for a permanent overseas presence with the need for a flexible ability to respond to contingencies, etc., 3) the United States will balance the need for assured access to support ongoing operations with the risks of introducing fragility into its lines of communication, 4) America's defense posture should provide a stabilizing influence abroad and be welcomed by the host nation, and 5) the defense posture will continuously adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

Furthermore, the new QDR will emphasize the following four priorities in adapting and developing its global defense posture over the next five-year period.

1) Reaffirm its commitment to Europe and NATO, including through the development of European missile defense capabilities;
2) Work with allies and key partners to ensure a peaceful and secure Asia-Pacific region;
3) Balance ongoing operations, crisis response, and prevent-and-deter activities in the development of a strategic defense posture in the broader Middle East, Africa, and Central and South Asia; and
4) Support partnership capacity-building efforts in key regions and states.

In Europe, in revising its military posture in this way the United States has constructed a forward military posture that is lighter, more flexible, and more deployable. The new QDR states that it will 1) serve to deter the political intimidation of allies and partners, 2) promote stability in the Aegean, Balkans, Caucasus, and Black Sea regions, 3) demonstrate U.S. commitment to NATO allies, 4) build trust and goodwill among host nations, and 5) facilitate multilateral operations in support of mutual security interests both inside and outside the continent. Based on this policy, on the European continent the U.S. military will retain four brigade combat teams and an Army Corps headquarters, while also beginning the deployment of a missile defense system and enhancement of its forward-deployed naval presence.

In the Asia-Pacific, the new QDR states that the United States will place importance on forward-stationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces as U.S. bases and infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific are sparse. In addition, the United States will sustain and strengthen its Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the region. Specifically, the QDR lays down the following policies.

1) The United States will continue to adapt its defense presence as necessary to maintain regional stability and assure allies of their security, including through the provision of extended deterrence to Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The United States will augment regional deterrence and rapid response capabilities and build the capacity of its Asian partners to respond more effectively to contingencies, including humanitarian crises and natural disasters.
2) With Japan, the United States will continue to implement the bilateral Realignment Roadmap agreement that will ensure a long-term presence of U.S. forces in Japan and transform Guam into a hub for security activities in the region.
3) The United States will develop a more adaptive and flexible U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula to strengthen the alliance's deterrent and defense capabilities. The United States will also transfer the wartime operational control to the ROK in 2012.

4) The United States will improve the resiliency of U.S. forces and facilities in the region in order to safeguard U.S., allied, and partner interests in response to emerging anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In addition, the United States will explore opportunities for a more forward-deployed presence that supports increased multilateral cooperation on maritime security and assured access to the sea, air, space, and cyber space.
5) The United States will seek additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Western Pacific, particularly in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and maritime security.

In regards to the Middle East, the new QDR indicates that while the United States had prioritized a defense posture necessary for the near-term operational capabilities in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is now time to renew focus on a strategic architecture that better serves U.S., allied, and partner interests through the medium to long term. Moreover, the United States will reshape its defense posture to assure partners of a long-term commitment to mutual security relationships and to deter attacks while balancing that requirement against the regional sensitivity to a large, long-term U.S. force presence. The United States will also strengthen defense capabilities and posture networks as efforts related to security in the Middle East for promoting regional stability and security.

In Africa, in October 2008, the United States Africa Command (headquarters: Germany) with the area of responsibility covering Africa, which had been previously covered by three Commands —the U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command— became an independent unified command. U.S. Africa Command is a joint command that aims to improve the capacity of African nations to deal with conflicts in their own region, through the provision of military assistance in the form of training for peacekeeping, etc., and the purpose of its establishment is to help African leaders deal with Africa's problems[6]. In addition, the new

Fig. I-2-1-1 U.S. Forces Deployment Status



Note: Materials are taken from published documents of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2009) and others.

QDR indicates that the United States will continue to maintain a limited military presence in Africa to help build partner security capacity.

In the North and South Americas, the new QDR states that while the region does not require a robust forward presence, the United States will retain a limited presence and seek to improve relationships with the region's countries. In addition, the U.S. Navy will homeport an East Coast carrier in Mayport, Florida in order to mitigate the risk of a terrorist attack or natural disaster.

We must continue to pay attention to how the concepts of global posture review, as outlined in the new QDR, are implemented in the future.
(See Fig. I-2-1-1)

6. Nuclear Strategy

While President Obama aims to realize a world without nuclear weapons, he admits that it is impossible to abolish nuclear weapons soon, and indicates the need to maintain a nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in April 2010, indicates that the nuclear security environment is changing and nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are an imminent threat of today. Furthermore, it points to the necessity of working on the issue of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers, in particular Russia and China.

The current NPR presents five key objectives based on awareness of this security environment.

1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism: In order to bolster the non-nuclear proliferation regime, the United States will reverse the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran and create an environment that subjects parties not compliant with the NPT to heavy sanctions. In addition, in order to prevent nuclear terrorism, the United States will secure the safety of all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years and take measures such as expanding the budget of the Department of Energy nuclear non-proliferation programs. Furthermore, in order to promote arms control and disarmament, the United States signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia and seeks the ratification and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
2) Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy: The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners. In order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons when deterring attacks via non-nuclear means, the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations (negative security assurance). In response to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attacks, the United States will answer with a devastating conventional weapon response, but also reserves the right to make any adjustment to this policy with consideration to advancements in biotechnology. In the case of addressing states that possess nuclear weapons and non-nuclear states that do not comply with the NPT, there remains a narrow range of possibilities in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack. Therefore, the United States is not prepared at present to limit the role of nuclear weapons to deterring a nuclear attack as its sole purpose. The United States will only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of itself, allies, and partners.
3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels: Under the New START, which was signed with Russia, the United States will maintain deterrence via its nuclear Triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and strategic bombers while also reducing accountable deployed strategic warheads and delivery platforms. With regards to non-strategic nuclear weapons[7], these should be included in any future reduction arrangements between the United States

and Russia, but the United States will retain a dual-capable fighter that can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons. Also, the United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N) as it is possible to substitute these missiles by other means.

4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners: The United States will enhance bilateral and regional security ties and closely cooperate with its allies and partner nations. The United States will also enhance its regional security architectures, which are composed of missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and others. The United States will reassure its allies and partners that U.S. extended deterrence is credible and effective.
5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal: The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will not develop new nuclear warheads. In order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of warheads, the United States will implement Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and enhance scientific, technical, and engineering infrastructures needed for implementing LEPs.

Fig. I-2-1-2 U.S. Defense Budget



Note: Expenses are shown in the Department of Defense Budget based on Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011; the amount for FY2010 is an estimate.

7. FY2011 Budget

The United States faces the challenge of how to distribute limited resources between the dual requirements of resolving the current issues and securing its military advantage into the future. The key objectives laid out for the fiscal year 2011 budget are: 1) taking care of people, 2) rebalancing the forces, 3) reforming how DoD does business, and 4) supporting our troops in the field. The 2011 budget shows a nearly 3% increase, or $548.9 billion, on the approved 2010 budget as well as a budget [8] for some $159.3 billion for overseas contingency operations. The budget totals $708.2 billion.
(See Fig. I-2-1-2)

A U.S. soldier with a family member [U.S. Department of Defense]

2. Military Posture

In regards to strategic offensive weapons including nuclear weapons, in April 2010 U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to replace START I. The new treaty indicates that the two countries are to reduce their numbers of deployed strategic warheads [9] to 1,550 and deployed delivery platforms to 700 in seven years following the entry into force of the treaty. Furthermore, in May 2010 the United States announced that it currently possessed 5,113 nuclear warheads [10], noting the necessity

to increase the transparency of nuclear stockpiles in order to promote nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms reduction.

In September and December of 2008, a report was released by a special committee on nuclear arms control[11]. Related to this, the United States took such measures as newly organizing the Global Strike Command (AFGSC) in August 2009 to oversee nuclear bombers and all ICBMs based on Revitalizing Nuclear Missions by the Air Force, which was released by the Air Force in October 2008.

The U.S. ground forces consist of approximately 550,000 soldiers, and approximately 200,000 marines, which are forward-deployed in Germany, the ROK, and Japan, among other countries. In order to prepare for prolonged overseas contingency operations, U.S. ground forces are reorganizing their combat and support troops into brigade-sized modular units[12]. The new QDR indicates that the U.S. ground forces are to maintain capabilities to respond to all types of contingencies while focusing on counterinsurgency operations, stabilization operations, and counterterrorism operations. The U.S. Marine Corps is enhancing its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in the overseas contingency operations, improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare.

U.S. maritime forces consist of approximately 1,010 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines) totaling about 6.03 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Atlantic Ocean; the 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea; the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and northwest Indian Ocean; the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific; the 4th Fleet to South America and the Caribbean Sea; and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The new QDR indicates that U.S. maritime forces will continue to retain a robust forward presence and power projection capabilities.

The U.S. air forces consist of roughly 3,820 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps[13]. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward-deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the ROK. The new QDR indicates that the increase of fifth-generation fighters will further improve the survivability of the U.S. air forces and strengthen support operations for the security forces of partner countries.

As for mobility to deploy U.S. forces to distant locations, the United States is modernizing C-5 transport aircraft to improve the transport capabilities of the forces, and tries to preposition equipment at various theaters[14].

In regards to missile defense (MD), in September 2009 the Obama administration reviewed the Bush administration's plan to deploy portions of its MD system to the Czech Republic and Poland, and announced a new plan to improve BMD capabilities in a step-wise fashion from 2011 to 2020, and ultimately construct a comprehensive MD structure that responds to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)[15] as well. As reasons for the revision, the Obama administration has voiced that while the threat from Iran's short- (SRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) is developing more rapidly than previously projected, the development of ICBMs has been slower than estimated and the capabilities and technologies for missile defense, such as interceptor missiles and sensors, have markedly improved[16].

In February 2010 the United States announced the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The review noted that, while it would be difficult to accurately predict the threat of an ICBM fired at the United States, it is still important to watch the trends in North Korea and Iran. The report also mentioned that the development of SRBMs and IRBMs that can be used to attack U.S. troops stationed in other regions as well as allied countries is advancing and that these are a clear threat. Furthermore, in defending United States homeland, the review notes that the United States will use ground-based interceptors to respond to ICBMs from North Korea and Iran. In regards to defense in other regions, the United States will expand investments into MD systems while taking a phased adaptive approach (PAA) that is tailored to each region and improve the BMD capabilities step by step, working with partner countries and properly sharing the burden.

In addition, the U.S. military relies on space systems for much of its information gathering and communications. The United States released the National Space Policy of the United States of America in 2010. This document states that the sustainability, stability, and free access to, and use of, space are vital to the national interests of the United States, and stipulates that the goals of the U.S. space policy includes measures such as strengthening stability in space. With regard to the use of space for national security purpose, the Unite States will enhance its space situational awareness capabilities and develop its capabilities to deter, defend, and defeat efforts to attack U.S. or allied space systems.

Moreover, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates decided on the creation of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in June 2009 in order to address the increasing threats in cyber space. It is to oversee operations in cyber space. It attained Initial Operation Capability (IOC) in May of this year and its full capability is set for October of this year[17].

3. Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific Region

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

The Army is composed of two divisions and deploys such forces as the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and the 2nd Infantry Division and 19th Sustainment Command in the ROK, in addition to approximately 3,000 personnel in Japan, including the I Corps (Forward) and the headquarters, U.S. Army Japan[18].

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet, which is in charge of the area including the eastern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, under the Pacific Fleet, the headquarters of which is located in Hawaii, totaling approximately 180 vessels. The 7th Fleet is comprised mainly of one carrier strike group, with main bases in Japan and Guam. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies, and other vital interests of the United States, and ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet including carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.

The Marine Corps deploys one Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps, which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force approximately 17,000 personnel are in the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircraft and are both deployed in Japan. In addition, maritime pre-positioning ships loaded with heavy equipment and others are deployed in the western Pacific.

The Air Force deploys four air forces under the Pacific Air Force, the headquarters of which is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings equipped with F-16, C-130 in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan, and two air wings equipped with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in the ROK.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Trends in Military Science and Technology (Conventional Prompt Global Strike)

Advanced nations continue to focus on research and development in such fields as precision guidance technologies, information-related technologies such as C4ISR, and unmanned technologies. In addition, these nations now emphasize the research and development of equipment adapted better to respond to regional conflict and energy countermeasures closely linked to climate change.

In February 2010 U.S. Vice President Joe Biden commented that, "We have long relied on nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries. Now, as our technology improves, we are developing non-nuclear ways to accomplish that same objective," indicating an example that seems to point to the concept of Conventional Prompt Global Strike, as a capability to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons This concept consists of utilizing highly precise non-nuclear weapons to penetrate the anti-access capabilities of adversaries and promptly strike, no matter what and where in the world the target may be. According to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the concept is currently studied as a part of long-range strike capabilities. According to the United States, weapons from that concept would count against the new START treaty's limits of delivery vehicles and warheads

Conventional strike missiles (CSMs) are the development plan that leads this concept. While retired ballistic missile rockets and others will be diverted for use, confusion with nuclear weapons will be avoided as CSMs move along a depressed trajectory that is clearly different from ballistic missiles.

Comparison of Ballistic Missile and CSM Trajectories (image)

Section 2. Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two — north and south — for more than half a century. Even today, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region, to say nothing of Japan.
(See Fig. I-2-2-1)

1. North Korea

1. General Situation

North Korea has been advocating the construction of a "powerful and prosperous nation" as its basic national policy [19], aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas — ideology, politics, military affairs, and economy — and it adopts "military-first politics" to realize this goal. The "military-first politics" has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise in the revolution and national construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of the revolution [20]. Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea's military forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission [21] and regularly visits military forces. It would appear that he intends to continue attaching importance to, and relying on, the military forces.

Although North Korea faces serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for food and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces. For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated to account for nearly 5% of the overall population [22]. It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to the official announcement made at the Supreme People's Assembly in April 2009, the proportion of the defense budget in FY2009's national budget was 15.8%, but it is estimated that this represents only a portion of real defense expenditures.

Furthermore, North Korea seems to maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetric military capabilities by making efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles and by maintaining large-scale special operation forces.

North Korea's military behavior has increased tension over the Korean Peninsula, and constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for the entire East Asian region, including Japan.

Needless to say, North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is not condoned, but at the same time, we should not forget security concerns other than the nuclear problem. It is necessary to continue to pay enough attention to the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea and the military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula continue to demand a close watch.

Since North Korea still largely maintains its closed regime, it is difficult to accurately capture the details and

Fig. I-2-2-1 Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula

		North Korea	ROK	U.S. Forces in ROK
Total armed forces		Approx. 1.1 million personnel	Approx. 690,000 personnel	Approx. 25,000 personnel
Army	Ground troops	Approx. 1 million personnel	Approx. 560,000 personnel	Approx. 17,000 personnel
	Battle tanks	T-62, T-54/-55, etc. Approx. 3,500	88, M-47, M-48, etc. Approx. 2,750	M-1
Navy	Naval vessels	Approx. 650; 106,000 tons	Approx. 190; 181,000 tons	Supporting corps only
	Destroyers Frigates Submarines	 3 23	10 9 11	
	Marines		2 divisions; approx. 25,000 personnel	
Air Force	Combat aircraft	Approx. 620	Approx. 490	Approx. 60
	3rd and 4th generation fighters	Mig-23×56 Mig-29×35 Su-25×34	F-4×70 F-16×164 F-15×39	F-16×40
Reference	Population	Approx. 22.7 million	Approx. 48.5 million	
	Military service	Army: 5–12 years Navy: 5–10 years Air Force: 3–4 years	Army: 18–24 months Navy: 20–26 months Air Force: 21–27 months	

Note: The Military Balance 2010, etc.

intentions of the country's policies and behavior. However, it is necessary to continue to pay utmost attention to them.

2. WMD and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMD, issues of North Korea's nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its chemical and biological weapons capabilities. In particular, North Korea's nuclear issue has serious influence on Japan's national security and it is also a critical problem for the entire international community in terms of nonproliferation of WMD[23]. In particular, nuclear tests by North Korea, when considered in conjunction with North Korea's reinforcement of its ballistic missile capability that could serve as the means of delivery of WMD, simply cannot be tolerated as they constitute a serious threat to the security of Japan and do considerable harm to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and the international community.

As for ballistic missiles, North Korea seems to be conducting R&D for deploying existing ballistic missiles, extending the range and putting solid fuel to use[24]. Also, it is pointed out that North Korea's proliferation of ballistic missiles continues. Both North Korea's missile issue as well as its nuclear issue are destabilizing factors for the entire international community and the Asia-Pacific region, and such moves are of great concern.

(1) Nuclear Weapons

a. Responses to the North Korean Nuclear Issue

With regards to the issue of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons, the Six-Party Talks[25] have been held since August 2003 in pursuit of a peaceful resolution to this problem and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time, which mentioned the verifiable abandonment of "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs" by North Korea. However, North Korea delayed its participation in the Six-Party Talks, and launched seven ballistic missiles and announced that it had conducted a nuclear test in 2006. Facing these actions by North Korea, which further increased international tensions, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolutions 1695 and 1718 imposing sanctions on North Korea. In December 2006, North Korea returned to the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks and, in February 2007, the parties reached an agreement on "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" to implement the joint statement made at the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks. After the shutdown of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon based on this agreement, in October 2007, the "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" were announced as the outcome of the sixth round of the Talks. The agreement includes completion of the disablement of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and "a complete and correct declaration of all its (North Korea's) nuclear programs" by the end of 2007. However, the implementation of the agreement has not been completed[26].

In response to the U.N. Security Council presidential statement condemning North Korea's missile launch, North Korea suggested that it would boycott the Six-Party Talks and announced the resumption of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods. It also announced that it would take steps including nuclear tests and test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles unless the U.N. Security Council apologized. North Korea announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test in May, 2009. In response, the international community adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 in June 2009, condemning North Korea's nuclear test in the strongest possible terms and imposing additional measures against North Korea. North Korea announced that the whole amount of the newly extracted plutonium would be weaponized, and the process of uranium enrichment would be commenced, etc. An additional announcement was made by North Korea that the uranium enrichment experiment had been successfully carried out in September 2009 and had entered the completion stage. In November 2009 it announced that the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods had been successfully completed by the end of August and it had made substantial achievements in weaponizing the extracted plutonium. While emphasizing

the progress in its nuclear development in this manner, North Korea also hinted at the possibility of holding multilateral consultations, including the Six-Party Talks, depending on the progress in talks with the United States. Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy, visited North Korea as the first Obama administration official to discuss the issue.

While some argue that North Korea's response to its nuclear development problem is a so-called brinkmanship policy by intentionally heightening tension in order to receive some sort of reward, others argue that North Korea's ultimate objective is to secure deterrence capability by possessing nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal of North Korea is said to be the maintenance of its existing regime. Considering this, these two views are not incompatible.

While it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to maintain close cooperation to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, roles played by other countries like China and Russia (the other participants in the Six-Party Talks), as well as such international institutions as the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are also important.

b. The Current Status of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Details about the current status of North Korea's nuclear weapons program still remains largely unclear, partly because North Korea remains an extremely closed regime. In light of the series of North Korean announcements and actions as well as the fact that the status of North Korea's nuclear development so far is not yet elucidated, the possibility that North Korea has already made considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program cannot be dismissed[27]. In addition, the fact that North Korea announced in May 2009 that it had conducted a nuclear test following the one in 2006 suggests that there is a high possibility that North Korea has further advanced its nuclear weapons program. When taken together with North Korea's enhancement of its ballistic missile capability, which could serve as a means of delivering WMD, nuclear tests by North Korea are totally unacceptable as they are a significant threat to Japan's security and seriously undermine the peace and security of Northeast Asia and the international community.

In general, miniaturizing a nuclear weapon enough to be loaded on a ballistic missile requires an extremely high degree of technological capacity. However, considering the fact that the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China succeeded in acquiring such technology by as early as the 1960s, it is difficult to eliminate the possibility that North Korea, in a relatively short time, will achieve miniaturization of nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear warheads[28]. It is necessary to remain watchful of all related developments.

(2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

Because North Korea is an extremely closed regime and most materials, equipment, and technology used for manufacturing biological and chemical weapons are for both military and civilian use, facilitating camouflage, details of North Korea's biological and chemical weapons development and arsenals are not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, North Korea has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and it is estimated that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing chemical agents and has a substantial amount of stock of such agents[29].

(3) Ballistic Missiles

North Korea is an extremely closed regime, and details of its ballistic missiles are unknown. It appears however, that North Korea gives high priority to the development of ballistic missiles out of political and diplomatic considerations and from the viewpoint of earning foreign currency[30], in addition to enhancing its military capabilities.

a. Scud

It is believed that, since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C[31], a variant of Scud B with extended range, and has exported these ballistic missiles to the Middle East and other countries.

b. Nodong

North Korea is also thought to have started its development of longer-range ballistic missiles by the 1990s, including Nodong. It appears that Nodong, the deployment of which is believed to be ongoing, is a liquid fuel propellant single-stage ballistic missile. It is assessed to have a range of about 1,300km, and may reach almost all parts of Japan.

It is highly probable that Nodong was used in the launch into the Sea of Japan in 1993. A total of six ballistic missiles fired from the Kittaeryong district in the southeastern part of North Korea in July 2006 are believed to be Scud and Nodong[32]. In July 2009, North Korea is believed to have launched a total of seven ballistic missiles from the same district, and it is possible that they were either Scud or Nodong[33].

Though details about Nodong's capability have not been confirmed, as the ballistic missile is believed to be based on the Scud technology, it seems that it does not have the accuracy to carry out strikes on specific target installations.

Due to the fact that it is extremely difficult to verify the intentions of North Korea' s military activities because of its closed regime, that it is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the country, and that Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded onto a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and operated with mobility, it is thought to be difficult to detect individual and concrete signs of a Nodong launch in advance, such as its specific launch site and timing.

Fig. I-2-2-2 Range of North Korean Ballistic Missiles



Note: The figure above shows the distance each missile can reach from the Taepodong district.

c. Taepodong-1

North Korea has also been developing Taepodong-1 which has an estimated range of at least approximately 1,500km. Taepodong-1 is assumed to be a two-stage, liquid fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong used as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The ballistic missile launched in 1998 is assessed to be based on Taepodong-1. North Korea is believed to have shifted its focus to the development of Taepodong-2, which has a longer range, and Taepodong-1 may have been a transitory product for the development of Taepodong-2.

d. Taepodong-2

Taepodong-2 is believed to be a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage, with a range of approximately 6,000km. A Taepodong-2 is believed to have been launched from the Taepodong district located in the northeastern coastal area in July 2006, and was damaged during the flight at an altitude of several kilometers, several tens of seconds after the launch without separating the first stage, and have fallen near the launch site. In the launch of April 2009, it is thought that North Korea used a Taepodong-2 or a variant of it[34] from the same district again. Since it is estimated that the missile crossed over Japan, and flew more than 3,000km before falling in the Pacific Ocean, it is believed that North Korea had been able to extend the range of its ballistic missiles since its failed launch of Taepodong-2 in 2006. Through the April 2009 launch, it is believed that North Korea may have tested the required technologies, such as increasing the size of

Fig. I-2-2-3 Missile Launches by North Korea



propulsion, separation of the multi-staged propulsion devices, and attitude control. Thus, it is highly possible that North Korea will advance the development of ballistic missiles, including longer-range missiles. Moreover, a test launch of a long-range ballistic missile would contribute to extending the range of other shorter-range missiles, increasing the warhead weight and improving the circular error probability (CEP). The April 2009 launch may lead to the improvement of the performance of Nodong and other ballistic missiles possessed by North Korea. (See Fig. I-2-2-2/3)

At present, North Korea appears to be developing not only ballistic missiles but also an intermediate-range ballistic missile[35] and a solid fuel propellant short-range missile[36]. It is also necessary to pay attention to the possibility of North Korea's efforts to improve existing ballistic missiles such as Scud and Nodong, including an attempt to extend their ranges.

As the background of North Korea's rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that the country imported various materials and technologies from outside. It is pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or related technologies including the transfer of Nodong airframes and related technologies to Iran and Pakistan, and that North Korea promotes the further development of missiles using funds procured by such transfer and proliferation[37].

In light of this, it is necessary to remain alert to North Korea's ballistic missiles, particularly in terms of transfer and proliferation, in addition to their development and deployment.

3. Military Posture

(1) General Situation

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines (extensive training for all the soldiers, modernizing all the armed forces, arming the entire population, and fortifying the entire country)[38].

North Korea's armed forces are comprised mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.1 million. North Korea's military forces are believed to have been maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and operational readiness, and it seems to have continued infiltration[39] exercises. However, most of its equipment is outdated.

Meanwhile, North Korea has large-scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence gathering and sabotage to guerrilla warfare. These forces are believed to reach approximately 100,000 personnel[40]. Moreover, North Korea seems to have many underground military-related installations across its territory.

(2) Military Capabilities

The North Korean Army comprises about one million personnel, and roughly two-thirds of them are believed to be deployed along the DMZ. The main body of the army is infantry, but the army also maintains armored and artillery forces including at least 3,500 tanks. North Korea is believed to regularly deploy long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240mm multiple launch rockets and 170mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities and bases in the northern part of the ROK including the capital city of Seoul.

The navy has about 650 ships with total displacement of approximately 107,000 tons and is chiefly made up of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. Also, it has about 20 Romeo class submarines, about 60 midget submarines, and about 140 air cushioned landing crafts, the latter two of which are believed to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operation forces.

The Air Force has about 590 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but some fourth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s are also included. North

Korea has a large number of outdated An-2s as well, which are believed to be used for transportation of special operation forces.

North Korea's military forces are vigorously conducting various types of training to maintain and enhance their operational readiness. Meanwhile, given the serious food situation, the military forces seem to be engaged in agricultural assistance as well.

4. Domestic Affairs

(1) Stability of the Regime

Some point out that in recent years North Korea's regime is not as stable as in previous years due to loosening of social control resulting from both an increasing income disparity and a trend of money-worshipping, and declining military morale. However, the fact that national events[41] and diplomatic negotiations have been held in an orderly manner suggests that the regime based around Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be on track[42]. On the other hand, there have been persistent rumors of his ailing health[43] since he failed to appear at the military parade of the Worker/Peasant Red Guard celebrating North Korea's 60th anniversary. Though Kim Jong Il is believed to have engaged in public activities such as frequent on-site inspections and visits[44], given his age of 68, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the regime will become unstable upon the possible change in power structure in the near future.

(2) Economic Conditions

In terms of their economy, North Korea has been facing chronic stagnation and energy and food shortages in recent years due to the vulnerability of its socialistic planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and East European countries following the end of the Cold War. In particular, it seems that North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries[45]. It is also pointed out that many North Koreans are starving and their sense of morale has declined.

In response to a host of economic difficulties, North Korea has tried some limited reform measures and changes in its economic management systems. It is believed that, since around July 2002, North Korea has raised wages and commodity prices and devaluated exchange rates[46], and in 2009, tried to raise productivity through mobilization movements called the 150-Day Battle and the 100-Day Battle[47]. However, as North Korea is not likely to undertake a structural reform that could damage its current regime, North Korea would still face various difficulties in fundamentally improving its current economic situation. At the end of 2009, North Korea is believed to have carried out redenomination of its currency. It remains to be seen how this action will affect the North Korean economy and the stability of the current regime.

5. The Sinking of an ROK Military Patrol Vessel

On March 26, 2010, the ROK military patrol vessel *Cheonan* sank near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea. Following the sinking, the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group, made up of experts from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, conducted investigations in four teams, scientific investigation, explosive analysis, ship structure, and intelligence analysis. On May 20, the Joint Investigation Group announced that the vessel had been split and sunk by a shockwave and bubble effect created by an underwater explosion generated by the detonation of a torpedo launched by a North Korean midget submarine[48]. Following this announcement, President Lee Myung-bak of the ROK issued a statement that the sinking of the *Cheonan* was an act of military provocation. He furthermore stated that the ROK would prohibit North Korean vessels from using sea lanes in the territorial waters of the ROK and all trade and exchanges between the South and the North would be suspended. Finally, he stated that the ROK would take firm measures such as the immediate exercise of the right of self-defense should North Korea invade the ROK's territorial waters, land, or air space, and refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council[49]. On May 20, North Korea proclaimed that the findings of the joint investigation group were fabricated and that it would take forceful actions, possibly including an all-out war, against any sanctions imposed[50]. On May 25, North Korea announced that it would stop all relations with the ROK[51].

In response to these actions, a Summit declaration was adopted by the international community on June 26 of the same year at the G8 Muskoka Summit, as was a Presidential Statement in the U.N. Security Council on July 9. The statements issued criticized the attack which caused the sinking of the Cheonan. In talks between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense, the two countries agreed to engage in a series of joint military exercises over the following months in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. During the period from 25th until the 28th of July, joint exercises, including anti-submarine training, were carried out in the Sea of Japan. Four MSDF officials were dispatched to the scene as observers.

U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington leaving port at Pusan in order to participate in a U.S.–Korea joint military exercise in the Sea of Japan in July 2010 [U.S. Department of Defense]

6. External Relations

(1) Relations with the United States

The United States made it clear that it would make efforts to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries, aiming to resolve the issue through the Six-Party Talks. North Korea has claimed that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the "dying wish" of Kim Il Sung and pledged to abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs." North Korea, however, continues to criticize various policies of the United States, insisting that the United States has yet to abandon its "hostile policy" toward North Korea. Thus, there exists a significant gap between the two parties' stances and the denuclearization process has seen no substantive progress. In addition, the United States has repeatedly expressed concerns over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials, and the development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles by North Korea.

In addition, while the United States pointed out in its country reports on terrorism that the abduction issue of Japanese citizens is yet to be solved and that the hijackers of Yodo are still living in North Korea, in October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism on the grounds that North

Korea had agreed to a series of verification measures related to a declaration of its nuclear programs submitted in June 2008[52].

(2) Relations with the Republic of Korea

Regarding relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea, there had not been much progress in North-South dialogue or exchanges, including in the military area, after the inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak in the ROK. Meanwhile, restrictions on inter-Korean traffic were lifted in the summer of 2009, and in late September 2009, projects for the reunion of separated families resumed for the first time in about two years[53]. On the other hand, near the NLL in the Yellow Sea, incidents transpired that heightened North-South military tensions, including the exchange of fire between North Korean and ROK naval vessels in November of that year, and the sinking of the South Korean patrol vessel which occurred in March 2010.

(3) Relations with China

With regard to the relationship between North Korea and China, the China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1961 is still in force. Since China and the ROK established diplomatic relations in 1992, the relationship between North Korea and China has changed from the close relationship they had enjoyed during the Cold War period. Since then, however, the leaders of the two countries have made mutual visits and the relationship has improved. In October 2009, the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and North Korea, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited North Korea and held talks with Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission[54]. China has repeatedly expressed its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula regarding North Korea's nuclear issue, and has been playing an active role in resolving the issue by, for example, asking North Korea to return to the Six-Party talks, as its chairman. Some, however, point out that the relationship between China and North Korea seems not to be as close as it used to be.

(4) Relations with Russia

While relations between North Korea and Russia have become less close since the end of the Cold War, the two countries signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in February 2000, which lacked articles on military alliance[55] that were included in the previous treaty. After this, relations between North Korea and Russia have improved, with the heads of both countries making mutual visits[56].

(5) Relations with Other Countries

Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with West European countries and others, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with them[57] and participation in the ARF ministerial meetings[58]. Meanwhile, the EU and ASEAN have traditionally expressed concerns over North Korea's nuclear and other issues.

2. The Republic of Korea and the U.S. Forces in the ROK

1. General Situation

In the ROK, democracy has taken firm root through such means as the direct presidential election adopted by the 1987 amendment to the constitution.

The administration of Lee Myung Bak, inaugurated in February 2008, is showing its intention to promote its policy to pursue "co-existence and co-prosperity" with regard to North Korea, and firmly maintains the principle of giving top priority to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. While it maintains the "Vision 3000:

Denuclearization and Openness," which aims to offer gradual economic assistance to North Korea in accordance with the progress in the abandonment of its nuclear program, the ROK government showed its renewed emphasis on the abandonment of the nuclear program by North Korea, with President Lee Myung Bak proposing the "grand bargain,"[59] a package deal to settle the nuclear issue.

The U.S.–ROK Foreign and Defense ministers' meeting held in Seoul in July 2010 [U.S. Department of Defense]

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the ceasefire of the Korean War. The ROK has established very close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK have been playing a vital role in deterring the outbreak of large-scale armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, in July 2010, on the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, the first U.S.–ROK foreign and defense ministers' meeting was held. The two nations confirmed that the U.S.–ROK alliance is promoting peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but in the wider region of Northeast Asia, and that it is developing as a powerful, successful and consistent alliance. In view of the progress in the North-South relations, improved national strength of the ROK, and changes in the U.S. strategy, the two countries have been committed to solving issues such as realignment of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and transition of the operational control authority in wartime[60] over U.S.–ROK combined forces to the ROK.

As for the realignment of the U.S. forces in the ROK, the relocation of U.S. forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to the Pyongtek area, south of Seoul, and the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the northern side of Han Gang to the southern side of the river were agreed upon in 2003. However, it seems that the relocation to the Pyongtek area is delayed[61].

As for the transition of the operational control authority in wartime to the ROK, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense determined during their meeting in February 2007 that the

Fig. I-2-2-4 Agreement on the Transfer and Relocation of the U.S. Forces in ROK



Note: ROK Defense White Paper 2006.

two countries would dismantle the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command and complete the transition on April 17, 2012. In talks between the leaders of the United States and the ROK in April 2008, both countries agreed to develop the ROK–U.S. Alliance into a new strategic alliance conforming to the 21st century, and the summit meeting in June 2009 created an agreement on the "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and Republic of Korea[62]." Further, the 41st Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2009 adopted a joint statement containing specific details of "extended deterrence" and strong U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK, showing a further strengthening of the bilateral relationship[63]. It is necessary to monitor how the transition to the new joint defense system of "the ROK forces leading and the U.S. forces supporting" will be implemented.
(See Fig. I-2-2-4)

2. Defense Policies and Defense Reform of the ROK

The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital Seoul, where a quarter of the country's population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ.

The ROK has set the defense objectives as follows: "defending the nation from external military threats and invasion, upholding the peaceful unification, and contributing to regional stability and world peace." As one of the "external military threats," the ROK had designated North Korea as its "main enemy," but, North Korea has no longer been described as such since the publication of the ROK Defense White Paper 2004.[64] In addition to the defense objectives, the ROK has identified "fostering an elite, advanced, robust military" as its defense vision and the following eight items have been set as the defense policy focus to achieve these goals and the vision.

(1) Establish defense posture to realize comprehensive security
(2) Creative development of the ROK–U.S. alliance
(3) Strengthen advanced defense capability
(4) Military support for creating a peaceful structure on the Korean Peninsula
(5) Specialized military development that plays its role in a given position
(6) Establish pragmatic, advanced defense management system
(7) Improve barracks and environment and welfare in accordance with national development
(8) A military of the people

The ROK intends to promote "National Defense Reform 2020"[65] to satisfy its defense needs such as maintenance of its military capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies; balanced development of its Army, Navy, and Air Forces; elimination of inefficiency; and build-up of barrack culture in accordance with social trends. The bill on the National Defense Reform incorporating these main ideas was enacted in December 2006.

As an amendment reflecting the results of an analysis and assessment of the security situation and defense reform records after the formulation of the Defense Reform 2020, the ROK Ministry of National Defense announced the Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009–2020) in June 2009, defining such matters as a narrowing of the initially planned reduction in the force strength[66] and the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korean nuclear and missile facilities.[67]

3. Trends in Defense Buildup in the ROK

As for the ROK's military capacity, the ground forces consist of 22 army divisions and two marine divisions, totaling 590,000 personnel; the naval forces consist of about 190 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 181,000 tons; and the air forces (Air Force and Navy combined) of approximately 500 combat aircraft.

In recent years, the ROK has been focused on modernizing its Navy and Air Force in particular in order to develop the capability to deal with a full spectrum of threats, not least threats from North Korea, as well as

omnidirectional military posture[68]. The Navy has been introducing submarines, large transport ships and domestically-built destroyers. In December 2008, the first KDX-III (an Aegis-equipped destroyer) was put into service, and the second is scheduled to be commissioned by the end of 2010. The third is now under construction for delivery in 2012. In February 20, a ceremony was held at Busan Base to mark the creation of the Seventh Mobile Unit, the first mobile force in the ROK[69]. The Air Force is proceeding with the introduction of F-15K fighters, and also plans to procure four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by 2012. In addition, the ROK is believed to be promoting domestic production of missiles.

The FY2010 defense budget amounts to approximately 29,562.7 billion won, an increase of approximately 3.6% over the previous fiscal year, marking the 11th consecutive rise since FY2000. (See Fig. I-2-2-5)

Fig. I-2-2-5 ROK's Defense Budget from FY2005 to 2010



Notes: 1. ROK Defense White Paper 2008 for FY2006 to 2008.
2. Press release from the Ministry of National Defense for FY2009 to 2010.

4. External Relations

(1) Relations with China and Russia

The ROK has been promoting military exchanges with China, including mutual visits of vessels and aircraft. In November 2008, the hot lines were established between the two countries' Navies and Air Forces. At the May 2008 summit meeting of the top leaders of the ROK and China, they agreed to upgrade the ROK–China relationship from a "full-scale cooperative partnership" to a "strategic cooperative partnership." However, the bilateral relations in the security area still remain at the initial level compared with their ties in economic and other areas.

Military exchanges have been under way between the ROK and Russia in recent years, including exchanges among high military officials and mutual visits of naval vessels. The two countries have also agreed on cooperation in the areas of military technology, defense industry and military supplies. At the ROK–Russia Summit in September 2008, they agreed to upgrade the bilateral relations to the "strategic cooperative partnership." Furthermore, in July 2009, then ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang Hee visited Russia for a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov[70], an indication of further progress in security relations between the two countries.

(2) Activities Overseas

The ROK acceded to the United Nations in 1992, and since its dispatch of an engineering unit to Somalia in 1993, has continuously participated in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). The ROK says the active participation in PKO activities is a way of returning international assistance the country has received in the past from the international community, as well as securing support from the international community in times of emergency[71]. In December 2009, the ROK unveiled plans to substantially expand the number of personnel sent overseas on PKO missions from the current level[72].

The ROK dispatched medical support units and engineering units to Afghanistan to support military operations by the United States and other countries, and withdrew them in December 2007 upon completion of their missions. However, in February 2010, the ROK decided to send up to 350 troops to the country again for the purpose of protecting about 140 Korean members of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) stationed in Parvan province, and thus resumed activities in Afghanistan in July 2010. The ROK also dispatched troops to Iraq at the request of the United States, but withdrew from the country in December 2008 upon completion of the mission. Further, the ROK has dispatched naval vessels to waters off the coast of Somalia where they have been engaged in the protection of ROK-registered ships and maritime security operations (MSO) of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).

Section 3. China

1. General Situation

China has the world's largest population and a vast landmass surrounded by 14 countries. It has long borderlines and a long coastline. China is also a nation with various races, religions, and languages. Most of its ethnic minorities[73] populate the borderlands often with the same ethnic groups living across the borders. China, with a long history, has been shaping and maintaining a distinct culture and civilization, and pride of its unique history and the experiences of semi-colonization in and after the 19th century is driving a desire for a strong nation as well as fueling their nationalism.

China is a state with a socialist regime, and aims at building a modern socialist state under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In recent years, China has significantly increased its international trade, attracting considerable foreign investment; the economy has dramatically grown, especially in the coastal and urban areas. It has maintained its economic growth despite the impact from the worldwide financial crisis. China's international presence is rising, as evidenced by the great deal of attention that was paid to its movements at the G20 Summit on the Financial Market and the World Economy that has been held since 2008 and the Fifteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP15) that was held in 2009. The fact that China's economy promptly broke free of the impact from the financial crisis is believed to form the backdrop for why the country has been becoming more self-confident and displaying a more assertive posture in the international community. On the other hand, however, a variety of problems exist within China. Such problems include the great political problem of corruption within central and local communist party leadership, and as a result of rapid economic growth there are regional disparities between urban-rural and coastal-inland regions, wealth gaps among urban residents, and the emergence of environmental pollution. Moreover, issues associated with the rapid aging of the population are forecasted to arise in the future. China also has domestic ethnic minority issues, such as the clashes between minorities and the authorities that were started by minority protests in areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It has been reported that some ethnic minorities are undertaking campaigns seeking separation and independence. Under the guiding principle of the "Scientific Outlook on Development," the Hu Jintao administration aims to build a "Harmonious Society" as its fundamental policy and is committed to giving priority to the solution of the aforementioned domestic problems[74]. China also aims to improve its current economic structure, where it is dependent on exports abroad and domestic demand is weak, in order to maintain stable economic growth.

On the diplomatic field, it is believed that in order to maintain national stability China is aiming to maintain stability in the strategic international environment by sustaining favorable relations with major powers such as the United States and Russia, to maintain favorable relations with neighboring countries and stable situations in those countries, to promote the multipolarization of the world, and to secure an energy supply and other interests necessary for economic development.

On the military front, China has been modernizing its military forces, backed by the high and constant increase in defense budget. In its military modernization China appears to give particular priority to the Taiwan issue as an issue of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and for the time being it will probably aim for the improvement of military capabilities to prevent Taiwan's independence and others, but in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue. The military trends of China draw attention from countries in the region, as the country has been steadily growing as a major political and economic power in the region.

2. Military Affairs

1. National Defense Policy

China states that it prioritizes the defense of national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else. China proclaims that it endeavors to build a fortified national defense and strong military forces compatible with national security and development interests and realize the enrichment of the country and reinforcement of the military while building a moderately prosperous society[75] in all aspects.

China has a policy of the active promotion of the "Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics," which mainly consists of the mechanization and informatization of its military power, based on its military strategy[76] to win a local war under informationized conditions, according to global trends in military developments observed in the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Iraq War and others. Compared to the military parades carried out in 1999, the military parades celebrating the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC in October 2009 showed a decrease in the formations of marching foot soldiers[77]. Conversely, mobile missile, combat vehicle, and aircraft formations increased, while advanced equipment such as early warning and control systems and unmanned aerial vehicles were displayed, thereby demonstrating China's military mechanization and informatization to Chinese people and overseas. Moreover, China appears to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, incorporating the concept of "Three Warfares" —"Psychological Warfare," "Media Warfare" and "Legal Warfare"— into the tasks of the political work by military[78], and declaring a policy of "close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural and legal endeavors[79]."

In China's military modernization, backed by the stable relations with Russia and other neighboring states that share land borders with China, it is believed that China is giving the top priority to handling of the Taiwan issue, more specifically to improving the capability[80] to hinder the independence of Taiwan and foreign military support for Taiwan. Furthermore, in recent years, China has begun to work on acquiring capabilities for missions other than the Taiwan issue[81]. As regards a long-term plan for China's military modernization, China proclaims that "according to the requirements of national security and the level of economic and social development, […] it will lay a solid foundation by 2010, basically accomplish mechanization and make major progress in informatization by 2020, and by and large reach the goal of modernization of national defense and armed forces by the mid-21st century[82]." In the long term, China appears to be aiming to develop a military force according to the development of national strength, as this is compliant with the development plan for the country as a whole[83].

China has reduced the number of its military personnel, mainly in the army, and has been modernizing equipment of its entire armed forces, especially its naval and air forces, and nuclear and missile capabilities. In addition, China is working to improve joint operational capabilities among services and branches, to conduct practical exercises, to cultivate and acquire highly-capable human resources for administering operations of an informationized force, and to improve the foundation of the domestic defense industry. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) still possesses outdated equipment, and the current military modernization efforts are believed to be undertakings that intend wholly to improve the military's capabilities. Nevertheless, China does not disclose a clear, specific future vision of its military modernization. China has been rather intensifying its activities in waters near Japan. The lack of transparency of its national defense policies, and the military activities are a matter of concern for the region and the international community, including Japan, which should require prudent analysis.

2. Military Transparency

China has not disclosed specific information on its possession of weapons, procurement goals or past procurements, the organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, or a detailed breakdown of the national defense budget.

China has released defense white papers titled China's National Defense every two years since 1998, and the nation also conducts a lot of dialogue with national defense authorities of other countries[84]. Furthermore, in August 2007, China expressed its will to return to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and to participate in the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures, and has submitted annual reports based on each system.

In this manner, China has regularly published compiled documents on its national security while reintegrating itself into and commencing participation in U.N. systems regarding armaments and military expenditures[85]. These and other efforts can be appreciated as a contribution to improving the transparency of its military capabilities.

However, China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the international society. For example, as for a detailed breakdown of national defense spending, China basically announced only the total amount and general purposes for the three categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. Slight progress was seen in China's National Defense in 2008 in terms of information disclosure[86] but it does not provide a basic breakdown such as procurement costs for major weapons. Moreover, the report for the United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures submitted by China in 2009 was not filled out in accordance with the standard format used by Japan and many other nations, whereby a detailed breakdown of military expenditure is required; the information disclosed was almost as simple as that provided in China's defense white papers.

Details have yet to be disclosed regarding the cause of the breach of international law in November 2004, where a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters. Moreover, in January 2007, when China conducted an anti-satellite weapons test, the Chinese government gave an insufficient explanation of the details and intention of the test to allay Japan's concerns. In addition, in November 2007, China sent notification indicating a refusal for U.S. naval vessels including U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk to pull into Hong Kong on the expected day of arrival, but then later revised their notice and allowed the vessels to port. However, the U.S. naval vessels had already abandoned their port and changed course. These incidents incite concern over China's decision-making and behavior concerning its military.

China is steadily growing as a major political and economic power, and its military power also attracts attention from other countries. In order to allay concerns over China, it is becoming more and more important for China itself to improve transparency of its national defense policy and military capability. It is hoped that

China will increase transparency concerning its military affairs by disclosing specific information pertaining to its defense policies and military capabilities.

3. National Defense Budget

China announced[87] a national defense budget for FY2010 of approximately 519.1 billion yuan[88]. The initial budget amount announced represented a growth of approximately 9.8%[89] compared to the initial budget amount from the previous fiscal year. While this falls short of its previous rates[90], China still maintains a high growth rate, with its announced national defense budget continuing to increase at a rapid pace. The nominal size of China's announced national defense budget has more than doubled in size over the past five years, and has grown 18-fold over the past 20 years. As regards the relationship between defense and the economy, China positions the build-up of defense capabilities as an important a task as economic development, explaining that it "sticks to the principle of coordinated development of economy and national defense" in China's National Defense in 2008. Accordingly, it is believed that China will continue to input resources for the improvement of its defense capabilities within the range of not hampering its economic development.

In addition, it must be noted that the amount of the defense budget announced by China is considered to be only part of its actual military expenditures[91]. For example, it is believed that the announced defense budget does not include all the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses.

(See Fig. I-2-3-1)

Fig. I-2-3-1 Changes in China's Official Defense Budget



Note: The total defense budgets for FY2002 and FY2004 were not disclosed, and there is a discrepancy when the disclosed growth rates and amounts of increase is applied to the initial budgets of FY2001 and FY2003. This graph uses 168.4 billion yuan and 210 billion yuan for FY2002 and FY2004, respectively. These are calculated on the assumption that the disclosed growth rates and amounts of increase are based on the actual defense expenditures for FY2001 and FY2003.

4. Military Posture

China's military forces are composed of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the People's Armed Police Force (PAP)[92], and the militia[93]. It is provided that these bodies be instructed and commanded by the Central Military Commission[94]. The PLA is defined as a people's army created and led by the CCP, comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force (strategic missile force).

(See Fig. I-2-3-2)

Fig. I-2-3-2 Location and Strength of PLA



Note: Army and Air Force Military Regions are identical. A Group Army consists of several divisions and brigades and has tens of thousands of personnel.

		China	Taiwan (Reference)
Total military forces		Approx. 2.3 million troops	Approx. 290,000 troops
Ground forces	Group troops	Approx. 1.6 million troops	Approx. 200,000 troops
	Tanks	Type-98A, Type-96, Type-88A/B and others Approx. 7,550 vehicles	M-60, M-48A/H and others Approx. 1,830 vehicles
Maritime forces	Warships	Approx. 950 vessels/1.343 million tons	Approx. 330 vessels/ 207,000 tons
	Destroyers & frigates	Approx. 75 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 60 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 10,000 troops	Approx. 15,000 troops
Air forces	Combat aircraft	Approx. 1,950 aircraft	Approx. 530 aircraft
	Modern fighters aircraft	J-10×120 Su-27×166 Su-30×97 (Fourth-generation fighters 383 aircraft)	Mirage 2000×57 F-16×146 F-CK-1 (IDF) ×128 (Fourth-generation fighters 331 aircraft)
Reference	Population	Approx. 1.339 billion	Approx. 23 million
	Term of service	2 years	1 year

Source: The Military Balance 2010 and others.

(1) Nuclear and Missile Forces

China has continued independent efforts to develop nuclear capabilities and ballistic missile forces since the middle of the 1950s, seemingly with a view to ensuring deterrence, supplementing its conventional forces, and maintaining its voice in the international community.

China possesses various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate range ballistic missiles/ medium range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The survivability and readiness of China's ballistic missile forces are under improvement by updating liquid propellant type to a solid propellant one. Moreover, it is also believed that China is working to increase performance by extending ranges, improving precision, introducing MIRV and other means[95]. China has developed the DF-31, which is a new mobile-type ICBM with a solid fuel propellant system mounted onto a transporter erector launcher (TEL), and the DF-31A, an extended model of the DF-31, which appears to have already begun to be deployed. Regarding SLBMs, the country currently appears to be developing the JL-2, a new SLBM with a range of approximately 8,000km, and constructing Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) to carry the missiles.

Fig. I-2-3-3 Range of Ballistic Missiles from China (Beijing)



A Chinese early warning aircraft flying over the East China Sea

Now that the DF-31 and the DF-31A have been deployed, once the JL-2 reaches a level of practical use, it is believed that China's strategic nuclear capabilities will improve by a great margin.

As for the IRBM/MRBM covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan, China has deployed liquid-propellant DF-3 and DF-4 missiles. Currently, however, the country also deploys the DF-21, which can be transported and operated on a TEL. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is believed that China possesses conventional ballistic missiles with high targeting accuracy based on the DF-21, and is developing conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), which could be used to attack ships at sea including aircraft carriers[96]. China also possesses the DH-10, a cruise missile with a range of 1,500km or longer. These missiles might complement ballistic missile forces, covering the Asia-Pacific region including Japan. In addition to IBRM/ MRBM, China also possesses a 100 plus dozens of H-6 (Tu-16) medium-range bombers that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and cruise missiles.

Concerning short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM), China possesses a large number of DF-15 and DF-11, and they are believed to be deployed against Taiwan[97].

China announced that it had conducted tests on midcourse missile interception technology in January 2010, and attention will be paid to China's future trends in ballistic missile defense[98].
(See Fig. I-2-3-3)

(2) Ground Forces

The size of the Chinese ground forces is the largest in the world with approximately 1.6 million personnel. Since 1985, China has continuously sought to modernize its armed forces by curtailing the number of personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. The country aims to develop highly capable military forces, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. Specifically, China is improving mobility by such measures as switching from the past regional-defense model to a nationwide-mobile model, working to motorize and mechanize its infantry. In addition, China is believed to be strengthening its airborne troops (belonging to the air force) and special operations forces. The country is making its military units smaller, modular and multi-functional[99] and also working on reforms to improve its logistical support capabilities. In 2009 China carried out "Stride 2009" exercises which traversed across military regions and were deemed its largest ever exercises of this type. These exercises are believed to have been designed to verify and improve capabilities necessary for deploying army units to distant areas, such as the army's long range maneuvering capabilities and logistical support capabilities, including the mobilization of militia and public transportation[100].

(3) Naval Forces

The naval forces consist of three fleets — the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. The Chinese Navy has approximately 950 ships (including approximately 60 submarines), with a total displacement of approximately 1.34 million tons. The navy is in charge of the maritime national defense and protecting the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese Navy introduced modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is actively constructing new types of domestic submarines to enhance its submarine force. Additionally, the Navy is increasing surface combatant ships with improved air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities, and is increasing and improving landing ships and supply ships. Also, a large hospital ship was commissioned in October 2008[101]. In view of these developments in the modernization of the Chinese Navy, it is believed that China is trying to build capabilities to perform operations in areas more distant from China's shore.

With regard to the possession of aircraft carriers, at the Japan–China Defense Ministers meetings held in March and November 2009, Chinese Defense Minster General Liang Guanglie remarked that China cannot remain "without an aircraft carrier indefinitely"[102] and that "the possession of aircraft carriers should be determined in comprehensive consideration of various factors including economic development, the level of the shipbuilding, and security factors."[103] Furthermore, a number of senior military officials have also made positive remarks about possessing an aircraft carrier[104]. China also purchased Varyag, an incomplete Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier, from Ukraine, and carried out renovations, and has also constructed a structure replicating an aircraft carrier on land. Based on these facts it is believed that China is currently advancing research and development on technology necessary for the possession of aircraft carriers[105].

(4) Air Forces

The Chinese Air Force and Navy have approximately 1,950 combat aircraft in total. The number of fourth-generation modern fighters is rising steadily. China is domestically mass producing J-10 fighters and carried out import and licensed production of Su-27 fighters as well as importing Su-30 fighters equipped with anti-surface and anti-ship attack capabilities from Russia. Moreover, China is believed to be developing its next generation fighter domestically[106]. China is importing highly sophisticated long-range surface-to-air missiles from Russia in order to improve air defense capabilities. It is making continuous efforts to improve its in-flight refueling capabilities and early warning and control system, which are essential for the operation of a modern air force. Furthermore, it is reported that China has a plan to import a number of large cargo aircraft from Russia.

China has also begun to enhance the electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capabilities of its aircraft in addition to increased efforts in actual reconnaissance flights against surrounding countries. In recent years in particular, Chinese air activities that appear to be some form of information gathering against Japan have been observed. Also, in September 2007, H-6 medium-range bombers flew into the Japanese air defense identification zone over the East China Sea to advance near to the Japan–China median line. In March 2010 a Y-8 early warning aircraft similarly flew to advance near to the Japan–China median line. What is more, it has also been reported that Air Force fighters and other aircraft are engaged in training that involves in-flight refueling over the South China Sea.

Judging from this modernization of air forces and the activities by aircraft, it is believed that China is improving its air defense capabilities for its national territory, aiming to build up capabilities for air superiority and anti-surface and anti-ship attacks in the anterior area, and improving long range transportation capabilities.[107] Further attention needs to be paid to these activities conducted by Chinese air forces in the area surrounding Japan.

(5) Military Use of Space and Cyber Warfare Capabilities

China continues to put forth efforts for space development. The country has launched various satellites into space using indigenously produced rockets, successfully conducted manned space flights, and launched a lunar orbiter. In September 2008, China launched the Shenzhou-7 manned spaceship and its astronaut successfully performed China's first extravehicular activities. As it appears that in China's space development military and non-military sectors are related[108], there is the possibility that China utilizes space for such military purposes as information gathering, communications, and navigation. Recently, several high ranking officials in China's Air Force expressed the Air Force's policy of actively working on utilization of space[109].

China is developing anti-satellite weapons, and the country tested the destruction of its own satellite in January 2007, applying ballistic missile technology. It is also pointed out that China is developing a system that uses laser beams to hamper satellite functions.

China is thought to have interest in cyber warfare and they are believed to have organized and be currently training a cyber warfare-specialized unit[110].

China's interest in anti-satellite weapons and cyber warfare can be attributed to the increasing reliance of information gathering and command and communication in the military sector, which are vital for swift and efficient exercise of military strength, on satellites and computer networks[111].

5. Activities in Waters Near Japan

(1) Situation of Activities in Waters Near Japan

China has been intensifying its maritime activities in recent years. With regard to activity in waters near Japan, Chinese naval vessels have been observed conducting what appeared to be exercises or information gathering activities. Chinese government ships have also been observed engaging in apparent oceanographic research within the exclusive economic zone of Japan[112].

Advancements to the Pacific Ocean by Chinese naval surface vessels have also been confirmed[113]. For example, in October 2008, four Chinese naval vessels, including a Soveremenny-class destroyer, passed through the Tsugaru Strait[114] and sailed south to the Pacific Ocean to circle Japan. In November 2008, four naval vessels, including a top-of-the-line Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the Pacific Ocean. In June 2009, five naval vessels, including a Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the waters northeast of Okinotori Island before engaging in apparent drills. In March 2010, six naval vessels, including a Luzhou-class destroyer, passed between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the Pacific Ocean. These vessels were reported to have advanced to the South China Sea[115]. Furthermore, in April 2010, 10 naval vessels, including Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers, passed the channel between Okinawa Island and Miyako Island and headed to the waters west of Okinotori Island, before engaging in apparent exercises[116]. At the time, Chinese ship-borne helicopters flew near the Japanese destroyers monitoring the vessels a couple of times.

In addition, a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine navigated in Japanese territorial waters in November 2004, breaching international law. In September 2005, it was confirmed that a total of five Chinese naval vessels, including one Soveremenny-class destroyer, were sailing near the Kashi gas field (Tianwaitian in Chinese) in the East China Sea and some of them circled around the said gas field. In October 2006, a Chinese Song-class

A Chinese Kilo-class submarine cruising on the East China Sea

submarine surfaced in the vicinity of the U.S. aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk* in international waters reportedly near Okinawa. The foreign submarine's approach to a U.S. aircraft carrier is a militarily noteworthy incident[117]. In December 2008, two Chinese maritime research ships of the State Oceanographic Administration conducted navigation operations not permitted to foreign ships under international law such as hovering and cruising within the territorial waters of Japan near the Senkaku Islands.

Besides activities in waters near Japan, China is enhancing its activities in the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands, over which it is engaged in territorial disputes with neighbors, including some ASEAN countries. In March 2009, Chinese ships including a Chinese naval vessel, a Chinese maritime research ship of the State Oceanographic Administration, a Bureau of Maritime Fisheries patrol ship, and trawlers approached a U.S. Navy acoustic research ship operating in the South China Sea to obstruct its operations. Other incidents also occurred in the same month[118]. What is more, in November 2008 and May 2009 a flotilla of vessels consisting of a Luyang II-class destroyer, a Yuzhao-class amphibious ship and other vessels reportedly conducted exercises in the waters of the South China Sea.

(See Fig. I-2-3-4)

(2) Objectives of Activities in Waters Near Japan

Taking into general consideration relevant factors including China's geographic location and economic globalization as well as the fact that China explicitly states in its laws and other means that its navy assumes the role of safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety, maritime activities by the Chinese navy and other organizations are considered to have the following objectives.

Fig. I-2-3-4 Recent Chinese Activities in the Waters near Japan



The first objective is to intercept naval operations by enemies in waters as far as possible from the country in order to defend Chinese territory and territorial waters. Behind this is an increase in effectiveness of long-range attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.

The second is to develop military capabilities to deter and prevent Taiwan's independence. For example, China maintains that it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. If China aims to hold back by force foreign intervention into Taiwan, which is surrounded by the sea, it needs to enhance its military operational capabilities at sea.

The third is to acquire, maintain, and protect maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in exploring and drilling oil and gas fields as well as building facilities and surveying for such facilities in the East China Sea and South China Sea. It is believed that the aims of the naval vessels operating near the drilling facilities of the Kashi oil and gas fields in September 2005 included the demonstration of their naval capabilities of acquiring, maintaining, and protecting maritime rights and interests.

The fourth is to defend the sea lanes of communications for China. The background of this is the fact that the sea lanes of communications, including crude oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are extremely important lifelines for the increasingly globalizing Chinese economy. It depends on future international situations at the time as to how far the Chinese Navy should defend the sea lanes of communications by itself, but given recent modernization of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, the scope of their capabilities is believed to expand beyond waters near China.

Attention needs to be paid to Chinese maritime activities with the objectives described above, including the operation of naval vessels and oceanographic research activities near Japan and development of facilities that serve as bases for these activities [119].

6. International Military Activities

In recent years the PLA has begun emphasizing nontraditional missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and anti-piracy. In order to carry out these missions it is becoming more active in dispatching units overseas [120]. The backdrop for this stance on international military activities is believed to be the fact that China's national interests have expanded beyond its national borders, thereby increasing its need to protect and promote its national interests overseas. It is also seen as being backed by China's intent to strengthen its stature by demonstrating its will to fulfill its responsibilities to the international community as a great power.

China states that it consistently supports and actively participates in U.N. peacekeeping operations. According to China's National Defense in 2008, the country has sent a total of 11,063 military personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations. According to the United Nations, as of January 2010, China had deployed a total of 2,131 personnel, police officers, and military observers to 10 U.N. peacekeeping operations, including the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), thus showing a certain presence in peacekeeping operations. China's aim in its proactive attitude to U.N. peacekeeping operations is seen to include its intent to strengthen relations with the regions where the peacekeeping operations are conducted, particularly with regard to relations with African nations.

China has also been taking part in international initiatives to deal with piracy off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden. As its first mission in distant

waters, the Chinese Navy has dispatched vessels to these waters since December 2008 to make them escort Chinese and other ships. This demonstrates that the Chinese Navy is improving its capacity to execute naval operations in increasingly distant waters. It is also thought to be an expression of the fact that China is placing a greater emphasis on protecting its own sea lanes of communication [121].

7. Education and Training

In recent years, the PLA has been conducting practical exercises and large-scale exercises, including cooperative exercises of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and landing exercises in order to modernize its operational capability. The whole PLA military training conference held in 2006 emphasized promoting a shift from military training under the conditions of mechanization to military training under the conditions of informatization. The new Outline of Military Training and Evaluation, in effect since 2009, highlights training for military operations other than war (MOOTW), education in the knowledge and expertise required for informatization, simulated training of high-tech weapons and equipment, network training and training in complex electromagnetic environments where electronic interference occurs, in addition to joint exercises by different services.

In the education spectrum, the PLA aims to develop military personnel versed in science and technology. In 2003, a human resource strategy project was launched to develop human resources capable of directing informatized operations and of building informatized armed forces. The project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the development of military personnel to 2020. In recent years, the PLA appears to be increasing its wage standards, and it is believed that the objective of this is to secure highly-capable human resources. Moreover, in 2000, in order to recruit highly-capable and highly-educated people, the military started a system where civilian college students are provided with scholarships and then allowed to enter the military as commissioned officers after graduation.

China has been developing a mobilization system with a view to effective use of civilian resources in the case of war and other emergency. In February 2010. China enacted National Defense Mobilization Law, which is the basic law for wartime mobilization.

8. National Defense Industry Sector

While China imports highly sophisticated equipment and parts that it cannot produce domestically from other countries such as Russia, it is believed to place emphasis on indigenous production of military equipment. The country manufactures much of its equipment domestically and is now actively making research and development efforts on new equipment. China's national defense industry sector appears to be developing due to an improvement of private industry infrastructure accompanying economic growth, use of dual technologies, and the absorption of foreign technologies, as well as its own efforts. The sector is working as a base for the modernization of China's military.

Favorable growth in the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by excessive secrecy and other factors; however, in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. In particular, emphasis has been placed on two-way technological exchanges where military technologies are utilized for building the national economy, and in turn civilian technologies are absorbed for a build-up of national defense. Specifically, the technologies of the defense industry have contributed to the development of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry, and the ship building industry. Furthermore, China maintains that it encourages and supports international cooperation and competition in dual-use industries, thus appearing to have interest in absorbing foreign technologies through dual-use industries.

3. External Relations

1. Relations with Taiwan

China holds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore a domestic issue. The country maintains that the "one-China" principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China also claims that it would never abandon efforts for peaceful unification, expressing that it will take policy and measures to solve issues of Taiwanese people's interest and protect their due authority, while it has also repeatedly stated that it has not renounced the use of force from the standpoint of strong opposition to any intervention in the unification of China by foreign powers as well as any move toward independence of Taiwan. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March 2005, provides that China will not renounce use of force, stating that China will employ non-peaceful means if a serious situation occurs which would lead to Taiwan's separation from China.

Ma Ying-jeou, who took office in May 2008, advocates a policy of pursuing Taiwanese economic development through expanding economic exchange with China and the status quo rather than independence. The leaders of both sides' authorized organizations for cross-strait talks [122] met for the first time in 10 years in June 2008, and direct chartered passenger weekday flights, direct maritime links, and direct mail services between China and Taiwan began in December 2008. In January 2010 consultations for the conclusion of an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which would be equivalent to a free trade agreement (FTA) between the two sides, were initiated. As these and other moves show, relations between the two sides continue to move forward centered mainly around the realm of economics. On the security front, while President Hu Jintao made appeals for China and Taiwan to make contact and hold exchanges over military issues at an appropriate time, and explore the creation of mechanisms for building mutual trust over military security [123], President Ma Ying-jeou has expressed demands including withdrawal of the Chinese missiles which are pointed at Taiwan. Attention will be paid to trends in the future relations between China and Taiwan.

2. Relations with the United States

There are various outstanding problems between the United States and China, such as human rights in China, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Taiwan issue, and trade issues. However, since a stable U.S.–China relationship is essential for China in developing its economy, it is believed that China will continue to desire to maintain that stable relationship.

The United States expresses that it welcomes a China that takes on a responsible leadership role in working with the international community over international issues such as the recovery of the world economy and proliferation of WMDs. The United States proclaims that it will monitor the Chinese military's modernization, and while it recognizes that the two nations do not agree on every issue and makes it clear that it will be candid on human rights and other issues, it also states that disagreement between the two should not prevent cooperation on issues of mutual interest [124].

On the Chinese side President Hu Jintao stated that China and the United States would work together to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship in the twenty-first century. China thus shows its stance of emphasizing the stable development of U.S.–China relations through pragmatic cooperation over an extensive array of fields.

Military exchanges have also developed between China and the United States. The countries have been conducting various policy dialogues. China has dispatched observers to U.S. military exercises, and joint drills have been conducted between the Chinese and U.S. navies on mutual port visits by naval vessels. A military hotline between the defense departments of the two countries was set up in April 2008. But while China wants to develop relations between the Chinese and U.S. militaries, it asserts that there are a number of issues that must

be resolved in order to realize sound development in said relations. These include arms sales to Taiwan, the activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft within China's exclusive economic zones, legal hurdles in mutual military exchanges, and a lack of strategic trust in China on the part of the United States [125]. Some unstable facets have been observed in the military exchanges of the two countries, such as the notification of suspensions of the major military exchanges with the United States when the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010. On the other hand, the United States maintains that China's military development, lack of transparency, and other issues raise questions about its future conduct and intentions. It asserts that U.S.–China relations must be undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust [126]. With regard to military exchanges, it is believed that the aim is to improve the current situation, wherein such exchanges are frequently suspended, and to build relations that are capable of maintaining more stable channels for mutual understanding.

3. Relations with Russia

Since the China–Soviet confrontation ended in 1989, both countries have continuously maintained a stance of placing importance on their bilateral relationship. The deepening of the "strategic partnership" between China and Russia, which was established in the mid-1990s, has been emphasized. In 2001, the China–Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation [127] was concluded. Subsequently in 2004, the long-standing issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once evolved into a military clash, came to a settlement. The two countries share a common idea that they will promote the multipolarization of the world and building of a new international order. In addition, economic motives have been driving the good relationship between them in recent years.

On the military front, since the 1990s, China has purchased modern weapons from Russia, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines. Russia is currently the largest supplier of weapons to China; however, some point out that their trade amounts have been on the decline in recent years due to the advancement of indigenous weapon production in China.

It is also pointed out that Russia, which shares a land border with China, has a policy of not supplying such sophisticated weapons to China that would cause a threat to Russia itself.

China–Russia military exchanges include regular visits by highest-ranking defense officials and joint military exercises. They conducted their first joint exercise in the Shandong Peninsula and other areas in China in August 2005. In August 2007, a joint anti-terrorism exercise was conducted by the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) [128]. In addition Russia and China held "Peace Mission 2009", a joint military exercise consisting of anti-terrorism operations, in July 2009. It is believed that through these joint military exercises with Russia, the two countries can deepen mutual understanding and build confidence between their military forces and show the presence of China and Russia as one pole in the multipolarizing world, and China can learn operational methods of Russian weapons and military operational doctrines.

4. Relations with North Korea

North Korea and China have a "traditional friendship," and North Korea seems to rely heavily on China for a great portion of its food assistance and energy supply. Accordingly, China is believed to have a stronger

influence on North Korea than other countries[129]. China agreed to U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1695, which condemned the launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea in 2006, UNSCR 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea in relation to the nuclear tests, the Security Council presidential statement in April 2009 condemning North Korea's missile launch, and UNSCR 1874, which settled additional measures against North Korea in response to the nuclear test in May 2009. In addition, China has played an active role chairing the Six-Party Talks that have been held in Beijing since 2003, and the international community expects that China will continue its proactive efforts to resolve the nuclear issue.

5. Relations with Other Countries

(1) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been continuously developing bilateral relations with all the countries in the region through active mutual top-level visits and other means. China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Plus One (China), ASEAN Plus Three, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Through diplomatic forums, the country is deepening economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries, and recently, it has been proactively advancing cooperation in the security sector[130].

(2) Relations with Central Asian Countries

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in the western part of China, is situated next to Central Asia. It shares borders with the three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally, the region hosts lively exchanges between the people of those countries. Thus China is greatly concerned about the political stability and security situations in Central Asian states, which might be influenced by terrorism caused by Islamic extremists and other factors. Chinese engagement in SCO, which was established in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of China's concerns in such areas. Moreover, China is also believed to be interested in the energy resources of Central Asia and is promoting cooperation in the energy field with Central Asian countries, such as the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines between China and Central Asian nations.

(3) Relations with South Asian Countries

While China has continued to be at odds with India due to issues such as border conflicts, it has traditionally maintained a favorable relationship with Pakistan, which has been at odds with India as well. Cooperation in the military sector, such as exporting weapons and transferring military technologies has also been reported. On the other hand, in recent years China has been committed to improving its relationship with India while also paying consideration to maintaining balance with Pakistan. Actively conducting mutual visits by top leaders with India, China states that relations with India are strategic and that the issue of border demarcation between the two countries, which once culminated in military clashes, is progressing. It is believed that the development of relations with India can be attributed to the two states' placing of importance on economic growth as well as responses to progressing U.S.–India relations.

Regarding military exchanges, China has conducted joint naval search and rescue exercises with Pakistan and India since 2003. In December 2007, "Hand-in-Hand 2007," the first anti-terrorism joint exercise since the 1962 China–India border conflict, was conducted between both countries' armies, and the anti-terrorism joint exercise "Hand-in-Hand 2008" was conducted in December 2008.

(4) Relations with EU Countries

Trade between China and EU countries has grown remarkably in recent years. For China, the EU is now as important a partner as Japan and the United States, especially in the economic field. China, at diplomatic

opportunities, strongly requests EU countries to lift their arms embargoes against China which have been imposed since the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

Regarding information technology, avionics, and air-independent propulsion systems for submarines and other areas, EU member countries possess more advanced technologies than that of China or Russia, which exports weapons to China. Therefore, if the EU arms embargo on China was lifted, it is possible that the weapons and military technologies of EU countries would transfer to China, and that they would be utilized as a bargaining chip to gain the edge in weapons transactions with Russia. Japan has expressed to the EU its objection to lifting the arms embargo on China, and it is necessary to pay continuous attention to future discussions within the EU.

6. International Transfer of Weapons

China has provided developing countries in Asia, Africa, and other areas with weapons such as small arms, tanks, and aircraft, and it is reported that the main recipients are Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, while weapons are also being exported to African countries such as Namibia and Zimbabwe. China has particularly close relations with Pakistan, and it has been reported that the two countries are working on joint programs including the development of JF-17 fighters. With regard to arms exports, China states that it does not interfere in the domestic affairs of importing countries. It has been pointed out that China is supplying weapons to countries that have problems in terms of democracy and human rights, and attention is paid as to whether China will improve the transparency of international weapons transfer in response to the concerns of the international community.

4. Military Capabilities of Taiwan

Taiwan, under the guidance of building the "hard rock" defense advocated by President Ma Jeou Ying, identifies prevention of war, homeland defense, response to contingencies, deterrence of conflict, and regional stability as the strategic objectives, and takes the military strategy of "resolute defense and credible deterrence."

Taiwan, for improved expertise of its military personnel and other purposes, aims to transform its armed forces currently consisting of drafted personnel and volunteers into all-volunteer forces, while reducing the total forces from 275,000 to 215,000 personnel by the end of 2014. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to introducing advanced technologies and improving joint operational capabilities. Additionally, in light of the serious damage that occurred from the typhoon in August 2009, the Taiwanese armed forces have resolved to strengthen its disaster prevention and disaster relief capabilities [131].

In August 2005, then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian announced a policy to increase the ratio of the defense budget to its GDP, which was approximately 2.4% in FY2005, up to 3% within three years, in order to meet increasing demands for national defense. Taiwan states that it reached a ratio of 3% in 2008 [132]. The Ma administration also sets out the policy that the defense budget will not go below 3% of the GDP, in principle [133]. (See Fig. I-2-3-5)

With regard to Taiwan's military power at present, ground forces include 41 Army brigades and three Navy Marine Corps brigades with a total of approximately 215,000 personnel. In addition, it is believed that the total of 1.65 million reserve personnel of air, naval, and ground forces would be available in case of war. Regarding naval capabilities, in addition to Kidd-class destroyers imported from the United States, Taiwan possesses relatively

modern frigates and other vessels. Regarding air capabilities, Taiwan possesses F-16 A/B fighters, Mirage 2000 fighters, Jing Guo fighters, etc.

In view of the fact that China is enhancing its missile, naval, and air forces, the Taiwanese military believes it still needs to modernize the equipment. In October 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense notified Congress of the possible sale of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles and AH-64D attack helicopters, and other equipment to Taiwan. In January 2010 it also notified Congress of the possible sales of PAC-3 missiles, UH-60 helicopters, Osprey-class mine hunters, and others. Taiwan also wishes to purchase F-16C/D fighter aircraft and other arms from the United States and the issue is to be observed.

Taiwan is also promoting the independent development of equipment. Tien Kung II surface-to-air missiles and Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles are deployed and it is believed that Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles are being developed in order to acquire long-range attack capabilities. The military capabilities of China and Taiwan are generally characterized as follows:

1) Regarding ground forces, China possesses an overwhelming number of troops; however, their capability of landing on and invading the island of Taiwan is limited. Nevertheless, China is making efforts to improve its landing and invasion capabilities in recent years, such as building large landing ships.
2) Regarding naval and air forces, China, as well as overwhelming Taiwan in terms of quantity, has been steadily modernizing its naval and air forces in recent years in the qualitative sphere, where Taiwan had superiority.
3) Regarding missile attack capabilities, China possesses numerous short-range ballistic missiles with a range that covers Taiwan, and Taiwan seems to have few effective countermeasures.

In addition to sizes of forces and performance and quantity of equipment, a comparison of military capabilities should take into account various factors such as objectives and characteristics of envisioned military operations, operational posture, proficiency of military personnel, and logistics. Nevertheless, as China is rapidly modernizing its military power, the overall military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in favor of China[134]. Attention should be paid to the modernization of both the Chinese and Taiwanese military capabilities and U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan.

(See Fig. I-2-3-6)

Fig. I-2-3-5 Changes in Taiwan's Defense Budget



Source: National Defense Reports of the Ministry of Defense of Taiwan, etc.

Fig. I-2-3-6
Changes in Modern Fighter Aircraft of China and Taiwan



Source: Military Balance (of respective year).

Section 4. Russia

1. General Situation

Russia claims that it has restored the level of social and economic development that was lost in the 1990s. It asserts that under President Dmitry Medvedev it will continue to pursue its national interests as a "strong state," while aiming to further the multipolarization of the international community.

One of the contributing factors to Russia recovering its national power to such an extent was the economic recovery propelled by price hikes of crude oil, its major export product. Russia takes the stance, in pursuing military modernization, that the country will not be drawn into the arms race and jeopardize economic development[135].

However, it is considered that there are various sorts of factors that might restrain further social and economic development, such as excessive dependence on the energy resource sector. Russia itself realizes that it must undertake a number of sweeping modernizations for the further development of the country. These include breaking free of its conventional resource-dependant economy, refashioning its economy and society on a fundamentally new foundation backed up by technical innovation, establishing a democratic political system, and eradicating corruption[136]. How Russia will overcome these challenges will be the focus of attention in the future[137].

2. Security and Defense Policies

1. Basic Posture

Approved in May 2009, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation through to 2020 sets out national and international objectives and strategic priorities for national security and for solid national development.

The National Security Strategy views that Russia's influence has been strengthened by a policy of promoting the creation of a multi-polar world and using the potential of Russia. The unilateral approach to the use of force and confrontation of major countries in international relations are listed as having a negative impact on the interests of Russia, and Russia expresses vigilance over the United States' plan to deploy a missile defense system in Europe as well as the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian border. Furthermore, it does not rule out the possibility that the conflicts over resources will be resolved by force. In order to ensure strategic security, Russia claims it will, under the central role of the United Nations in the international security, enhance cooperation with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and build an equal and full-fledged strategic partnership with the United States. Russia says it will use political, legal, economic, military and other instruments in order to uphold national sovereignty and interests.

As for the field of national defense, viewing as a threat the series of policies of some developed nations that pursue superiority in the military field, particularly in the area of strategy by developing high-tech weapons, non-nuclear strategic weapons, and global missile defense systems, Russia exemplifies, as challenges for strengthening defense capabilities, a shift to a new military structure by increasing the number of permanent

readiness units[138] and improving organizational and military alignment, while maintaining the capabilities of its strategic nuclear forces.

In February 2010 the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was formulated as a document substantiating the principles of the National Security Strategy in the military sphere[139]. This doctrine demonstrates the recognition that, while the probability of a large-scale war breaking out is on the decline, the military dangers facing Russia are increasing[140], which is evidenced by the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, as well as the construction and deployment of a strategic missile defense system. Furthermore, it also states that Russia will maintain permanent combat-readiness to deter and prevent conflict, and that in the event of war it will repel aggression and forcibly put a stop to military actions.

The doctrine regards nuclear weapons as an essential component for preventing the outbreak of nuclear wars and wars that use conventional weapons. It also claims that in addition to maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrent capacity[141], Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to an event where nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction were to be used against it or its allies or under circumstances wherein conventional weapons have been used against it and where the survival of the country itself is imperiled[142].

Furthermore, concerning the use of its army, it claims that Russia may use its armed forces outside of its territory for the purposes of peacekeeping operations pursuant to resolutions by the United Nations Security Council, etc., and of the protection of Russian citizens overseas[143]. Furthermore, it lists as characteristics of modern wars the frequent use of weapons comparable to nuclear weapons and high-tech weapons, the expansion of the scale of the use of weapons to aerospace areas, information wars, and it claims that it must equip each echelon of its forces with the requisite new equipment, such as new precision guidance weapons or information command systems.

2. Military Reform

Having gone through the chaos after the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with the difficulty in maintaining its military posture of the same level as during the Cold War era because of the severe economic situation and the decline in population in the 1990s, Russia began a full-scale process for military reform in 1997 by heeding the three pillars of reform: down-sizing, modernization, and professionalization.

Currently, Russia is showing progress in the modernization of military forces, including the reduction of the number of soldiers, structural reforms, the improvement of combat-readiness, and the development and introduction of new types of equipment.

The country's troop reduction goal, set in order to maintain an adequate troop level of one million personnel, is scheduled to be achieved by 2016[144]. In terms of structural reforms, thus far Russia has shifted to three services and three independent corps and has integrated military districts. In order to improve combat readiness for the high probability of a small-scale conflict, it is currently promoting a reorganization from its previous division-based command structure to a brigade-based command structure, while also moving forward with reorganizing all of its combat forces to permanent readiness units[145].

Regarding the modernization of military forces, in October 2006 the president approved the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015, and accordingly, approximately five trillion rubles (approximately 15 trillion yen) will be spent in the development and procurement of military equipment by 2015[146].

Furthermore, in order to make effective the combat readiness of permanent readiness units, Russia is promoting the introduction of a contract service system which secures personnel with high combat readiness capabilities by selecting them through contract from among the recruited military personnel[147]. Russia also recognizes as a challenge securing human resources who possess expert skills and knowledge through treatment improvement, etc.[148]

It is thought that Russia will continue these measures to improve conventional armed forces along with its efforts to maintain its strategic nuclear deterrent capability against the backdrop of the national defense budget that has been increasing in recent years.
(See Fig. I-2-4-1)

Fig. I-2-4-1 Russia's Defense Budget from FY2006 to 2010



Note: Official figures announced by Russian Government.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Status of Fifth Generation Fighters in Various Countries

While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter generations, a fifth generation fighter is considered to have more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations because they have been combined with the latest technologies, such as various types of avionics and stealth. The United States' F-22, which is currently considered to be the sole fifth generation fighter currently in use, possesses advanced stealth capabilities, supersonic cruising capabilities, sophisticated fire control capabilities, and more.

The nine countries of the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Norway are jointly developing the F-35 based on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. They are moving forward with the development of three types: the F-35A conventional takeoff and landing model, the F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing model, and the F-35C carrier-variant model.

Russia is currently developing its PAK FA (Future Frontline Aircraft System), which it is aiming to equip beginning in 2015, and conducted test flights for it in January 2010.

China is also believed to be developing a next generation fighter, with the opinion that it will begin operation around 2010.

3. Military Posture

1. Nuclear Forces

The Russian military emphasizes nuclear forces in order to supplement its conventional forces. In addition, it allots focus to nuclear forces to secure a global position in the context of an increasingly multipolar world, and as a balance with the nuclear forces of the United States. It is believed that Russia is working to maintain a state of immediate readiness for its nuclear force unit.

Russia is gradually reducing the number of its strategic nuclear missiles due to issues such as aging. However, it still possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) following the United States in scale, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and long range bombers (Tu-95MS Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks).

Regarding the update of nuclear missiles, Russia began to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons, beginning with the deployment of new Topol-M ICBM (SS-27) units in 2005. In addition, flight trials for the RS-24, which appear to be a multi-headed version of the Topol-M, started in 2007.

In April 2007, Russia launched a Borey-class ballistic missile submarine (nuclear powered) (SSBN); however, it is believed that construction of the new SSBN is behind its initial schedule. Russia also started a flight test in September 2005 for the new-type SLBM Bulava, which appears to mount Borey-class SSBNs. However, it has been pointed out that all flight tests as of 2008 have been unsuccessful, and they have not yet reached the stage of deployment.

In addition, the United States and Russia agreed in April 2009 to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, legally binding treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) before it expired on December 5 of that year[149]. In April 2010 the U.S. and Russian Presidents signed a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which stipulates reducing both side's deployed strategic warheads[150] to 1,550 and their deployed delivery platforms to 700 within seven years after entry into force of the treaty[151].

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped surface-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons deployed aboard naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces[152].

2. Conventional Forces and Other Issues

Russia recognizes the need to outfit its conventional forces with new equipment[153], and it is assumed that Russia implements the development and procurement of such equipment based on its state policy on military equipment for the period of 2007 to 2015. In January 2010 Russia carried out its first test flights for its so-called fifth generation fighters, and continued attention needs to be paid to trends in their future development[154].

Furthermore, the Russian armed forces have been striving to maintain their combat readiness by promoting the reorganization of all of their combat forces to permanent readiness units and have been carrying out large-scale exercises using its conventional forces in Europe. In addition, Russia is intensifying its military activities; its naval aircraft carrier units were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in 2008 as well as in 2007; it has taken part in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden; in 2008 its naval vessels visited Central and South American countries for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

However, as there are issues such as difficulties in securing personnel and lax military discipline due to the decrease in the population of young men as well as poor living conditions for military personnel, the modernization of conventional forces is not necessarily sufficient.

As for the future Russian armed forces, since there are opaque elements which may influence Russia's future economic and social development, it is necessary to continue to observe their future trends.

4. Russian Forces in the Vicinity of Japan

1. General Situation

The current presence of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is comparatively much smaller than it was at its peak. However, a considerable scale of military forces, including nuclear forces, still remains in the region. Russian military operations in the vicinity of Japan appear to be increasingly active, including exercises and drills.

Russia has conducted military exercises in the Far East region, including "Vostok", which is a large-scale anti-terrorism exercise that has been held almost biennially, and "Mobility 2004", which was an exercise for the

Fig. I-2-4-2 Russian Military Deployment in Areas Close to Japan



Notes: 1. represents the number of divisions and brigades.
2. represents the locations of main naval bases.
3. represents the locations of main air bases.
4. Figures shown are approximate.

country's permanent combat-ready troops to deploy from the western part of Russia to the Far East region. A large-scale exercise, "Vostok2010," was held in 2010 with many units from other than Far East region, with the aim of verifying the achievement of military reform through the reorganization of command structure etc [155].

With regard to activities done throughout Russia and with the involvement of the entire Russian military, "Stability 2008", a major joint strategic military exercise involving the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile, was conducted in 2008, and in "Zapad 2009", a major joint strategic military exercise conducted with Belarus in 2009, Russia is thought to have verified the new command organization indicated in the Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation [156].

Given that the overall Russian armed forces set their basis of operation on maintaining the combat readiness of their strategic nuclear unit as well as dealing with conflicts with the inter-theater mobility of its permanent readiness units [157], it is necessary to continue paying attention to the positioning and trends of the Russian armed forces in the Far East region with the movement of units in other regions also in mind.
(See Fig. I-2-4-2)

(1) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s, and approximately 30 Tu-95MS Bear long range bombers are mainly deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway. In addition, SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained.

As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, a variety of weapons are deployed in the Far East region, including medium-range bombers such as Tu-22M Backfires and sea- (undersea) and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 80 Tu-22 are deployed in the west of Lake Baikal and coastal areas, including the area across from Sakhalin.

(2) Ground Forces

Ground forces in the Far East region have continued to shrink. As part of its military reforms, it is believed that Russia is promoting a reorganization from a division-based command structure to a brigade-based one, while also reorganizing all of its combat forces to permanent readiness units. They now consist of 15 divisions and brigades and approximately 90,000 personnel [158]. Also, the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Navy has a naval infantry division with an amphibious capability.
(See Fig. I-2-4-3)

Fig. I-2-4-3
Changes in the Russian Ground Forces in the Far East Region



Source: Based on the Military Balance of each corresponding year and others.

(3) Naval Forces

The Pacific Fleet is stationed and deployed from its main bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk. The fleet comprises approximately 240 ships with a total displacement in the region of about 550,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear-powered submarines) with a total displacement of

approximately 280,000 tons. The forces have been scaled down.
(See Fig. I-2-4-4)

(4) Air Forces

In terms of air forces in the Far Eastern region, Russia deploys approximately 570 combat aircraft from its Air Force and Navy. This number continues to shrink, but existing models are being modified to improve their capabilities.
(See Fig. I-2-4-5)

2. Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories

Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan's Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory. However, the numbers of military personnel are considered to be far less than at past peak times. Nevertheless, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are still deployed in the region.

The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, and at the Japan-Russia Summit Meeting held in 1997, then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would neither increase nor decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to maintain the status quo.

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are an integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.

3. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

The number of exercises carried out by Russian ground forces in areas adjacent to Japan decreased sharply from peak numbers; however, some activities seem to be on the rise again [159].

Fig. I-2-4-4
Changes in the Russian Naval Forces in the Far East Region



Fig. I-2-4-5
Changes in the Russian Air Forces in the Far East Region
(Fighters and Bombers)





A Tu-160 long-range bomber flying near the Hokkaido area

With regard to naval vessels, their activities seem to be on the rise in recent years. For example, joint exercises and counter-piracy operations have been carried out, in extended voyages by vessels deployed in the Pacific Fleet, and nuclear submarines carry out patrols [160].

Regarding aircraft, since the resumption of patrol activities by its strategic aviation units in 2007, Russia has been increasing flights by long distance bombers and carrying out flights of Tu-95MS and Tu-160 long range bombers which are refueled in mid-flight. Moreover, due to an upturn in its fuel situation, etc., pilot training time is on an upward trend, and there also seems to be an increase in activities such as flights approaching Japan and exercises and training [161].
(See Fig. I-2-4-6)

Fig. I-2-4-6
Changes in the Number of Scrambles against Russian Aircraft



5. External Relations

1. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States

(1) General Situation

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by President Dmitry Medvedev in July 2008, which sets out the basic foreign policy of Russia, presents the view that Russia's international status has been elevated as one of the influential centers in the trend toward multipolarity and lists the following three basic foreign policies: (a) to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, (b) to commit to resolving global issues multilaterally in accordance with the rule of international law, and (c) to form friendly relations with neighboring counties. Russia identifies the development of bilateral/multilateral cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the first priority of foreign policy [162], and it maintains relationships including multi-lateral frameworks such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) [163].

Russia has promoted military integration with CIS member countries, stating that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS; Russia has dispatched its federal forces to remain in Ukraine, Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia), Moldova (Transdniester), Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz; it has also concluded agreements to form a joint air defense system [164] and joint border security treaties with CIS member countries [165].
(See Fig. I-2-4-7)

With increasing activities by Islamic armed forces in Central Asia/Caucasus, Russia pursued military cooperation centered on counterterrorism measures in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) [166]. Since U.S. and other military forces launched the military campaign in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001, Russia has permitted U.S. assistance or U.S. military presence in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Georgia [167]. On the other hand, in 2003, Russia established an air force base in Kyrgyz to enhance the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force. Russia also had a division (approximately 8,000 personnel) stationed in Tajikistan, and later made an agreement with Tajikistan in October 2004, securing a Russian military

base in the country. Furthermore, in June 2009 a permanent, joint rapid reaction force was created with the enhanced function of the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force [168].

(2) Georgia Conflict

The Georgia conflict is the incident that broke out in August 2008, touched off by the armed conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia and introduced a large-scale armed intervention by Russia, against the backdrop of Georgia's suppression on movements seeking separation and independence by South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the fact that relations between Georgia, which was taking a pro-U.S./Europe policy, and Russia had grown strained. With mediation by the European Union (EU), the conflict itself ended after five days. However, the relationship between Russia and Europe–U.S., which had been appealing for a peaceful resolution based on the principle of Georgia's territorial integrity, deteriorated as Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Moreover, Russia has also displayed moves to strengthen military cooperation with South Ossetia and Abkhazia [169]. How Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia will influence the movement of secession and independence within the CIS, such as the Chechen Republic [170] in the Russian territory, Nogorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Transdniester in Morvdova is worthy of attention.

Fig. I-2-4-7 CIS Member States

2. Relations with the United States

Russia agreed with the United States in April 2009 to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, legally binding treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace START I[171].

Russia strongly opposed an agreement that had been reached to begin full-scale negotiations for the deployment of the ballistic missile defense (MD) system being promoted by the United States, part of which would be deployed in the Czech Republic and Poland, on the grounds that this system would be pointed at Russia and has the potential to negatively impact its own nuclear deterrent capabilities. However, in September 2009 the United States announced that it was revising its plan to deploy the MD system in Europe[172], in response to which Russia assessed it at a certain value. But this is not to imply that the United States has suspended its plan to deploy MD in Europe itself.

In addition, the Presidents of the United States and Russia signed a new treaty in April 2010 on reducing strategic arms to replace the START I. With regard to the MD system, this treaty stipulates that there exists an interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that the current strategic defensive arms will not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of both the United States and Russia. The treaty also prohibits using launchers of ICBM, etc., for MD, and using launchers of MD for ICBM, etc. However, Russia's interpretation is that the treaty will become invalid in the event that the United States develops its capabilities pertaining to the MD quantitatively or qualitatively and threatens the potential capabilities of its nuclear forces[173]. Attention will be paid to future Russian responses as the United States' MD plan progresses further.

3. Relations with Europe and NATO

Russia, as a rule, has been against the accession to NATO of former Soviet Union countries as well as Central and Eastern European countries.

However, Russia took steps to build a new cooperative relationship with NATO following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and within the framework of the NATO–Russia Council (NRC), Russia participates in decision making to a certain degree and acts as an equal partner in areas of common interest[174]. Meanwhile, Russia was dissatisfied that NATO countries would not ratify the Application Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)[175] because Russian forces would not withdraw from Georgia and Moldova. Thereafter, discussions were held in such forums as the NRC; however, Russia suspended the CFE Treaty in December 2007, halting inspections based on the treaty. Russia expressed concerns that Ukraine and Georgia reached an agreement with NATO about their future membership at the NATO summit meeting in April 2008[176], and NATO's announcement in April 2009 that it would hold multilateral drills in Georgia. But foreign minister-level NRC meetings were resumed in June 2009, and it is believed that NATO–Russian relations, which had been at a standstill because of the Georgia conflict, have returned to normal for the time being.

In addition, Russia has also proposed a new European security treaty which would get rid of the existing NATO-centered security framework and set out new basic principles for security in the European and Atlantic Ocean region[177].

4. Relations with Asian Countries

Russia recognizes that the significance of the Asia-Pacific region is increasing within its multi-pronged foreign policy, and the region is also important from the viewpoint of economic development in Siberia and the Far East, anti-terrorist measures, and security[178]. The country is currently implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberian oil to the Far East and developing natural gas fields in Sakhalin. In order to develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social infrastructure, it is important for Russia to enhance economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries including Japan and China. For this reason, Russia emphasizes relations with these countries in its foreign policy and has joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)[179], the ARF, and the SCO[180] (See Section 3-3). Additionally, Russia signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004.

5. Exportation of Arms

Russia seems to actively promote the export of arms not only to maintain the infrastructure of its military industry and to make economic profit, but also to help promote better foreign policy. The country's export value has been increasing in recent years. In January 2007, the Russian government granted the exclusive right to export arms to the Rosoboronexport State Corporation[181] as part of its on-going efforts to improve its export system. In addition, Russia regards the military industry as an integral part of the nation's military organization and is committed to improving and further developing the military industry by such measures as promoting the integration of aircraft companies such as Sukhoi, MiG, and Tupolev.

Russia has exported its jet fighters and warships to countries including India, Algeria, ASEAN member countries, China, and Venezuela[182]. In addition, Russia signed agreements with North Korea and Iran on military technology cooperation in 2001.

Section 5 Southeast Asia

1. General Situation

Southeast Asia holds key positions for traffic linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans, such as the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and is an important region for Japan. The countries in this region are making efforts to achieve political stability and steady economic growth, and lately have realized overall economic development to varying degrees. Such economic development has deepened the relationships of interdependence within and outside the region. However, this region still has destabilizing factors, including the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, ethnic minority issues, separatist and independence movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Moreover, there are still incidents such as piracy by which the safe passage of ships is obstructed, though the number of incidents of piracy has been on the decline in recent year[183]. In order to cope with these problems, the countries in the region are working to build sufficient military forces not only for traditional national defense but also to address new security issues such as anti-terrorism and piracy. In recent years, against the backdrop of economic development, they have been modernizing their military forces, particularly their navy and air forces.

In this region, the United States is developing relationships of confidence with Southeast Asian countries and working to strengthen their readiness through numerous joint military exercises such as the multinational military exercise Cobra Gold and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT)[184] and the provision of military technology and military assistance.
(See Fig. I-2-5-1)

2. Defense Policy of Each Country

1. Singapore

Given the concentration of people and their property in limited national land space and deepening economic interdependence with other countries, Singapore identifies diplomacy and deterrence as the twin pillars of national defense for maintaining peace and stability, and gives high priority to national defense, with defense spending accounting for about one-quarter of its national budget[185]. As its national defense policy, Singapore declares that it will strengthen dialogue, confidence-building and cooperation with armed forces of countries within and outside Southeast Asia and promoting Total Defense[186]. Faced with the need to appropriately and flexibly respond to war, terrorism, peacekeeping activities, and humanitarian crises, Singapore is working on the transformation of the 3rd Generation Singapore Forces to implement effective responses with limited resources, and is striving to modernize equipment and enhance operational capabilities[187].

Singapore is making aggressive efforts to modernize military equipment, including the earliest introduction in Southeast Asia of early-warning aircraft, air refueling tankers and a submarine rescue mother ship[188]. Regarding enhancement of operational capability, it conducts training by stationing its troops overseas on an ongoing basis to overcome constraints on training areas due to limited land space[189].

Singapore makes efforts for regional cooperation based on friendly cooperative relations with other Southeast Asian countries, including the conclusion of defense cooperation agreements with countries within and outside the region[190]. Also, aiming to contribute to the stability and development in the region, Singapore supports the United States' presence in the Asia-Pacific. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in 1990 permitting the United States to use military facilities in Singapore. This allows U.S. forces to promptly respond to emergencies in the Middle East and Africa. The United States ranks Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner. In July 2005, the two countries signed the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of

America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security to further strengthen cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, joint military exercises and training, and policy dialogues.

Singapore has been actively participating in international peace cooperation activities as well. Though on a limited scale, in addition to U.N. peacekeeping activities, it has dispatched personnel, aircraft, and naval vessels to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden [191].

2. Malaysia

Malaysia, surrounded by other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), considers that its strategic interests have close ties with those of countries in the region and that any threat to ASEAN or an ASEAN country is a threat to Malaysia [192].

For this reason, Malaysia regards the strengthening of bilateral relations with neighboring countries, strengthening of ASEAN, cooperation with Islamic countries, South-South cooperation, and the upholding of the

Fig. I-2-5-1 Comparison of Forces Strength and Defense Budget between Southeast Asia and Japan/China/ROK 2009



Source: Military Balance 2010, Jane's Fighting Ships 2009–2010.

Notes: 1. The size of each block indicates relative size using Japan as the base size.
2. For Japan, the force strength shows the actual strength of each Self-Defense Force as of the end of FY2009; the number of combat aircraft is the sum of the number of combat aircraft of the ASDF (excluding transport aircraft) and that of the MSDF (fixed-wing aircraft only).
3. The national defense budget of China is from the Finance Minister's Budget Report to the National People's congress in 2009.
4. The national defense budget of the ROK is from the ROK National Defense White Paper 2009.
5. The national defense budget of China and the ROK is expressed in U.S. dollars and is calculated at the FY2009 Ministry of Finance announced-exchange rates of 103 yen to the dollar, 15 yen to the yuan, and 85 yen to 1,000 won.
6. The Japanese national defense budget is expressed in U.S. dollars converting 2009 figures at the FY2008 Ministry of Finance announced-exchange rate of 103 yen to the dollar.

principle of noninterference in internal affairs, as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Malaysia's defense policy revolves around the fundamental principles of Self-Reliance, Regional Cooperation and Foreign Aid [193]. Malaysia sets forth deterrence and Total Defense as their defense concepts and regards a strategy to repel aggression and the buildup of highly reliable military force as important and the involvement of not only the military but also all the people as necessary.

Malaysia conducts bilateral military exercises and promotes military cooperation with other countries, including the United States, Australia, and India, but does not take part in multilateral exercises other than those under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) [194], and maintains the national security system based on the FPDA.

Furthermore, like other Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia or the Philippines, Malaysia actively participates in U.N. peacekeeping activities [195], and has also sent its troops for antipiracy measures in the Gulf of Aden [196].

3. Indonesia

While there is a perception that within the next several years there is yet to be any indication of a conventional military threat from outside, the intensity of trans-national security threats has actually significantly increased in the past few years. Indonesia states that it treats non-military security issues as a part of national defense issues [197]. To that end, Indonesia is promoting Total Defense through both military defense and non-military defense activities under the idea that all people utilizing all resources available, maintaining Indonesia's independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unification. Furthermore, Indonesia is implementing military reform, which includes the prohibition of the involvement of military officers in politics and business activities, and the separation of military and police roles.

In foreign policy, Indonesia emphasizes cooperation with other ASEAN states and pursues independent and proactive diplomacy as its basic idea. In its national defense policy, Indonesia makes it clear that it does not rely on other nations for the safety of the nation and also is not part of any defense pacts with other countries. However, Indonesia regards defense and military cooperation with the United States as significant for the development of the country's defense force, not only for the interest of Indonesia but also for its regional security interests [198], and has strengthened cooperative relations with the United States in such fields as military education and training, and military equipment procurement in recent years.

Though International Military Education and Training (IMET) with the United States was temporarily suspended due to disputes over the activities of Indonesian forces in Timor-Leste [199], the United States in November 2005 decided to resume IMET and also decided to resume arms exports to Indonesia. In February 2008, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Indonesia and held talks with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and then Minister of Defence Juwono Sudarsono, where they agreed to strengthen cooperation in counter-piracy activities and counterterrorism as well as military cooperation. In January 2009, the Indonesian Navy and the U.S. Navy conducted a joint exercise of their Special Forces on the island of Java. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Indonesia as part of the tour of Asian countries, her first foreign trip as top U.S. diplomat, and reached an agreement with then Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda to build a comprehensive partnership in various areas, including security cooperation, and to further strengthen the bilateral relationship.

Indonesia believes that the participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities leads to the elevation of its status in the international community, and has dispatched a total of some 18,000 military personnel on 43 contingents [200]. Between March and late November 2009, Indonesia sent its surface force for the first time to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), including the country's state-of-the-art Sigma-class corvette [201].

4. Thailand

Under its flexible omnidirectional diplomatic policy, Thailand pursues cooperation with other Southeast Asian countries and coordination with major countries, including Japan, the United States and China. Thailand's national defense policy consists of the two elements of 1) enhancement of the defense capabilities of the armed forces, and coordination and integration with other government institutions; and 2) strengthening of security cooperation relationships with neighboring countries, the regional community, and the international community. On this basis, it has adopted the national defense strategy that revolves around the three pillars of Security Cooperation, United Defense, and Active Defense[202]. Thailand is promoting close security cooperation with neighboring countries, the buildup of defense capabilities, and reform of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence.

Thailand believes that while risks of traditional threats such as a large-scale invasion have decreased, the risk of non-traditional threats such as international terrorism are on the rise, and in particular the insurgency in southern Thailand by separatists poses a national challenge going forward[203]. Thailand also has border disputes with neighboring Myanmar and Cambodia, and the disputes occasionally heighten tensions between Thailand and Cambodia. The insurgency in the south is raising realistic concerns for Thailand, but in the area of build-up of defense capabilities, it is modernizing the armed forces centering on the naval and air forces and is the sole owner of an aircraft carrier in Southeast Asia.[204]

With respect to relations with the United States, which serves as the core of security cooperation, Thailand believes the presence of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region provides security assurances for many countries as well as security concerns for some states[205]. Thailand has established a good relationship with the United States by maintaining cooperation with the United States since the Cold War era. Since the conclusion of the Military Assistance Agreement in 1950, Thailand and the United States maintained the cooperative relationship, and they have been conducting the joint military exercise Cobra Gold since 1982. Cobra Gold became a multinational exercise in 2000, and includes noncombat missions such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief[206].

In addition to U.N. peacekeeping operations, Thailand has been actively engaged in international peace cooperation activities, dispatching its troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2003, the United States designated Thailand as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA)[207] in appreciation of its proactive participation in the U.S.-led war on terror. The United States also views Thailand, together with Japan, Korea, Australia, and the Philippines, as the cornerstone of peace and security in Asia[208].

5. Vietnam

In the Cold War era, the Soviet Union was the largest donor of assistance for Vietnam, and Russia owned a naval base in the Bay of Cam Ranh. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam rapidly expanded its diplomatic relations, and established diplomatic ties with the United States. At present, Vietnam pursues an omnidirectional diplomatic policy and states that it will actively participate in international and regional cooperation in order to build friendly relations with all countries under its foreign policy principles of multilateral participation and respect for diversity. Based on its experiences with the independence war, Vietnam emphasizes that other countries must strictly respect its independence, national sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity, and declares that it will neither join any military alliance nor give any foreign country permission to have military bases in Vietnam. Vietnam advocates a posture of all-people national defense[209], and states that maintaining a peaceful and stable environment for socio-economic development, achieving industrialization and modernization, and building a socialism-based market economy are its vital national interests and the objectives of its national defense policy.

Vietnam believes that a state of tension which may lead to armed conflict remains unsettled in Southeast Asia and that territorial disputes are becoming complicated; in particular, those relating to sovereignty and national interests in the South China Sea have been on the rise[210]. Vietnam highly appreciates the United Nations and its

peacekeeping activities, and insists that international cooperation in such areas as counterterrorism and the war against terror should be carried out within the framework of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

Vietnam has maintained close ties with Russia particularly in the area of national defense since the Cold War era, and aside from the use of the Bay of Cam Ranh by Russia, Vietnam depends almost totally on Russia for its military equipment. In 2001, Vietnam and Russia signed the Joint Statement for a Strategic Partnership, and agreed to strengthen cooperation in the area of national defense.

Regarding relations with the United States, the two countries concluded an agreement on International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program in June 2005 and major progress was witnessed in bilateral military cooperation. In June 2006, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Vietnam, and agreement was reached to expand military exchanges between the two countries. Many U.S. defense-related personnel, including the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, frequently visited Vietnam between 2006 and 2007, and in April 2007, the United States partially lifted its arms embargo on Vietnam[211]. In October 2008, the first strategic dialogue was held between Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Mark Kimmitt to build up cooperative relations between the two countries in political, security, defense and other areas. Further, in December 2009, Vietnamese Minister of Defence Phung Quang Thanh visited the United States.

6. The Philippines

The Philippines perceives terrorism by domestic anti-government armed groups as the most serious threat to national security. Since 2004, the country has been implementing reform programs in the areas of defense planning, improvement of operational and training capabilities, reform of military structures and modernization of forces in accordance with a defense reform program called the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR).

The Philippines and the United States have a history of a close relationship and maintain a long-standing, tight military cooperation relationship[212]. The two countries maintain the cooperative relationship, with the continuation of the mutual defense treaty and military assistance agreement, even after the eviction of U.S. forces in 1992[213]. The two countries have been conducting the large-scale annual joint military exercise Balikatan since 2000 as counterterrorism measures against terrorist groups including the Abu Sayyaf Group[214]. The Philippines and the United States have also conducted other joint exercises, including Balance Piston and Talon Vision. The United States designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), as the United States views the Philippines as the cornerstone of peace and security in Asia[215].

3. Military Modernization in the Region

In recent years, Southeast Asian countries have been modernizing their militaries against a backdrop of economic development and other factors.

In May 2009, Singapore took the first delivery of four U.S.-made F-15 fighters for the detachments in Idaho, United States. Singapore plans to have a total of 24 F-15 fighter jets, all of which are scheduled to be delivered by 2012. Singapore has also participated in the joint development program of the F-35 fighter, the first Asian country to do so. As for the naval strength of Singapore, all six French-made Formidable-class frigates with stealth capability were commissioned in 2009. Singapore also purchased two secondhand Swedish-made submarines, which are scheduled to be delivered by the end of 2010 after upgrading and refurbishing operations.

Malaysia started introducing Russian-made Su-30 fighters from 2007, and the delivery of all 18 of them was completed in 2009. As for naval strength, Malaysia's first submarine (the Scorpene-class submarine jointly developed by France and Spain) was commissioned in January 2009, and a second one in November 2009.



The launching ceremony of an Archer-class submarine (Singapore)
[Ministry of Defence, Singapore]

The commissioning of a Scorpene-class submarine (second ship) in Malaysia
[Royal Malaysian Navy]

Malaysia also placed orders for six German-made Kedah-class corvettes, and all of them are scheduled to be commissioned by the end of 2010.

Indonesia introduced two each of Russian-made Su-27 and Su-30 fighters in 2003, and plans to ultimately own a total of five of each. Regarding naval strength, in 2009 Indonesia completed the commissioning of four Dutch-made Sigma-class corvettes. In addition, in September 2007, Indonesia agreed with Russia to strengthen military technological and defense cooperation, and signed an agreement to purchase $1 billion worth of Russian-made weapons with government loans. The agreement reportedly covers such weapons as two Kilo-class submarines.

Thailand in 2007 decided to purchase Swedish-made JAS-39 fighters as well as aircraft with early-warning systems. Thailand does not own any submarines at present, but it is reported to have started considering the purchase of a submarine[216].

Vietnam purchased four Su-30 fighters in 2004, and there are reports that the country is making an additional purchase of the fighter jet[217]. In December 2009, Vietnam was reported to have concluded a contract to purchase six Kilo-class submarines from Russia[218].

Many Southeast Asian countries have expanded the growth of their defense spending in recent years, and this is considered one of factors that make the modernization of military equipment possible. Aside from this factor, there are views that sensitive relations among Southeast Asian countries to the military buildup, the growing influence of China, and the limited effectiveness of the regional security institutions as a confidence-building measure, are behind the ongoing military modernization in Southeast Asia[219].

4. Relations with China

There are currently territorial disputes between Southeast Asian countries and China over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands[220]. At the Summit Meeting between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China held in November 2002, ASEAN member countries and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea[221], which aims for a peaceful settlement of the territorial issue. However, no major development has been seen in the drafting of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea[222], which would provide more concrete behavior and possess legal binding force. Movements observed in recent years with regard to the relationship with the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands include an increase in activities of neighboring countries claiming ownership and subsequent protests against these claims[223].

In recent years, China has actively pushed the related countries to give priority to the development of resources in the waters surrounding the Spratly Islands, setting aside the territorial issue. For example, in September 2004, China and the Philippines agreed on a joint oil field exploration in the waters of the Spratly Islands, and in March 2005, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam reached an agreement on the launch of a joint exploration of oil

and natural gas in the South China Sea. However, the Philippines did not agree to the renewal/extension of the agreement and withdrew from the agreement in July 2008.

In recent years, China has been making efforts to develop cooperative relations with Southeast Asian countries. The first ASEAN–China Summit was held in 1997, and at the 11th ASEAN-China Summit in 2007, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that China is "ready to enhance cooperation with ASEAN in non-traditional security fields, and will fund training such as the maritime investigation training in the Malacca Strait."

In the area of national defense, mutual visits of senior military officials and exchanges and cooperation between troops of ASEAN countries and China are under way, centering on bilateral exchanges. China conducted the first joint search and rescue exercise with Thailand in 2004, the first of its kind with any Southeast Asian nation. A joint patrol was launched in the Gulf of Tonkin by Vietnamese and Chinese naval vessels in April 2006. In 2007 and 2008, the special forces of China and Thailand came together to conduct a combined counterterrorism military exercise[224]. In 2009, China and Singapore conducted a joint counterterrorism exercise[225]. Further, in 2007, China provided Cambodia with patrol boats as an assistance package, and in 2008, China reportedly concluded a contract to sell two patrol boats to Timor-Leste.

5. Regional Cooperation

Southeast Asian nations utilize ASEAN as a multilateral security framework for the region. In addition to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a dialogue forum on the political and security sectors in the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM) has been held annually since 2006[226]. Furthermore, at the 13th ASEAN Summit in 2007, the ASEAN Charter was adopted, containing the basic principles for establishing the ASEAN Community by 2015[227], and entered into force in December 2008 after the completion of the ratification procedures of all member states. At the 15th ASEAN Summit held in October 2009, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was formally established, underscoring steady progress toward the establishment of the ASEAN Community in 2015. At the same Summit, ASEAN set forth its policy of holding summit meetings with the United States and Russia as part of the dialogue with extra-regional countries[228], and it also expressed its appreciation of the United States' accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a strong signal of its involvement in peace and security of the region[229]. At the ASEAN summit meeting in April 2010 an agreement was made to hold an expanded ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM+8), and in addition they mentioned holding summit meetings with the United States and Russia, continuing efforts to strengthen relations with countries outside the region.

In the Southeast Asian region, multilateral cooperation is being promoted in frameworks other than ASEAN as well, in order to deal with a wide variety of security issues such as transnational problems including terrorism and piracy.

In July 2004, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore started the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols for vigilance against pirates in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In this effort, the naval forces of the three countries patrol their own territories in cooperation with each other. Subsequently, in September 2005, the countries launched their joint coastline airborne patrols code-named Eyes in the Sky. In September 2008, Thailand joined these schemes. As another counter-piracy measure, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships

The 4th ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (Vietnam)
[Ministry of Defence, Singapore]

and Asia (ReCAAP)[230], proposed and led by Japan, entered into effect in September 2006, promoting the sharing of information concerning piracy and establishment of cooperation systems.

Since 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have conducted joint exercises including maritime interdiction training within the framework of the Five Powers Defense Arrangements (FPDA).

6. Regional Issues

In Southeast Asia, while intra-regional cooperation is in progress, some unstable factors remain.

In July 2008, the tension between Cambodia and Thailand intensified over the disputed border area near the Preah Vihear Temple, and the opposing forces exchanged gun fire in October 2008, resulting in a number of deaths and injuries on both sides. Later, the field commanders of both sides held talks and agreed to conduct joint patrols around the temple, in an effort to alleviate the tense situation. Subsequently, however, sporadic exchanges of gun fire have occurred between the two sides.

In the Philippines, armed conflicts between government forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have continued for some 40 years. Progress was made in the peace process following the ceasefire agreement of 2003 and activities of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) from 2004[231]. Since August 2008, however, armed clashes intensified again over the settlement of the pending land problem, and after Malaysia, one of the principal members, withdrew from the IMT, the IMT suspended its operations at the end of November 2008. Subsequently, in December 2008, the Philippine Government and the MILF agreed to put together the IMT again, reopening negotiations for a peace agreement. Following this development, Japan and Malaysia dispatched personnel to the IMT again, and the IMT officially resumed its activities in Mindanao[232]. Going forward, it is desired that a final agreement on peace in Mindanao will be reached at an early date[233].

In Timor-Leste, Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia dispatched their troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in April 2006 in response to a worsening security situation, and subsequently in August 2006, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established[234].

In February 2008, President José Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao of Timor-Leste were attacked by armed groups. Since then, however, the security situation has been stabilized as a result of continued political and economic efforts. The mandate of UNMIT was extended to February 26, 2011, from the standpoint of promoting peace, stability, and development of newly born nation[235]. In the meantime, Timor-Leste aspires to gain accession to ASEAN by 2012.

Section 6. South Asia

1. India

1. General Situation

India is surrounded by many countries and has long coastlines totaling 7,600km. The country has the world's second largest population of more than one billion following China and has great influence in the South Asian region. Also, it has a geographic position that is significant in maritime traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. India is expected to play an important role in maritime security.

India has multiple ethnic groups, religions, languages and cultures within it, but it has an administration elected through free and fair elections under the multi-party system and is the world's largest democratic nation[236]. Also, India shares a lot with major developed countries including Japan in terms of fundamental values and systems, such as liberalism, democracy and a market economy.

2. National Defense Policy and Security Situation

India, as its national security policies, lists the possession of military capabilities to protect national interests and the minimum level deterrent against nuclear threats; response to various security challenges ranging from terrorism and low-intensity conflicts to conventional wars and nuclear wars; and enhancement of international cooperation to deal with new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction[237].

In fact, India actively participates in peacebuilding assistance, including U.N. peacekeeping operations. As of May 2010, about 9,000 personnel are involved in 9 peacekeeping operations[238]. India has been sending naval vessels off the coast of Somalia to conduct coast guard surveillance operations against piracy since October 2008[239].

India intends to maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence while committing to no first use on nuclear weapons and maintaining the unilateral moratorium (temporary suspension) on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test conducted in 1998. In addition, in its nuclear doctrine released in January 2003, India expressed its commitment to continuing export controls of nuclear weapons and missile-related materials and technologies, and participating in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, as well as to creating a nuclear-free world. However, the doctrine declares that India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against India by biological or chemical weapons.

The Indian Armed Forces include ground forces of 13 corps with approximately 1,100,000 personnel; naval forces of two fleets of about 150 warships, totaling approximately 350,000 tons, and air forces of 19 combat air wings and others with roughly 670 combat aircraft.

India is expanding the procurement of equipment from foreign countries and also joint development as the Russian and former Soviet equipment which comprises 70% of its arsenal becomes obsolete. India currently possesses one aircraft carrier, and in addition to promoting a construction plan for one new domestic aircraft carrier, will introduce another aircraft carrier from Russia upon completion of repair work as explained later. In July 2009, India's first domestic nuclear submarine was launched. Further, it is reported that one Russian Acula class nuclear submarine will be supplied to India during this year. In addition, in conjunction with the retirement of the now-degraded MiG-21 fighter-interceptors, India is planning for procurement of multi-purpose fighter-interceptors, and in February 2007 Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony announced that the country would procure 126 multi-purpose fighter-interceptors through a bidding process[240].

India is currently building up a ballistic missile that could load a nuclear warhead. In September 2003, India announced that it would operationally deploy the Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile with the army[241]. In February 2010, it succeeded in the fourth test launch of the Agni-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile and it

is reported that India had begun development of the Agni-5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)[242].

India is working toward the practical realization of ballistic missile defense as a defensive response measure to threats against the homeland. In November 2006, December 2007, and again in March 2009, missile interceptor test was conducted, and reported to be a success[243]. India has started negotiations with the United States on its ballistic missile defense system[244].

(See Fig. I-2-6-1)

Fig. I-2-6-1 Military Forces of India and Pakistan (approximate)



Notes: 1. Figures based on Military Balance 2010.
2. Combat aircraft include naval aircraft.

3. Foreign Policies

(1) Basic Posture

India has been promoting economic liberalization and reform since the 1990s, and is actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy, thereby steadily increasing its presence in the international community. India's rapid expansion of military cooperation with friendly nations not only strengthens the security environment of the South Asia region, but also is expected to enhance security worldwide. In recent years, India has been making efforts to expand military exchanges, such as by conducting joint exercises with various other countries[245].

(2) Relations with the United States

India is actively striving to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States, while the United States is also promoting the expansion of involvement in India in line with the economic growth of India, thus leading to increasingly stronger mutual relationships in various fields.

In July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States and made a joint statement with then U.S. President George W. Bush that the relationship between the two countries would transform into

a global partnership through which they would cooperate in the fields of space exploration, nuclear energy for civilian applications, and military and non-military technologies. Subsequently in March 2006, President Bush in turn visited India for the first time in six years as president of the United States [246], and agreed with Prime Minister Singh to strategically strengthen bilateral relations. Further, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited India in July 2009 [247], and Prime Minister Singh made an official visit to the United States in November of the same year for talks with U.S. President Barack Obama [248].

As for cooperation in civilian nuclear activities, in October 2008, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and then Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.

In the security field, in June 2005, then Indian Defense Minister Mukherjee and then U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year military agreement called the New Framework for the U.S.–India Defense Relationship, based on the recognition that the U.S.–India defense relationship is an important pillar in the mutually beneficial relations between the two countries, which are changing over time. In March 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense announced its intention to enhance cooperation with India on security issues, including maritime security [249]. Secretary of Defense Gates visited India in January 2010 for talks with Prime Minister Singh and Defense Minister Antony to discuss antiterrorism measures, Indian–Pakistan relations, the problem of Afghanistan, and overall regional security.

India and the United States have carried out active military exchanges, including joint military exercises. The "Malabar 09" exercise was carried out with additional participation from Japan off the coast of Okinawa during April and May of 2009 [250]. The "Yudh Abhyas 2009" joint training exercises were carried out in India in October 2009 with participation by Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers from the United States to train for the War on Terror [251].

India has expressed an interest in U.S. weapons. India has already purchased a used amphibious ship from the United States [252], and the United States has approved the sale of a P-8 patrol aircraft to India [253] in March 2009.

(3) Relations with China

India has been trying to improve relations with China through mutual visits by leaders despite the Tibet issue and unresolved national border issues between the two countries as well as concerns over Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles and the modernization of its military force, including naval forces. When then Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan visited India in March 2004, the two countries agreed on the expansion of military exchanges. Subsequently in December 2004, based on this agreement, a visit to China by an Indian Chief of Army Staff was made for the first time in 10 years. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, the two countries reached an agreement on establishing a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity [254]. In November 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India, the first time in 10 years, that a Chinese president met with Indian Prime Minister Singh. Both agreed that the development of a strategic and cooperative partnership between China and India is commonly recognized as an important issue and announced a joint declaration that includes holding regular summit meetings [255]. Further, in October 2009, Prime Minister Singh spoke with Premier Wen when visiting Thailand to attend the East Asian Summit and agreed to steadily close the gap regarding views on the border issue between the two countries and make efforts to reduce tensions [256]. The first China-India security talks were held in Beijing in November 2007, with the second talks held on December 2008 in Delhi and the third on January 2010 again in Beijing. At the third talks, agreement was reached to strengthen mutual trust and improve cooperation while celebrating the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. In December 2007, the first joint military exercise between the armies of the two countries —an India–China anti-terrorism joint exercise— took place in Yunnan Province in China. In December 2008, the second joint exercise —a China–India anti-terrorism joint exercise— took place in India [257].

(4) Relations with Russia

India has maintained a close relationship with Russia through mutual visits made annually by both leaders. In October 2000, the two countries signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership to further strengthen their bilateral relations, and have been promoting acquisition of T-90 tanks by India from Russia as well as joint development of a supersonic cruise missile[258]. In December 2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Russia for talks with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In addition to a joint statement by the leaders of both countries[259], agreements were signed including an intergovernmental agreement regarding cooperation in military technology[260].

Russia is a major supplier of weapons to India. In January 2004, then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov visited India and concluded a contract to sell a retired aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, to India. Also in January 2007, then Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India and conducted a consultation meeting on military technology cooperation, joint exercises, and other issues[261]. Further, Russian Prime Minister Putin visited India in March 2010 to conclude a contract for the purchase of 29 MiG-29K carrier based fighter aircraft and to discuss joint development of a multipurpose transport and a fifth generation fighter aircraft.

In addition, the two countries have conducted joint military exercises since 2003[262].

(5) Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

Since the latter half of the 1990s, India has been emphasizing relations with East Asian countries, including ASEAN members. In October 2003, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC)[263].

2. Pakistan

1. General Situation

Pakistan, with approximately 160 million people, borders India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and is one of the most geopolitically important countries in Southwestern Asia. Since Pakistan borders Afghanistan and in the past the so-called Khan network was involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, Pakistan's attitude towards the international fight against terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is attracting increasing international attention.

The military government established by General Pervez Musharraf (then Chief of Army Staff) who effected a military coup d'état in October 1999 came to an end after nine years and Asif Ali Zardari was elected President in September 2008. However, soon after his inauguration, President Zardari faced difficulties controlling the government, being stuck between the war on terror led by the United States and the acts of retaliatory terrorism stemming from anti-U.S. sentiment being carried out by armed groups in the country. A major cleanup operation was launched in October 2009 against Islamist insurgents in the South Waziristan Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the northwest of the country and it has been reported that several insurgent bases have been neutralized. In February 2010, Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani stated that the primary

goals of military operations in the Agency had been achieved. However, terrorist attacks thought to be retaliatory are increasing, causing many civilian casualties [264].

2. National Defense Policy

Pakistan claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self-defense.

The Pakistan Armed Forces include ground forces of nine corps with approximately 550,000 personnel; one naval fleet of about 40 warships, totaling approximately 79, 000 tons; and air forces including 12 air combat wings with a total of roughly 400 combat aircraft.

In recent years, Pakistan has been actively proceeding with development of a ballistic missile capable of mating with a nuclear warhead and cruise missiles. Pakistan first test-launched the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile in August 2005 [265]. From January to February 2008, in exercises of the Army Strategic Force Command (ASFC), the Strategic Missile Group (SMG), following actions in 2006 [266], it consecutively conducted test launches of various intermediate-range ballistic missiles it owns, including the Ghauri (Hatf-V), and the Shaheen 1 (Hatf-IV). And in March 2004, the test launch of the intermediate-range ballistic missile Shaheen 2 (Hatf-VI) was conducted. This seems to demonstrate that Pakistan is steadily deploying ballistic missiles to its forces.
(See Fig. I-2-6-1)

3. Foreign Policies

(1) Relations with India

India and Pakistan, which became independent from the former British India after World War II, have had three large armed conflicts over the Kashmir territorial issue and others [267].

The territorial dispute over Kashmir has continued, with dialogues repeatedly resumed and suspended, and it constitutes one of the root causes of confrontation between India and Pakistan.

However, in February 2004, “multiple dialogues” for the normalization of relations between the two countries, including on the Kashmir issue, were initiated. Although definite progress had been seen in the bilateral relationship before this time [268], no fundamental solutions to the issues were in place and relations between the two countries had become tense again after the successive terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Later efforts of the international community, led by the United States, served to put a hold on any further deterioration of the relations between the two countries [269]. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India and Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gillani of Pakistan met for talks in Egypt while attending the Non-Aligned Movement summit in July 2009, where they issued a joint statement and agreed in principle to restart the multiple dialogues to discuss the outstanding issues which had been stopped since the successive terrorist attacks in Mumbai [270]. In February

2010, in New Delhi, vice foreign ministers' talks were restarted after one and a half years, at which they agreed to continue contact. Later in the year, a summit meeting and a foreign ministers' conference were held, in April and in July respectively. However, the "multiple dialogues" have not yet restarted.

(2) Relations with other countries

Pakistan, while attaching importance to friendship and cooperation with Islamic countries, maintains close relations with China as a countermeasure against India. In October 2008, President Zardari visited China and held talks with President Hu Jintao, allowing both leaders to reach a consensus to raise the strategic partnership to a new level. Further, it has been reported that production of the JF-17 fighter aircraft developed jointly between the two countries had begun in July 2009.[271]

Also, since the 9/11 attacks on the United States, Pakistan has expressed its intention to cooperate with the efforts against terrorism by the United States and others[272]. This cooperative attitude was highly appreciated by the international community, and the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan by the United States and other countries due to Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998 were lifted[273]. Pakistan strengthened military cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism. In March 2005 the United States decided to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, lifting its freeze on the sale that had lasted over 20 years. Furthermore, in March 2007, then U.S. President George W. Bush visited Pakistan and strongly praised Pakistan's support for anti terrorism issues. The two countries confirmed their policy of promoting terrorism-related information sharing[274]. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Pakistan in January 2010 for talks with President Zardari, Prime Minister Gillani, and Chief of Army Staff Kayani to discuss the reevaluation of strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and Pakistan's role therein[275].

Regarding the issue of nuclear proliferation involving Pakistan, then President Pervez Musharraf disclosed in February 2004 that some Pakistani scientists, including Dr. Khan, were involved in nuclear proliferation, although the president denied the Pakistani government's involvement in any kind of proliferation activity[276].

Section 7. Australia

1. General Situation

Australia shares basic values with Japan such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy, and is allied with the United States as are Japan and the Republic of Korea. Although the main focus is on neighboring regions such as Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, Australia has been broadly and actively involved in resolving international security issues such as the problem in Afghanistan.

2. Security and National Defense Policy

In May 2009, Australia released the defense white paper titled "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030"[277] for the first time in the nine years since 2000, which presented national defense policies for the period through to 2030, based on a strategic outlook for the future. The white paper states that Australia has strategic interests in (1) the defense of Australia against direct armed attack; (2) the security, stability and cohesion of the immediate neighborhood, which Australia shares with Indonesia, New Zealand, and other countries; (3) the stability of the wider Asia-Pacific region, which stretches from North Asia to the Eastern Indian Ocean; and (4) preserving an international order that restrains aggression by states against each other, and can effectively manage other risks and threats, such as the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, state fragility and failure, intra-state conflict, and the security impacts of climate change and resource scarcity.

It is stated that the defense policy should be founded on the principle of self-reliance in direct defense and in relation to the country's unique strategic interests, but with a capacity to do more when required, consistent with those strategic interests that Australia might share with others, and within the limits of its resources. This defense policy means that Australia must have the military capacity to (1) act independently where Australia has unique strategic interests at stake, and in relation to which it would not wish to be reliant on the combat forces of any foreign power; (2) lead military coalitions where Australia has shared strategic interests at stake with others, and in relation to which it would be willing to accept a leadership role; and (3) make tailored contributions to military coalitions where Australia shares wider strategic interests with others and is willing to accept a share of the burden in securing those interests.

It then gives priorities to the tasks of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as follows: (1) to deter and defeat attacks on Australia by conducting independent military operations without relying on the combat or combat support forces of other countries; (2) to contribute to stability and security in the South Pacific and Timor-Leste; (3) to contribute to military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region; and (4) to contribute to military contingencies in the rest of the world.

In order to carry out these tasks, the ADF will need to be more potent in certain areas, particularly undersea warfare and anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surface maritime warfare, air superiority, strategic strike, special forces, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and cyber warfare. Specifically, Australia intends to acquire 12 new future submarines, three new air warfare destroyers (AWD)[278], around 100 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) and maritime-based land-attack cruise missiles. The Government is committed to 3 percent real growth in the defense budget for 2017–2018 and 2.2 percent real growth to 2030.

3. Relationship with Other Countries

Australia attaches importance to its alliance with the United States and intends to strengthen cooperation through security policies with neighboring countries in order to maintain the stability of the region[279].

1. Relations with the United States

Australia recognizes that the strategic stability of the Asia-Pacific region relies significantly on the presence of the United States, and emphasizes the importance of its alliance with the United States based on the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS Treaty)[280]. Australia holds the annual Australia–U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN), a cabinet level meeting of foreign and defense ministers. In addition to the annual consultations, Australia stresses the importance of the alliance as a reason for the Australian military's activities in Afghanistan. The close alliance is being maintained by taking part in the review process and consultations of U.S. strategy regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, and repeated discussions in contribution to the preparation of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Further, Australia carries out the joint training exercise "Talisman Saber"[281] with the United States, and making efforts to improve interoperability for cooperation on humanitarian aid and disaster relief missions[282]. In addition to declaring participation in the U.S. lead F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project, Australia intends to cooperate in missile defense[283]. Further, they are promoting cooperation in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), military satellite communications, information, and cyber security.

A scene from the Australia–U.S. joint exercise Talisman Saber 09
[Department of Defense, United States]

2. Relations with China

Australia understands that China possesses strategic influence that extends beyond East Asia, and that U.S.–China relations are the most important factor for strategic stability in the Asia Pacific region[284]. Australia understands that China's increased defense spending due to economic growth, if not explained, has the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern[285], and China is facing pressure for transparency. With this understanding, Australia is carrying out Australia–China Strategic Defense Dialogues regularly[286] to further mutual understanding and cooperation in common areas of interest[287]. Further, exchanges are being carried out[288] to develop Australia–China defense relations including joint search and rescue training in addition to mutual port visits by warships[289].

3. Relations with Southeast Asian countries

Australia emphasizes cooperation with the various countries of Southeast Asia to fight terrorism and crime in the region, and engages in security related cooperation with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Brunei[290].

Australia sees Indonesia as having the most important defense relations in neighboring regions[291]. Given the terrorist bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005 and the terrorist bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, Australia has deepened counter-terrorism cooperation[292] and the two countries concluded a framework agreement regarding security cooperation which described cooperation across a wide range of defense relationships in November 2006[293]. Also, in January 2009, the two countries signed the Australia Indonesia Joint Statement on Defence Cooperation which focuses on counter-terrorism, maritime security, intelligence, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, and peacekeeping. Australia is also carrying out comprehensive joint exercises with Malaysia and Singapore[294] regarding non-traditional threats such as terrorism and maritime

safety under the Five Power Defence Arrangements framework [295].

4. Overseas Activities

Australia identifies the security, stability, and cohesion of the neighboring region as one of its strategic interests; fragile states in the neighboring region are potential havens for criminals and terrorists, and domestic conflicts would inflict considerable damage on the regional community, including Australia. Thus, Australia is committed to contributing to regional stability by providing active support, including the deployment of military forces [296].

If the Australian government decides that it is in Australia's wider strategic interests to undertake operations in the Middle East or other remote regions, Australia would do so only after the Government has satisfied itself that its forces have the necessary environment to ensure the success of the operations with minimum risk to the deployed forces [297].

Based on this policy, Australia is deploying about 3,000 personnel abroad out of its 55,000-strong force [298] mainly in the following areas.
(See Fig. I-2-7-1)

Fig. I-2-7-1 Overseas Deployment of ADF

(As of May 2010)

Afghanistan (inside Afghanistan)		Approx. 1,550
Afghanistan (outside Afghanistan)		Approx. 800
Iraq		Approx. 80
Timor-Leste		Approx. 400
Solomon Islands		Approx. 80
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers	Approx. 25
UNMIS	UN Mission in Sudan	17
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization	11
UNMIT	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	4
UNAMID	UN/AU Mission in Darfur	8
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	1
UNAMI	UN Assistance Mission for Iraq	2
Total		Approx. 3,000

Source: The website of the Department of Defence of Australia.

An Australian soldier in action in Afghanistan [Ministry of Defence, Australia]

1. Timor-Leste

Australia has actively supported the political and social stability of Timor-Leste since 1999, when the independence movement gained momentum there. The ADF leads the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), and about 400 troops are working with about 150 New Zealand troops [299].

2. Solomon Islands

Australia has actively supported the stability and development of the Solomon Islands since ethnic disputes intensified there in the late 1990s. The operation has been led by the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) since July 2003 [300]. About 80 ADF troops comprise the military component of RAMSI together with the forces of

New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga, and engage in providing security for RAMSI's multinational Participation Police Force.

3. Afghanistan

Australia announced its support for the United States immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 under the U.S.–Australia alliance, and dispatched its troops to Afghanistan in October 2001. Australia is participating as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the aim to prevent the proliferation of terrorism and to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists by providing support to enable Afghanistan to become a peaceful and stable country. The country has expressed a commitment to maintain the Australian military presence in Afghanistan [301]. Additional units were deployed in July 2009 [302], and currently an approximate 1,550 troops are engaged in reconstruction support activities in Uruzgan Province and the training of Afghan security forces. Further, approximately an additional 800 troops are operating around the region in support of the Afghanistan mission [303].

Section 8. Europe

1. General Situation

With the end of the Cold War, many European countries now recognize that the threat of large-scale invasion by other countries has disappeared and regard an outbreak of regional conflict within and around Europe, the rise of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other developments as new security challenges.

To adapt to new and emerging threats, Europe has sought to stabilize the security environment primarily by strengthening and expanding the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 28 member states) and the European Union (EU: 27 member states). Moreover, many European countries are proceeding with the development of their own capacity to cope with these new challenges.

2. Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks

1. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Peacekeeping Functions

(1) Development of a system necessary for a new role

Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has been shifting the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War.

This shift has also been reflected in the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, reviewed in 1999, in which NATO added conflict prevention, crisis management, and other missions [304] to its primary mission of collective defense, based on the view that various dangers are difficult to forecast, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, human rights suppression, and the dissolution of a state, still remain in Europe and surrounding regions.

Also, to fill the gap between U.S. and European capability, reform of military capability is being carried out in NATO such as structural reform [305]. Improvement of the NATO Response Force (NRF) has been ongoing since 2002 and it was declared in November 2006 that complete operational capability had been achieved. However, as unit deployment to Afghanistan increases and is extended, the future form of the NRF is under consideration to handle the issues faced. In June 2009, it was agreed to develop a new chain of command and combat capability formation mechanism by the meeting of NATO defence ministers [306].

Further, in order to define NATO's long term role in the new security environment of the 21st century, a declaration was made to begin the process of drafting a new Strategic Concept at the NATO summit of April 2009. NATO is currently drafting a new Strategic Concept in the group of experts and so on and is going to make their decision at the NATO summit in November 2010.

The EU, enhancing its own commitment to security issues, adopted its first security strategy paper in December 2003, titled "A Secure Europe in a Better World-European Security Strategy." It sets forth the objectives of addressing major threats including

terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, collapse of states, and organized crime, through the stabilization of surrounding regions and multinational cooperation.

In December 2008, the EU released the Declaration On Strengthening Capabilities. This was released with the Statement on Strengthening International Security as a document related to the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy —Providing Security in a Changing World, which reviews the progress in implementing the security strategy. The declaration calls for the EU to increase personnel, equipment/materials, and facilities necessary to respond to threats listed in the European Security Strategy of 2003.

Furthermore, unlike NATO, the EU does not assume the mission of defending its member states; however, it has been strengthening cooperation with NATO and working on the development of a system necessary in order to conduct military activities of its own, such as peacekeeping, in cases where NATO does not interfere. In January 2007, the EU established its own operations center in Brussels and a posture was prepared to have two battle groups in a permanent state of readiness. In November 2009, the EU adopted the Ministerial Declaration: ESDP Ten Years —Challenges and Opportunities and demonstrated a policy of improving effectiveness and

Fig. I-2-8-1 European Security Organization (as of April 2010)



Note: The Warsaw Pact Military Organization was dissolved in April 1991. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved as a political organization after the signing of the dissolution agreement on July 1, 1991 and ratification of the parliaments of the member states.

flexibility for the operation of the battle group limited to emergency operations was expressed to strengthen EU defensive capability while working to improve operational planning and direction capability.

With the Lisbon Treaty, the new fundamental EU treaty, coming into force in December 2009, the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was established along with the associated European External Action Service under control of the position[307]. Much interest is now focused on how these newly organized external policy institutions of the EU will function.
(See Fig. I-2-8-1)

(2) Commitment to a New Role

NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan since August 2003, which marked its first operation outside Europe, and the NATO-led ISAF mission expanded its presence in October 2006 to cover the whole country. At the NATO summit meeting held in spring 2008, the Bucharest Summit Declaration was adopted, which states that the ISAF mission is NATO's top priority. Since then, some progress has been made, such as the transfer of the security responsibility in Kabul from ISAF forces to Afghan national security forces, but the country is faced with challenges in security and other areas. In the Summit Declaration on Afghanistan adopted at the NATO Summit held in April 2009, member states agreed on issues including to improve support for training for Afghan national forces and police forces, to send troops on a short-term basis to stabilize security in preparation for the Afghanistan presidential elections, and to support the building of a closer relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In November 2009, a restructuring of the ISAF was carried out in which the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) took over daily peacekeeping and reconstruction support, and the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) is supporting the training of the Afghan National Army and police. Further, in December, the meeting of NATO foreign ministers announced the intent to deploy a total of over 7,000 personnel from member states.

Fig. I-2-8-2 Trend of Capability Build-up of NATO and the EU

	NATO Response Force (NRF)	EU Battle Groups (Combat Groups)
Missions	Swiftly responding to situations worldwide	Responding to EU-led missions, such as peacekeeping operations, in cases where there is no NATO intervention
Organization	• Standing joint task forces formed mainly by brigade-scale ground unites (approx. 4,000 troops), plus maritime, air, and specialized units • Size of force: Approx. 25,000 troops	Thirteen 1,500-strong units will be formed. Of these, two units are capable of rapid simultaneous deployment.
Capabilities	• Deployment begins within 5 days of an order • Capability of 30-day operations	• Deployment begins within 5 days of an order and is completed within 15 days • Capability of 30-day operations
Operations	• One year rotation (in the case of ground units, 6 months of training, and 6 months on standby) • Basic operational concept: to be dispatched as an initial response unit • Segmentation of units is possible depending on the mission	Units will be formed and on standby by rotation within the unilateral or multinational framework
Force building	• Initiative was formulated in November 2002 • Prototype force was formed in October 2003 • Initial operational capability was acquired in October 2004 • Complete operational capability was achieved in November 2006	• Initiative was formulated in June 2004 • Complete operational capability was achieved in January 2007

Based on the agreement made at the NATO Istanbul Summit in June 2004, NATO is training the Iraqi security forces in Iraq, and also continues its missions such as the maintenance of security in Kosovo which declared independence in February 2008.

Moreover, European countries play an active role in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia. From October 2008, NATO sent the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) comprising navy forces of member states to waters off the coast of Somalia to conduct counter-piracy operations, alternately deploying the SNMG1 and SNMG2 fleets. In Operation Ocean Shield being carried out since August 2009, support to strengthen counter-piracy capabilities for countries which request it has been added to the mission of counter-piracy operations. In March 2010, NATO extended the period of this operation until the end of 2012. The EU has been engaged in Operation Atalanta, its first maritime mission, since December 2008, deploying vessels and aircraft from each nation[308]. In June 2010, the EU extended this operation until December 2012. The dispatched vessels and aircraft are engaged in escorting ships employed by the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and surveillance activities in the waters.

The EU led peacekeeping operations in Macedonia in 2003 for the first time using NATO's equipment and capabilities[309]. The EU also conducted its first peacekeeping operations outside Europe without utilizing NATO's equipment and capabilities in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003. In December 2004, the EU took over the mission of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), which had been operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina[310], and sent troops to Chad and Central Africa in January 2008[311]. These operations represent the EU's proactive

Fig. I-2-8-3 Enlargement of NATO and EU Membership



involvement in risk management/maintenance of security[312].
(See Fig. I-2-8-2)

(3) Criteria for Arms Export in Europe

In December 2008, the Council of European Union Foreign Ministers adopted the Council Common Positions defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (EU Common Position), which sets out a new common ground for approving exports based on arms export control laws of EU member states. Unlike the previous European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EU Code of Conduct), the EU Common Position has legally binding power and requires member countries to take more stringent measures.

2. Geographical Expansion of Security Frameworks and Partnership

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework[313]. At present, most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe are NATO member states and have borders with Russia, which has consistently opposed NATO's expansion to the east.

At the same time, NATO has pursued a policy of partnership with non-NATO member countries. For example, NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP)[314], which aims to foster confidence and improve interoperability with non-NATO European countries, and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)[315], which seeks stability in the Mediterranean region.

NATO is also strengthening relations with Contact Countries[316] such as Australia and Japan with a view to conducting activities outside the region.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO and Russia have sought to improve relations, and established the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 in light of the need to deal with common issues concerning security. NATO and Russia have continued to pursue dialogue and cooperation in areas such as anti-terrorism efforts, arms control, and theater missile defense. While the NATO–Russia dialogue was temporarily suspended after the Georgia conflict in August 2008, at the NATO summit in December 2009 it was agreed to resume the official NRC to include the cabinet level talks, and the foreign minister level NRC was resumed in June of the same year. Further, a meeting was held in December of the same year between NATO Secretary General Rasmussen and Russian president Medvedev to discuss common areas of interest including efforts regarding Afghanistan and terrorism.

The number of EU member countries in Central and Eastern Europe is also expanding, with the accession of 10 countries in 2004, including Poland and the Czech Republic, and the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007.
(See Fig. I-2-8-3)

3. Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Situations

Since the end of the Cold War, individual countries conscious of the new threats of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD have begun to place emphasis on the allocation of personnel to missions other than homeland defense. As a result, there has been an emphasis on strengthening transport capability for overseas deployment in defense building, giving consideration to the role of NATO and other defense organizations. Moreover, many European countries have been implementing quantitative reductions and restructuring of their military power, while channeling efforts into modernizing their military and increasing national defense expenditures.

1. The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has maintained the perception that it is not subject to any direct military threats and therefore has pursued military reform focused on enhancing capability in order to cope with new threats since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the United Kingdom regards international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD as major threats and has improved its overseas deployment capability and readiness [317].

The first National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, announced in March 2008, highlights the broadened view of national security to include threats to individual citizens, and it considers transnational crime, pandemics, flooding and others as threats along with terrorism and the spread of WMD. It also cites factors such as climate change, the increasing demand for energy, and poverty as causes of these threats. To cope with these diverse and interrelated threats and risks, the strategy takes a multilateral approach through the U.N., EU, and NATO while seeking cooperation not only between the military and the police, but also with the private sector and regional governments, with a view to addressing threats at an early stage.

The strategy affirms the existing assessment, concluding that state-led threats will not emerge in the predictable future [318]. The strategy nevertheless states that the international security environment has grown more complex and less predictable and that while the reemergence of such threats in the long run is unlikely, they cannot be discounted, thus it sets forth a policy for maintaining strong defense capabilities [319]. To be specific, it gives priority to the procurement of equipment for supporting its ongoing operations, including strategic transportation, support helicopters and armored vehicles. At the same time, it plans to invest for the long term in a broad range of military capabilities for the defense of the United Kingdom such as aircraft carriers, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare, which are difficult to rebuild from zero. Furthermore, in a white paper issued in December 2006, The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent, the United Kingdom announced it would maintain its own nuclear deterrence based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the 2020s and beyond [320].

These military capabilities will guarantee the United Kingdom's future security while enabling it to make contributions to peacekeeping and other international efforts and thus contribute to the international security environment.

Further, the United Kingdom plans to carry out a "Strategic Defence and Security Review" in 2010 to review national defense policy for the coming security environment [321]. It released "Adaptability & Partnership: Issues for the Strategic Defence Review" (green paper) in February of the same year, which lists and organizes the discussion points ahead of the deliberations for the Strategic Defence and Security Review, stating that it is necessary to reevaluate the role of the military in consideration of the complex and uncertain security environment and national defense budget restrictions [322].

2. Germany

In its first national defense white paper in 12 years issued in October 2006, Germany specified that the primary mission of its allied forces remains national defense and collective defense in the traditional sense. However, it declared that in light of the expansion of new threats including terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism, are the most likely missions to come.

To ensure the necessary military capabilities to meet the above mission, Germany plans to give priority in resource allocation to strengthening strategic transport capacity, global reconnaissance and efficient command with high interoperability. Specifically, Germany is currently planning to introduce A-400M transport aircraft and has also completed launches of five satellites fitted with a synthetic aperture radar SAR-LUPE by July 2008. In addition to reducing personnel and relocating its domestic camps and facilities, it is also restructuring its military into joint units grouped by function: intervention, stabilization and assistance [323].

3. France

France, in its White Paper on Defense and National Security, issued in June 2008, identified risks ranging from cyber attacks to environmental crises, in addition to the direct threats of mass terrorism and ballistic missiles, stating that these threats and risks are interconnected due to globalization and that the continuity between domestic and foreign security has taken on strategic significance.

The regions cited as those that have influence on the stability of France and Europe included the area extending from the Atlantic to the Indian oceans; sub-Saharan Africa; Russia, with whom relationship-building is important; the Balkans, whose stability is of essence; as well as Asia, which is growing in its importance. It specifies five statutes of France's national security strategy: prevention, nuclear deterrence[324], protection, and overseas intervention, based on accurate perception, knowledge, and anticipation of conditions in a world characterized by uncertainty and instability. The report states that France will strengthen these functions and combine them flexibly in order to adapt to changes in the strategic environment over the next 15 years.

In July 2009, the "Loi de programmation militaire 2009–2014" was ratified by the parliament. This plan was the first midterm plan to take into account the national defense and security strategies laid out in the White Paper on Defense and National Security. It includes the establishment of a council for national defense and security as well as a council for national intelligence, an increase in the equipment related budget, and a force reduction of 54,000 personnel.

Regarding France's foreign relations, France calls for strengthening of EU security and renovation of transatlantic relations, and restored its full participation in NATO integrated military structure in April 2009 in view of the changes in the situation since France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure and, in particular, the complementary relationship between the EU and NATO[325].

With respect to the provision of military power, France intends to meet operational requirements such as enhancing protection capabilities while reducing personnel and consolidating military bases, as well as to proceed with strengthening its intelligence functions and modernizing its military equipment.

Notes:

1) U.S. Code, Title 50 404a stipulates that the President must submit a national security strategy to Congress every year, but this responsibility has not necessarily been fulfilled every year. For example, the former Bush administration only released said strategic report in September 2002 and March 2006. The Obama administration released the strategy in May of this year for the first time.

   The National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the United States' policy for implementing its national security strategy and indicates a framework for strategic documents of the Department of Defense, including the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NDS was released in March 2005 and then again in July 2008. The 2008 NDS stipulated that the United States' national interests were to protect itself and allied nations from attack or coercion, promote international security in order to contain conflicts and stimulate economic growth, and to secure access to the global commons, global markets that are born from the global commons, as well as to resources. The strategy indicates that, in order to pursue these objectives, military capabilities will be developed along with other efforts, including diplomatic and economic means, and said capabilities will be invoked if necessary. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates points out in the foreword of the NDS that, "The United States will soon have a new President and Commander-in-Chief, but the complex issues the United States faces will remain. This strategy is a blueprint to succeed in the years to come."

   The QDR is a document that the Secretary of Defense must submit to Congress every four years according to US Code, Title 10 118. The document clarifies policies for national defense strategy, military composition, plans to modernize forces, national defense infrastructure, budget plans, etc., in view of the security environment over the ensuing 20 years. The Department of Defense reported it to Congress in February 2010.

   The NPR is required to comprehensively review the nuclear posture of the United States over the ensuing five to ten years and submit a report to Congress. Reports were previously submitted in 1994 and 2002, making this the third report.

2) The QDR indicates that the rise of China, the world's most populous country, and India, the world's largest democracy, will continue to reshape the international system. In addition, the rise of China is one of the most consequential aspects of the evolving strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that engages in greater cooperation.

3) The QDR points out that North Korea and Iraq are developing and deploying new ballistic missile systems, and that these systems pose a threat to United States forces deployed forward. China, also, is developing and fielding large numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles (CM), new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems. However, China has shared only limited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernization program, raising a number of questions regarding its long-term intentions. Therefore, U.S.–China relations must be multidimensional and undergirded by a process of enhancing confidence and reducing mistrust in a manner that reinforces mutual interests. Both countries should sustain open channels of communication to discuss disagreements.

4) The 2001 QDR stipulated that forces were to be composed based on the following four objectives: 1) to defend the U.S. homeland, 2) to provide forward deterrence in the four major regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, East Asian coastal areas, and the Middle East and Southwest Asia), 3) simultaneously defeat the enemy quickly in any two theaters of operation while also decisively defeating the enemy in one of the two, and 4) address the limited number of small contingency situations. The 2006 QDR, however, indicates that experience from recent operations has made clear that it is necessary to conduct operations not only in the four major regions but also globally, and that the ideas of "defeat quickly" and "defeat decisively" are not

necessarily suited for long-term irregular warfare. As this is the case, the 2006 QDR indicates that military potential should be composed in a way that prepares the necessary capabilities in the following three fields: 1) homeland defense, 2) war on terror / irregular warfare, and 3) conventional campaign(s).

5) At a press conference on February 1, 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made the following statement, voicing that the current way of thinking for handling two major regional conflicts was insufficient, "one of the steers that I gave to the folks working on the QDR was that I felt that, for some time, the two-major-theater-of-operations construct was out of date, that we are already in two major operations. What if we should have a homeland disaster? What if we have another encounter? What if we have a Haiti? The world is very much more complex that when the two-MCO concept came together in the early 1990s."
6) Joint press conference by then U.S. President Bush and then President Kufor of Ghana (February 20, 2008).
7) As for non-strategic nuclear forces, the Nuclear Posture Review announced by the Clinton administration in September 1994 states as follows: (1) Eliminate the option to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based, dual-capable (nuclear/conventional) aircraft; (2) Eliminate the option to carry nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM-N) on surface ships: (3) Retain the option to deploy TLAM-N on attack submarines; and (4) Retain the current commitment of dual-capable aircraft based in Europe and Continental United States (CONUS) and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe. The new NPR includes that the United States is to retain a dual-capable fighter capable of equipping both conventional and nuclear weapons and apply a Life Extension Program to the nuclear warheads that would be equipped in these aircraft.
8) This is commensurate with counterterrorism expenses under the previous Bush administration and includes expenses for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
9) Warheads that have been equipped in deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and nuclear warheads equipped in heavy bombers.
10) The figure as of September 30, 2009. This figure includes all deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads. The United States also released the number of nuclear warheads possessed each year from 1962 and the number dismantled each year since 1994.
11) The Secretary of Defense Task Force on Department of Defense Nuclear Weapons Management was set up in June 2008 because of two nuclear management-related incidents. The task force released a report on the Air Force's nuclear mission in September 2008 and a similar type of report on the overall Department of Defense (except for the Air Force) in December 2009.
12) In the organizational reform of the U.S. Army, its conventional pyramid structure (army, corps, divisions, and brigades) will be reorganized into the headquarters with command and control functions and self sufficient combat units (the size of a brigade) so that it can respond to various situations promptly and flexibly by combining headquarters and working units according to the purpose and scale of the mission.
13) The budget proposal for FY2011 includes a budget for researching next-generation bombers and maintaining production infrastructure for bombers.
14) The budget proposal for FY2011 states that no additional production of the C-17 airlifter will be requested. The U.S. has sufficient C-17 to meet airlift needs with the 223 that are already in force or in production.
15) While there is the possibility for changes in specifics and timing, this is a plan to improve BMD capabilities over four phases by deploying SM-3 Block IA by 2011, SM-3 Block IB by 2015, SM-3 Block IIA by 2018, and SM-3 Block IIB by 2020.
16) Briefing by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright (September, 17 2009).

17) As cyber-related units, Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), 24th Air Force, and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) have been newly formed. In addition, Army Forces Cyber Command (ARFORCYBER) is going to be established no later than October of this year.

18) The figures of U.S. military mentioned in this paragraph are the numbers of active personnel recorded on the publication source of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2009), and it could change according to unit deployment.

19) North Korea says it will open the door to the "powerful and prosperous nation" in 2012, which falls on the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late President Kim Il Sung.

20) Joint editorial of the Korean Workers' Party's journals *Rodong Shinmun and Workers* (June 16, 1999).

21) Constitutionally, the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, "commands and takes the reins of all armed forces" as the "Supreme Leader" of North Korea. The Ministry of People's Armed Forces, the equivalent of the Ministry of Defense in other countries, appears to be placed under the National Defense Commission, not under the Cabinet.

22) The approximate percentage of active service members in total population is 0.2% in Japan, 0.5% in the United States, 0.7% in Russia, and 1.4% in the ROK.

23) Then White House Press Secretary Dana Perino announced in a statement on April 24, 2008 that North Korea had assisted Syria's covert nuclear activities. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI)'s Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 pointed out, "Despite the Six-Party October 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology."

24) Generally, missiles propelled by liquid fuel can only be fueled right before the launch. On the other hand, missiles based on a solid fuel propellant system are considered to be militarily superior to those based on a liquid fuel propellant system because they are capable of immediate launches with their propellant stored in airframes beforehand, signs of their launches are unlikely to be detected in advance, and they are easy to store and handle.

25) The second and third rounds of the Six-Party Talks were held in February and June 2004 respectively, the fourth round from July to August and in September 2005, and the fifth round in November 2005, December 2006, and February 2007. The sixth round was held in March and September 2007.

26) In June 2008 North Korea submitted a declaration of its nuclear program. However, as of May 2009, no agreement has been made concerning a specific framework for verification.

27) The DNI Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 said that "while we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, we assess it has the capability to do so." On plutonium-based nuclear weapons, U.S. Forces Korea commander Walter Sharp testified before the House Appropriations Committee in March 2010 that "we assess North Korea currently holds enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons." Regarding uranium-based nuclear weapons, the DNI Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 pointed out, "The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons."

28) In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated that "North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead to a ballistic missile." Further, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed out that "we must assume… if there are no major changes in its (North Korea's) national security strategy in the next decade, it will be able to mate a nuclear warhead to a proven delivery system.

29) In his statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009, Lieutenant General Maples, Director of the DIA, stated that "North Korea has had a longstanding chemical warfare program," and "We believe that Pyongyang possesses a sizeable stockpile of agents." He also stated that "North Korea is believed to have a long-standing biological warfare program that could support the production of biological warfare agents." The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 pointed out that "It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical agents remain stored in a number of facilities scattered around the country and that North Korea is able to produce biological weapons such as anthrax bacteria, smallpox, and cholera."

30) North Korea admitted that it is exporting ballistic missiles to earn foreign currency. (Comment by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on June 16, 1998, and statement made by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman on December 13, 2002)

31) The ranges of Scud B and Scud C missiles are estimated to be about 300km and 500km, respectively.

32) Of a total of seven ballistic missiles North Korea launched in July 2006 after completely abandoning the freeze on ballistic missile launches announced in 1999, the third one is believed to have been a Taepodong-2 fired from the Taepodong district in the northeastern coastal area. The launch of other Scud and Nodong missiles had more practical characteristics, based on the indication that the missiles were launched before dawn, a number of different types of ballistic missiles were launched in succession over a short period of time, the launch was carried out using a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), and ballistic missiles with different ranges were landed within a certain area. This leads to the assumption that North Korea has improved the operability of ballistic missiles.

33) All seven ballistic missiles launched were assumed to have landed in the military target practice area (the area surrounded by the points at 1) 39 degrees 9 minutes north latitude and 127 degrees 37 minutes east longitude; 2) 41 degrees 12 minutes north latitude and 129 degrees 50 minutes east longitude; 3) 41 degrees 30 minutes north latitude and 131 degrees 59 minutes east longitude; 4) 41 degrees 15 minutes north latitude and 132 degrees 6 minutes east longitude; and 5) 38 degrees 55 minutes north latitude and 128 degrees 2 minutes east longitude), for which the navigation warning was issued by the Japan Coast Guard upon notification by North Korea on June 22, 2009.

34) For instance, making a three-stage missile by installing a booster at the warhead of a two-stage missile.

35) In his statement for the House Armed Services Committee in March 2009, General Sharp, Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, stated that preparations are currently underway in North Korea to field a new intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam, and Alaska. The BMDR Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 noted, "A mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is also under development (by North Korea)." The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 points out that North Korea has been developing IRBM with a range of over 3,000 km since the end of the 1990s and has recently deployed them.

36) In March 2007, then U.S. Forces Korea Commander Burwell B. Bell testified before the House Armed Services Committee that, "North Korea is developing a new solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile. Recently, in March 2006, North Korea successfully test-fired the missile. Once operational, the missile can be deployed more flexibly and rapidly than the existing system and North Korea will be able to launch the missile in a much shorter preparation period." The BMDR Report released by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2010 pointed out, "North Korea has developed an advanced solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)."

37) The DNI Annual Threat Assessment released in February 2010 noted that "North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries including Iran and Pakistan… illustrate the reach of the North's proliferation activities." Some point out that North Korea conducts tests in importing countries such as Iran and Pakistan and is making good use of the test results.

38) Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the fifth Plenum of the fourth Korean Workers' Party's Central Committee in 1962.

39) Covert operations to infiltrate enemy territories by dispersed small units.

40) Reportedly, North Korea has two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers' Party. For example, the operation department of the Party is said to be in charge of transporting agents. Moreover, General Burwell B. Bell, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated at the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2009 that "North Korea still keeps the world's largest Special Forces with more than 80,000 troops." Also, the ROK Defense White Paper 2008 points out "North Korea's special forces number some 180,000. Considering the operational environment in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has intensively improved the capabilities of its special operations by strengthening training programs for night, mountain, and street-to-street fighting.

41) Kim Jong Il was re-elected as Chairman of the National Defense Commission at the Supreme People's Assembly in April 2009. In April 2007, a large-scale military parade including the march of missile units was held to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Korean People's Army with Kim Jong Il in attendance.

42) In 2009, North Korea is believed to have increased the number of members of the National Defense Commission and took measures to strengthen or clarify the functions of the National Defense Commission, centering on the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, by positioning the Chairman of the National Defense Commission as the "supreme leader" of North Korea under constitution and specifying the mission of the Commission as "making decisions on important national policies in order to carry through the military-first revolution."

43) On a U.S. TV program broadcast in September 2009, President Barack Obama, relaying an assessment by former President Bill Clinton who visited North Korea in August 2009, said Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, seems "pretty healthy and in control."

44) There were no official reports on public activities by Kim Jong Il, for 50 days since mid-August 2008 (the longest period of such "disappearance" since he assumed the post of the General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party in 1997). Since November 2008, however, he has been appearing in the public scene more frequently than ever, including a meeting with former U.S. President Bill Clinton in August 2009 and talks with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in September 2009.

45) In December 2008, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the U.N. World Food Programme (WFP) forecasted that North Korea would produce approximately 3.34 million tons of crops between November 2008 and October 2009, estimating required imports at 1.79 million tons.

46) It has been pointed out that acceleration of inflation as a result of the simultaneous raising of wages and commodity prices amid the unresolved shortage of commodities, the widening of income gaps as a result of the implementation of these new measures, as well as an increased inflow of outside information, have led to rising dissatisfaction with the regime in some areas, or at least signs of such dissatisfaction are emerging.

47) In public activities by Kim Jong Il, the number of activities related to economic affairs exceeded that of activities related to military affairs for the first time since he assumed the post of General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party in 1997.

48) The Joint Investigation Group assessed that the sinking was causes by a torpedo due to precise measurement and analysis of the damaged part of the hull which indicated that a shockwave and bubble effect caused

significant upward bending of the keel, compared to its original state, and the shell plate was steeply bent, with some parts of the ship fragmented. As for evidence that the torpedo was launched from a North Korean midget submarine, the Joint Investigative Group stated that the torpedo parts recovered at the site of the explosion by a dredging ship on May 15 perfectly matched the schematics of the CHT-02D torpedo included in the introductory brochures provided to foreign countries by North Korea for export purposes, among other reasons.

49) The same day, ROK Defense Minister Kim Tae-young announced that the ROK would take measures against North Korea, including the restarting of psychological warfare, the implementation of a joint ROK–U.S. anti-submarine exercise, and preparations for marine blockades in and outside of ROK territorial waters.

50) From the May 20, 2010 announcement of a spokesman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea.

51) From the May 25, 2010 statement of a spokesman of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea.

52) The Country Report on Terrorism 2008 published in April 2009 states that "the United States rescinded the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the North Korean government had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the government of assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future." In February 2010, President Obama submitted a letter to the President of the Senate and the Chairman of the House of Congress stating that as a result of the careful examination of North Korea's behavior up to November 2009, North Korea "does not meet the statutory criteria to again be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism."

53) In October 2009, the ROK government announced that at the request of North Korea, the ROK will provide 10,000 tons of corn to North Korea in the first assistance program under the Lee Myung Bak administration, and in January 2010, North Korea notified the ROK of its acceptance of the aid offer.

54) North Korea signed an agreement on economic cooperation and a number of other agreements with China.

55) The previous treaty contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) is attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance by any means available. This provision, however, was dropped from the new treaty.

56) In August 2009, Russian Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov was quoted as saying that the Russian Armed Forces have deployed the new surface-to-air missile S-400 in order to ensure Russia's safety in the event of North Korea's missile launch failure.

57) For example, the United Kingdom and Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 2000 and 2001, respectively. In October 2009 French President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed a special presidential envoy for an analysis of the situation for the consideration of the establishment of diplomatic ties with North Korea, and the special envoy visited North Korea in November 2009. In December 2009, North Korea agreed to the establishment of a French diplomatic office in Pyongyang.

58) After the ARF ministerial meeting in July 2008, North Korea signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).

59) According to a remark by the spokesman of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the "grand bargain" package deal proposal seeks a comprehensive agreement on the nuclear issue by putting a complete set of denuclearization steps by North Korea and the corresponding measures that North Korea wants from the five countries of Japan, the United States, the ROK, China, and Russia.

60) The United States and the ROK have been operating the U.S.–ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to run the U.S.–ROK joint defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective joint operations in case of emergency. Under the U.S.–ROK joint defense system, the operational control authority over ROK forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, who also serves as Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in wartime.

61) The United States is advancing the realignment of its forces stationed in the ROK in line with the June 2003 agreement to relocate its forces to the southern side of Han Gang in two stages and the October 2004 agreement to cut the number of its forces stationed in the ROK by 12,500 from approximately 37,500. The two countries agreed at the summit meeting in April 2008 to maintain the current strength of 28,500 as the appropriate level. With the realignment process, the United States is investing in the modernization of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and striving to maintain and strengthen the deterrence of the U.S.–ROK combined forces under the U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.

62) The Joint Vision states, "Over that time, our security Alliance has strengthened and our partnership has widened to encompass political, economic, social and cultural cooperation. Together, on this solid foundation, we will build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust" and "The Alliance is adapting to changes in the 21st Century security environment. We will maintain a robust defense posture, backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests."

63) The SCM joint statement reemphasized the non-acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and stated that North Korea's ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests represent direct and serious threats. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates emphasized anew the strong and robust U.S. commitment in the event of crisis for the defense of the ROK, not only through its forces deployed on the Korean Peninsula but also by strategically and flexibly boosted and deployed U.S. forces and capabilities available in all parts of the world for the defense of the U.S.–ROK alliance. Furthermore, Gates reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence using the full range of military capabilities, including the nuclear umbrella, strike capabilities of conventional weapons and missile defense capabilities, to ensure the security of the ROK.

64) The ROK Defense White Paper 2008 described North Korea as follows: "North Korea's conventional military capabilities, weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles, and forward military deployment pose direct and serious threats to our national security."

65) The reform plan has four pillars: (1) expansion of a civilian base for national defense, (2) build-up of military structure and system of the forces in conformity with characteristics of modern wars, (3) reorganization of the national defense management system into a low cost, high efficiency system, and (4) improvement of barrack culture in accordance with the trends of the time.

66) The Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009–2020) revised the force strength from 500,000 to 517,000.

67) The Defense Reform Basic Plan (2009–2020) prioritizes the following measures in order to prepare for North Korean threats: 1) organize front-line troops in a manner that allows them to exercise their combat strength immediately after the outbreak of war to secure the security of the metropolitan region; 2) boost surveillance/reconnaissance, precision strike, and interception capabilities in order to block and eliminate North Korea's asymmetric threats in enemy areas to the utmost extent; 3) secure strong reserve mobile power for each unit in order to counter enemies with a numerical advantage; and 4) secure combat sustainability by stabilizing noncombat zones and nurturing elite reserve forces.

68) Based on the ROK Defense White Paper 2008.

69) The primary missions of the Seventh Mobile Corps are described as the protection of sea lanes, deterrence against North Korea and support for the government's external policies. The Seventh Mobile Corps consists of three mobile squadrons. In addition to the 71st Mobile Squadron (Busan), the 72nd Mobile Squadron (Jinhae) is scheduled to be created in August 2010 and the 73rd Mobile Squadron (Jeju) in 2014. The Seventh Mobile Corps has one Aegis-equipped vessel and six destroyers under its command, and more Aegis vessels and destroyers to be put in service in the future are expected to be deployed to the corps.

70) At a press conference, then ROK Minister of National Defense Lee Sang Hee referred to an agreement reached at the ROK–Russia summit meeting in 2008, and said his meeting with Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov provided a momentum to elevate the bilateral military relationship a notch higher.

71) Based on the ROK Defense White Paper 2008.

72) The ROK intends to further improve the legal and institutional foundations for the ROK armed forces to expand their participation in PKO activities. In December 2009, a bill concerning the participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations passed parliament.

73) It is reported that there are 55 ethnic minorities living in China, besides the Han Chinese ethnic group.

74) "Scientific Development Concept" chiefly consists of "adhering to standardized plans and consideration for all perspectives, maintaining a people-oriented position of establishing comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development concept and the need to promote complete economic, social, and human development." (As commented by President Hu Jintao at the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in October 2003) The construction of a "Harmonious Society" is defined as a process to continue dissolving social inconsistencies. The "Resolution on Major Issues Regarding the Building of a Harmonious Socialist Society" (adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2006).

75) Building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2020 is a goal of the Party and the state as outlined in General Secretary Hu Jintao's report to the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 2007.

76) China traditionally adopted the strategy of a "People's War" based on the recognition that a world-scale war was possible. Under that strategy, the country attributed importance to guerrilla warfare using its vast territory and enormous population. This posture, however, led to harmful effects such as excessively enlarged and inefficient military forces. Under these circumstances, China has come to place importance on local wars such as conflicts that occur over its territorial land and waters since the first half of the 1980s based on a new recognition that a world-scale war will not take place on a long-term basis. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, the country started to implement measures to improve its military operation abilities in order to win a local war under highly technological conditions. Recently, it has been stated that the core of military modernization is to strengthen capabilities to win a local war under informationized conditions.

77) Military parades carried out during events celebrating the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the PRC in 1999.

78) China amended Regulations on the Political Work of the People's Liberation Army in 2003 to add the practices of Media, Psychological and Legal Warfare to its political work. The Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2010) of the U.S. Department of Defense explains Media, Psychological and Legal Warfare as follows:

- Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build public and international support for China's military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to China's interests

- Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy's ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.
- Legal Warfare uses international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China's military actions.

79) China's National Defense in 2008.

80) The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (February 2010) states that it will be necessary to retain the capacity to protect the United States and its allies in an environment wherein states with a wide range of sophisticated weapons exercise anti-access capability to impede the deployment of U.S. forces. It points out that "China is developing and fielding large numbers of advanced medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, new attack submarines equipped with advanced weapons, increasingly capable long-range air defense systems, electronic warfare and computer network attack capabilities, advanced fighter aircraft, and counter-space systems."

81) China's National Defense in 2008 states that "… it works to increase the country's capabilities to maintain maritime, space and electromagnetic space security and to carry out the tasks of counter-terrorism, stability maintenance, emergency rescue, and international peacekeeping."

82) China's National Defense in 2008.

83) The CCP's constitution amended in 2002 states, "Upon the 100th anniversary of the party's foundation (in 2021), a higher-level, somewhat affluent society shall be created that benefits a population of over a billion, and upon the 100th anniversary of the country's foundation (in 2049), the nation shall achieve a medium level of development for per-capita gross domestic product, realizing modernization on a basic level."

84) China's National Defense in 2008 states that "in the past two years, senior PLA delegations have visited more than 40 countries, and defense ministers and chiefs of staff from more than 60 countries have visited China."

85) China disclosed some fighter aircraft and submarines which had previously been generally undisclosed to foreign delegates, including delegates from Japan, at the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the Navy (in April) and of its Air Force (in November), which were held in 2009. This is thought to be a sign of its posture of working to improve transparency with regard to the military.

86) For example, China's National Defense in 2008 provides details of personnel expenses, operation maintenance costs, and equipment costs only for the defense budget for FY2007 each by active force, reserve force, and militia.

87) National defense budget within central fiscal expenditures. The national defense budget amount for FY2010 within nationwide fiscal expenditures is said to be 532.1 billion yuan. This budget amount represents growth of approximately 10.7% compared to the national defense budget (initial budget) within the nationwide fiscal expenditures for the previous fiscal year.

88) Simply applying rates of foreign exchange to the national defense budgets of foreign countries to convert them into another currency does not necessarily reflect the accurate value as revealed in the country's price level. But hypothetically speaking, if China's national defense budget for FY2010 were converted at a rate of 14 yen per yuan, then this would result in approximately 7.2671 trillion yen. The 2009 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI; June 2009) estimated that China's military expenditures for 2008 were approximately $84.9 billion, ranking it second place in the world behind the United States.

89) China announced that the rate of growth for its FY2010 national defense budget is "an increase of 7.5% compared to the previous year," but this is the growth rate by comparing the spending of FY2009 with the initial budget of FY2010.

90) China's announced national defense budget achieved a double-digit-percent growth on the initial-budget basis for 21 successive years up through FY2009.
91) U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2010) estimates China's defense spending on military-related expenditures as more than $150 billion in FY2009. The same report indicates that China's official defense budget does not include major categories of expenditure.
92) Missions of the PAP include security of party and government, border security, social projects, and firefighting activities. According to China's National Defense in 2002, it is to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defense operations.
93) The militia engages in economic development in peacetime and other activities and has a duty to provide logistical support for combat operations in wartime. China's National Defense in 2002 explains, "Under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order."
94) Formally, there are two Central Military Commissions — one for the CCP and one for the state. However, both commissions basically consist of the same membership, and both are essentially regarded as institutions for the CCP to command the military forces.
95) Generally, liquid-propellant missiles require a long time for liquid fuel to be injected immediately prior to launch, whereas with solid-propellant missiles the propellant is loaded in advance and they can be launched immediately. Therefore, compared to liquid-propellant missiles, it is more difficult to detect signs of the launch of solid propellant-missiles in advance, and the risk of suffering a preemptive attack is believed to be lower.
96) The Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence of the United States published in February 2009 states that China is developing conventionally armed short- and long-range ballistic missiles with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) that could be used to attack U.S. naval forces and airbases.
97) U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2010) states that by December 2009 China had deployed 1,050 to 1,150 SRBMs on the shore opposing Taiwan, and it is engaged in efforts to increase offensive capability, including the introduction of derived models with improved ranges, accuracies and payloads.
98) At the press conference on the day after it was announced that the test had been carried out, a spokesperson from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "The test would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft. The test was defensive in nature and targeted at no country. It is consistent with the defensive national defense policies that China has consistently pursued. There is no change in China's position on missile defense issues."
99) China's National Defense in 2008.
100) In the "Stride 2009" exercises, it was reported that the four individual army divisions, belonging to each of the military regions of Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan, and Guangzhou, traveled long distances from their own military region to a different one, after which they engaged in exercises with simulated enemy forces. In order to transport personnel and equipment, they are reported to have used civilian cargo aircraft, passenger airplanes, and the "Hexie" high-speed train, as well as air force cargo aircraft and freight trains.
101) This hospital ship is reported to have circled around the coast of the Chinese continent and the islands and reefs of the Spratly and Paracel Islands for the span of roughly a month beginning in October 2009, delivering medical services to the stationed military personnel and inhabitants there.
102) Remarks made at the Japan–China Defense Ministers' meeting held in March 2009.

103) Remarks made at the Japan–China Defense Ministers' meeting held in November 2009.

104) Positive remarks by several government and military officers about possessing and constructing an aircraft carrier have been reported since 2005. Recently, in November 2008, Major General Qian Lihua, director of the Defense Ministry's Foreign Affairs Office, reportedly said that the navy of any great power has the dream to have one or more aircraft carriers. In December 2008, a Ministry of Defense spokesman commented on building Chinese aircraft carriers, "The Chinese government will incorporate all aspects of factors, and carefully examine and consider related matters." In March 2009, a series of positive remarks on the possession or construction of an aircraft carrier were made by senior Navy officers.

105) Since the 1980s, in addition to *Varyag*, China has purchased *Melbourne*, a decommissioned Majestic-class aircraft carrier made in the United Kingdom, and *Minsk* and *Kiev*, Kiev-class aircraft carriers made in the former Soviet Union, nominally for recycling for scraps of iron or leisure facilities. In 2006, it was reported that China was negotiating the purchase of Russian made Su-33 carrier-based fighter aircraft, which can be operated with a Kuznetsov class carrier. It was also reported in 2007 that China had plans to purchase arresting wires that are used on aircraft carriers from Russia. In September 2008, it was reported that China was planning cooperation with Ukraine, which has a simulation training facility for carrier-based aircraft, with respect to the education and training of navy pilots. China is reported to have imported a Su-25UTG, a training airplane for carrier landing, from Ukraine in 2007. U.S. Defense Department's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2010) highlighted the fact that "China has an active aircraft carrier research and development program. The PRC shipbuilding industry could start construction of an indigenous platform by the end of this year. China is interested in building multiple operational aircraft carriers with support ships in the 2020s."

106) In a television interview broadcast in November 2009, Air Force Deputy Commander He Weirong said with regard to China's next generation fighters that they could be deployed to units in 8 to 10 years. In addition, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in May 2009, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave the prospect that China's fifth generation fighters would achieve initial operation capability in 10 to 12 years.

107) China's National Defense in 2008 explains that China's Air force is "working to accelerate its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increase its capabilities for carrying out reconnaissance and early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection, in an effort to build itself into a modernized strategic air force." U.S. Department of Defense's Annual Report on Military Power of the People's Republic of China (May 2006) points out that the goal of the PLA Air Force is "to develop a mobile, all-weather, day-night, low altitude, and over-water force that is capable and flexible enough to quickly perform multiple operational tasks and to project power beyond the "first island chain."

108) China's National Defense in 2006 notates that, regarding science, technology and industry for national defense, "Major scientific and technological projects such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises and to bring about overall improvement in defense-related science and technology." Also, the entire manned space project, including Shenzhou-7, is said to be commanded by Director of the PLA's General Armaments Department.

109) For example, Air Force Commander Xu Qiliang is reported to have said, "China's Air Force has established a strategy of having both offensive and defensive unified aerospace capabilities."

110) U.S. Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (August 2010) points out that, "The PLA has established information warfare units to develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, and tactics and measures

to protect friendly computer systems and networks. These units include elements of the militia, creating a linkage between PLA network operators and China's civilian information technology professionals."

111) China's National Defense in 2008 refers to an increase in the capabilities to maintain space and electromagnetic space security.

112) Concerning the Chinese military forces, there is a view that believes that by turning exception into normality through uniform peacetime and wartime force deployment and exceeding traditional activity spaces, they intend to desensitize the alertness of others and make the international society tolerate and accept changes in the situation. (Taiwan's 2009 National Defense Report).

113) China's National Defense in 2006 states "The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations." Additionally, with regard to Chinese Navy training, Chinese Navy Commander Wu Shengli is reported to have stated in April 2009 that, "Open sea training has been normalized".

114) This was the first identified passage by Chinese surface combatants through the Tsugaru Strait.

115) These vessels are reported to have passed through the Bashi Channel and advanced to the South China Sea, cruised in the waters adjacent to the Spratly Islands, and conducted military drills in the waters of the Paracel Islands.

116) In April 2010, PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the PLA, reported that a multi-branch joint force of the East Sea Fleet, which consists of submarines, destroyers, frigates, supply ships, and ship-borne helicopters, had begun an open sea deployment training to conduct training for "Three Warfares" ("Psychological Warfare," "Media Warfare," and "Legal Warfare"), counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy as well as actual match-style exercises. Some of these ten vessels conducted exercises in the middle of the East China Sea before advancing to the Pacific Ocean. At the time, a Chinese shipborne helicopter flew near to the Japanese destroyer Suzunami, which was monitoring the Chinese vessels. At its nearest it came at a distance of approximately 90 m horizontally and the altitude was approximately 30 m. Since it was recognized that flying in this manner posed a danger to the safe navigation of the Japanese vessel, the recognition was conveyed to the Chinese government to inquire after the fact via diplomatic routes. Later, another Chinese shipborne helicopter approached destroyer Asayuki, which was monitoring the vessels in the Pacific Ocean and flew in a circle around it. At its nearest it came at a distance of approximately 90 m horizontally and the altitude was approximately 50 m, constituting an act that posed a danger to the safe navigation of the Japanese vessel. Since similar incidents occurred in succession, remonstrance was made to the Chinese government via diplomatic routes.

117) A view was presented that China is inclined to adopt a more confident and assertive stance than before, and the anti-satellite weapons test in January 2007 and the Chinese Song-class submarine incident in October 2006, where the submarine surfaced near the USS Kitty Hawk, can be seen in such a context. (The testimony of then Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard Lawless at the U.S. China Economy and Security Review Commission on February, 2007)

118) Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009, that "in the past several years, they [Chinese] have become more aggressive in asserting claims for the EEZ."

119) It is reported that China is constructing a large-scale naval base that has underground tunnels for nuclear-powered submarines in the city of Sanya located in the southern tip of Hainan island.

120) When Haiti was struck by a major earthquake in January 2010, the China International Search and Rescue Team (CISAR), which includes military personnel such as engineers, departed for the scene the day after the earthquake struck.

121) China's National Defense in 2008 mentions that the Chinese Navy is developing cooperation in distant waters, and has been gradually boosting its capacity to respond to nontraditional security threats.
122) The organizations authorized to deal with cross-strait talks are the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the Chinese side and the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwanese side.
123) Discourse at the discussion on December 31, 2008, commemorating the 30th anniversary of the announcement of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.
124) The U.S. National Security Strategy (May 2010).
125) Remarks by Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) Xu Caihou in a conference with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (October 2009).
126) The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR; February 2010).
127) Regarding the military field, this treaty mentions military confidence building or strengthening of mutual troop reductions in border areas, military cooperation such as military technical cooperation, and holding discussions in the event that there is awareness of any threat to peace.
128) The organization was established in June 2001 and the original members are China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). The missions of the organization include promoting cooperation between member countries in a vast range of sectors, including security, politics, culture, and energy. Since the organization's establishment, it has developed organizationally and functionally, such as in holding regular summit-level meetings, and establishing the organization's head office and the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS).
129) North Korea seems to emphasize negotiations with the United States over the nuclear issue, and it is believed that China, apprehensive that the destabilization of situations in surrounding countries would lead to repercussions within China, hesitates to employ firm measures. In light of this, there is a view that China's wieldable influence on North Korea is limited.
130) Recent military exchanges between China and Southeast Asian countries include the China-Singapore joint army anti-terrorism drills in June 2009, the China–Thai joint army anti-terrorism drills in July 2007 and September 2008, and China–Vietnam naval joint patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin every year since 2006.
131) Taiwanese National Defense Report 2009 (October 2009).
132) Taiwanese National Defense Report 2008 (May 2008).
133) Taiwanese National Defense Report 2009.
134) With regard to China's and Taiwan's military strength, the Taiwanese National Defense Report 2009 assessed that, "Military superiority between the two sides has already clearly tilted toward the Chinese side."
135) In the speech of then President Putin titled "Russia's Development Strategy through to 2020," he said that Russia's military spending will be in keeping with the national capability and will not be to the detriment of their social and economic development priorities.
136) Annual State of the Nation Address by President Medvedev (November 2009).
137) With the impact from the slump in crude oil prices and the financial crisis in recent years, negative growth was recorded for the last year's economic growth rate (-7.9%; 5.6% in 1998) for the first time since the financial crisis in Russia (1998).
138) Troops were reorganized, in the midst of a military forces reduction after the launch of the Russian Federation's armed forces, to strengthen combat readiness through concentrating personnel. It is hoped that this will enable them to promptly respond during the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a minor conflict. In the meantime, in September 2008 the president approved the "Future of the Armed

Forces of the Russian Federation" and it was decided that all the combat forces would be transformed into combat-ready troops.

139) This is a revised version of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation which was formulated in April 2000.

140) In the Doctrine, the general notion pertaining to threats is split into two categories: military dangers (a state of interstate or intrastate relations that may, in certain conditions, cause the emergence of a military threat) and military threats (a state of interstate or intrastate relations where there is the real possibility of the outbreak of a military conflict). It lists for the former's example the approach of NATO's military infrastructure to the Russian border, including the expansion of NATO, the construction and deployment of a strategic missile defense system, ,as well as the territorial claims and the intervention against Russia and its allies. For the latter it lists the radicalization of military and political situations, and ostentatious displays of military strength designed to provoke through exercises in its adjacent territories.

141) Russia supposes that it will use precision guidance weapons as part of its strategic deterrence.

142) The doctrine of April 2000 states that, "The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response to large-scale aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation." The current doctrine deletes the wording on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Furthermore, it does not touch on the use of nuclear weapons as a "response" to a "large-scale" aggression in the event where conventional weapons have been used, and the description of the non-preemptive use of nuclear weapons has been made less clear.
In an interview with the newspaper *Izvestia* last year (October 14, 2009), Secretary Nikolai Patrushev of the Russian Security Council stated that, "We also adjusted the conditions of use of nuclear weapons to counter a conventional aggression —not only to full-scale wars, but also to regional and even to local wars," and, "In situations critical for national security we do not rule out a possibility of using a preemptive (or preventive) nuclear strike against the aggressor."

143) According to the revisions of the law related to national defense signed by the president in November 2009, Russia can agilely use its armed forces outside of its territory for the following purposes: (1) to repel an armed attack against Russian armed forces overseas, (2) on the request of another country that has been attacked, (3) to protect overseas Russian citizens from armed attack, and (4) to crack down on acts of piracy and to ensure the safe navigation of ships. In the revision it was decided that the use of the armed forces outside of Russian territory would be adopted by the president based on a decision by the Federation Council of Russia, but in December 2009 the council resolved to grant authority related to the use of the armed forces outside of Russian territory to the president.

144) It was decided that the total military force would be limited to 1 million people as of 2016 by a presidential order in December 2008 (approximately 1.13 million people as of 2008).

145) The president approved the document titled "Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" in September 2008, which resolved that the command structure be reorganized (reorganized from the four-tiered structure of military district–army–division–regiment to a three-tiered structure of military district–operational command–brigade), all combat forces be converted to permanent readiness units, and the class structure of commissioned officers be revised, etc. It claimed to have completed the structural reorganization to a three-tiered structure in December 2009, but hereafter there remains the challenge of setting in place a system to operate the structure. Moreover, according to reports, four "joint strategic commands" were established by presidential decree in July 2010 to operate the ground, naval, and air forces in a consolidated manner based on the current six military districts.

146) In his annual State of the Nation Address in November 2009, President Medvedev stated that Russia would promote upgrading equipment such as ballistic missiles to new models. Furthermore, giving priority to the procurement of high-tech equipment, the state policy on military equipment for the period of 2011 to 2020 is under preparation and takes into account the lessons learned from the Georgia conflict.

147) In April 2007, then President Putin stated that professional servicemen would account for two-thirds of the armed forces in his annual address. In addition, the period for conscription was reduced to 12 months as of January 2008. According to news reports, senior military officials have stated that contract soldiers will be reduced and conscripted soldiers will be increased since the challenge of creating a professional army has not been achieved. This will require further attention in the future.

148) President Putin's speech "Russia's Development Strategy through to 2020" (February 2008). In order to ensure the necessary number of junior officers, efforts are being made to ensure human resources, by restructuring the military academy, establishing an education center in private higher-education institutions (universities) to train officers on short-term assignment, setting up special education courses in the military academy to train professional non-commissioned officers.

149) Joint Statement by the leaders of the United States and Russia regarding negotiations on further reductions in strategic offensive arms (April 1, 2009)

150) Warheads mounted on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) (the number of warheads which is actually emplaced on them is counted) as well as nuclear warheads loaded on deployed heavy bombers (one nuclear warhead is counted for each heavy bomber).

151) In addition, it stipulated verification measures that are simpler and less costly than those in START I, while also touching on the mutual relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. Following the entering into force of this treaty, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty) ,which stipulates that the deployed nuclear warheads of both countries should be reduced to between 1,700 to 2,200 (excluding stored nuclear warheads) by December 31, 2012, will be rendered invalid.

152) Based on the current situation wherein countries other than the United States and Russia retain intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), Russia had hinted at withdrawing from the INF Treaty, which only regulates the United States and Russia. But in October 2007 Russia announced the globalization of the INF Treaty to the international community together with the United States.

153) The need for new equipment is touched on in the annual speech by President Medvedev in November 2009, and in the military doctrine that was formulated in February 2010.

154) While there are no clear standards for demarcating fighter generations, a fifth generation fighter is considered to have more advanced capabilities than those of previous generations by combining the latest technologies, such as various types of electronic equipment and stealth. According to various news reports, Russia aims to mass-produce and equip its fifth generation fighter PAK FA (Future Frontline Aircraft System) by 2015. Based on news reports (Russia Now, February 4, 2010), the features of Russia's fighters prior to the fifth generation are as follows.

First generation: Subsonic jet fighters equipped with cannons that appeared after World War II (Examples: MiG-15, MiG-17)

Second generation: Sonic fighters equipped with missiles (Examples: MiG-19, MiG-21)

Third generation: Fighters equipped with more powerful engines and more advanced radar (Examples: MiG-23, MiG-27)

Fourth generation: Fighters with new onboard equipment, powerful radar, and extensive armaments (Examples: MiG-29, Su-27)

Advanced fourth generation: Fighters that are equipped with a thrust deflecting engine and phased array radar, have multi-functionality, and are furnished with a digital cockpit (Examples: MiG-29SMT, MiG-35, and Su-35)

155) In "Vostok 2010" conducted in June-July 2010 in the Far Eastern and Siberian military districts, there were the combat-ready troops in the Volga-Ural military district, ships from the Northern Fleet and Black Sea Fleet, as well as the units in the military districts mentioned above. Also, as part of the "Vostok 2010" exercise, a relevant drill was conducted on Etorofu Island.

156) In October 2009 Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Nikolay Makarov stated that, "Through the 'Zapad 2009' exercises we confirmed the truth of our views concerning the military organization for the transition to the "Future of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." Moreover, Chief Makarov also indicated that, "In the 'Zapad 2009' exercises every service and army corps took part. Troops were moved through the use of railroad, aircraft, and maritime transport methods, and drills were carried out on all sorts of elements of combat behavior".

157) During the war with Georgia in August 2008, the Russian military not only put in troops from the North Caucasus region, but also those from other regions as well.

158) Estimated number of military personnel within the Siberian and the Far Eastern Military Districts.

159) In the Siberian Military District an exercise was carried out to evaluate the newly reorganized brigade in the wake of the military reforms in March 2009. In addition, there was a news report that then Commander in Chief of Ground Forces Vladimir Boldyrev said that exercises testing the brigades in the "Future of the Armed Forces" would be carried out 30 times in 2009. (*Russia Now*, March 23, 2009).

160) The number of cases of the Russian fleet passing through the three international straits (Soya, Tsugaru, Tsushima) of Japan that have been identified and disclosed is as follows: three cases in the Soya Strait in FY2009 (two in 2007, three in 2008), none in the Tsugaru Strait (none in 2007, two in 2008), and ten cases in the Tsushima Strait (none in 2007 and one in 2008), showing an increase in the last few years.

161) Long range flights in the vicinity around Japan were carried out in areas surrounding Japan by Tu-95 long range bombers in October and November 2009, and January, March, April, May, June, July and August 2010, by Tu-160 long range bombers in June 2010, and by Tu-142 patrol planes in September and October 2009.

162) In August 2008, after the Georgia conflict, President Medvedev expressed the view that Russia has regions where it has its privileged interests.

163) Aiming to maintain regional peace and security and implement a joint response to terrorism, etc., SCO conducts an anti-terrorism drill "Peace Mission" and makes efforts for the stability of Afghanistan.

164) Russia and Belarus signed an arrangement on a united regional air defense system in February 2009.

165) Some CIS countries attempt to maintain a distance from Russia. Each member state of GUAM, a regional structure formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (the acronym "GUAM" is composed of the initial letters of the member states) had been taking mostly pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. Georgia seceded from the CIS in August 2009. On the other hand, in Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, whose base of support is a region that is strongly influenced by Russia, was appointed as the new President in February 2010. Attention will be paid to trends in the improvement of relations with Russia in the future.

166) In August 2001, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan provided one troop unit each (battalion or smaller unit) to form the Collective Rapid Deployment Force that consisted of 1,000 to 1,300 personnel. The headquarters is located in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyz. In May 2004, Tajikistan provided another two troop units, and Russia and Kazakhstan provided one unit each as well. As a result, the force has expanded to nine battalions with 4,500 personnel.

167) In November 2005, U.S. forces withdrew from Uzbekistan. In February 2009, Kyrgyz notified the United States that it would close down its air base in Manas that the U.S. uses for anti-terrorism operations. But in June 2009 the United States and the Kyrgyz signed an agreement on the creation of a Transit Center at this base.

168) However, Uzbekistan and Belarus did not sign at the Non-Official Summit of the Heads of the CSTO (July–August 2009) concerning its creation.

169) Russia concluded a border security agreement with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in April 2009, and signed an agreement over the establishment of a Russian military base within Abkhazian territory with Abkhazia in February 2010.

170) The Chechen Republic was hit by large-scale terrorist attacks in 1999 with the involvement of insurgents. The Russian government conducted sweep operations against pro-independence opposition groups and many prominent terrorists were either killed or captured. The overall number of terrorist attacks has been on the decline since 2007, although attacks on VIPs and police officers have occurred sporadically in Ingushetia and Dagestan.

171) Joint Statement by the leaders of the United States and Russia regarding negotiations on further reductions in strategic offensive arms (April 1, 2009).

172) The United States plans to set in place MD systems which include sea-based missiles and mobile radar by 2011 and-land based missiles in a phased manner from then until 2020, on the grounds that the threat to Europe from Iran's medium and short range missiles to which the United States needs to respond has developed more rapidly than predicted.

173) Statement by the Russian Federation concerning missile defense (April 8, 2010).

174) The following nine items have been named as common interests: 1) the fight against terrorism, 2) crisis management, 3) the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, 4) arms control and confidence measures, 5) theater missile defense, 6) search and rescue at sea, 7) military cooperation and defense reform, 8) responses to civilian emergency situations, and 9) new threats and challenges.

175) At the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 1999 summit in Istanbul, agreement was met on changing the possession limit by bloc to a possession limit by country and territory, ensuring transparency and predictability, trust building and verification measures, and compliance with the current CFE Treaty until the CFE Application Treaty took effect. As of present, only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have ratified the CFE Application treaty, and it has yet to enter into effect.

176) In a statement released in September 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Ukraine's aspirations towards NATO membership are in conflict with the security interests of Russia.

177) Proposed by President Medvedev during a visit to Germany in June 2008.

178) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (released in July 2008).

179) The 2012 APEC Summit Meeting is planned to be held in Vladivostok, based on suggestions by Russia.

180) "Peace Mission 2009," an SCO joint exercise for anti-terrorism, was held in July 2009.

181) Rosoboronexport became a subsidiary of Rostechnology, a state-run public corporation founded in November 2007.

182) From 2003 to 2004, Russia concluded contracts with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam to sell its Su-27 and Su-30 jet fighters and some fighters have already been delivered to the contracting countries. In March 2010 Russia agreed to deliver an aircraft carrier to India by the end of 2012, and concluded a contract to sell MiG-29K fighters to India. In 2006, Russia concluded agreements with Algeria and Venezuela to sell Su-30 jet fighters, and a number of them have already been delivered to these countries.

183) According to a report by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the number of incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia has been declining every year, from 170 cases in 2003 to 158 cases in 2004, 102 cases in 2005, 83 cases in 2006, 70 cases in 2007, 54 cases in 2008, and 45 cases in 2009.

184) CARAT is a collective term for a series of the bilateral exercises held between the United States and six Southeast Asian countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).

185) The ratio of defense spending to the national budget has stood at 26–32% from 2000 through 2009. Singapore has the policy of keeping its defense budget to no more than 6% of its gross domestic product (GDP), and this ratio has been in the 4–5% range between 2000 and 2010.

186) Based on the perception that national defense cannot be achieved by conventional military force alone, being faced with limited human resources and changes in the nature of modern warfare, Total Defense is promoted whereby people are organized in five components: Psychological, Social, Economic, Civil, and Military Defense.

187) The Third Generation Singapore Forces place emphasis on three aspects: integration/networking, holistic advancements, and technological advancement.

188) Singapore introduced early-warning aircraft E-2C in 1987, air tanker KC-135R in 1997, and a submarine rescue mother ship in 2008.

189) Singapore conducts flight training by establishing detachments in the United States, the F-15SG in Idaho and the F-16 in Arizona, and also carries out training by dispatching its troops for a long period of time to France, Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, and other countries.

190) Singapore concluded a Defence Cooperation Agreement with India in 2003; as well as other similar agreements with Germany in 2005; with China and Australia in 2008; and with New Zealand, Vietnam and South Korea in 2009. In December 2009, Japan and Singapore signed a Memorandum on Defence Exchanges.

191) Singapore dispatched landing ships, transport planes and air tankers to Iraq for a total of 11 times between November 2003 and December 2008, while it sent dental officers and construction engineering corps to Afghanistan between May 2007 and January 2010. Furthermore, Singapore dispatched a naval vessel for counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in operations under the command of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) from April 2009 to July 2009. In January 2010, Singapore took over command of CTF-151 from the United States and took charge of the task force until April 2010.

192) Based on the website of the Malaysian Ministry of Defense.

193) The Malaysian Ministry of Defense explains Self-Reliance, Regional Cooperation and Foreign Aid as follows:

- The pursuit of self-reliance involves not only combat forces but also a logistical support network and the defense industry.
- Regional Cooperation involves the promotion of strong bilateral defense cooperation among ASEAN countries.
- Foreign Aid involves seeking assistance from outside the region when the level of threat is beyond the country's capability as well as the utilization of the framework of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).

194) In April 2009, Chief of Army Muhammad Ismail Jamaluddin stated that the Malaysian Army would not participate in any other multilateral joint exercises than the FPDA.

195) As of the end of April 2010, Malaysia has dispatched a total of 1,084 servicemen on U.N. peacekeeping missions, including 741 to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and 215 to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).

196) In August 2008, when two chemical tankers of Malaysian registry were attacked in succession by pirates in the Gulf of Aden, Malaysia dispatched naval vessels and special forces for rescue operations in order to protect Malaysian commercial ships passing through the waters there. Subsequently, in June 2009, the Malaysian Navy requisitioned a container ship from one of the country's private shipping companies and sent them to the Gulf of Aden for antipiracy measures.

197) Based on Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2008.

198) Based on Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2008.

199) IMET provides the military personnel of U.S. allies and friendly nations with opportunities for studying and training at U.S. military educational institutions. In action against Indonesia's suppression of independence movements in Timor-Leste, the United States in 1992 suspended IMET for Indonesia. Though sanctions against Indonesia were partially lifted in 1995, the United States suspended IMET again in 1999.

200) Based on Indonesia's Defence White Paper 2008.

201) Sigma-class corvettes have been built in the Netherlands, with the first of them commissioned in 2007. The corvette has a full displacement of some 1,700 tons, is about 90 m long, 13m wide and of 3.6m draft. Indonesia currently has four Sigma-class corvettes.

202) According to Defence of Thailand 2008, United Defence means the consolidation of national power by the armed forces in every dimension including military, political, economic, socio-psychological, and scientific and technological aspects, for national defense. Active Defence means that the armed forces prepare, reinforce, develop, and administer all military resources so that they are self-sufficient and ready to be used as a deterrent to solve problems and to settle disputes.

203) Based on Defence of Thailand 2008.
In southern Thailand, there have been frequent attacks and explosions reportedly caused by Islamic armed groups calling for separation and independence from Thailand. Since 2004 to the present, over 3,000 people were reportedly killed and several thousands injured in these attacks.

204) The aircraft carrier *Chakri Naruebet* was built in Spain and commissioned in 1997. The flattop has a full displacement of some 11,500 tons, and is some 180m long and some 30m wide. Its main tasks are search and rescue operations and EEZ surveillance; however, some point out that the aircraft carrier rarely goes to sea due to funding shortages.

205) Based on Defence of Thailand 2008.

206) Thailand, the United States, Japan, Singapore, Indonesia, and the ROK participated in the Cobra Gold exercise, with some 100 people taking part from Japan's Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces.

207) Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), which was a status established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Nunn Amendment of 1987, allows designated countries to receive benefits in military areas such as eligibility to have military equipment. A status of MNNA also strongly represents a designated country's close military cooperation with the United States. On top of Thailand, the 13 other countries of Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, ROK, Jordan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, the Philippines, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan have been designated as MNNAs.

208) Remarks of then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte at the 5th annual United States Asia Pacific Council conference (April 11, 2008).

209) The all-people national defense is described as efforts to build up defense capabilities by combining the unity of people and the political system under the guidance of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

210) Based on Vietnam National Defence 2009.

211) The United States amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, opening the way for exports of nonlethal defense articles to Vietnam on the condition of case-by-case licenses or approvals.

212) The Philippine Constitution states that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines," unless the Senate formally approves a treaty and furthermore, if Congress requires it, that the people of the Philippines vote for the treaty, since the end of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991. However, in addition to the mutual defense treaty and the military assistance agreement, the Philippines concluded the Philippines–United States Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998 and the Mutual Logistics Supply Agreement in 2002, maintaining close military relations with the United States.

213) When the 1947 Philippine–U.S. agreement on military bases was revised in 1966, the time limit for the presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines was set for 1991. Negotiations regarding the Military Bases Agreement began in 1992 but were difficult, and furthermore Clark Air Base was rendered unusable due to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in 1991. Although the two nations signed a U.S.–Philippines friendship cooperation treaty the same year, the Philippines Senate rejected it, and since they could not agree on an alternate treaty, in December 1991 the Philippines government announced, with U.S. agreement, that the Military Bases Agreement would be terminated. Clark Air Base Field was returned in November 1991, followed by the return of the Subic Naval Base in November 1991. U.S. forces stationed at the two bases were moved to Guam, Okinawa, and other locations. Subsequently, the two countries signed the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998, providing for the legal status of U.S. military personnel visiting for joint military exercises in the Philippines.

214) Balikatan has been conducted since 1991, but it was suspended between 1995 and 1999 due to the domestic conditions of the Philippines. It was resumed in 2000.

215) See Notes 206 and 207.

216) Defence of Thailand 2008 states that "Major equipment of the Navy must be modernized to meet these needs and must also be balanced with our neighboring states so that the Royal Thailand Navy can jointly engage in regional security cooperation" and "submarines will be efficient deterrent weapons and offensive defence to enhance capability of underwater operation for naval force in the Gulf of Thailand and the Coast of Andaman Sea."

In January 2010, Commander of the Royal Thai Navy Admiral Khamthorn Pumhiran reportedly remarked that "The reason for acquiring submarines is to fulfill our military strategy. The submarines can serve many purposes and is a necessity. We want to make sure that once we are able to afford submarines, we'll be ready for them."

217) The vice president of Rosoboronexport, Russia's state-run weapons exporter, reportedly said in August 2009 that the company will supply Vietnam with eight Su-30 fighters by the end of 2010.

218) It was reported in December 2009 that Vietnam has agreed to purchase six Kilo-class submarines for a total of some $2 billion and Russia will build them at the pace of one submarine a year.

219) Based on the Military Balance (2010), published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

220) Currently, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei all claim territorial rights over the Spratly Islands, while China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim rights over the Paracel Islands. Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces engaged in an armed conflict in 1988 over the Spratly Islands amongst escalating tensions at the time. However, there have not been any major armed conflicts since.

221) The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is a political declaration that clarifies general principles for resolving issues related to the South China Sea.

222) The draft of the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was proposed by the Philippines at an ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in 1999 and discussion has continued at other meetings thereafter. However, the draft has yet to be adopted as there are major differences in countries' opinions on the details.

223) China conducted military exercises in the Paracel Islands in November 2007 and it was reported in December 2008 that the Chinese government approved the establishment of "Sansha City" including the Spratly Islands, which provoked anti-Chinese public demonstrations in Vietnam. In 2008, Vietnam and the Philippines condemned and expressed concerns about the visit of then Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian to Itu Aba Island of the Spratly Islands. In February 2009, China protested against the legislation of the Philippines Archipelagic Baseline Law, and Taiwan and Vietnam both announced that the Spratly Islands and others belonged exclusively to them and that they would not approve of any act of infringement of this. In November 2009, the Hainan provincial government of China decided to establish a committee of villagers in some islands of the Paracel Islands, which drew Vietnam's denunciation as an act to infringe on its territorial rights, and when China sent ships to control fishery operations to the Paracel Islands, Vietnam lodged a protest with China that the act represented a serious violation of Vietnamese sovereignty. Recently, it has been reported that China considers the South China Sea to be its "core interest."

224) In July 2007, a joint exercise codenamed Strike 2007 was conducted in Guangzhou, China, followed by the joint exercise Strike 2008 in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in September 2008.

225) A joint counterterrorism exercise code-named Cooperation 2009 was conducted in Guilin, China, in June 2009, with some 60 people each participating from China and Singapore.

226) The 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting discussed a wide range of cross-border security issues, including natural disasters, terrorism, maritime security, pandemics, and three concept papers were adopted, on the principles for membership in the enlarged ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM Plus), the use of ASEAN military assets and capabilities in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and others. Also, at the 4th ADMM in May this year, a decision was made to establish the ADDM-Plus, to include eight nations from outside the ASEAN region, including Japan.

227) Based on the principles of the consensus system and of non-interference in internal affairs, ASEAN failed to take effective measures against Myanmar, etc., and thus the direction of organizational reform attracted much attention. The ASEAN Charter has adopted the principle of unanimity as before; thus, when a consensus cannot be reached, the ASEAN Summit may decide how a specific decision is to be made. Furthermore, the Charter prescribed that in the case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance, the matter shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision and that ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body. The ASEAN Charter strives for the enhancement of its organization and institutions as mentioned above.

228) The first ASEAN–U.S. Summit was held in conjunction with the ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in November 2009. The second Summit with Russia is scheduled to take place by the end of 2010.

229) Based on the Chairman's Statement of the 15th ASEAN Summit.

230) The ReCAAP is designed to enhance cooperation among maritime security agencies of the countries involved through the establishment of a piracy-related information sharing system and a cooperation network among the countries. The ASEAN member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia), Japan, Bangladesh, China, India, The Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka participated in the negotiations on the agreement. However, Indonesia and Malaysia did not sign the agreement. Meanwhile, Norway became the first extra-regional party to sign the agreement, bringing the number of parties to the agreement to 15.

231) The IMT comprised Brunei, Libya, and Japan, is chaired by Malaysia and has conducted truce monitoring in Mindanao since October 2004 based on the ceasefire agreement reached in July 2003 between the Philippines government and the MILF.

232) The newly resumed IMT comprised Malaysia, Japan, Brunei, including some NGOs.

233) In December 2009, Japan decided to join the International Contact Group (ICG), which comprises Japan, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and four nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The ICG is providing advice to parties for peace in Mindanao and participating in peace negotiations as an observer.

234) At present, the International Stabilization Force (ISF) consists of the two countries of Australia (some 400 members) and New Zealand (some 150 members).

235) The mandate of UNMIT has been extended to February 26, 2011, under the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1912 adopted in February 2010. As of the end of March 2010, a total of 1,553 members have been sent from 40 countries.

236) The country has a Muslim population exceeding 100 million.

237) The Annual Defense Report published in August 2009 states that the threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons, drugs, and nuclear technology are threats which require vigilance without rest with regard to relations with surrounding nations with the understanding that security threats to India are not limited by borders.

238) The number of personnel from the Indian forces engaged in U.N. peacekeeping operations has been ranked either third or fourth in the world since 2001.

239) In October 2008, the Indian government approved the dispatch of Navy vessels on a patrol mission to the Gulf of Aden, and in November 2008, a frigate of Indian Navy sank a fishing vessel which had been hijacked by pirates.

240) Regarding the procurement of multipurpose fighters, Defense Minister Antony has cited the provision of the contract which calls for introduction of technology created through joint development.

241) India also conducted a test launch of the Agni-2 in November 2009; however, it was reported that the test had failed.

242) In December 2007, Dr. V. K. Saraswat, Chief Controller at the Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) of India's Ministry of Defence said that "the Agni-4 is still in the design stage and so we cannot give a date for the trials and several tests remain before we operationalize it." However, in February 2010, he stated to reporters that the Agni-5 is categorized as an ICBM with a range of over 5,000km and that there are plans for a test launch to take place within a year.

243) In March 2009, in the Bay of Bengal in eastern Orissa Province, India conducted a test of shooting down a ballistic missile with an interceptor missile, and reported success. It is also said that India successfully conducted similar tests in 2006 and December 2007.

244) U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told reporters at the press conference during his visit to India in February 2008, "Missile defense talks with India are in the very initial stages. We have just started to talk about conducting a joint analysis about what India's needs would be in the realm of missile defense and where cooperation between us might help advance that."

245) From March to May 2007, the Indian Navy dispatched a fleet and held joint exercises with Singapore, the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and other countries.

246) Then U.S. President Bush called India a "natural partner" of the United States.

247) Both countries agreed to begin "strategic dialogue" to discuss wide ranging issues including the prevention of nuclear proliferation and measures for global warming. Minister of External Affairs S. M. Krishna expressed his understanding at the press conference following the talks that U.S.–India relations had entered a "third phase" on top of the existing relationship of cooperation in the realms of the economy and politics.

248) U.S. President Obama received Prime Minister Singh as the first state guest since the beginning of his administration. After the talks, he announced a policy to move forward with cooperation in new areas in addition to announcing a joint statement and reconfirming the "Global Partnership".

249) In cooperation with India, the United States intends to provide India with capabilities and technologies required for the country to improve its defense capabilities to an appropriate level, including the sale of F-16 and F-18 fighters.

250) Originally, the "Malabar" exercise was a bilateral exercise between the United States and India, but five countries took part in Malabar 07-2, including Japan, Australia, and Singapore.

251) Seventeen Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers participated from the United States.

252) India purchased an Austin-class Amphibious Transport Dock from the U.S. Navy in 2007, and the vessel was commissioned as INS *Jalashwa* in June 2007. This vessel is the first former U.S. vessel possessed by Indian Navy.

253) P-8 is a new type of U.S. Navy patrol aircraft. The United States had not exported the aircraft before it did to India.

254) In the agreement, China recognized that Sikkim belongs to India. Also, the two countries agreed to continue efforts for the early settlement of the pending border issue.

255) The two countries agreed to hold regular summit meetings and established the target of doubling the bilateral trade amount to $40 billion by 2010. They also signed an agreement on such issues as investment protection and mutual establishment of new Consulates General.

256) At the talks, both countries agreed to continue talks in order to reach an equitable accord acceptable to both countries. They also verified that efforts would be made to protect the peace and security of border regions.

257) The objective of this exercise is reported to be the strengthening of mutual understanding/trust and the promotion of relationships between Chinese and Indian military forces. Hand-in-Hand 2007 in December 2007 and Hand-in-Hand 2008 in December 2008 saw the participation of about 100 military personnel from both sides.

258) India test-launched the said missile in January and March 2009.

259) The joint statement included deepening of the strategic partnership.

260) Both countries signed agreements including an agreement regarding a military technology cooperation program to run from 2011 through 2020, an agreement regarding maintenance for equipment and weapons sold by Russia to India, the November 12, 2007 agreement protocol regarding cooperation in the development and manufacturing of military transports, and an agreement regarding cooperation in nuclear energy use for peaceful purposes.

261) The two countries signed a document concerning a joint development project for mid-size, multi-purpose transport aircraft and fifth-generation fighters. In addition, study was made of a proposal to provide India with additional T-90 tanks, Su-30MKI fighters, and Mil-17 helicopters within the framework of the agreement already concluded. It was confirmed to enhance the production capabilities of the Brahmos cruise missiles now under joint nuclear development by the two countries as well as to aim to develop the air launch version of the missile. An intergovernmental agreement was concluded concerning the contract for licensed production of engines for MiG-29 fighters. It was also agreed that the two countries would conduct joint anti-terrorism military exercises in Russian territory in April and September 2007.

262) The joint exercise India has been conducting every other year since 2003.

263) At the same time, India signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN and the ASEAN–India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.

264) President Zardari delivered the first address to the Parliament in September 2008. He said that his administration would continue the three-pronged strategy of the previous administration but that the use of force would only be used as a last resort against terrorism, advocating the necessity of renouncing violence

and making peace with those who are willing to make peace as well as of investing in the development and social improvement of the local people. He also stressed the need of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) reform to root out terrorism. While he asked the government to stay firm in its resolve to not allow its soil to be used for terrorist activities against foreign countries, he also stated that Pakistan would not tolerate the violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity by any power in the name of combating terrorism.

265) Pakistan also conducted a test launch of the Babur (Hatf-VII) cruise missile in March 2007.

266) From November to December 2006 Pakistan conducted a series of initial test launches of the Ghauri (Hatf-V) and Shaheen (Hatf-IV) intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

267) The two countries have adopted greatly different positions in relation to solving the Kashmir territorial issue. India's territorial claim over Kashmir is based on a document from the Maharaja of Kashmir to India, while Pakistan claims that the territorial claim over Kashmir should be decided through referendum in accordance with the 1948 U.N. Resolution.

268) In August 2005, the two countries agreed on the prior notification of ballistic missile testing and on the establishment of a hotline between their Vice Foreign Ministers.

269) In December 2008, General Kayani, Chief of Army Staff, released a statement after a meeting with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, He Yafei, who visited Pakistan to ease tensions. He demonstrated Pakistan's stance of avoiding armed conflict, highlighting the need to de-escalate and avoid conflict in the interests of peace and security.

270) While both Prime Ministers agreed that talks were the only method to move forward (with relations between the two countries) and to separate (Pakistani) anti-terrorism measures from (the restarting of) the multiple dialogues (between India and Pakistan), a specific date for the restart of talks was not touched on.

271) English papers in Pakistan dated March 8, 2009, reported that the Pakistani Air Force and a Chinese company had struck a deal to jointly produce 42 JF-17 fighter aircraft.

272) Pakistan has supported the fight against terrorism led by the United States and other countries. For example, it provided logistical support for the U.S. operations against Afghanistan, and carried out operations to sweep up terrorists in the border regions of Afghanistan. Also, Pakistan started to dispatch warships to naval operations in the Indian Ocean in April 2004. In appreciation of this support from Pakistan, the United States designated the country as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

Further, in March 2009 the navies of twelve nations of Pakistan, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Japan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Kuwait, Nigeria, and Turkey participated in the Pakistan hosted the multinational joint military training exercise "Aman 2009." China deployed naval special forces to the exercise in addition to warships.

273) At the same time, the sanctions that had been imposed also on India by the United States and other countries due to India's nuclear test were lifted.

274) Regarding the possibility of extending nuclear energy cooperation to Pakistan, then President Bush only referred to the differences between Pakistan and India in terms of energy needs and history. In response, Pakistan said that it was important for the United States to treat Pakistan and India equally in order to ensure strategic stability in South Asia.

275) The United States has expressed the intention to provide 12 RQ-7 "Shadow" unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to Pakistan.

276) In September 2005, then President Musharraf reportedly demonstrated his recognition that the Khan network had probably exported a dozen ultracentrifuges to North Korea. In May 2008, BBC News reported that the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan said allegations that he passed on nuclear secrets were false. In the interview, he said that there was pressure put on him to accept the charges "in the national interest."

277) Australia released its Defence White Paper previously in 1987, 1994, and 2000.
278) It has been decided that the destroyer combat system will be a U.S.-made Aegis system equipped with SM-6 long-range anti-aircraft missiles.
279) 2009 Defence White Paper.
280) A trilateral security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. The United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand's non-nuclear policy.
281) Talisman Saber is a biennial joint exercise between the United States and Australia, first carried out in 2005, and aims to improve readiness and interoperability in operations ranging from traditional wars to peacekeeping and humanitarian aid. In 2009 it included more than 24,000 troops participating from the United States and Australia in amphibious assault training, urban combat training, and airborne training.
282) The Joint Combined Training Capability Memorandum of Understanding was concluded in 2009 to improve the quality of joint training and reduce cost.
283) Australia announced its participation in the U.S. missile defense program in December 2003. At the AUSMIN in 2004, the United States and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides a 25-year framework for missile defense system development and testing (details of the MOU have not been disclosed). In August 2004, Australia selected the Aegis air warfare system as the combat system for new air warfare destroyers (AWD). It is suggested that the AWD would support the ballistic missile defense system.
284) 2009 Defence White Paper.
285) The 2009 Defence White Paper states that "China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin… But the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans. China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernization appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan." In its regularly scheduled press conference of May 5, 2008, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense stated that "the modernization of China's military strength is not a threat to any nation. Related nations should view this objectively and without bias."
286) From a speech given by then Minister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon at the Australian Defence Force Academy on March 10, 2009.
287) The 12th Australia–China Strategic Defense Dialogue was held in October 2001. Note that these talks were raised to the chief of staff/assistant defense minister level in 2008.
288) The 2009 Defence White Paper states, "Developing our defence relationship with China is therefore a priority. Greater engagement is essential to encourage transparency about Chinese military capabilities and intentions, understand each other's approaches and secure greater cooperation in areas of shared interest."
289) In addition to carrying out joint search and rescue exercises, the first such exercises between the navies of Australia and China off the coast of Qingdao in October 2004, a trilateral search and rescue exercise with the addition of New Zealand was carried out in the Tasmanian Sea in October 2007. It is reported that in September 2009, the Chief of the Australian Defence Force and the U.S. Commander, Pacific Command, agreed to approach China with the possibility of military training exercises between the three countries.
290) In July 2004, the ASEAN–Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was signed between Australia and ASEAN.

Australia signed a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism with the Philippines in March 2003 and a status of forces agreement in May 2007 regarding visiting units. Further, approximately 130 Philippine soldiers are being trained in Australia.

Regarding Vietnam, Vietnamese officers are being trained in Australia based on a bilateral defense cooperation program, and regional defense dialogues have been carried out since 1998.

Australia concluded a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism with Thailand in October 2002. Australia also signed a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism with Brunei in February 2002.

291) 2009 Defence Whitepaper.

292) In addition to signing a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism in February 2002, Australia and Indonesia jointly held a regional summit regarding counter-terrorism in March 2007.

293) The agreement regarding a framework for security cooperation, called the Lombok Agreement, was signed in November 2006 and took effect in February 2008. Its goals include the cooperation in the war on terror and transnational crimes, defense, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, intelligence, maritime and aviation security, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and response to contingencies.

294) A large scale military exercise called "Bersama Padu," was held in 2006 around the South China Sea, and a joint air force training exercise called "Bersama Shield" is also held each year in Malaysia. Australia signed a memorandum of understanding for counter-terrorism with Malaysia in August 2002. Further, in addition to a permanent Australian Air Force presence in Malaysia's Butterworth air base, the Malaysian military receives training in Australia based on the Australia Malaysia joint defense program which began in 1994, and joint exercises are carried out every year. Australia signed a memorandum of understanding regarding defense cooperation with Singapore in August 2008.

295) This took effect in 1971. The framework stipulated that in the event of an attack on or threat to Malaysia or Singapore, the nations of Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom would discuss the response. In recent years focus has been expanded to include non-traditional threats such as terrorism and maritime security as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

296) A Defence Update 2007 and 2009 Defence White Paper.

297) 2009 Defence White Paper.

298) The breakdown of the military forces is as follows: Army: approx. 27,500 personnel, Navy: approx. 13,200 personnel, Air Force: 14,100 personnel.

299) In April 2006 demonstrations by rebels in Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, turned into riots, and the ADF was dispatched in response to a request from the Government of Timor-Leste. In December 2009, stating that the security conditions of Timor-Leste had improved, the Australian Department of Defence announced that the Australian military presence be reduced from 650 to 400 troops, and the ISF announced it would shift its focus to improving the capability of the Timor-Leste military.

300) The activities began with participation of South Pacific nations, led by Australia, in response to a request for assistance from the Government of the Solomon Islands, where a deteriorating security situation triggered by tribal conflict was out of control. The 15 participating countries include Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga.

301) This is from a statement by Australian Minister for Defence John Faulkner in a speech in support of the U.S. reevaluation of its strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Australian military is the largest contributor to the ISAF among non NATO member nations. Australia has expressed support for the reevaluation by the United States of its Afghanistan and Pakistan strategies and has not set a deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, it has stated that there is also no plan to increase the deployment.

302) The government announced on April 29, 2009 that it would deploy approximately 450 additional personnel to Afghanistan. The additional units include approximately 330 personnel engaged in training and support of the Afghanistan military in Uruzgan Province and approximately 120 troops deployed temporarily to maintain security during the elections in August of the same year.

303) Two sea patrol aircraft, three transports, and one frigate are operating in the Middle East. It was announced in May 2009 that in addition to their anti-terrorism mission, the patrol aircraft and frigate would also take on the mission of responding to piracy.

304) In contrast to the mission of collective defense (collective defense within the region) provided in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mission of conflict prevention and crisis management is called a non-Article 5 mission.

305) Two strategic commands; Allied Command, Europe and Allied Command, Atlantic; were merged into one Allied Command Operations, and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) was established to supervise the transformation of capabilities and improvement of interoperability of NATO forces.

306) Also, in an effort to strengthen NATO's Strategic Airlift Capability, three C-17 airlifters were procured from the United States and began operations between July and October 2009.

307) Article 42 section 7 of the fundamental European treaty amended by the Lisbon Treaty stipulates aid and assistance by other member states if the territory of a member state is the victim of armed aggressions. However, it also stipulates that actions based on this article shall be consistent with commitments under NATO.

308) As of April 2010, units from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Luxembourg, and Portugal are participating in Operation Atalanta. There has also been participation from non-EU member states such as Norway.

309) The NATO Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996 made a decision enabling access to NATO's assets and capabilities in operations led by the Western European Union (WEU). Most of the roles and missions of the WEU were transferred to the EU. As a result, it was decided, at the NATO Washington Summit Meeting held in April 1999, to once again permit the use of NATO's assets and capacities by the EU. This decision was called the Berlin Plus. In December 2002, NATO and the EU made a permanent arrangement concerning the above decision.

310) Stating that security conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained unstable, the European Council announced that it was prepared to continue its military role in support of Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond 2010.

311) In March 2009, military missions in Chad and the Central African Republic were transferred from the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUROR TCHAD RCA) to United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT).

312) They are called Petersberg tasks. They consist of combat unit missions in crisis management, including 1) humanitarian assistance and rescue operations, 2) peacekeeping, and 3) peacebuilding.

313) Four central/eastern European countries and three Baltic States (Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Slovakia) joined in March 2004 and Albania and Croatia joined in April 2009. The Council of European Union Foreign Ministers meeting in December 2008 called for Georgia and Ukraine to accelerate political, military and other reforms towards accession to the EU.

314) Established in 1994. Separate cooperation agreements have been concluded between NATO and non-NATO countries of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) such as Central and Eastern European countries.

315) Established in 1994, the MD currently has seven participant countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia). Its objective is to foster stability in the Mediterranean region through political dialogue and engagement in NATO-related activities by Mediterranean countries.

316) The term "Contact Country" has been used since the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting in 2004. NATO pursues partnerships on a case-by-case basis with countries which share common interests and concerns with NATO.

317) The white paper titled Delivering Security in a Changing World published in December 2003, states the need for rapid and long-range deployment of military force in order to deal with international terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. It set the objective of establishing defense capabilities to support three concurrent operations, including one long-term peacekeeping operation.

318) The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998 stated that a direct military threat to the United Kingdom did not exist and that recurrence of such a threat could not be predicted.

319) Delivering Security in a Changing World released in December 2003 stated that there was no longer a need for capacity to prepare for the recurrence of direct, traditional, strategic threats to the United Kingdom or its allies.

320) The currently operating Vanguard class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to begin decommissioning in the early 2020s. Therefore, the U.K. government considered whether or not to maintain its nuclear deterrent and consequently announced this white paper. In March 2007, the House of Commons adopted the motion submitted by the government to support the policy set forth in the white paper.

321) The Cameron administration which was inaugurated in May 2010 has determined to implement the "Strategic Defence and Security Review" under the newly formed National Security Council.

322) The questions raised as requiring deliberation are: 1) "Given that domestic security cannot be separated from international security, where should we set the balance between focusing on our territory and region and engaging threats at a distance?", 2) "What approach should we take if we employ the Armed Forces to address threats at distance?," 3) "What contribution should the Armed Forces make in ensuring security and contributing to resilience within the UK?", 4) "How could we more effectively employ the Armed Forces in support of wider efforts to prevent conflict and strengthen international stability?", 5) "Do our current international defence and security relationships require rebalancing in the longer term?" and 6) "Should we further integrate our forces with those of key allies and partners?" In addition, according to the paper, the Review will also have to decide: "To what extent and in what areas should we continue to refocus .our current efforts on Afghanistan?"

323) The intervention force comprises combat readiness troops equipped with state-of-the-art weapons. It is designed to deal with opponents that have well-organized military formations in intensive multilateral operations, such as those executed by NATO combat readiness troops or EU battlegroups, with the goal of providing the foundation for peace stabilization operations. The stabilization force deals with opponents that have a certain level of military formations and performs peace stabilization operations in low- and medium-intensity operations that last for a relatively long period. The assistance force supports the intervention and stabilization forces in preparing for and performing operations in Germany and in the target areas, through activities including the management of command, educational, and training organizations.

324) At the launching ceremony of the ship submersible ballistic nuclear-powered (SSBN) submarine, *Le Terrible*, in March 2008, French president Sarkozy expressed his view of the country's nuclear capability; given the existing risk of nuclear proliferation and other threats, nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantee to protect France from any state's aggression against vital national interests and it is essential to maintain its missile capabilities, both submarine-launched and air-launched. He also announced his decision to reduce France's air-launched nuclear missile capability by one-third, which means its arsenal would become no more than 300 warheads. Further, on January 27, 2010, the new SLBM (M-51) was successfully test launched from a submarine for the first time.

325) On March 17, 2009, the French government won a parliamentary vote on its plan to return to NATO's integrated military command. While the government announced its participation in NATO's integrated military command in April at the NATO Summit, President Sarkozy stated in his speech delivered in March 2009 that France will retain an independent nuclear deterrent.

Part II

The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Chapter 1

The Basic Concepts of Japan's Defense Policy and Related Issues

Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security
Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense
Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy

[Cabinet Public Relations Office]

Section 1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security

Peace and safety are vital to ensuring that people can live without fear and so that Japan can continue to develop and prosper. In addition, national independence must be protected in order to allow Japan to individually determine how its politics, economy, and society should be, and maintain its culture, tradition, and values. Peace, safety, and independence cannot be secured by wishing alone. Indeed, these can only be secured by comprehensively implementing various measures in consideration of the current situation of the increasingly interdependent international community, including for Japan's own defense capabilities, diplomatic efforts, and cooperation between allied nations and the international community.

Dependence on foreign trade for resources and food is particularly high, and maintaining peace and cooperation in the international community is of tremendous importance to Japan, as it places the foundation for its development and prosperity on free trade. For this reason, Japan is working to strengthen bilateral cooperative relationships such as the Japan–U.S. alliance[1] while actively advancing regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and with the United Nations, and to prevent and resolve conflicts and disputes, develop economically, promote arms control and disarmament, ensure maritime security, and enhance mutual understanding and trust. Domestically Japan also works to enrich the backbone of the people, which is characterized by ensuring stable lifestyles for the people and protecting the country, while also working to establish a security foundation by implementing various measures in such sectors as the economy and education so as not to allow for openings that would invite an invasion.

Meanwhile, the reality of the current international community suggests that it is not necessarily possible to prevent invasions from the outside via nonmilitary means alone, and in the event that Japan was invaded it would not be able to remove said threat. Defense capabilities are Japan's ultimate guarantee for security, expressing the will and capacity of Japan to defend against foreign invasions. In this way, the function of defense capabilities cannot be substituted by any other method. Therefore, defense capabilities are vital as preparations against the remote chance of a full-blown invasion of Japan. Moreover, in today's security environment it is necessary to go beyond preparations for a full-blown invasion and develop defense capabilities that can effectively respond to new threats and diverse circumstances, including the transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorism. Also, from the perspective of improving the international security environment so as to ward off threats to Japan, the role that defense capabilities play in such areas as international peace cooperation activities is increasing. In consideration of the factors above, Japan is advancing the development of a proper level of defense capabilities. The security of Japan is ensured through such individual efforts to develop adequate defense capabilities along with Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements to formulate watertight defense measures.

Japan recognizes the important role played by its defense capabilities and works in a variety of fields to ensure national security while also aiming to create peace and safety for the Asia-Pacific region and consequently the entire world.

(See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2)

Section 2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

1. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Since the end of World War II, Japan has worked hard to build a peace-loving nation far from the miseries of war. The Japanese people desire lasting peace, and the principle of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 renounces war, the possession of war potential, and the right of belligerency by the state. Nonetheless, since Japan is an independent nation, these provisions do not deny Japan's inherent right of self-defense as a sovereign state.

Since the right of self-defense is not denied, the Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed force needed to exercise that right. Therefore, the Government, as part of its exclusively national defense-oriented policy under the Constitution, maintains the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, and continues to keep it equipped and ready for operations.

2. The Government's View on Article 9 of the Constitution

1. The Permitted Self-Defense Capability

Under the Constitution, Japan is permitted to possess the minimum necessary level of self-defense capability.

The specific limit may vary with the prevailing international situation, the technologies available, and various other factors, and it is discussed and decided according to annual budgets and other factors by the Diet on behalf of the people. Whether such capability constitutes a "war potential" that is prohibited by Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution must be considered within the context of Japan's overall military strength. Therefore, whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain armaments depends on whether such possession would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

The possession of armaments deemed to be offensive weapons designed to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, which would, by definition, exceed the minimum necessary level, is not permissible under any circumstances. For example, the SDF is not allowed to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2. Requirements for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense

The Government interprets Article 9 of the Constitution to mean that armed force can be used to exercise the right of self-defense only when the following three conditions are met:

1) When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;
2) When there is no appropriate means to deal with such aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; and
3) When the use of armed force is confined to the minimum necessary level.

3. Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense may be Exercised

The use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters and airspace. However, it is difficult to give a general definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this would vary with the situation.

Nevertheless, the Government interprets that the Constitution does not permit armed troops to be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level for self-defense.

4. The Right of Collective Self-Defense

International law permits a state to have the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use force to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the minimum necessary level of self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not permissible.

5. The Right of Belligerency

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution prescribes that "the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." However, the "right of belligerency" does not mean the right to engage in battle; rather it is a general term for various rights that a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force and to occupy enemy territory.

On the other hand, Japan may of course use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force in exercising its right of self-defense, this is conceptually distinguished from the exercise of the right of belligerency, even though those actions do not appear to be different. Occupation of enemy territory, however, would exceed the minimum necessary level of self-defense and so is not permissible.

Section 3. The Basis of Defense Policy

1. Basic Policy for National Defense

Under the Constitution, Japan has adhered to its Basic Policy for National Defense[2], which was adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in 1957.

The national defense objectives provided in the Basic Policy for National Defense are to prevent direct and indirect invasions of Japan, eliminate threats for the remote chance that Japan is invaded, and thus protect the independence and peace of Japan as a democratic nation. In addition, the Basic Policy lays down the following four items as a basic policy for achieving these objectives.

1) Support the activities of the United Nations, cooperate with other nations, and aim to achieve world peace.
2) Establish the foundation necessary to ensure a stable quality of life for the people, boost nationalism, and guarantee the nation's safety.
3) Progressively develop efficient national defense capabilities to the necessary limit for self-defense in accordance with national power and circumstances.
4) Deal with foreign invasions of Japan based on security arrangements formed with the United States until the United Nations becomes able to effectively prevent said threats.

(See Reference 6)

2. Other Basic Policies

Under the Basic Policy for National Defense, Japan has been building a modest defense capability under the Constitution purely for defense purposes without becoming a military power that could threaten other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military, observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and firmly maintaining the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

1. Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that Japan will not employ defensive force unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country, and even in such a case, only the minimum force necessary to defend itself may be used. Furthermore, only the minimum defense forces necessary for self-defense should be retained and used. This exclusively defense-oriented policy is a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.

2. Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the term "military power." For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that could threaten the security of other countries means that Japan will not possess more military force than is necessary for self-defense and that could pose a threat to other countries.

3. The Three Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are that Japan: will not possess nuclear weapons, will not produce nuclear weapons, and will not allow nuclear weapons into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed national policy.

Japan is prohibited from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons also under the Atomic Energy Basic Law[3]. In addition, Japan ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and as a non-nuclear weapons state, is not permitted to produce or acquire nuclear weapons[4].

4. Ensuring Civilian Control

Civilian control of the military means the precedence of political will over the military in a democratic state, and hence democratic political control over the military.

Learning lessons from World War II, Japan has adopted the following system of uncompromising civilian control that is entirely different from those under the former Constitution[5]. Civilian control ensures that the SDF is operated in accordance with the will of the people.

Prime Minister Kan delivering an address at the meeting to exchange views with Chiefs of Staff of the SDF and other senior officials [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

The Japanese people are represented in the Diet, which makes legislative and budgetary decisions on matters such as the authorized number of uniformed SDF personnel and principal institutions of the SDF. The Diet also approves defense operations.

As part of its general administrative functions, the Cabinet has entire authority related to defense. The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State in the Cabinet to be civilians. The Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Cabinet, is the supreme commander of the SDF. The Minister of Defense, who is exclusively in charge of national defense, exercises general control over SDF activities. The Security Council of Japan[6] within the Cabinet discusses important defense matters.

At the Ministry of Defense, the Minister of Defense is in charge of administrative work related to national defense and controls the SDF. The Minister of Defense is assisted in planning policies by the Senior Vice-Minister and two Parliamentary Secretaries.[7]

In addition, in August 2009, in relation to important affairs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, the positions of special Advisors to the Ministry of Defense were created to fulfill such functions as offering advice to the Minister of Defense based on their own insight. Furthermore, the Defense Council —a meeting composed of the political appointees, civil servants and uniformed SDF personnel of the Ministry of Defense as well as the Minister of Defense to deliberate on important policies under the ministry's jurisdiction— was established. In this way, the Ministry of Defense is working to enhance the advisory system for the Minister of Defense and further enrich the civilian control system.

(See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1)

The top three politicians' meeting

As mentioned above, the civilian control systems are well-established. The success of the system depends on ongoing political and administrative efforts, as well as a keen interest among Japanese citizens in defense issues.

Notes:

1) Signifies the relationship between Japan and the United States in which they, as nations that share fundamental values and interests, work together on political, economic, and security issues, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. (See Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2)
2) The function of this Council was taken over by the Security Council of Japan in 1986.
3) Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that "The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management."
4) Article 2 of the NPT states that "Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes....not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices..."
5) The Cabinet's control over military matters was limited.
6) Members of the Security Council are the Prime Minister (chairman); Minister designated pursuant to Article 9 of the Cabinet Law (Minister of State pre-designated to perform duties of the Prime Minister temporarily when the Prime Minister is absent, involved in an accident, or in a similar situation); Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; Minister of Defense; the Chief Cabinet Secretary; and Chairperson of the National Public Safety Commission.
7) In addition, to help the Minister of Defense effectively handle administrative work related to national defense and to reliably manage the SDF, other systems to assist the Minister have been established. See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1 for the organization of the SDF, including such advisory systems to the Minister.

Part II

The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy and Build-up of Defense Capability

Chapter 2

The National Defense Program Guidelines and Build-up of Defense Capability

Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines
Section 2. The National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-term Defense Program
Section 3. Defense Posture Review
Section 4. FY2010 Defense Program
Section 5. Defense-Related Expenditures
Section 6. New Efforts Based on Recent Trends

Section 1. Basic Concepts of Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) set forth the basic principles of Japan's security policy and the basic guidelines for Japan's defense capability in the future, including its significance and role as well as the specific organization of the SDF and the target levels of major defense equipment to be built-up based on these principles and guidelines.

The NDPG have been formulated twice in the past, once in 1976 as "The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1977 and Beyond[1]" (1976 NDPG) and again in 1995 as "The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and Beyond[2]" (1995 NDPG). After deliberation by bodies such as the Defense Posture Review Board of the then Defense Agency and the Security Council[3], the current guidelines were formulated in 2004 as "The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond" (2004 NDPG) in order to respond adequately to the international security environment following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. This section explains the background and basic concepts of the formulation of the National Defense Program Guidelines.

The 2004 NDPG stipulates that the trends of the current security environment and technical standards should be considered five years after the drafting of the guidelines and then the necessary amendments made. There were plans to initially revise the 2004 NDPG in 2009, however, there was a historical change of regime as a result of the general election held in the same year and it was determined that the new government would have to pay sufficient consideration to the revisions, as they are an important issue related to the security of Japan. For this reason, it was decided that a resolution on revising the 2004 NDPG would be made in 2010.

As a result, Japan's defense capabilities for FY2010 was built up based on the concepts of the 2004 NDPG as the resolution for the 2004 NDPG revisions would be reflected in the budget from FY2011 onward.

Moreover, in revising the 2004 NDPG, it is stipulated that upon its revision, a basic policy for Japan's security will be drafted after carrying out an analysis and evaluation on such factors as trends in international affairs, the security environment of Japan, Japan's national defense capabilities, and the current situation of the SDF. At the same time, it is supposed that Japan is to work to efficiently develop effective defense capabilities.

This section covers the background of the drafting of the 2004 NDPG along with its basic concepts. Section 2 will further explain its content while Section 3 provides additional explanation on such aspects as the revision of the 2004 NDPG.

(See Reference 7)

1. Background to Formulating the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines

1. Changes in the International Situation and the Diversifying Roles of Military Capability

Since the end of the Cold War, the interdependence of states has deepened and expanded, and with the advancement of international coordination and cooperation, the likelihood of a global armed conflict has become even more distant than it was at the time of the formulation of the 1995 NDPG. On the other hand, complex and diversified regional conflicts stemming from territorial, religious, and ethnic issues have occurred, and responding to new threats and diverse contingencies[4] has become an urgent task for various nations and the international community.

Against this background, maintaining conventional forms of deterrence remains important in order to prevent inter-state conflicts. However, maintaining conventional forms of deterrence is not always effective against non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations.

In addition, it has become increasingly difficult for a single country to resolve security environment issues, and stabilizing the international security environment has become a common interest of all countries. Therefore,

each country has been making a broad range of efforts to resolve such issues through various means including military capabilities, through coordination of various measures, and through international collaboration. In this context, the roles of military capabilities have diversified to include prevention of conflict and reconstruction assistance in addition to the traditional roles of deterrence and response to armed conflict.

Under these circumstances, the United States, while giving consideration to international collaboration, has been engaged in a variety of activities, including international terrorism and activities to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Depending on the nature of these activities, there have been instances in which international cooperative frameworks in the form of "coalitions" have been established that differ from traditional alliance relations.

In the midst of these global changes, the countries in areas surrounding Japan are characterized by ethnic, religious, political and economic diversity. The area also features several major countries with a complex structure of interrelated interests and disputes over unification, territorial issues, and maritime interests. Many countries are also modernizing and improving their military capabilities. In particular, North Korea is engaged in the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as well as maintenance and reinforcement of its asymmetric military capabilities (including large-scale special forces). In addition, China continues to grow steadily as a major power in the region both politically and economically. In the military sphere, the country has been modernizing its nuclear/missile forces as well as its naval/air capabilities, and seeking to promote space development and expand the scope of its maritime activities. These trends must continue to be monitored in the future.

2. Remarkable Developments of Scientific Technology

Technological advancement, led by information and communications technology, have not only given rise to significant improvement in combat capabilities, but have also brought about a fundamental transformation of military power, exercising considerable influence on the defense strategies of all countries.

3. Expansion of SDF Activities and the Improvement of Japan's Emergency Response Mechanism

The SDF's activities have been diversifying and expanding to include response to incidents with suspicious vessels, nuclear accidents, various natural disasters, illegal acts, emergency situations, and international activities including both U.N. peacekeeping operations and cooperation in international efforts for preventing and eradicating international terrorism, as well as efforts for the national reconstruction of Iraq. Through the activities being undertaken in response to these situations, coordination with relevant agencies such as police and local communities has been reinforced.

4. Characteristics of Japan

Closely located to major powers of the Eurasian continent, Japan is situated at a strategically important position for the maritime traffic from the northeastern part of the continent to the Pacific Ocean. Japan's territory consists of a long and thin crescent-shaped archipelago with long coast lines and numerous small islands. The country's large population is confined within a very narrow territory, with industry and population concentrated mainly in urban areas, while a large number of facilities essential to economic development are located in coastal areas, all of which can be regarded in terms of topology as vulnerabilities. Due to geographic, geologic, and climate conditions, Japan is also prone to natural disasters of various kinds.

Furthermore, stability in the international security environment is essential for Japan's stability and development, which are based on a market-based economic system and free trade. Above all, Japan depends on imports for many resources and food, relying on the Middle East for approximately 90% of its crude oil

consumption and other countries for approximately 60% of its food. The maintenance of secure and stable sea lanes are therefore of extreme importance to Japan.

2. The Basic Concept of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines

1. Two Objectives and Three Approaches

The purpose of Japan's security is to protect the peace; safety; independence; and land, sea, and air territories of Japan; to maintain the national system based on freedom and democracy; and to protect the lives and property of the Japanese people.

With a steady trend toward attaching importance to collaboration and cooperation in the international community, as well as from the Japanese perspective of playing a role commensurate with the nation's position and gaining the trust of the international community, Japan must independently and proactively make efforts for the peace and stability of the international community, which are prerequisites for Japan's own peace and independence.

In doing so, due to the unpredictable, complex, and diverse nature of today's security threats, it is important that the Government take swift and appropriate responses through a systematic combination of security-related measures, including those of public security, economy, and intelligence, and promotion of diplomatic efforts in times of peace and effective operation of defense capabilities. Furthermore, it must engage in cooperation with the United States, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and promote cooperation with relevant countries and organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.).

Based on the aforementioned recognition, the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines define the following two objectives for security:

1) Prevention of direct threats from reaching Japan and, in the event that they do, repelling them and minimizing any damage.
2) Improvement of the international security environment to reduce the potential that threats will reach Japan in the first place.

In order to achieve the two objectives listed above, three approaches —Japan's own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community— are to be combined in an integrated manner.

(See Fig. II-2-1-1)

Fig. II-2-1-1 Relations between Two Objectives and Three Approaches



Fig. II-2-1-2 Changes in Conception of Defense Force that Should be Retained



Note1: The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and beyond

To combat the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and at the same time will play an active role in efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles.

2. New Concept for Defense Capability (Shifting emphasis from "deterrent effects" to "response capability")

(1) Reviewing the Basic Defense Force Concept

With regard to Japan's defense capability, the 1976 NDPG set forth the Basic Defense Force Concept. The concept is designed to enable Japan to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense capability as an independent state so as not to turn into a power vacuum and become a destabilizing factor in the region, rather than preparing to directly counter military threats. The 1995 NDPG essentially adhered to this concept.

The Basic Defense Force Concept was reviewed for the following two reasons in line with changes in the security environment surrounding Japan.

(See Fig. II-2-1-2)

a) Effective Response to Contingencies

Under the Basic Defense Force Concept, focus is placed on defense capabilities of an adequate scale in addition to the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements as preventative measures against potential invasion. Behind this idea is the deterrent effect generated by a country that possesses adequate defense capabilities. However, new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and can occur unexpectedly, such that conventional deterrent effects that derive from the presence of a defense force do not necessarily work effectively. Therefore, future defense capabilities are strongly required to have the ability to prevent such threats from surfacing, as well as the ability to enable effective response to various contingencies and to minimize damage when such events do occur.

b) Proactive Efforts on Japan's Own Initiative for International Peace Cooperation Activities

The Basic Defense Force Concept is based on the assumption that while it is internationally recognized that efforts for stable international relationships will continue despite the existence of unpredictable and uncertain elements, at the same time, mutually cooperative and interdependent relationships among nations have been advancing, and new threats and diverse contingencies are becoming increasingly difficult for a single nation to resolve.

Under these circumstances, Japan, in order to ensure its security, must proactively participate in international collaborative activities for the improvement of the international security environment (international peace cooperation activities) on its own initiative by utilizing its defense capabilities. It has become difficult to build defense capabilities solely on the basis of Japan's Basic Defense Force Concept, which is focused on the defense of Japan.

(2) Multifunctional, Flexible and Effective Defense Capabilities

With regard to future defense capabilities, the NDPG states that the effective portion of the Basic Defense Force Concept shall be maintained[5] under the new security environment, and that in addition to responding to new threats and diverse contingencies effectively, there is also a need to be able to participate proactively in international peace cooperation activities on Japan's own initiative.

In addition, while the expected roles of defense capabilities are becoming more diverse, a decline in the youth population due to dwindling birthrates and a dramatic increase in the severity of Japan's fiscal condition should be considered as the country plans the future build-up of defense capabilities.

Based on this viewpoint, Japan's future defense capability needs to be equipped with high responsiveness, flexibility, and multi-purpose functionality, and to be supported by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities in line with trends in military technology standards so that it can establish "multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities" that can respond appropriately to various contingencies through flexible deployment of SDF units and utilization of multifunctional defense equipment.

The 2004 NDPG thus stipulates that Japan must shift the emphasis of its defense capabilities from pursuit of conventional deterrence effects to acquisition of ability to respond to various contingencies at home and abroad.

Section 2. The National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-term Defense Program

1. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

As described earlier, there are two objectives for Japan's security: to prevent direct threats from reaching Japan and to repel them, and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that threats will reach Japan.

Japan will achieve these objectives by combining Japan's own efforts, cooperation with alliance partners, and cooperation with the international community in an integrated manner.

1. Japan's Own Efforts

Japan's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts. Based on this recognition, it is stated in the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) that Japan will make its utmost efforts, utilizing all available means, to prevent threats from reaching the country directly. The guidelines state that in the event that these efforts fail to prevent the threat from reaching the country, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making the appropriate decisions and bringing together all relevant organizations, such as the SDF, the police and the Japan Coast Guard, and ensuring adequate cooperation among them. In addition, the Government will establish necessary civil defense systems to respond to various emergency situations, and the central and local governments will work together closely to establish adequate systems.

At the same time, Japan will engage in its own diplomatic and other activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving the international security environment.

The guidelines prescribe that Japan's defense capabilities, which are the ultimate guarantee of national security, shall be multi-functional, flexible, and effective, and that the improvement of efficiency and rationalization are necessary in order to realize such capabilities.

2. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to ensuring Japan's security, and the presence of the U.S. military is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the progress made in Japan–U.S. cooperation in dealing with global issues, as exemplified in the fight against terrorism, the close Japan–U.S. cooperative relationship plays a significant role in the effective promotion of international efforts to prevent and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies.

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements do not function simply because of the existence of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. In order to make this agreement effective, it is essential to make continuous efforts in times of peace. From this perspective, the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines clearly specify the following efforts.

(1) Implementation of Strategic Dialogue between Japan and the United States (Strategic Objectives, Role-sharing and Military Posture)

Based on the posture of Japan's security and defense capabilities clarified in the 2004 NDPG, Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and military posture while working to harmonize perceptions of the new security environment and the appropriate strategic objectives[6]. In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden on local communities which host U.S. military facilities, while maintaining the deterrent capabilities that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

(2) Various Efforts for Strengthening the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements shall be enhanced through active promotion of measures including information sharing, various forms of operational cooperation and collaboration on ballistic missile defense (BMD).

3. Cooperation with the International Community

The 2004 NDPG states that in order to improve the international security environment in cooperation with the international community and to help maintain the security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of official development assistance (ODA). The guidelines also state that based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region extending from the Middle East to East Asia is crucial to Japan. Therefore, the Government of Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries concerned in order to deal with common security challenges. Japan will also actively engage in U.N. reforms, as well as promote efforts for multilateral frameworks for security in the Asia-Pacific region such as the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF).

2. Vision for Future Defense Capabilities

1. Role of Defense Capabilities

In recognition of the new security environment, the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) define the role of defense capabilities as:

1) Effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies
2) Preparation for a response to a full-scale invasion
3) Proactive efforts, on Japan's own initiative, to improve the international security environment. The guidelines state that Japan will efficiently maintain the SDF posture deemed necessary to carry out missions effectively in each area.

The 1995 NDPG clearly stated the maintenance of the defense posture of each branch of the SDF. However, the current 2004 NDPG adopts the idea that a new SDF posture should be formed in the process of joint operations being conducted to respond to each contingency. Based on this concept, the guidelines specify in a comprehensive manner, the role and response to be fulfilled in each contingency and the concept of the SDF posture under "The Role of Defense Capabilities."

(1) Effective Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

New threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and have the potential to emerge suddenly. In order to effectively counter such situations, it is necessary for Japan to form and deploy highly ready and mobile defense force units in accordance with the characteristics of the units and Japan's geographical characteristics. When contingencies do actually occur, the SDF will act quickly and appropriately in accordance with the characteristics of the situation. In that event, the SDF will work in close collaboration with the police, the Japan Coast Guard, and other relevant organizations in accordance with the situation's development and the need for division of labor to respond to the situation in a seamless manner.

Major responses to new threats and diverse contingencies are as follows.

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan will effectively deal with ballistic missile attacks by maintaining a system to counter such attacks, including a BMD system, to be established at an early date.

Japan will appropriately deal with nuclear threats through efforts to build the BMD system as well as relying on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1)

b. Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Forces

In response to guerillas and special operations force attacks, Japan will maintain the necessary defense force structure to effectively deal with the situation by enhancing the readiness and mobility of defense force units, as well as by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner, including swift and concentrated unit deployments. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-2)

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

Because of Japan's geographical characteristics, featuring many offshore islands, invasion of such islands can be envisioned as one method of orchestrating an armed attack against Japan. In this regard, Japan must maintain a defense structure which is capable of dealing with precise guidance attacks by transporting SDF units by sea and air in a flexible manner. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-3)

d. Patrol and Surveillance of Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Responses to Violations of Japan's Airspace and Intrusion of Armed Special Operation Vessels and Other Vessels

Early detection is extremely important in order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies and to prevent said contingencies and the expansion of contingencies when they should occur. Therefore, around-the-clock patrol and surveillance of the sea and airspace surrounding Japan remains a key role of the SDF. For this reason, Japan will maintain warships, aircraft, and other equipment necessary to achieve this aim. Japan will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond swiftly and appropriately to the violation of territorial airspace. Furthermore, in light of issues concerning armed North Korean special operation vessels and submerged navigation within Japanese territory by Chinese nuclear submarines, Japan will maintain a structure to take appropriate actions against such spy ships in the waters surrounding Japan and submerged foreign submarines navigating in Japan's territorial waters. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-4)

e. Response to Large-Scale and Special Disasters

In the event of a large-scale natural disaster or a special disaster such as a nuclear disaster, it is of extreme importance that Japan utilizes the capabilities of the SDF to ensure the security of the people. For situations in which protection of life or property are necessary, Japan will maintain an adequate force structure consisting of defense force units and personnel with specialized abilities and expertise with the ability to undertake disaster relief operations throughout Japan. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-5)

(2) Preparations for Full-Scale Invasion

While the likelihood of full-scale invasion is declining, new defense capabilities are required for Japan to effectively respond to new threats and diverse contingencies. Proactive engagement is also required of Japan, on its own initiative, aimed at improving the international security environment.

In recognition of this security environment, the 2004 NDPG states that Japan will depart from the previous defense build-up concept that emphasizes so-called Cold War-type counter-armor warfare and implement a sweeping review of its defense equipment and personnel earmarked for responding to full-scale invasion with an eye toward reducing numbers.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Current Defense Situation of the Nansei Islands

Geographically, Japan is home to a vast number of offshore islands. Therefore, it is necessary for Japan to take every measure possible so that this geographical characteristic does not become a vulnerability in the instance that one of such islands is invaded.

The Ministry of Defense and SDF continuously patrol the sea and airspace of the Nansei Islands and surrounding areas during times of peace, and conduct various different activities such as collecting information necessary for national defense and working to detect signs of a contingency in the early stages. In addition, the SDF maintains preparedness that allows for flexibly transferring and deploying forces to effectively handle invasions of Japanese islands.

Amidst these circumstances, Japan has advanced the development of the defense structure in the Nansei Islands, such as by reorganizing the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) 1st Combined Brigade into the GSDF 15th Brigade and enhancing it in March 2010.

Minister of Defense Kitazawa awarding regimental colors to Colonel Nakanishi, chief of the 51st Regiment Infantry, at the ceremony to present the unit flag as part of the realignment of the 15th Brigade (March 26, 2010)



Current deployment of units in the Nansei Islands

In addition, Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) vessels and aircraft are monitoring the surrounding waters of the Nansei Islands as of recent, and these monitoring forces have been strengthened in recent years.

The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) fielded a F-15 fighter aircraft squadron at Naha Air Base by March 2009 in order to prepare for the phase out of F-4 fighters and to sustain effective defense posture for air threats.

On the other hand, currently there are no SDF units deployed to the west of Miyako Island, where a ASDF radar site is stationed, making this area a sort of "vacuum" in terms of defense. Considering the security environment around Japan, the Ministry of Defense is examining the role of the defense of the Nansei Islands including deployment of a new unit.

At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of defense capability is to respond to full-scale invasion and that the rearrangement of defense build-up will require time, the 2004 NDPG states that Japan will secure the most fundamental element of its defense capabilities in order to prepare for full-scale invasion.
(See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 3)

(3) Proactive Efforts on Japan's Own Initiative to Improve the International Security Environment

a. Proactive Engagement on its Own Initiative in International Peace Cooperation Activities

It is stated in the 2004 NDPG that Japan will proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative with the objective of further ensuring the peace and security of Japan, rather than simply "making a contribution," as was stated in the previous version of the guidelines.

The scope of international peace cooperation activities is extremely broad, and the Government of Japan as a whole needs to be engaged in these activities in an integrated manner with diplomacy as part of the country's unified efforts. Within the framework of the Government's overall policy, the SDF must be appropriately engaged in international peace cooperation activities drawing on its self-sustainability and organizational capabilities. For this reason, the SDF plans to establish the infrastructure necessary to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, maintaining a highly ready force posture for relevant units, and improving transport and other capabilities.

In order for Japan to appropriately participate in international peace cooperation activities, Japan maintains that necessary arrangements will be made including efforts to properly prioritize these activities within the SDF's overall missions.
(See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 1)

b. Security Dialogues and Promotion of Defense Exchanges

Security dialogues and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training need to be continued in view of the changes in the international security environment and in recognition of the fact that such efforts contribute to the effective implementation of international peace cooperation activities. In addition, activities which contribute to the peace and stability of the international community need to be actively promoted by continuing the implementation of cooperative activities in the area of arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations such as the United Nations.
(See Part III, Chapter 3, Section 2 and 3)

2. Fundamental Elements of Japan's Defense Capabilities

The following are fundamental elements of Japan's defense capabilities that are included in the 2004 NDPG, which are necessary to fulfill the defense roles described earlier.

(1) Enhancement of Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to execute its missions swiftly and effectively and respond to new threats and diverse contingencies without delay in the new security environment, the SDF needs to enhance the joint operational posture so that all SDF services can operate in a unified manner in such situations from the moment they arise.

For this reason, the Joint Staff was established and the infrastructure for joint operations was put in place in such areas as education and training, and information and communications, and the SDF reexamined its existing organizations for joint operations capabilities so as to enhance their efficiency.

(See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 1-4)

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order for defense capabilities to function effectively with multi-functionality and flexibility, it is imperative for the Government of Japan to build and fully utilize advanced intelligence capabilities, including the ability to detect contingencies as early as possible and to consolidate and share intelligence accurately and in a timely manner.

Therefore, Japan will strengthen its advanced and diversified intelligence-gathering capabilities and enhance its comprehensive analysis and assessment capabilities, considering the security environment and technological trends. Japan will also strengthen its intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which will play a role in supporting these capabilities, and in this regard, Japan will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-6)

(3) Incorporating the Progress of Science and Technology in Japan's Defense Capabilities

In order to realize multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities, the fruits of various technological innovations resulting from progress in information science and technology should be adequately reflected. In particular, advanced command and communications systems as well as information communication networks that can respond even to cyber attacks shall be established to develop reliable command and control systems while the rapid intelligence-sharing systems that are indispensable to the SDF's joint operations described above will be enhanced in line with the advanced information and communication technologies available in Japan and abroad.

(See this Chapter, Section 6-2)

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

In order to achieve greater outcomes with limited human resources, the 2004 NDPG notes the necessity to recruit human resources with high potential and train and educate them to adequately respond to increasingly diverse and international SDF missions and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech defense equipment.

Research and education on security issues will be promoted together with a reinforcement of the manpower foundation for promoting such research.

(See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1)

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Establishment of the Branch of Service of Military Intelligence

Previously there had been 14* branches in the GSDF. Although exhibiting their own individual characteristics, they have developed a flexible response with respect to all kinds of circumstances. Meanwhile, in recent years, the importance of information has been mounting in the defense sector, and accordingly, the branch of service of Military Intelligence was newly established in March 2010 in order to develop personnel who will retain highly specialized skills, and to strengthen the intelligence functions of the GSDF. This is the first new branch of service established since the foundation of the GSDF itself.

Due to the establishment of the Military Intelligence Command, not only will personnel who specialize in intelligence be stably and sustainably secured, it is also thought that gradual and systematic human resource development will become possible over a long-term perspective, and the human foundation with respect to information strengthened.

The Military-Intelligence GSDF units include the Military Intelligence Command, the Army Military Intelligence Units and the Army Intelligence Analysis, working on such tasks as information and data gathering and processing.

[Origin of service badge]
The golden bird on the badge is a golden crow called Yatagarasu, which according to Kojiki and other writings led the forces of Emperor Jinmu — who would become the founding emperor of Japan — to victory around 3,000 years ago. This crow is frequently used in Japan as a symbol of information and victory in battle.

The items held in each of the bird's three feet are a "telescope" which symbolizes information gathering, a "key" which symbolizes the key of preserving and analyzing information, and the "Japanese sword" which symbolizes the intangible fighting strength of information, and the sharp edge of its incisive analysis.

* Infantry, Armored, Artillery, Aviation, Engineer, Signal, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Transportation, Chemical, Military Police, Finance, Medic, and Military Band.

A celebratory event being held at the Ministry of Defense (Ichigaya) on March 30, 2010 (Minister Kitazawa at the center of the stage)

3. Specific Posture for Defense Capability

The attached table of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) clarifies the specific posture for the defense capabilities needed to fulfill the missions described above. The following provides an overview[7].

1. Ground Self-Defense Force

(1) Establishing a More Effective System

a. Basic Strategic Units

Divisions and brigades are the basic units that possess combat functions such as infantry and tank units, combat service support functions such as airborne and communications units, and logistic support functions such as supply units, in order to execute their various missions independently. Due to these characteristics, divisions and brigades are referred to as basic strategic units.

In order to effectively respond to new threats and contingencies that are difficult to predict and require prompt response, in peacetime, regionally deployed units (basic strategic units) comprising eight divisions and six brigades, which are responsive and highly mobile, will be formed. The units will each be stationed with consideration given to Japan's geography, which is characterized by mountains, rivers, and straits, and one armored division (7th Division) will be maintained as a mobile operation unit.
(See Fig. II-2-2-1)

Fig. II-2-2-1 Deployment of Divisions and Brigades under the National Defense Program Guidelines



b. Formation of the Central Readiness Force

In order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies should they occur, the Central Readiness Force will be maintained, for the unified control of Mobile Operation Units (Central Readiness Regiment, etc.) and various other specialized units (Central NBC Unit, etc.), as a unit which will be provided to each area in the case of contingencies. Within this force, the International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit will be maintained to conduct the necessary education, training and research with the aim of swiftly dispatching personnel for international peace cooperation activities.

(2) Transition to Personnel-oriented System in Response to the New Security Environment

The transition will be made from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept to a personnel (manpower)-oriented system in order to respond quickly to new threats and diverse contingencies such as attacks by guerillas and special operations forces, and large-scale disasters by deploying units across the country and enhance participation in international peace cooperation activities.

Specifically, the amount of primary equipment, tanks and artilleries, will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicles for artillery, respectively. At the same time, personnel (manpower) will be reduced from the 160,000 authorized number of personnel in the 1995 NDPG to 155,000, while the fixed number of full-time SDF personnel will be increased from the 1995 NDPG figure of 145,000 to 148,000 in order to guarantee effective response.
(See Fig. II-2-2-2)

Fig. II-2-2-2 Changes in Number of SDF Personnel and Main Defense Equipment



[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Opening of New (Vice) Camps, etc.

In March 2010, a new facility was constructed at Camp Kochi, which is located in Konan City, Kochi Prefecture, and Vice-Camp Kitatokushima was opened in Matsushigecho, Itano-gun, Tokushima Prefecture.

Both the camp and vice-camp were constructed not only from the perspective of defense and security as a part of the reorganization of the 2nd Combined Brigade into the 14th Brigade, which is in charge of policing the Shikoku region, implemented in March 2006, but also with the aim of providing an effective response to various natural disasters such as Tonankai and Nankai earthquakes.

Camp Kochi is a new facility developed in accordance with the transfer of the GSDF 50th Infantry Regiment from GSDF Camp Zentsuji (Zentsuji City, Kagawa Prefecture) where it used to be stationed. The GSDF 50th Infantry Regiment is the major unit of the 14th Brigade, which is equipped with light armored vehicles, and 120-mm mortars.

Vice-Camp Kitatokushima is the first camp or vice-camp of the GSDF to be constructed in Tokushima Prefecture. It was constructed within MSDF Tokushima Air Base, where the GSDF 14th Squadron was newly stationed and deployed. The said Squadron is the first air GSDF unit in Shikoku and is equipped with utility helicopters and observation helicopters.

The GSDF currently has 157 camps and vice-camps nationwide. This was the first vice-camp newly constructed in 16 years since the construction of the Vice-Camp Ashoro (Ashorocho, Ashoro-gun, Hokkaido) in 1994.

The understanding and cooperation of local residents are essential in constructing camps and vice camps. This project was carried out with proactive cooperation and support from the community, after providing a thorough explanation about the construction to relevant municipalities, including Kochi Prefecture and Tokushima Prefecture, as well as local residents. The newly deployed units will work to ensure the safety and peace of mind of the local residents through various activities, and at the same time strive for mutual coexistence with the people through social contribution efforts.



Camp Kochi

Vice-Camp Kitatokushima

2. Maritime Self-Defense Force

(1) Posture of New Destroyer Units for More Effective Response

In order to secure a large number of well-trained destroyers within the limited number of vessels and to enable prompt response to diverse contingencies, destroyer units will be formed according to the level of readiness rather than the conventional fixed formation.

Mobile Operation Units will be integrated into eight divisions (one division consisting of four vessels) to enable swift and continuous response to contingencies. The formation of Regional District Units will be modified so that one unit is deployed in each of five patrol districts in view of the current security environment.

(2) Formation of Submarine Units Focusing on Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

Submarines will be deployed in important maritime traffic points in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan for information gathering and other purposes in order to allow for detecting signs of new threats and diverse contingencies as early as possible and to enable a flexible response.

For this reason, submarine units will continue to retain a total of 16 submarines (units are to be consolidated, from six divisions with two or three vessels per division to four divisions with four vessels each).

(3) Streamlining of Combat Aircraft Units

In regard to combat aircraft numbers, such as for patrol aircraft, while ensuring the continued surveillance posture of the surrounding waters, as well as its readiness and effectiveness, the number of combat aircraft will be reduced from approximately 170 to 150 as a result of consolidation of units and improvements in efficiency.

For the fixed-wing patrol aircraft units, P-3C successor aircraft (P-1) with improved performance will be introduced, and the current eight squadrons will be integrated into four squadrons for increased efficiency. From the viewpoint of increasing operational efficiency, patrol helicopter units will be consolidated from eight squadrons to four, and will be ship-based, in principle.

3. Air Self-Defense Force

(1) Improving the Efficiency of Fighter Aircraft Units

While fighter aircraft units will continue to be major units in order to permit appropriate action in a timely manner against the violation of airspace, in light of the decreased probability of a full-scale invasion of Japan, the number of aircraft will be reduced from approximately 300 to 260 by means of improvements in operational efficiency.

The number of combat aircraft, including fighters, will be reduced from approximately 400 to 350 in line with such developments as the downsizing of air reconnaissance units.

(See Fig. II-2-2-3)

(2) Strengthening Transport and Deployment Capabilities

In order to allow Japan to effectively respond to an invasion of its offshore islands and to properly participate in international peace cooperation activities, Aerial Refueling/Transport Units will be newly established.

(See Fig. II-2-2-4)

(3) Division of Airborne Early-Warning Group into Two Groups

The Airborne Early-Warning Group will be reorganized from the single group described in NDPG 1995 into two groups: E-767 early-warning and control aircraft units and E-2C early-warning aircraft units.

Fig. II-2-2-3 Deployment of Fighter Units



Fig. II-2-2-4 Future Structure of Air Transport Units



4. Major Equipment and Major Units Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The 2004 NDPG states that the posture of the SDF must be capable of taking on various roles. In particular, it has been deemed important for Japan to obtain understanding of its BMD system both domestically and abroad by explaining the system as specifically as possible and ensuring its transparency. To that end, the guidelines in the attached table denote the concrete system for BMD as being, "major equipment and major units also available for ballistic missile defense[8]."

(See Fig. II-2-2-5)

Fig. II-2-2-5
National Defense Program Guidelines Appendix and Structure of the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program at Time of Completion

Category			1976 NDPG	1995 NDPG	2004 NDPG	2005 Mid-Term Defense Program at Time of Completion
GSDF	Authorized personnel		180,000	160,000	155,000	About 161,000
	Regular			145,000	148,000	About 152,000[1]
	Ready reserve			15,000	7,000	8,000
	Major units	Regionally deployed units in peacetime	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile operation units	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 combined training brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Force	1 armored division Central Readiness Force
		Ground-to-air guided missile units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Main equipment	Tanks	—	About 900	About 600	About 790
		Main artillery	—	About 900/vehicle	About 600/vehicle	About 830/vehicle
MSDF	Major units	Destroyer units (for mobile operations)	4 escort flotillas	4 escort flotillas	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions)	4 escort flotillas (8 divisions)
		Destroyer units (regional district units)	(Regional units) 10 units	(Regional units) 7 units	5 divisions	6 divisions
		Submarine units	6 divisions	6 divisions	4 divisions	5 divisions
		Minesweeping units	2 minesweeper flotillas	1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla	1 minesweeper flotilla
		Patrol aircraft units	(Land-based)16 squadrons	(Land-based)13 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons
	Main equipment	Destroyers	About 60 ships	About 50 ships	47 ships	48 ships
		Submarines	16 ships	16 ships	16 ships	16 ships
		Combat aircraft	About 220 aircraft	About 170 aircraft	About 150 aircraft	About 170 aircraft
ASDF	Major units	Aircraft control & warning units	28 warning groups — 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne warning squadron (2 squadrons)
		Fighter units	—	—	12 squadrons	12 squadrons
		Fighter-interceptor units	10 squadrons	9 squadrons	—	—
		Support fighter units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	—	—
		Air Reconnaissance Units	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron
		Air Transport Units	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
		Air refueling/ transport units	—	—	1 squadron	1 squadron
		Surface-to-air guided Missile Units	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups
	Main equipment	Combat aircraft (fighter aircraft)	About 430 aircraft (about 350 aircraft)	About 400 aircraft (about 300 aircraft)	About 350 aircraft (about 260 aircraft)	About 350 aircraft (about 260 aircraft)
Main equipment & major units which can also be used in ballistic missile defense		Aegis-equipped destroyers	—	—	4 ships	4 ships
		Aircraft control & warning units	— —	— —	7 groups 4 squadrons	7 groups 4 squadrons
		Surface-to-air guided missile units	—	—	3 groups	3 groups

Note 1: In regards to the increase of full-time SDF personnel as outlined in the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program, in order to effectively respond to new threats, and diverse contingencies, and for Japan to proactively engage in international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative, current levels will be maintained, increases to make up for vacant spots will be around 146,000.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

First Flight of the Next-Generation Transport Plane (XC-2)

On January 26, 2010, the first flight for the first test model of the next-generation transport plane, the XC-2, was conducted at ASDF Gifu Air Base. The result of the test was favorable and on March 30, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, a manufacturing company, delivered the planes to the Ministry of Defense.

The XC-2 — which was developed based on the concept of combining large-quantity loads, long cruising distance, and high-speed cruise — is the largest plane developed independently by Japan in history, and is the second domestically developed transport plane in Japan, following the current C-1 transport plane.

In terms of cruising distance, while the C-1 cruises around 1,700 km (with a disposable load of 2.6 t) and the C-130H cruises about 4,000 km (with a disposable load of 5.0 t), the XC-2 can cruise up to approximately 6,500 km (with a disposable load of 12.0 t). The introduction of this plane has allowed for a significant expansion in air transport capabilities for the ASDF.

As a comparison of the load capacity of transport planes possessed by the ASDF, the XC-2 can load large size trailers while the C-1 can transport standard-size RVs and the C-130H can transport mid-size trucks. If the XC-2 was used in unit deployments, Patriot units would be able to be transported by air.

This expansion in cruising distance and load streamlines the number of flights, necessary time, and number of planes used to achieve a single transport mission, and improves the ASDF's transport capabilities.

It is expected that the development of the XC-2 will be completed by the end of 2013, and when it commences operations, it will be sent around the world, assigned to air transport missions in contingencies and in peacetime to disaster relief missions or international peace cooperation activities.

The XC-2 taking off

4. Additional Elements for Consideration

The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) state that the following elements shall be taken into consideration in building up, maintaining, and operating defense capabilities.

1. Fiscal Conditions, Procurement of Defense Equipment, and Maintenance and Operation of Defense Facilities

In light of severe fiscal conditions, defense expenditures must be curbed by further rationalizing and streamlining of defense forces. In addition, effort will be made to harmonize expenditures with other government policies and overall defense capability will be made to function smoothly and efficiently.

In addition, the Government will make the following efforts: promotion of measures to curb the lifecycle cost[9] (LCC) for equipment, implementation of effective and efficient research and development activities, as well as the allocation of limited resources focused on core technological fields for the establishment of a truly necessary defense production system and technological foundation.

In order to efficiently maintain and upgrade Japan's defense-related facilities, the Government will take various measures to promote more harmonious coexistence between these facilities and the local communities.

2. Time Frame for Achieving Defense Capability Objectives and Its Review

The 2004 NDPG provides a vision for Japan's defense capabilities for the next decade, based on the idea that it is important to set a concrete timeline for achieving the goals of defense capabilities more clearly.

However, the guidelines indicate that necessary revisions will be made either after five years or in the instance that there is a significant change in the security environment, taking into consideration such change in the environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

5. Mid-term Defense Program

National defense is vital to a country's existence. And defense build-up for it is realized finally in accordance with the budget of each fiscal year. At the same time, however, defense capabilities should be built-up continuously, systematically and steadily based on the security environment surrounding Japan and the role of defense capability in line with a concrete medium-term outlook because research and development of defense equipment, its adoption, improvement of facilities, education of defense personnel, and training of SDF units cannot be realized in the short term.

Therefore, since FY1986 the Government of Japan has formulated mid-term defense programs, each covering five years, and has built-up the nation's defense capabilities each fiscal year based on these programs.

The "Mid-term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009)" is a plan that defines Japan's policy regarding the build-up of its defense capabilities and the main projects for the five-year period between FY2005 and FY2009. (See Fig. II-2-2-6 and 7) (See Reference 8 and 10).

Meanwhile, it has been decided that, in response to the regime change, the next Mid-term Defense Program will be drafted in consideration of the conclusion of revisions made to the 2004 Nation Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), which will take place in 2010. Amidst these circumstances, in December 2009 policy that will serve as reference for forming the FY2010 defense budget was approved by the Cabinet, clarifying such factors as the relationship between the FY2010 defense budget and the 2004 NDPG as well as a policy for properly developing defense capabilities without a Mid-term Defense Program[10].

Fig. II-2-2-6
Number of Major Equipment Increases in the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program

	Major Equipment	Original Plan	Post-Revision[1]
GSDF	Tanks	49 tanks	49 tanks
	Artillery (excluding mortars)	38 vehicles	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	104 pieces	96 pieces
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	7 units	4 units
	Transport helicopters (CH-7JA)	11 units	9 units
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	8 companies	7 companies
MSDF	Improve capabilities of Aegis system-equipped destroyers	3 vessels	3 vessels
	Destroyers	5 vessels	5 ships
	Submarines	4 vessels	4 ships
	Others	11 vessels	8 ships
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4 units	4 crafts
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	23 units	17 crafts
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 units	3 crafts
ASDF	Enhance capabilities of Patriot surface-to-air guided missiles[2]	2 groups & required training, etc.	2 groups & required training, etc.
	Modernize fighter aircraft (F-15)	26 planes	48 planes[3]
	Fighter aircraft (F-2)	22 planes	18 planes
	New fighter aircraft[4]	7 planes	0 planes
	New transport aircraft[5]	8 planes	0 planes
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	4 units	3 units
	Aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 plane	1 plane

Notes: 1. Revisions, such as the modernization of fighter aircraft (F-15) and revisions of how much equipment to develop, were conducted according to Regarding the Revision of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009) (Decision by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 20 December 2008).
2. The composition of equipment required for such activities as training differs from equipment used for outfitting units.
3. In addition to the build-up amount listed above, radar parts for 38 aircraft were acquired for the modernization and renovation of fighters (F-15).
4. The development of new fighter aircraft has not commenced as it was determined that, due to the progress of information gathering on the surveyed fighter models as well as further streamlining of cruising times, it is possible to regulate the phase-out of F-4 fighters.
5. The development of new fighter aircraft has not commenced as efforts are being made to further streamline cruising times for currently possessed C-1. This is due to delays in development resulting from the belated delivery of test flight prototypes spawning from airframe strength problems.

Fig. II-2-2-7 Necessary Expenses for the 2005 Mid-Term Defense Program[1]

	Original Plan	Post-Revision
Total Value[2]	¥24.24 trillion	¥23.64 trillion[3]
Personnel and provisions expenses	¥10.61 trillion	—
Non-personnel expenses[4]	¥13.63 trillion	—

Notes: 1. In view of the need for the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) to show a ceiling on the amount of defense-related expenses for the period covered by the program, necessary expenses under the program are shown on a spending basis, which covers expenditures both for already concluded contracts and new contracts for the period. Figures for the 2005 MTDP are shown in FY2004 prices.
2. Moreover, in the event that it is determined particularly necessary in light of future events that are difficult to foresee, it is possible to acquire the permission of the Security Council to receive up to ¥100 billion in special measures.
3. Moreover, the required amount during the plan for U.S. base relocation costs (reduced amount from the local burden) that were not predicted during the draft of the 2005 MTDP is ¥90 billion in FY2006 prices.
4. The contract amount for non-personnel expenses during the 2005 MTDP is ¥13.65 trillion in FY2004 prices.

6. Three Principles on Arms Exports

A statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary released at the time of the formulation of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) addressed issues related to arms export control. It stated that given the fact that ballistic missile defense (BMD) would contribute to the effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and from the viewpoint of contributing to the security of Japan, the Government would exempt items related to BMD systems from the regulations of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and related provisions, on the condition that those items would be subject to strict export control [11].
(See Reference 9 and 12)

In addition, with regard to cases of joint development and production with the United States as well as cases seen as contributing to counterterrorism and counter-piracy, regarding which questions were raised through the process of developing the NDPG, it mentioned that the Government would decide whether to take any actions in the future on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation of avoiding exacerbation of international conflicts [12].

The statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary clarified that Japan would continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing carefully with arms export control in light of the country's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation, which is the basis for the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines.

Section 3. Defense Posture Review

This section describes the progress of the defense posture review conducted by the Government and Ministry of Defense.

1. Background of the Review of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines

As described in Section 1 of this chapter, the revision of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) is an important issue for Japan's security, and adequate considerations must be paid by the new government following the recent historical change in administration. In order to comprehensively consider the roles of security and defense capabilities in Japan from a broad range of perspectives, the Government decided to establish the Council on the Future of National Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era[13]. Established on February 16, 2010, the composition of the council includes intellectuals in areas such as those related to the roles of security and defense capabilities.

2. The Council on the Future of Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era

1. Council Meetings to Date

The council held its first meeting on February 18, 2010, where Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (at the time) introduced details of the one year postponement of the process of revising the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), in order for the revision to be discussed under the new administration. He also referred to recent notable changes in the security environment, indicated the existence of problems in strengthening the Japan–U.S. alliance, and responding to efforts for international peace, including U.N. peace activities, disaster-relief activities, and countermeasures to terrorism, and stated his hope that considerations in the council will be paid from various angles and in sight of the mid- to long-term.

This council held eight meetings by May 2010 (for details regarding the holding of meetings, see Fig. II-2-3-1), with the ninth meeting held on August 27 of the same year, and a report submitted to Prime Minister Naoto Kan.

Fig. II-2-3-1
Holding of Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in a New Era

(As of June 30, 2010)

Number of meetings	Date	Major agenda
1	February 18, 2010	Concept of the Previous National Defense Program Guidelines
2	February 24, 2010	Military Trends in Neighboring Countries
3	March 9, 2010	Issues of International Society and Japan's Response
4	March 17, 2010	U.S. Security Strategy and the Japan–U.S. Alliance
5	April 8, 2010	Foundation supporting Defense Capabilities
6	April 27, 2010	Future System of the SDF Japan's Financial Situation and Development of Defense Capabilities
7	May 12, 2010	Information and Information Security (including cyber attack countermeasures)
8	May 28, 2010	Overall Summary of Issues Discussed

Note: As well as the above eight meetings of the council, fourteen workshops were held. Other work included gathering opinions from the local governments of areas which are home to SDF garrisons and bases (Chitose and Sasebo), and other such parties, and coordination over the writing of the report.

2. Outline of the Report

The report is composed of four chapters.

Firstly, in Chapter 1, the security objectives are defined as security strategies which Japan should take in the near future, and analysis is provided regarding the international environment in which Japan is likely to find itself over the period until around 2020. This is followed by basic policy discussion in terms of the kind of measures Japan will devise, and whether they should be adopted.

The 9th meeting of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era (August 27, 2010) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

Specifically, three security objectives are presented, namely 1) maintaining Japan's security and prosperity, 2) maintaining regional and global stability and prosperity, and 3) maintaining a free and open international system. Then, while analyzing the security environment surrounding Japan, it is highlighted, that in consideration of features such as Japan's geographical characteristics, economic strength, and defense capabilities, Japan's identity could be referred to as that of a "peace fostering nation," after which, the necessity of 1) Japan's own efforts, 2) cooperation with its allies, and 3) multilayered cooperative security is described as strategies and measures for their attainment.

In Chapter 2, it is explained that as a basic idea behind the modality of Japan's defense capabilities, the timely and appropriate use of defense capabilities under normal circumstances, combined with the operational capacity to demonstrate our high defense capabilities, the so-called dynamic deterrence is becoming important, and that Japan will no longer continue to follow the Basic Defense Force Concept. It suggests that with Japan reaching a stage where it is necessary to reorganize its defense structure, moving away from the passive ideals and practices which are associated with that concept, the position Japan's defense capabilities should fulfill in the future will be restructured in terms of the three roles [14] indicated in the 2004 NDPG, 1) response to diverse contingencies, 2) maintaining stability in the region surrounding Japan, and 3) improving the global security environment.

In regard to responding to diverse contingencies, the report discusses the necessity of responding to ballistic and cruise missile attacks, and special operations forces, terrorist and cyber attacks, and of possessing defense capabilities that are capable of acting effectively to incidents which necessitate immediate and complex handling in cases such as these ("complex situations").

In regard to maintaining stability in the region surrounding Japan, the report highlights the necessity of the SDF and U.S. Forces working more closely together, and emphasizes information gathering, warning and surveillance, and intelligence activities. It also mentions the necessity of strengthening defense cooperation and exchange with other countries, our participation in regional security frameworks, and so on.

In regard to improving the global security environment, the report states that the SDF should use international peace cooperation activities to demonstrate the presence of Japan as a "peace-fostering nation" to the rest of the world, and that Japan should proactively participate wherever possible.

Furthermore, in order to fulfill the above three roles, it proposes advancing the selection of and focus on necessary defense functions and systems.

In consideration of the question of what infrastructure development is needed to support the defense capabilities that Japan strives for, Chapter 3 proposes the human, material and social infrastructural challenges involved, together with the course of improvement that should be taken.

Chapter 4 discusses making the security strategies that Japan should take (as raised in Chapter 1) become more effective, as a fundamental improvement to support security strategies. It also discusses which foundations

to the various essential systems and structures should be improved, and how, in order that defense force may be applied appropriately as a security measure.

An outline of the report is given in Fig. II-2-3-2.

The Government will continue to use this report as reference, as the review of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines progresses.

3. Considerations Made at the Ministry of Defense

The Defense Council was held on February 18, 2010 at the Ministry of Defense in order to contribute to these government considerations. The council held wide-spanning discussion from various perspectives on such issues as Japan's future defense capabilities.

Amidst these discussions, Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa ordered that discussion be carried out within the ministry so that it would be reflected in the FY2011 budget requests, and so that considerations are shifted into full swing based on the following two pillars.

(1) It is necessary to efficiently develop more effective defense capabilities from a new perspective that takes into account the regime change, and considerations must be advanced on such issues as awareness of the security environment and the role of defense capabilities.

(2) The issues brought up in the FY2010 budget-forming process and points of consideration indicated in the Cabinet decision should be considered while also calculating the strict financial circumstances. These issues and points of consideration are:

1) Fixed versus actual personnel numbers
2) Further streamlining the acquisition of equipment as well as the roles of defense production and technological infrastructure
3) The role of policies regarding human-related affairs
4) The streamlining and rationalization of units, taking into consideration their relationship with community residents and local society
5) An effective SDF posture, including strengthening integrated operations

The Ministry of Defense is working together with the Cabinet Secretariat to advance considerations on the defense posture of Japan in view of evaluating the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), international affairs, role of defense capabilities, and future issues while organically linking these considerations with other considerations being made at the ministry, including those on ministry reform. These considerations are being carried out in mind of such issues as post-2004 Japan–U.S. relations, phenomena occurring in neighboring countries, and the new definition of international peace cooperation activities as a primary mission of the SDF.

Defense Council held on August 11, 2010 (in relation to the agenda on what the defense capability should be in the future)

Section 4. FY2010 Defense Program

1. Background of Budget Compilation

As a result of the general elections held in 2009 there was a historic change of regime and the FY2010 budget was compiled under a new government.

Following a Cabinet decision on September 18, 2009, the Government Revitalization Unit was established to review the national budget, systems, and other administrative organs overall, from the public perspective. A Cabinet decision[15] on the 29th of the same month pertaining to budget compilation for FY2010 required that in order to implement new measures, following the manifesto, all budget items must be recompiled, and new sources of revenues be found. In addition, a Cabinet decision on October 23 of the same year calls for the project screening[16] process conducted by the Government Revitalization Unit to be entirely open to the public, to implement reform and provide transparency and visibility in the budget compilation process.

The review of expenditures, including project screening, is intended to include outside perspectives in the review of the basic necessity of existing projects and budgets.

At the 2nd meeting of the Government Revitalization Unit, decisions on projects subject to screening were

Fig. II-2-4-1 Major Results of Project Screening for Defense Ministry Projects

Item name	Outline	Results of project screening, etc.	Reflection on evaluation results
Request to increase SDF personnel	Discuss request to increase regular SDF personnel for frontline SDF units in FY2010 budget request	❍ Budget appropriation for this fiscal year postponed	❍ Budget appropriation for this fiscal year postponed
Acquisition of equipment and material (New future obligation from FY2010)	Discuss new acquisitions of equipment such as aircraft, vessels, guided missiles, firearms, and vehicles in FY2010	❍ Waiting for a government decision • PAC-3 is a political matter • Must wait for preparation of the NDPG • Must wait for the year-end Cabinet decision	❍ Will prepare defense capabilities based on the FY2010 Defense Program (December 17, 2009 Cabinet decision)
Cost of materials, clothing, firearms, ammunition	Discuss cost reductions of general materials such as general office supplies, clothing such as uniforms, and firearms and ammunition	❍ Reduced the budget request (materials, clothing) ❍ Will review (firearms, ammunition) • Must introduce and expand import purchasing • Need to verify emergency response	❍ Reduced from budget estimate request ❍ Will examine quality, functions, price, stability of supply, etc., of foreign made firearms and ammunition, from this fiscal year
Standard for leasing land for defense facilities	Discuss standard for rent to lease areas for SDF facilities and U.S. Forces facilities and areas	❍ Will not review rental amounts • Make effort to have as many landowners as possible understand the overall budget situation ❍ The renewal cooperation expenses remain as requested (Application effort)	❍ The budget estimate remains as requested
Base environs countermeasures (Soundproofing housing) (Stable public welfare (general aid)) (Designated Defense Facility Environs Maintenance Grant)	Discuss public welfare stability projects and maintenance grants for such activities as construction to soundproof houses for residents in surrounding areas to mitigate the negative effects of establishing and operating defense facilities nearby, and for local governments nearby defense facilities	❍ The budget for soundproofing houses remains as requested ❍ Both the stable public welfare (general aid) and Designated Defense Facility Environs Maintenance Grant systems are to be reviewed. (Make them freer to use, and make them more useful to local regions so that they are more effective.)	❍ Proposed partial changes to the Living Environment Improvement Law in the 174th meeting of the House of Representatives to make Designated Defense Facility Environs Maintenance Grants applicable to soft projects in addition to facility equipment (See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 3-3)

Note: 17 Defense Ministry projects subject to project screening.

determined. Of these, 17 Defense Ministry projects were to be screened, including requests to increase the actual number of SDF personnel, acquisition of equipment and material, base environs countermeasures, and standards for leasing land for defense facilities. These projects were screened in November 2009, and the Defense Ministry explained the purpose and necessity of each project. Discussions were then held after hearing explanations from the Ministry of Finance. In the end, the project evaluations were compiled and sorted into the categories of "budget requests reduced," "budget appropriation postponed," "project revision needed," and "budget approved as requested."

Based on the results of project screening the budget estimation for the FY2010 budget proposal was reduced by 16.8 billion yen, reflecting expense reductions for projects that were subject to screening. In conjunction, the Defense Ministry will conduct survey research into how it can provide an efficient and effective defense program in the future, and are looking at more efficient and effective ways to implement projects, and to organize the SDF.

Furthermore, "project screening" targeting projects implemented by independent administrative agencies and government-affiliated public corporations was conducted for a month beginning in late April. From FY2010, "administrative project reviews" are also being conducted at each ministry[17].

2. Policies to Adhere to in Compiling the FY2010 Defense Budget

As a result of the regime change, in parallel to these activities, the next Mid-term Defense Program will be formulated incorporating the conclusions of the reviews of the 2004 NDPG. As described in Section 2 of this chapter, the policies to adhere to in compiling the FY2010 budget were decided by the Cabinet, and policies for preparing appropriate defense capabilities in the absence of a Mid-term Defense Program were clarified.
(See this chapter, Section 2, Reference 11)

(1) Basic Concept

These policies allow for preparation of defense capabilities in FY2010 based on the 2004 NDPG to effectively fulfill the defense capability roles defined in the 2004 NDPG.

While observing the following items, efficient defense build-up through replacement and effective utilization by renovation and repair of obsolete equipment and of currently deployed equipment becoming out of date is the basic principle, and at the same time the readiness and strength of units is to be improved through achieving the utmost efficiency of regular SDF personnel and by increasing the staffing of front-line units.

a. Ensure capability to deter all types of situations and readiness to respond effectively

Prepare necessary equipment and maintain responsive capability to respond to ballistic missile attack, special forces attack or situations in Japan's offshore islands, to constantly conduct surveillance monitoring and information gathering, and to respond to major or unusual disasters.

b. Further stabilize the regional security environment

In order to further stabilize the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, further promote all types of cooperation such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and bilateral and multilateral talks between nations.

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Nagashima speaking at the review hearing for the "project screening" [Asagumo Shimbunsha]

c. Promote efforts to improve the global security environment

In order to take a major proactive role in peacekeeping operations and other international cooperative activities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and to handle terrorism and piracy, promote participation in all types of training and acquire equipment so as to be able to actively engage in international peace cooperation activities.

d. Efforts towards higher efficiency and rationalization

Under severe financial constraints, promote efforts to prepare defense capabilities effectively and efficiently by clarifying project priorities, utilizing human resources efficiently and effectively, and acquiring equipment and materials efficiently.

(2) Points to Bear in Mind

The following points are particularly noteworthy to respond to new trends in the security environment around Japan as we prepare defense capabilities as described above.

1) Promote further efficiency by reducing purchasing costs through utilization of LCC management. In addition, from the medium and long-term perspective, examine the appropriate form for defense manufacturing and the technology base in Japan.
2) In order to utilize human resources efficiently and effectively, outsource tasks that can be done outside. In addition, implement training to obtain and foster high quality personnel. Furthermore, with fewer children in our society, and higher levels of education, the SDF must examine its ranking and age structure in order to diversify duties in the SDF.
3) While paying attention to attaining closer relations with local residents and local society, the SDF will study rationalizing and making its units more efficient from the perspective of attaining a structure that will allow it to exercise its overall capabilities effectively and efficiently.
4) Based on operational results obtained after transitioning to a joint operations posture, enhance joint operations so that the SDF can effectively perform its duties.

3. Major Items for FY2010 Defense Equipment

Based on the principles described above, advances will include the Type 10 Main Battle Tank (MBT) to replace the current tank, a destroyer (DDH) to replace the Shirane class destroyer, improved anti-ballistic missile capabilities, and improved fighter (F-15, F2) capabilities.

In addition, under severe financial circumstances, reductions of 3,500 by outsourcing to civilian personnel and other means in SDF personnel strength will be accomplished in FY2010, while taking care not to have an adverse impact on front-line units, in line with the reduction implemented based on the Administrative Reform Promotion Act. Based on that, while the number of regular SDF personnel was 236,759 at the end of FY2004 based on the 2004 NDPG, it is anticipated that the number will decline by 6,862 to 228,897 by the end of FY2010[18]. As mentioned previously, based on the policies to be adhered to in compilation of the FY2010 budget, "Concerning the actual number of SDF personnel, while striving for efficiency as much as possible, the readiness and strength of units is to be improved by increasing the staffing of front-line units," so the Defense Ministry will be considering necessary measures toward the revision of the 2004 NDPG and the formulation of the next Mid-term Defense Program.

Fixed SDF personnel strength indicates the number of personnel required to perform the duties of the SDF. The 273,801 personnel at the end of FY1995 was the peak, and the number has declined ever since, with reduction of the authorized number for the GSDF stipulated in the 1995 and 2004 NDPGs. Amidst this development, the

FY2010 budget maintained the same 247,746 personnel as at the end of FY2009, based on the need to ensure the security environment around Japan and the capability for an appropriate response, and in line with the units reorganization implemented based on the 2004 NDPG.
(See Fig. II-2-4-2), (See References 13 and 14)

The Defense Ministry is working to further rationalize and increase the efficiency of equipment and material purchases overall, and has set the goal of a reduction in the costs of R&D for equipment and material, purchasing, and maintenance of 15% from FY2006 to FY2011. The reduction in FY2010 is expected to be around 150 billion yen, a rate of reduction of about 7.9% (provisional figure)[19].
(See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 2)

Fig. II-2-4-2 Main Items for FY2010 Defense Build-up

Classification	Major Projects
1. Ensuring Japan's defense and security by deterrence and effective response	1) Further strengthen BMD systems, starting with joint Japan–U.S. development of Aegis BMD weapons systems based on the experience of units during North Korean missile launches
	2) Conduct R&D on advanced equipment such as the 03-type medium-range surface-to-air missiles (improved) in order to counter future threats such as improved functionality and proliferation of cruise missiles and high-speed air-to-ground missiles, to provide appropriate air defense for important facilities
	3) Prepare all types of equipment, such as the new tank, and training to strengthen capabilities for effective response to attacks by terrorists or special forces
	4) Prepare all types of training and equipment such as field exercises by GSDF units (leaving islands) to enable quick responses to all kinds of circumstances in Japan's remote islands
	5) In order to establish information superiority from the collection of information and monitoring of warnings, conduct demonstration research of medium-range unmanned reconnaissance craft
	6) Advance preparations of equipment and materials (NBC reconnaissance vehicles and portable biological detection equipment, etc.) that are necessary to respond to attacks by NBC weapons, large-scale or specialized disasters, or large-scale infectious disease, to ensure the safety of the Japanese people
	7) Improve fighter aircraft (F-2, F-15) and conduct advanced research including research on stealth aircraft technology to respond to future threats in order to provide appropriate air defense for Japan against the trend of future threats from advanced military aviation technology
	8) Build a destroyers (DDH) and procure equipment for counter-piracy measures in order to ensure the safety of maritime traffic
2. Further stabilization of regional environment and public order	Engage in proactive regional cooperation, exchanges and dialogues such as participation in Pacific Partnership 2010 in order to contribute to stable regional security environment and order near Japan, including in the East China Sea and the Western Pacific
3. Improve global security environment	Participate in anti-terrorist activities and PKO, proactively participate in cooperative international activities aimed at responding to the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and at the same time expand global defense exchanges and cooperation to improve the global security environment. In addition, strengthen the SDF's base of international activities, such as preparing equipment related to international activities.
4. Effectively and efficiently use human resources	In order to respond effectively to all types of situations, obtain the appropriate number of SDF personnel, and provide an environment where they can concentrate on their duties, such as child care facilities
5. Efforts towards space projects and countering cyber attacks	Implement various measures to promote use of space in the defense field, and to strengthen cyber attack countermeasures and the foundations of information and communications
6. Improving efficiency and rationalization	Further advance efficiency and rationalization through such efforts as concentrated purchasing and reforming general personnel expenses
7. Strengthen education and research systems	Promote measures to strengthen education and research at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy of Japan, the National Defense Medical College, etc.
8. Efforts towards U.S. Forces realignment	In order to proceed steadily with the U.S. Forces realignment, implement measures such as those related to the transfer of U.S. Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam
9. Advance base measures	Steadily implement measures around bases to promote harmony between defense facilities and surrounding areas. Promote measures for smooth and effective stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Status of SDF Personnel (actual number)

The authorized number of SDF personnel counts units, etc., organized with necessary functions in accomplishing the mission of each of the three Self-Defense Forces, in order for them to protect Japan's peace and independence and maintain its national security.

During the late 1950s, shortly after the SDF was established, the social environment around the SDF was severe and it was very difficult to recruit and employ the personnel to the authorized number. That meant that even if budgets were appropriated for personnel and provision expenses for the number of authorized personnel, a considerable portion of the budgeted amount could not be executed. The so-called staffing rate, the proportion of the personnel staffed (actual number) in the SDF against the authorized number, was introduced from the perspective of streamlining budgeting.

That was during the Cold War era, and the major role expected of the GSDF was to resist a large-scale invasion of Japan. Therefore the premise for the staffing rate was that a certain amount of time would be necessary before an enemy could actually invade, so that during ordinary times the staffing rate was held to a little more than 80%, and if events required it, they would conduct emergency recruiting and hiring to meet the personnel demand. As for the MSDF and ASDF, while maintaining an overall staffing rate of around 90% as their ordinary duties included such activities as scrambling and surveillance operations in the surrounding seas and airspace, it was presumed that they would also recruit and employ additional staff in contingencies as an emergency step.

However these days, the SDF is also required to have as many well-trained regular personnel in frontline units as possible in ordinary times, to be ready to respond to events that cannot be anticipated such as ballistic missile attacks, terrorist or special forces attacks, and major disasters, as well as to actively participate in PKO and other overseas activities.

Since the 1995 NDPG the staffing rate had been improved as a result of reducing the authorized number, but the actual number has been reduced due to the reform of total personnel expenses implemented since FY2006, which aims to reduce the number of personnel by about 7,200 by FY2010, and ultimately by about 8,700.

Under these circumstances, the Basic Concept included in the Policies to Adhere to in Compiling the FY2010 Defense Budget decided by the Cabinet in December last year says, "the readiness and strength of units is to be improved through achieving the utmost efficiency of regular SDF personnel and by increasing

Status of SDF Personnel (actual number)



the staffing of front-line units." Under the "Points of Concern," it says, "For effective and efficient use of human resources, outsourcing and other such measures are encouraged where possible. Also, while securing and nurturing high-quality human resources and enhancing education, consideration should be given on the modality of ranking and age composition, etc., of the SDF personnel, so that it can respond to the diversification of the SDF's missions amidst the social trends of declining birthrates and increasing enrollment rates for higher education." Based on these considerations, the Defense Ministry is studying a range of measures to be taken.

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Type 10 Main Battle Tank (MBT)

Q: Tell us about the new tank (Type 10 MBT).

A: "'We are protected.' At the very least, how much courage is felt by the people who believe it! How it allows them to show their martial spirit!" Those are the words of Charles de Gaulle[1].

"Peace of mind in the battle field." The tank is the embodiment of that. The tank was originally introduced to the battlefield in WWI to break open the deadlock of trench warfare with its armor (defensive power) and tractor treads (mobility), like a savior when it appeared on the field. High defensive power, mobility, and strong firepower. The combination of those three characteristics gave it an overpowering presence, and it was the source of encouragement to the soldiers on the battlefield who were enveloped in fear and isolation.

After the end of the Cold War Canada gave up the tank once, but learning a lesson from street fighting and operations to maintain security in Afghanistan, they reconsidered the operational value of the tank and decided to reintroduce it. In addition, Singapore continues to keep their tanks as an effective street fighting weapon, and furthermore, France operates tanks in its U.N. peacekeeping activities. In that sense the original significance of the tank has not been lost, and in the future all nations will continue to recognize it as equipment that they cannot do without.

On reflection, the Type 10 MBT has high C4I[2] capability in addition to defensive power, mobility, and firepower. That means that the tank, which has powerful capabilities even by itself, can work in close coordination with many other tanks, sharing image data information in real-time.

In addition, the gun barrel of the Type 10 MBT is made in Japan, so that it is a Japanese-made tank in name and in fact. Tank production requires using a high level of manufacturing precision technology, and only a few countries can produce tanks, including the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Israel. Now a tank is not only an emblem of encouragement on the battlefield, it also embodies the fruit of a country's general manufacturing technology. In many senses, the Type 10 MBT will demand attention.

A Type 10 tank in action

Main specifications	
Main armament	120mm smoothbore gun
Maximum speed	About 70km/h
Weight	About 44t

1) Charles de Gaulle: French Army soldier and first President of the French Fifth Republic.
2) C4I: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Destroyer Equipped with Helicopters Planned for FY2010 (22DDH)

The MSDF equips each of its four escort flotillas with a DDH destroyer loading three patrol helicopters, which acts as a command center vessel in anti-submarine combat, controlling command and communication as well as helicopter operation. The construction of a destroyer equipped with helicopters planned for FY2010 (22DDH) was decided in order to replace and update the DDH Shirane, which will be withdrawn from service in FY2014.

In the light of the modernization of neighboring countries' naval forces, including submarines and surface ships, in recent years, it will be important in the future to strengthen anti-submarine and anti-surface ship defense capabilities in order to effectively perform such tasks as ensuring the safety of maritime traffic and defending the waters around Japan. The 22DDH is larger than the 16DDH Hyuga commissioned in 2009 and is equipped with storage space to carry an increased number of patrol helicopters that can perform those duties.

In addition, the 22DDH can serve multiple purposes and can stay at sea for an extended period of time, and therefore can respond to diverse situations in both peacetime and in contingency. It is also designed in line with the inclusion of overseas missions into the primary missions, the transition to an integrated management of the Self-Defense Forces, and other trends. In addition to capabilities to control command, communication, and helicopter operation of the flotilla possessed by previous DDHs, using its enlarged hull it can serve a broad range of functions for international peace cooperation activities, large-scale disaster response, transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, and other missions, including transport functions for vehicles and cargo, and medical care for injured or sick. The 22DDH is therefore expected to play a crucial role, as a multi-purpose destroyer, in ensuring the safety of Japanese people and in international contribution.

22DDH main features	
Standard displacement	About 19,500 tons
Speed	30 knots
Main engines	Gas turbines, 2 axles
Main equipment	
High performance 20mm machine guns	2 guns
Anti-ship missile defense system	2 emplacements
Surface ship sonar system	1 system
Torpedo defense equipment	1 system
Patrol helicopters	7 helicopters
Maritime rescue helicopters	2 helicopters



An image of the 22DDH

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

KC767 Begins Operations

The 404th Squadron was newly formed at Komaki Air Base in March 2009 as the first ASDF unit to operate the KC-767 for midair refueling of fighters and air transport duties. They received a fourth KC-767 in January 2010, completed operational tests in February, and began operations with four aircraft in April.

The KC-767 was developed based on the Boeing 767-200 cargo aircraft, and it is equipped with a midair refueling boom in its tail. It can be used for both midair refueling and air transport duties. In addition, the interior can be transformed into two ways, to carry cargo, or to carry passengers. As a transport it can carry a maximum of 30 tons of cargo, or up to 200 passengers in palletized passenger seating that is nearly the same as in passenger aircraft. It has the longest operating range of any transport aircraft the ASDF has operated up until now, except for special government aircraft, with a range of 7,200 km (when loaded with about 30 tons of cargo).

The KC-767's midair refueling capability will allow fighters to refuel in training areas that are far from their bases over an extended period of time, which will make fighter training more efficient, prevent accidents, and reduce noise around their bases. Furthermore, the KC-767's transport capabilities will enhance the ASDF's ability to respond to international peace cooperation activities quickly and flexibly.
(See Fig. II-2-2-4)

A KC-767 being guided to an airport ramp

A KC-767 refueling an F-15 fighter in midair

Section 5. Defense-Related Expenditures

1. Defense-Related Expenditures and Changes

Defense-related expenditures include spending for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving living conditions in the neighborhoods of defense facilities, and supporting U.S. forces in Japan.

Regarding defense-related expenditures in FY2010, in the guidelines which form the basis of the FY2010 defense budget given Cabinet approval in December 2009, it is stated that "based on the necessity of defense, one of the most fundamental policies of our country, and taking into consideration today's increasingly severe financial circumstances, we will endeavor to curtail the amount of annual expenditure and new future obligation." As a result, excluding the reduction of burden on local communities in the expenditures related to SACO[20] and realignment of U.S. forces, there has been a decrease in budget expenditure compared to the previous fiscal year for the eighth consecutive year, at 4.6826 trillion yen, a reduction of 20.2 billion yen (0.4%).

Including 16.9 billion yen in SACO-related expenses (increased 5.7 billion yen (50.9%) from the preceding fiscal year) and 90.9 billion yen in expenses for reducing the burden on local communities (increased 30.7 billion yen (50.9%) from the preceding fiscal year), which is a part of the U.S. forces realignment-related costs, Japan's

Fig. II-2-5-1 Comparison between FY2009 Budget and FY2010 Budget

(billion Yen)

Category	FY2009	FY2010	Fiscal YOY growth
Annual expenditure[1]	¥4,702.8 billion	¥4,682.6 billion	-20.2 (-0.4%)
Personnel and food provision expenses	¥2,077.3 billion	¥2,085.0 billion	7.8 (0.4%)
Material expenses	¥2,625.5 billion	¥2,597.5 billion	-27.9 (-1.1%)
Future Obligation	¥2,994.3 billion	¥2,944.3 billion	-50.0 (-1.7%)
New Contracts	¥1,699.0 billion	¥1,662.3 billion	-36.7 (-2.2%)
Previous Contracts	¥1,295.2 billion	¥1,282.0 billion	-13.2 (-1.0%)

Note 1: Does not include SACO-related expense, nor U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community). If these are included, the figures are 4,774.1 billion yen for FY2009 and 4,790.3 billion yen for FY2010.

Fig. II-2-5-2 Trend of Defense-Related Expenditures over the Past Ten Years



Note: Does not include SACO-related expenses, or U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community).

total defense-related expenditures for FY2010 amount to 4.7903 trillion yen, representing an increase of 0.3% or 16.2 billion yen from the preceding fiscal year.
(See Fig. II-2-5-1 and 2) (See Reference 19–20)

2. Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into "personnel and food provisions expenses," which cover such items as pay and meals for SDF personnel, and "material expenses," which finance the repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of fuel, education and training of SDF personnel, procurement of equipment, and others. Material expenses are further classified into "obligatory outlay expenses[21]," which are

Fig. II-2-5-3 Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures

Structure of Defense-Related Expenditures

Annual expenditure

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into personnel and food provision expenses and material expenses (operating expenses). Material expenses (operating expenses) are further classified into obligatory outlay expenses and general material expenses (activity expenses).

Personnel and food provision expenses	Expenses relating to wages for personnel, retirement allowance, meals in barracks, etc.
Material expenses (operating expenses)	Expenses relating to procurement; repair and upgrading of equipment; purchase of oil; education and training of staff; facilities improvement; barracks expenses such as lighting, heating, water and supplies; technology research and development; cost-sharing for the stationing of USFJ; and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan
Obligatory outlay expenses	Expenses paid in FY2010 based on contracts made before FY2009
General material expenses (activity expenses)	Expenses paid in FY2010 based on contracts made in FY2010

Amount of future obligation

In the improvement of defense capabilities, it is common for multiple years to be required in areas like the procurement of equipment, and upgrading of facilities. Consequently, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged (five years in principle), and the government promises in advance at the time of the agreement, to make payment at a fixed time in the future.
Future obligation refers to the sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond based contracts like this which extend for multiple years.

Example:
Case in which 10 billion yen of equipment is procured under a contract to run for four years



paid under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years, and "general material expenses," which are paid under current-year contracts. Material expenses are also referred to as "operating expenses," and since general material expenses include repair costs for equipment, education and training expenses for personnel, and the purchase of oil, they are referred to also as "activity expenses." The Ministry of Defense terms this classification method as "classification by expenses."
(See Fig. II-2-5-3 and 4)

Personnel and food provisions expenses and obligatory outlay expenses, both of which are mandatory expenses, account for 80% or more of the total defense-related budget. A breakdown of general material expenses shows that mandatory costs account for a significant portion of the total, including cost-sharing for the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, and expenses related to measures to alleviate the burden on local communities hosting U.S. bases in Japan[22].

Personnel and food provisions expenses increased by 7.8 billion yen (0.4%) from the previous fiscal year. Obligatory outlay expenses for the year decreased by 16.0 billion yen or 0.9% from the previous year while general material expenses decreased by 11.9 billion yen or 1.3% from the previous year[23].

The breakdown of FY2010 defense-related expenditures classified by organization, such as the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and also by use, such as maintenance costs and equipment and material purchase expenses is shown in Fig. II-2-5-5.

In addition to the budget expenditure, the amount of new future obligation also indicates payments for the following year and beyond. In the improvement of defense capabilities, it is common for multiple years to be required from contract to delivery or completion, in areas such as the procurement of vessels, aircraft, and other primary equipment, as well as the construction of buildings such as aircraft hangars and barracks. However, the budget of Japan must meet with Cabinet approval each fiscal year, and therefore, as a general rule, the spending of national expenditures prescribed in the budget is limited to the applicable year. Consequently, for the things which require multiple years between contract and delivery or completion, a procedure is undertaken whereby a contract that extends for multiple years is arranged, and it is promised in advance at the time of the agreement that payment will be made at a fixed time in the future (within five years in principle). The sum of money to be paid in the following year and beyond based on contracts such as this which extend for multiple years, is called future obligation. The amount of future obligation that newly came to be

Type 99 155mm self-propelled howitzer

Escort vessel *Ise* at its launch ceremony

Modernized and improved F-15 Eagle

Fig. II-2-5-4 Relation between Annual Expenditure and New Future Obligation



Fig. II-2-5-5 Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures



Notes: 1. ( ) is budget amount, unit: ¥100 million.
2. In addition to this, there are 16.9 billion yen of SACO-related expenses, and 90.9 billion yen of U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community).
3. For example of use breakdown, refer to Reference 21.

borne in FY2010 (amount of new future obligation) was reduced from FY2009 by 36.7 billion yen or 202%.

Furthermore, if looked at on a contract basis which shows the scale of operations, then there is a reduction from FY2009 of 48.6 billion yen or 1.8%[24].

(See Reference 21)

3. Comparison with Other Countries

Understanding the defense expenditures of each country using a single standard is not possible in view of differences in the socioeconomic and budgetary systems. There is not an internationally unified definition of defense expenditures, and breakdowns of defense expenditures are often unclear even in many countries where such data is publicly disclosed.

(See Reference 20–21)

Furthermore, though there exists the method of converting defense expenditures into a dollar-termed value for comparison, defense spending based on this method does not necessarily reflect the precise value resulted from counting each country's price levels.

Thus, there are limits to how far a comparison can be significant simply by comparing Japan's defense-related expenditures with those of other countries in dollar terms. For reference, Fig. II-2-5-6 displays the defense expenditures of each country shown in dollar terms using the purchasing power parity[25] of each country as published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)[26].

Fig. II-2-5-6 Defense Expenses of Major Countries (FY2008)



	Japan	U.S.	U.K.	Germany	France
Defense expense (unit: $ million)	40,884	594,632	62,224	34,324	40,021
Per capita defense expense (unit: $)	320	1,890	946	418	642
Defense expense as % of GDP	0.9	4.1	2.4	1.2	1.9

Notes: 1. Defense expenses are from each country's public documents. The dollar exchange rate uses purchasing power parity (OECD publication). US$1 = 116 yen = 0.662 pounds = 0.858 euros (Germany) = 0.919 euros (France).
2. Populations are from the *State of World Population*, GDP figures are from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs *Major Economic Indicators*, etc. Japan's population is from the *Monthly Report of Current Population Estimates* (Ministry of International Affairs and Communications publication).
3. U.S. defense expenses are the narrow definition of expenditures, according to the FY2009 Historical Tables.

Fig. II-2-5-7 Changes in Defense Expenditures Over the Past Ten Years



Notes: 1. Created based on the defense expenditures published by each country.
2. These are numerical values obtained by simple calculation of the ratio between the defense expenditures each year, with the FY2000 value as 1 (times) (truncated to two decimal places).
3. The definition and breakdown of the defense expenditures of each country is not necessarily clear. As we must take into account various factors such as foreign exchange fluctuations and price levels of each country, it is very difficult to draw a comparison of defense budgets or expenditures among the countries.
4. The figures for main EU countries were calculated based on the sum total of the defense expenditures of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. (Since France and Germany converted to the euro in 2002, it was newly calculated with 2002 as 1).
5. See Reference 22.

Section 6. New Efforts Based on Recent Trends

1. Efforts for Development and Use of Space

The enactment of the Basic Space Law[27] passed by the Diet in May 2008, has made it clearer that the development and use of space by Japan shall be carried out under the pacifism enshrined in the Constitution of Japan in compliance with international commitments. The law also stipulates that the Government of Japan shall take necessary measures to promote the development and use of space that contributes to ensuring the peace and security of the international community, as well as to the security of Japan. Furthermore, the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy was formed within the Cabinet in order to promote measures for the development and utilization of space in a comprehensive and systematic manner.

On June 2, 2009, the Basic Plan for Space Policy was formulated based on the Basic Space Law by the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy. The six key elements of the plan include the realization of a secure, pleasant and affluent society utilizing space, as well as the enhancement of national security utilizing space.

With the drastic changes in the environment through the enactment of the Basic Space Law, the Ministry of Defense has been deliberating on potential development and use of space in the new security context, in coordination with discussions on the comprehensive and systematic development and use of space of the entire Government. Specifically, on January 15, 2009, the Committee on Promotion of Space Development and Use formulated the "Basic Guidelines for Space Development and Use of Space," the Ministry of Defense of Japan (Basic Guidelines).

Incorporated into the Basic Guidelines are the following.

1) The development and use of space is a particularly effective tool for strengthening functions of C4ISR[28] in light of the emphasis on building-up of defense capabilities on realization of sophisticated situational awareness, information sharing, and command and control systems by organically linking individual equipment and systems, and thus maximizing the capacity of the equipment as a whole.
2) Based on the significance of the development and use of space in the defense area, with regard to measures for the promotion of the development and use of space, examinations are to be conducted in view of specific measures, including ones beyond the generalization theory[29], while keeping in mind the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the formulation of the next Mid-term Defense Program, with the effective coordination of the whole Government.

In the future, the Ministry of Defense intends to vigorously conduct examinations on specific measures, in coordination with related ministries, including the Cabinet Secretariat, based on the Basic Guidelines and the Basic Plan for Space Policy in order to promote new development and use of space in the security field. In FY2010, it will address projects such as 1) research for enhancement of C4ISR utilizing space, 2) enhance space-based communication capability, and 3) expanded use of imagery from commercial satellites.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Current Situation regarding the Development and Use of Space in the Area of Defense in Other Countries

It is extremely beneficial in defense, to make use of the special properties of space that it does not belong to the territory of any country, and that there are no constraints such as the topography of the earth's surface. The use of space in the area of defense is being actively promoted in other countries.

The United States, for example, is a significant leader in the field of space development and use. As well as improving its large high-performance satellites, and increasing the purchase of imagery from commercial satellites to obtain information for defense purposes, it is working to secure diverse methods of information collection. This includes advancing the development of operationally responsive space satellites capable where necessary, of being launched in a short period of time.

On the other hand, because of enormous costs incurred in upgrading satellites, joint efforts are undertaken by multiple nations, in which satellite information is shared. In Europe in 2006, the six countries of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Greece agreed on the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS) program in which the countries make use of one another's satellite information. Efforts to move toward dual-use are also underway, including the collaborative application of satellites in both defense and civilian areas.

2. Enhancing Information and Communications Capabilities

Information and communications are the basis for command and control, between the central commands, the respective headquarters of each Self-Defense Force, and the subordinate units. The Ministry of Defense is making efforts in areas including the response to cyber attacks, by improving information systems and communication networks based on operational requirements to enhance information and communications capabilities, which are directly linked to the ability to complete missions, and to secure these systems and networks.

1. Improvement of Information Systems and Communication Networks

Based on the remarkable development of information and communications technology (ICT) in recent years, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are driving the construction of an advanced information and communications system compatible with the excellent ICT at home and abroad, in order to facilitate the certain transmission of commands and orders, and the rapid sharing of information. This includes 1) improvement of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII), 2) improvement of the Central Command System (CCS) and the various command systems from the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces[30].

2. Response to Cyber Attacks

In recent years, cyber attacks have become more sophisticated and complicated, and responding to these attacks has been recognized as an important challenge in national security. In July 2009, large-scale cyber attacks were perpetrated against websites such as those of the Republic of Korea and U.S government agencies.
(See Part I Chapter 1 Section 3)

Due to the fact that information systems and communications networks are crucial foundations for SDF activities, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF must prepare sufficiently for their response to cyber attacks.

Consequently, not only did the Ministry of Defense and the SDF inaugurate the SDF C4 (Command, Control,

Communication & Computers) System Command in March 2008, but they are also engaged in various efforts as follow.

1) Introduction of intrusion prevention systems and so on in order to increase the safety of information and communication systems.
2) Development of defense systems such as analysis devise for cyber defense.
3) Enactment of regulations[31] establishing postures and procedures for response to cyber attacks.
4) Development of talented people with high-level knowledge and technical capabilities, through the dispatch of exchange students to professional institutions in the United States.
5) Driving of information sharing with concerned organizations, such as the National Information Security Center.
6) Research in order to acquire the latest technology pertaining to responding to cyber attacks.

In FY2010, a strengthening of the ability to respond to cyber attacks is planned, through efforts of the kind outlined below.

1) New assignment of a Coordinator for Cyber Planning (provisional title) to the Joint Staff Office
2) Implementation of a design for the purpose of enhancing the functions of analysis devise for cyber defense
3) Strengthening of Defense Intelligence Headquarters functions in order to conduct long-term, specialist gathering and analysis of information relating to trends in cyber warfare in other countries.

(See Fig. II-2-6-1) (See This Chapter Section 4)

Fig. II-2-6-1 Cyber Defense Policy Package of the Ministry of Defense and SDF



[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

The Role of Satellite Communications in Everyday SDF Activities

Satellite communications are now a vital communications method in the execution of SDF missions due to their ability to offer wide-ranged and instantaneous communications.

For instance, the exchange of information for timely and proper reporting between destroyers and aircraft conducting surveillance activities in surrounding waters, or to ensure flexible operations in disaster and other areas, would not be possible without the wide-ranged coverage capacity of satellite communications. In addition, satellite communications significantly contribute to the prompt and accurate transfer of information and command structure, which are important in effectively handling ballistic missile attacks. Furthermore, satellite communications play a major role as a method for members of units dispatched in remote areas overseas to directly communicate with their families so that they can carry out their missions in a comfortable state of mind.

In this way, satellite communications are a vital information communications foundation for everyday SDF activities. Satellite communications are aimed to increase in speed and capacity in order to further enhance the information communications capacity of the SDF.

An SDF officer dispatched overseas using a satellite phone


The satellite antenna of an escort vessel

3. Efforts Relating to the Environment

1. Effects Exerted by Climate Change on the Security Environment

With the mounting concern for climate change caused by global warming, there has been a growing tendency in recent years to give thought to the effects exerted by climate change on security. For example, in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published by the U.S. Department of Defense on February 1 this year, climate change is positioned as one of the factors which exert an important effect on the shape of the security environment of the future.

In this way, there is increasingly shared understanding of the fact that a range of effects may be brought about by climate change even on the security environment. For Japan too, it is necessary to pay attention to the effects that climate change will exert on the security environment.

2. Efforts for Environmental Conservation

As part of the government, the Ministry of Defense is developing action plans based on various government programs, and actively promoting a variety of efforts for the environment [32].

In 2001, the Ministry of Defense "Environment Month" and "Environment Week" were established. Garrisons nationwide also took part, performing diverse activities for the purpose of environmental conservation in areas such as preventing global warming. Their objective was to raise consciousness among troops and personnel in relation to environmental conservation.

In managing and maintaining its facilities and equipment, the SDF is promoting a range of efforts [33] to ensure thorough environmental conservation and to reduce the environmental burden. Specifically, in March 2010, the facilities at Camp Kochi (in Konan, Kochi Prefecture) adopted for the first time an all-electric system in which everything is covered by electricity, including the kitchen, air conditioning, and hot water system which had used gas and boilers. Furthermore, progress is being made in areas such as the installation of energy conservation equipment at SDF buildings, and the replacement of worn out vehicles with eco-cars, which are compatible with exhaust gas regulations, and which have excellent mileage. Thanks to efforts like these, great results can be expected in environmental conservation, such as reduced exhaust CO2, not to mention the substantial economic benefits.

4. Efforts for Ocean Policy

Under various circumstances regarding the ocean, including the sea areas surrounding Japan, the Basic Act on Ocean Policy [34] was put into force in July 2007 with the aim of the sound development of the economic society and the stability and improvement of the lives of the people in Japan as well as our contribution to the coexistence of the ocean and human beings, recognizing that it is critical for Japan, as a maritime nation, to establish a new Oceanic State which harmonizes peaceful and proactive development and use of the sea with the preservation of the marine environment. Then, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy was established within the Cabinet as a system to promote ocean policy intensively and comprehensively.

Based on this act, a cabinet decision was made in March 2008 to adopt the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy [35], which stipulates the basic policy of various measures with regard to the oceans in order to promote such measures comprehensively and systematically.

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy includes extremely important measures in terms of the security of our country: for example, maintaining order at sea carried out from the viewpoint of securing maritime safety, efforts for maritime transport safety, countermeasures against marine-derived natural disasters, and securing maritime transport.

The Headquarters for Ocean Policy has been discussing coordination between ministries on the integration of marine survey data and the preservation and management of islands [36]. The Ministry of Defense participates in these discussions so that works in the related fields can be performed in closer coordination with other ministries.

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy stipulates: the systematic development of ships and aircraft for the purpose of ensuring maritime safety; and the conducting of exercises based on the manuals on joint response to suspicious boats. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense is engaged in a number of efforts in FY2010, including 1) to improve equipment for ensuring maritime transport safety, such as escort vessels, fixed-wing and rotary-wing patrol aircraft, 2) to strengthen cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard through events such as joint maritime exercises in dealing with suspicious ships, and 3) to deal with pirates off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.
(See Part III Chapter 1 Section 4)

Notes:

1) See <http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1977/w1977_9110.html>.
2) See <http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/2005/2005/html/17221300.html>.
3) "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" (decided by Cabinet) (See Reference 27), Report by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities <http://kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2003/1219seibi.html>, etc.
4) "New threats and diverse contingencies" are defined in the 2004 NDPG to include increased proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities by international terrorist organization and others, and diverse situations in which peace and security are affected."
   Some basic examples of these are ballistic missile attacks, guerrillas and special operations force attacks, invasions of Japan's offshore islands, violations of Japanese airspace, invasions by armed special operations vessels, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan's territorial waters, and large-scale and unconventional disasters. In addition, issues such as response to cyber attacks and providing transport for Japanese nationals living abroad can also be considered to be part of the response to these situations.
5) 1) Not designed to directly counter military threats 2) The portion of the concept stating that Japan will maintain defense capabilities based on strategic environments and geographical characteristics in order to prevent invasion is deemed to remain effective and thus will be sustained under the new security environment.
6) Regarding the contents of talks Japan held with the United States based on ideas shown in the 2004 NDPG, see Part III, Chapter 2, Section 2.
7) The following is in regards to the specific posture for defense capabilities as described above in the figure outlining the 2004 NDPG:
   1) Regarding the change in structure of the GSDF, in March 2007, the Central Readiness Force was newly organized, and in March 2010, the 15th Brigade was newly organized, whereupon the GSDF was reorganized into a structure of nine divisions (including one armored division) and six brigades.
   2) Regarding the change in structure of the MSDF, in March 2008, consolidations were made to destroyer units and fixed-wing aircraft units, while regional destroyer units and rotating wing aircraft were unified with the Self Defense Fleet.
   3) Regarding the change in structure of the ASDF, all changes except those related to BMD were completed by March 2009.
8) Major equipment of the MSDF (Aegis-equipped destroyers: four vessels) and major units of the ASDF (Air-warning control units: seven warning groups and four warning squadrons; surface-to-air guided missile units: three groups). For development of the BMD system, see Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1.
9) Total costs of defense equipment that becomes necessary throughout the full lifecycle of brainstorming sessions, the development process, mass production, operations (including maintenance and repair costs), and equipment scrapping.
10) Cabinet decision, "Regarding the development of defense capabilities, etc." (See Reference 11)
11) Based on this statement, it was decided on December 24, 2005 by the Security Council and the Cabinet that the joint Japan–U.S. technical research on a sea-based midcourse system of the BMD would be succeeded by joint Japan–U.S. development in FY2006. In a statement issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the same day, it was stated that "weapons required by the United States for the purpose of joint Japan–U.S. development shall be provided under strict control and also upon coordination with the United States regarding a framework for provision of weapons." Following this statement, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies was concluded by the Japanese and U.S. Governments in June of 2006. The exchange provides a framework for enabling the transfer of weapons

and weapons technologies designed for the joint Japan–U.S. BMD development, as well as weapon technologies that were subject to transfer under the previous Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies. (See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2-1 and Part III, Chapter 2, Section 3-6).

12) In June 2006, Japan decided to provide patrol vessels, which fall under the category of weapons and others under the Three Principles on Arms Export, to Indonesia as grant aid meant to support the country in its efforts to control and prevent terrorism and piracy. A statement issued at that time by the Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that the transfer of the patrol vessels was exempted from the Three Principles on Arms Export on the condition that an international agreement is concluded with the recipient country to ensure that the vessels are not used for purposes other than controlling and preventing terrorism and piracy and that the country does not transfer the vessels to a third party without Japan's prior consent.

13) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/shin-ampobouei2010>.

14) 1) Effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies, 2) preparations for full-scale invasion, 3) proactive efforts on Japan's own initiative to improve the international security environment. See Section 2-2 of this chapter.

15) FY2010 Budget Compilation Policies. In addition, there are Cabinet decisions that determine polices for the entire government related to FY2010 budget compilation, the Reform of Budget Compilation (October 23, 2009) and Basic Policies for Budget Compilation (December 15, 2009).

16) The project screening of the necessity of existing budgets, and the discussions of budget execution occur in public, so that "the points of discussion," and "the budgetary priorities" are clear to the Japanese people. See <http://www.cao.go.jp/sasshin/index.html> for more information on the Government Revitalization Unit and project screening.

17) Efforts within each ministry to grasp the actual budget expenditures and uses, inspect its own projects by such means as an open process inviting outside experts, and reflect the result of such reviews into project implementations and budget requests.

18) The breakdown for the Ground, Maritime, and Air SDF is as shown below. There are other elements such as the Joint Staff and Defense Intelligence Headquarters, so these numbers do not match the overall total.

	2004 NDPG regular personnel	End of FY2010 regular personnel	Increase or decrease (-)
GSDF	145,906	141,223	-4,683
MSDF	43,697	41,940	-1,757
ASDF	45,007	43,270	-1,737

19) Cost reduction amount = initial requirement (theoretical value before implementing efficiency measures) – actual accumulated amount
Cost reduction ratio = cost reduction amount / (expenses related to equipment and materials + cost reduction amount).

20) "Special Action Committee on Okinawa". See Part III Chapter 2 Section 4-1.

21) In the improvement of defense capabilities, some things span multiple years. In these cases, the fiscal year in which the contract is concluded is different from the fiscal year in which the payment to the contractor is made. Therefore, first of all, the maximum future payment amount is appropriated in the budget as an act of bearing liabilities with national treasury funds (budget authority only to incur obligations is granted, i.e., the MOD is able to conclude a contract but not to make payment). Then, based on such budgeting, in principle, in the fiscal year that construction is completed or that equipment is procured, expenses necessary for payment are allocated as budget expenditure (budget authority to incur obligations and make payment is granted, i.e., the MOD is able to conclude contracts and allocate budget expenditure).

Budget expenditure for payments incurred under contracts concluded in previous fiscal years is called "obligatory outlay expenses," while expenditure for which the payment period has yet to come is termed "future obligation."

22) A typical cost under this category is expenses for installation of a sound-proof system in residences located near U.S. bases. (See Part 4, Section3-3).

23) The comparison with the previous year does not account for SACO-related expenses and the U.S. forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community).

24) The sum total of new future obligation based on general material expenses and the act of bearing liabilities with national treasury funds. The contract is concluded in the applicable year, and the scale of the material expenses (operating expenses) that are to be paid from the applicable year in future is shown. In FY2010 this is 2.5848 trillion yen.

25) A gauge that measures each country's ability to purchase assets or services by taking into account their respective price levels.

26) The table excludes Russia and China, for which no OECD data on purchasing power parity exist. For changes in defense expenditures of each country in its local currency, see Fig. Part I, Chapter 2, Fig. II-2-5-7 and Reference 22.

27) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/about2.html>.

28) Abbreviation"Command,Control,Communication,Computer,Intelligence,SurveillanceandReconnaissance" which is the collective term of each function.

29) The notion that allows the SDF to use satellites whose use has been generalized and those with similar functions.

30) For further details on Defense Information Infrastructure (DII: unified network of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF) and Central Command System (CSS: a central command system which performs operations such as intensive processing of data while connected online with the various command systems of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces and so on), see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/security/it/youkou/index.html>.

31) There are directives relating to information assurance of the Ministry of Defense (Ministry of Defense Directive No. 160, 2007).

32) The action plan of the Ministry of Defense which was devised in October 2007 on the back of the "Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction in Government Operations" (Cabinet decision made in the same year), the "Defense Agency Guidelines on Environmental Consideration" enacted in 2003 based on the government's Basic Environment Plan, and a review of those guidelines carried out in January 2005, etc. For details on Ministry of Defense guidelines for environmental consideration, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/chouwa/hairyo.html>.

33) Specifically, this includes measures for the purpose of conservation of the atmospheric environment, water quality conservation, recycling and waste disposal, improvement of environmental conservation facilities, and environmental surveys.

34) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/about2.html>.

35) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/kaiyou/kihonkeikaku/index.html>.

36) In order to appropriately manage the sea under jurisdiction, the area of which (approximately 4.47 million km^2) includes exclusive economic zones extending to roughly 12 times the land area (of approximately 380,000 km^2), in December 2009, the Headquarters for Ocean Policy formulated the "Basic Policy concerning Preservation Management of Islands for Management of the Sea." Then, on May 26, 2010, a bill was passed that pertained to the conservation of exclusive economic zones and the continental shelf, and to improvement of base facilities.

Part III

Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 1

Self-Defense Forces Operations

Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations
Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies
Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression
Section 4. Anti-Piracy Efforts

Section 1. Frameworks for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

Under the administrative policy announced in 2002, the Government would seek the concrete development of legal systems "so as to advance building of a nation that is strong in emergencies." In light of this, three pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2003. Furthermore, seven pieces of legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2004 and three related treaties were ratified in the same year. With this, a basis for emergency legislation [1] was established. The development of these legal systems reflects many of results of the "emergency legislation study," which had been conducted by the former Defense Agency since 1977. (See Fig. III-1-1-1)

It is of utmost importance for the national government to establish a national response framework as a basis for an SDF operational structure to deal with serious situations that threaten the peace and security of the country, and its people, such as armed attacks against Japan. This establishment enables an effective response to armed attack situations and anticipated situations (both to armed attack situations [2] and to situations where armed attacks are anticipated [3]), contributes to the deterrence of an armed attack, and is also vital from the perspective of achieving civilian control in an armed attack situation.

This section outlines the key aspects of Japan's response framework in the event of an armed attack situation, and the SDF operational structure that is based on this framework.

Fig. III-1-1-1 Outline of the Emergency Legislation



1. The Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situations

1. Responses to Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law[4] determines the fundamental nature of Japan's response to armed attack situations and defines basic principles, basic policies (the Basic Response Plan), and the responsibilities of national and local governments in the event of an armed attack situation. That is to say, this legislation and other emergency legislation, such as the Civil Protection Law, prescribe that the relevant organizations (designated government institutions, local governments and designated public institutions[5]) cooperate to implement coordinated response measures in the event of an armed attack situation or similar event. The establishment of this legislative framework enables the country as a whole to implement a thorough response to armed attack situations. (See Fig. III-1-1-2) (See Reference 24–25)

(1) Basic Response Plan, etc.

In situations such as armed attack situations, the Cabinet must decide upon the following items for a Basic Response Plan and ask for approval by the Diet. In addition, when the Basic Response Plan has been decided, a

Fig. III-1-1-2 Procedures for Responding to Armed Attack Situations



Note 1: The Task Force will be established in the Cabinet for general advancement of measures to respond to armed attacks and other situations.

temporary Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) is to be established within the Cabinet, and it will implement these measures.

1) Certification of the facts, and the premises to that certification supporting the armed attack situation or the situation where an armed attack situation is anticipated
2) Overall plan to respond to the pertinent armed attack situation
3) Important items related to the response measures

(2) Response Measures

When responding to armed attack situations, the designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following countermeasures based on legal provisions between the period of formulation and termination of the Basic Response Plan.

a. Measures to Bring Armed Attack Situations to an End Depending on the Progress of the Situation

1) The use of military force, unit deployment and other activities conducted by the SDF.
2) Provision of materials, facilities and services, and other measures to facilitate the smooth and efficient implementation of the SDF and U.S. forces' operations.
3) Diplomatic measures other than those described in items 1) and 2) above.

b. Measures to Protect Lives, Bodies and Properties of the People, and to Minimize the Effects on People's Lives and Economy

1) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of disaster victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures.
2) Price stabilization, distribution of necessities of daily life, and other necessary measures.

(3) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments

The responsibilities of the national and local governments as defined in the Armed Attack Situation Response Law are outlined in Fig. III-1-1-3.

Fig. III-1-1-3 Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments

Main body	Responsibility
Government	• Has a unique mission to defend Japan, protect the homeland and the lives, bodies, and properties of the people • Respond to armed attack situations and take every possible measure by using all organizations and functions • Implement all possible measures as a whole nation
Local Government	• Has responsibilities of protecting the region and the lives, bodies, and properties of the residents • Implement necessary measures in mutual cooperation with the national government, other local governments, and other institutions
Designated Public Institutions	• Implement necessary measures in the scope of their work, in mutual cooperation with the national government, local governments, and other institutions
People	• Strive to provide necessary cooperation for implementation of response measures taken by the designated administrative institutions, local governments, or designated public institutions

(4) Authority of the Prime Minister for Response Measures

Following the stipulation of the Basic Response Plan, for overall promotion of response measures, the Task Force for Armed Attack Situations, etc., (the Task Force) will be established within the Cabinet, with the Prime Minister appointed as leader of the Task Force and appropriate Ministers of State as Deputy Chief and other members of the Task Force.

If the Prime Minister recognizes that there are obstacles to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, and to eliminating an armed attack, when necessary response measures under comprehensive coordination are not implemented, he may instruct the head of the local government concerned and other relevant persons to implement the necessary measures. In circumstances where necessary response measures are not implemented or if there is an obstacle to protecting the lives, bodies, and properties of the people, in emergency response situations, the Prime Minister or the Minister of State responsible for operations relating to the relevant countermeasure may take responsibility for and implement the response measures that the local governments or designated public institutions have failed to implement, after notifying the relevant heads of local government or other relevant individuals.

(5) Report to the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council

In accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the government will immediately report measures it has implemented to terminate armed attacks on Japan to the U.N. Security Council.

2. Responses to Emergency Situations other than Armed Attack Situations

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provides for appropriate and rapid response measures to be implemented in emergency situations[6] other than armed attacks, in order for the government to ensure the peace and independence of the country, and to maintain the security of the country and its people.

In addition, based on changes in various situations surrounding Japan, such as the appearance of unidentified vessels or mass terrorism incidents, measures shall be taken including the following: 1) Development of the systems for assembling information, analysis, and situational evaluations; 2) Preparation for formulating response measures in accordance with various situations; 3) Rapid implementation of measures to strengthen levels of coordination between the SDF, the police, the Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations.

(1) Emergency Response Situation Response Plan

In an emergency response situation, the Cabinet must decide the following items for those policies concerning emergency response situations (emergency response situation response plan) and must obtain approval of the plan by the Diet. Also, on the approval of the emergency response situation response plan, the Headquarters for the Emergency Response Situation will be temporarily established within the Cabinet to deal with the relevant situation.

1) Certification of an emergency response situation and the facts supporting the certification
2) General plan for responses
3) Important matters relating to emergency response measures

(2) Emergency Response Measures

The designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions will implement the following emergency response measures based on legal provisions, during the period between the formulation and termination of an Emergency Response Situation Response Plan:

1) Measures most appropriate to end the emergency response situation and measures to prevent or suppress attacks during emergency response situations.

2) In order to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people from attacks or to minimize the impact on their daily lives and economic conditions in emergency response situations, the following measures will also be implemented according to current developments in the emergency response situation: the issuance of warnings, evacuation instructions, the rescue of disaster victims, the emergency restoration of facilities and equipment, etc.

2. Measures Based on the Armed Attack Situation Response Law

There were seven pieces of emergency legislation, and three treaties enacted and signed in June 2004 as a result of the Armed Attack Situation Response Law[7] that was enacted in June 2003. Based on that the framework to enable necessary measures for responding to armed attack situations to be taken was prepared. The following items summarize that.

1. Measures to Protect the Lives etc. of the People and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives of the People

Japan established the Civil Protection Law[8], which prescribes measures for three necessary items to protect the lives, etc., of the people in armed attack situations and emergency response situations[9]. In addition, it prescribes similar measures in the case of emergency response situations. (See 3 of this section)

2. Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situations

(1) Facilitation of SDF Operations

The Emergency Legislation Study, resulting from the partial amendment of the SDF Law at the same time the Armed Attack Situation Response Law was enacted, required enactment of Classification 1 (laws pertaining to the Ministry of Defense) and Classification 2 (laws pertaining to ministries other than the Ministry of Defense) legislation, so that new laws were enacted such as measures for the construction of defense facilities before orders for defense operations, laws pertaining to emergency activities during defense operations, and specific regulations necessary for application of laws related to road and other laws.

Japan also enacted the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law[10], which enables the implementation of measures to restrict the maritime transportation of foreign military supplies (weapons, etc.) in Japanese territorial waters or in international waters surrounding Japan.

(2) Facilitation of U.S. Forces Operations

a. Japan established the Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc.[11] (U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law). In accordance with the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, it prescribes measures to be implemented so that U.S. forces may smoothly and effectively take the necessary actions to terminate armed attacks against Japan.

b. The Diet approved partial amendment of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA —Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement)[12]. The scope of application for this Agreement has been widened so that it now additionally applies to responses to armed attack situations, the efforts of the international community to contribute to global peace and security, and for disaster response measures. Also, the revision of one part of the SDF Law has enabled the SDF to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to U.S. forces implementing these actions.

(See Chapter 2, Section 3)

(3) Other (Coordination of the Use of Facilities of Ports and Airfields, Roads and Others)

Japan established the Law Regarding the Use of Specific Public Facilities[13], ensuring that the SDF and U.S. forces' actions and measures to protect the people of Japan can be implemented appropriately and promptly. The Law enables the comprehensive coordination of specific public facilities, etc., (ports, airfields, roads, territorial waters and airspace, and radio frequencies) that may be required in armed attack situations.

3. Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of International Humanitarian Laws

(1) Japan established the Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations (Prisoners of War Law)[14]. The Law was created to ensure that prisoners are always treated humanely in armed attack situations and to ensure that prisoners' lives, bodies, health, and dignity are always respected and protected from any violations or threats.

Treatment of prisoners during a joint international humanitarian task training exercise

(2) Japan established the Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law[15] prescribing appropriate punishment for "grave breaches" of international humanitarian laws applicable to international armed conflicts.

(3) Along with these individual emergency legislations, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions[16] of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I[17]) and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II[18]), which are the main International Humanitarian Laws, were ratified.

Vehicles being deployed from transport vessels during an SDF joint exercise

(4) Japan has established legislation to protect cultural properties during armed conflict establishing a system to provide international protection for those cultural properties that can be considered valuable cultural assets for the entire human race, as well as legislation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court which ensures the appropriate implementation of International Criminal Court regulations.

(5) In addition to these laws, three treaties relating to the protection of cultural properties at a time of armed conflict and the regulations of the International Criminal Court were concluded in 2007.

4. Efforts towards High Readiness for Armed Attack Situations

With the passing of the emergency legislation, Japan has established a legal foundation but still needs to confirm the legislation's effectiveness and also ceaselessly strive to maintain the effectiveness of the required operational infrastructure to ensure an appropriate response in an ever-changing security environment.

As part of these efforts, during peacetime, the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning, under the jurisdiction of the Security Council, will study responses to emergency situations, such as armed attacks,

terrorist attacks, or the appearance of unidentified vessels. In addition, it will formulate plans for the specific response measures to be implemented by designated government institutions, local governments, and designated public institutions in armed attack situations. The Council will also take steps to formulate role-related plans and ensure that these plans are reflected into policies and operations.

The government also works to utilize a range of opportunities to educate the public on all of the important measures that it will implement to protect the lives, bodies, and properties of the people in armed attack situations. Also, it verifies the effectiveness of its operational structure through methods such as training, and maintains high levels of readiness for armed attack situations.

The government conducted joint international humanitarian training in October 2009, in order to practice the main tasks based on the Prisoners of War Law, etc., to improve knowledge and skill in treating prisoners of war, etc.

In addition, the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces conducted field exercises[19] in November 2009 based on plans created by the Joint Staff, to maintain and improve their capabilities to jointly utilize those functions and capabilities. Furthermore, in January 2010 Japan and the United States conducted joint training (command post exercises) to verify and improve the proficiency of the SDF in a variety of situations pertaining to joint Japan–U.S. responses to situations surrounding Japan in the defense of Japan and Japan–U.S. cooperation, in order to maintain and improve bilateral joint operations capabilities.

(See Chapter 4, Section 1-3)

3. Efforts for Civil Protection

1. Measures for Civil Protection in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Measures)

All organizations and functions of the government will implement their measures for civil protection in armed attack situations based on the Basic Response Plan[20] and the basic guidelines for civil protection in armed attack situations. Also, the country as a whole will give its unfailing support for all civil protection measures to be implemented by local governments and designated public institutions.

Local governments will implement their respective civil protection measures based on the national government policies, and will be responsible for the overall coordination of the civil protection measures to be implemented by relevant authorities in their jurisdiction.

2. The Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection

In March 2005, the government established the Basic Guidelines for Civil Protection (hereinafter the “Basic Guidelines”), based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. The Basic Guidelines presumes four types of armed attack situations, including amphibious landing invasion, guerilla or special forces unit attacks, ballistic missile attacks, and air attacks, and prescribes matters requiring attention to implement civil protection measures in response to each of them. In addition, it prescribes the content and distribution of roles for implementation of measures by the national, prefectural and municipal governments and designated public institutions for civil protection measures in response to evacuation, relief and disasters.

Designated government institutions and prefectural governments, etc., established the plan concerning civil protection (the Civil Protection Plan) based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines.

3. Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection

In October 2005, the Defense Agency and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, both designated government institutions, established the Civil Protection Plan[21], based on the Civil Protection Law, Article 33, Section 1, and the Basic Guidelines. The Plan included measures to be implemented in full force by the SDF to

terminate armed attacks, which is a primary mission of the SDF. In addition, the Plan described civil protection measures to be implemented within a feasible range, relating to evacuation, relief support, and responses to armed attack disasters.
(See Reference 26)

(1) Civil Protection Dispatch

The outline of the stipulations of Civil Protection Dispatch is as follows.

a. Dispatch Procedure

For situations where it is recognized that a dispatch is required, the Minister of Defense may issue a Civil Protection Dispatch order to dispatch relevant units to implement civil protection measures following a request by a prefectural governor or the Task Force Chief[22].
(See Fig. III-1-1-4)

Also, when a defense operations order has been issued in an armed attack situation, or on the issuance of a public security operations order as a response measure in an emergency situation, the Minister of Defense may implement civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures as a part of the consistent defense or public security operations strategy without civil protection dispatch orders.

Fig. III-1-1-4 Mechanism of Civil Protection Dispatches



Notes: 1. Armed Attack Situations Task Force Chief or Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief.
2. If it is found particularly necessary.

b. Authorities

Only in cases when police officers[23] are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation are authorized to execute evacuation and other measures, to prevent and control crime, and to enter private premises. And only in cases when officials other than police officers are not at the scene the SDF personnel are authorized to use weapons, as prescribed by the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials.

In addition, only in cases when the municipal mayors, etc., are not at the scene, the SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch operation are authorized to execute evacuation instructions, perform emergency public duties, to establish areas on alert, to request cooperation of residents and other measures.

c. Special Organization of Units

When civil protection dispatch operations are being conducted, special units may be organized temporarily based on necessity, and SDF ready and reserve personnel may be called to duty.

d. Emergency Response Protection Measures

The same provisions as measures in armed attack situations, based on the Civil Protection Law and the Basic Guidelines etc., shall apply for measures in emergency response situations.

(2) Measures to be implemented by the SDF

a. Evacuation of Residents

The SDF will collect and distribute essential information, coordinate with relevant organizations, and provide guidance and transport services for the evacuation of residents.

b. Relief of Evacuated Residents

Centered on measures for the relief of lives (search, rescue, and emergency medical care) and following a request from the Task Force Chief or other authorized persons, the SDF will implement measures to support medical care activities (transporting injured people, etc.), to support the lives of the people when necessary (distributing hot meals, supplying water, transporting relief materials, etc.), and to gather safety information, etc., as required.

c. Responses to Armed Attack Disasters

The SDF will carry out the following response measures: confirming the extent of damage, providing monitoring support, implementing measures for relief of lives (search, rescue, providing emergency medical care, etc.), preventing damage expansion (supporting evacuation of surrounding residents, extinguishing fires, etc.), and removing dangerous substances as a result of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) attacks. Otherwise, the SDF will implement other important measures to ensure the security of facilities such as those related to daily life (guidance and advice, dispatching personnel, etc.) and other necessary measures as ordered by the Prime Minister.

d. Emergency Recovery

While implementing emergency recovery measures for SDF facilities and equipment support operations will be conducted including the removal of dangerous wreckage, and emergency repairs of roads and runways based on a request from prefectural governors, etc.

4. Activities by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to Facilitate the Civil Protection Measures

(1) A scene from Training for Civil Protection (Oita prefecture)

In order to appropriately and promptly implement civil protection measures in armed attack situations, etc., it is essential to jointly coordinate matters related to the implementation of civil protection measures with other ministries and agencies, local governments, and other relevant organizations.

From this perspective, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively participate and cooperate in civil protection training implemented by the Cabinet Secretariat, prefectural government organizations, or local governments. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF intend to continue such efforts to strengthen coordination and response capabilities.

Joint exercises between the national and local governments regard civil protection were started in FY2005 and field exercises were conducted in 5 prefectures that year including field exercise in Fukui Prefecture; and exercises were conducted in 14 prefectures and cities in FY2009, including field exercises in Hyogo Prefecture and Tokushima Prefecture, and map exercises in Tokyo.

(See Reference 27)

A scene from Training for Civil Protection (Oita prefecture)

(2) Coordination with Local Governments in Peacetime

During peacetime, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF closely coordinate with local governments, etc. The Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division was established within the GSDF Army Headquarters to achieve effective implementation for civil protection measures through close coordination. To strengthen functions relating to coordination and cooperation with local governments, etc., a Civil Protection and Disaster Countermeasures Liaison Coordination Officer post was established in each SDF Provincial Cooperation Office.

Civil protection councils were established in prefectures and municipalities as institutions to gather opinions from a wide range of citizens, and members of the Ground, Maritime or Air Self-Defense Force were assigned to be council members. Furthermore, related staff of the Regional Defense Bureaus, which are designated regional government institutions, are assigned to be members.

4. The Joint Operational Structure of the Self-Defense Forces

In 2006, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF shifted to a joint operational structure. This has established the basis for unified SDF operations among the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF in peacetime, and is enabling the SDF to fulfill its expanding range of already diversified duties in an effective and prompt manner.

(See Fig. III-1-1-5)

1. Outline of Joint Operational Structure

(1) Role of the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff

a. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff develops a joint operations concept for the operations, and solely supports the Minister of Defense on operations from a military expert's perspective.

b. The Minister's commands concerning the operations of the SDF shall be delivered through the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and orders concerning operations of the SDF shall be executed by the Chief of Joint Staff. In

doing this, the Minister's commands and orders shall be delivered through the Chief of Joint Staff not only in cases where a joint task force[24] is organized, but also in cases where a single SDF unit is employed to take responses.

(2) Relationship between Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and Other Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Staff undertakes the functions relating to those SDF operations that were transferred and consolidated from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff. The GSDF, MSDF and ASDF Staff Offices continue to undertake functions for unit maintenance, such as personnel, building-up defense capability, and education and training.

In addition, from the perspective of facilitating smooth SDF joint operations, the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff creates medium- to long-term defense concepts and strategies, and annual planning policies to clarify the requirements of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF functions. Each of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will implement all measures in accordance with these plans.

The information necessary for the SDF to carry out its operations is provided by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters to the Joint Staff and the relevant units.

(See Fig. III-1-1-6)

Fig. III-1-1-5 Situation Response with the Joint Operations Posture (Image)
(Diagram of an Example of a Response to an Invasion of Japan's Remote Islands)



Note: The Chiefs of Staff are not military commanders of units, but provide expert military perspective as advisors to the Minister of Defense. Before the transition to the joint operations posture, orders from the Minister of Defense for SDF operations were executed through the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces, but since the transition to the joint operations posture, orders from the Minister of Defense relating to SDF operations go through the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff to be executed in a centralized manner.

Fig. III-1-1-6 Operational System of the SDF and Roles of the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces



Notes: 1. The Chief of Staff, Joint Staff is responsible for joint training.
2. With respect to forces affairs other than operations in regards to the Joint Task Force, command responsibilities of the Defense Minister.

2. Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance the Joint Operational Structure

Within the joint operational structure it is essential that the Joint Staff and each SDF unit maintain systems to communicate commands accurately and to share information promptly. With this in mind, in March 2008, the SDF Command and Communication Squadron was established to strengthen communication functions. Also, a wide-ranging and mobile information communications structure has been created employing information and communication technologies available at home, overseas.

Furthermore, at the unit level, commanders[25] of major units who may be required to take command of a joint task force will create plans for such forces' operations during peacetime. Also, they need to maintain a posture capable of executing duties through joint training and other methods. For this purpose, personnel from other SDF branches are to be stationed at major command headquarters during peacetime, and if necessary, the number of Joint Staff personnel will be increased.

Deliberation continues aiming for a more effective joint operational structure and necessary measures to be taken, while bearing in mind past accomplishments. This deliberation includes topics such as the improvement of education and training, the SDF headquarter structure, and the development of human resources and common equipment to fit joint operations.

3. Placing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under the Direct Command of the Minister of Defense

Following the shift to a joint operations posture, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which had been under the control of the Joint Staff Council (at that time), became a special institution under the direct control of the Minister of Defense. Its position and role were identified as the central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense. This change has enabled the intelligence organizations of the Ministry of Defense to strengthen the following functions: to collect extensive intelligence and carry out high quality analysis based on the intelligence needs of each organization of the Ministry of Defense, and more prompt, accurate, and direct reporting to the Minister of Defense.

Section 2. Effective Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

In the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), the primary role of defensive capability is to provide an effective response to new threats and diverse contingencies. Further, the Guideline for Formulation of the FY2010 Defense Budget also states the necessity of securing deterrence and readiness as well as the ability to respond effectively to various situations. This section explains the role of the SDF in response to new threats and diverse contingencies under the joint operations posture as well as efforts that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have made.

(See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

While various efforts have been made by the international community for the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, proliferation still continues.

Among the countries surrounding Japan, a great number of nuclear capable ballistic missiles are deployed. In 2006, North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles and carried out a launch which they called a launch of "an experimental communications satellite" on April 5, 2009. On July 4 of the same year they again launched seven missiles. These events serve to reconfirm that the threat from ballistic missiles is a reality.

(See Part I, Chapter 2, Section 2) (See Reference 1–2)



The Combat Information Center (CIC) of an Aegis destroyer during an SM-3 test launch

Based on this background, Japan began developing a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in FY2004 in order to improve readiness in response to ballistic missile attacks. Necessary amendments were subsequently made to the SDF Law in 2005. In the same year, the Security Council and Cabinet decided to begin Japan–U.S. joint development of advanced BMD interceptor missiles.

Following the successful flight test of a Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) by Aegis destroyer *Kongo*[26] in 2007, the Aegis destroyer *Chokai* conducted a flight test in 2008. Further, in October 2009, the Aegis destroyer *Myoko* conducted a flight test of an SM-3 in the sea off Hawaii's Kauai Island, successfully striking its target outside the atmosphere.

In September 2008 and September 2009, flight tests of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)[27] interceptor missile were carried out at White Sands Missile Range New Mexico in the U.S., and simulated ballistic missile targets were successfully shot down.

In addition to the assignment of ballistic missile capability to the three Aegis vessels, the success in the flight test of the Patriot PAC-3 shows that Japan is steadily building up its own multi-tiered defense system against ballistic missile attacks.

(See Fig. III-1-2-1)

Fig. III-1-2-1 The History of Efforts for BMD Development in Japan

1995	Commenced a comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan–U.S. joint study on ballistic missile defense
1998	North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory
	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Japan–U.S. joint cooperative technical research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) as part of a sea-based upper-tier system
1999	Started the joint Japan–U.S. technical research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles
2000	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–FY2005) with a decision to continue the Japan–U.S. joint cooperative technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system and to take necessary measures after the review of its technical feasibility
2002	Decision by the United States on the initial deployment of BMD
2003	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the introduction of BMD system and other measures, and the deployment of BMD in Japan started
2004	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Program, with a decision to take necessary measures after examining possible transition of the joint technical research to a development stage, together with continued efforts of build-up to establish a necessary defense posture including development of the BMD system
2005	The Security Council and the Cabinet meeting approved a Japan–U.S. Cooperative Development on advanced interceptor missiles for BMD
2006	North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles toward the Sea of Japan
2007	• Started the deployment of Patriot PAC-3 units • SM-3 test-launch by Aegis-equipped destroyer *Kongo*
2008	• Test-launch of Patriot PAC-3 • SM-3 test-launch by Aegis-equipped destroyer *Chokai*
2009	• 2009 North Korea launched one ballistic missile toward the Pacific Ocean in April and seven toward the Sea of Japan in July • Orders for ballistic missile destruction measures were issued for the first time • Flight tests were carried out for the PAC-3 Patriot missile • SM-3 test-launch by Aegis-equipped destroyer *Myoko*

1. Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense

(1) General Situation of BMD System Development

a. Basic Concept

Japan's BMD system has been developed by improving the capability of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot systems currently maintained by the SDF. Furthermore, with Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment (JADGE), the basic concept is efficient execution of a multi-tier defense system with the upper tier interception by Aegis destroyers in coordination with the lower-tier interception by Patriot PAC-3.

(See Reference 28–29)

b. Configuration of the BMD System

Japan's BMD system consists of 1) Aegis destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles at the mid-course phase, 2) Patriot PAC-3 to intercept ballistic missiles at the terminal phase, 3) the sensor systems to detect and track ballistic missiles, and 4) the command, control, battle management and communications systems (C2BMC) to systematically counter ballistic missiles by effectively coordinating the weapons systems and the sensor systems.

(See Fig. III-1-2-2)

c. Policy for Introducing the BMD System

In developing the BMD system, existing equipment will be utilized from the perspective of developing an effective and efficient system while reducing costs. Beginning with capability improvements of the Aegis destroyers

and Patriot system, an improved model of the current ground radar system will also be employed in the area of sensors, and the newly developed air warning radar (FPS-5)[28] has been introduced, which is able to deal not only with conventional airborne threats such as aircraft but also with ballistic missiles. The same also applies to JADGE.

An SM-3 launched from an Aegis destroyer

d. Development Status of the BMD System

By the end of FY2009, the MSDF equipped its *Kongo*, *Chokai*, and *Myoko* Aegis destroyers with SM-3s, and the ASDF deployed Patriot PAC-3 to four fire units (FU) of the 1st Air Defense Missile Group (Narashino, Takeyama, Kasumigaura, and Iruma), three fire units of the 2nd Air Defense Missile Group (Ashiya, Kouradai, and Tsuiki), four fire units of the 4th Air Defense Missile Group (Aibano, Gifu, and Hakusan), and Air Defense Missile Training Group and 2nd Technical School (Hamamatsu). By way of continuing the development of the BMD system, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have the present objective of constructing a system by FY2011 that links four Aegis

Fig. III-1-2-2 Concept of BMD Deployment and Operation (Image)



destroyers (with added BMD capability), 16 Patriot PAC-3 Fire Units[29] (Air Defense Missile Groups and educational expenses), four FPS-5 radars and seven FPS-3 upgraded radars (improved model) through various types of command, control, battle management and communications systems, such as JADGE.

Based on the policy of improving defense capability, including ballistic missile defense, which is based on the concept in the current NDPG, the budget for FY2010 includes ¥53.8 billion for the additional acquisition of PAC-3 missiles for existing PAC-3 units, and the further increase of anti-ballistic missile capabilities including maintenance and improvement of the BMD system.

Further, the budget includes ¥61.9 billion (contract-based amount not including the cost for the first fiscal year) for maintaining the current level of existing PAC-2 units lacking BMD capability, dealing with components becoming unavailable by upgrading equipment systems.

(2) Future Capability Improvement

The proliferation of ballistic missile technology continues and the possibility remains that ballistic missiles will be furnished with countermeasures to avoid interception in the future. Furthermore, expansion of the defense coverage and improvement of interception probability are also required in response to conventional ballistic missiles. Thus, it is essential to improve the kinetic performance of interceptor missiles and undertake initiatives to advance the efficiency and reliability of the BMD system.

From this perspective, a Japan–U.S. cooperative development project concerning an advanced interceptor missile commenced from 2006 based on results obtained from Japan–U.S. cooperative BMD research, which had started in 1999. Thus, efforts to improve future capabilities are being made.
(See Fig. III-1-2-3 and 4)

Fig. III-1-2-3 Recent Methods to Avoid Ballistic Missile Interception



Fig. III-1-2-4 Images of Expanding Protected Areas through Future Improvement in Capabilities of BMD Missiles (Image)



2. Improvement in Legislation and Operations

(1) Legal Measures regarding Responses to Ballistic Missiles

In response to the event that ballistic missiles or other objects[30] are launched toward Japan and recognized as armed attacks, defense operation orders for armed attack situations will be ordered and the missiles will be intercepted.

On the other hand, in the event ballistic missiles are launched towards Japan and an armed attack situation is not acknowledged, the SDF may take the following measures giving adequate consideration 1) to provide a prompt and appropriate response and 2) to ensure civilian control.

a. When the Minister of Defense determines that there is a possibility that ballistic missiles or other objects will come flying toward Japan, the Minister of Defense may order SDF units to take measures to destroy the ballistic missiles upon approval of the Prime Minister[31].

b. Furthermore, in addition to the above, there may be cases where the situation changes suddenly, such as when almost no information is available concerning missile launches or when missiles are launched mistakenly or accidentally, and there is no time for the Minister of Defense to obtain the approval of the Prime Minister. To prepare for such contingencies, the Minister of Defense may prepare emergency response procedures during peacetime that are preapproved by the Prime Minister. Subsequently, in accordance with these emergency response procedures, the Minister of Defense may issue an order with a specified period of validity in advance to SDF units to take the necessary measures to destroy a ballistic missile when it actually does fly toward Japan.

(See Fig. III-1-2-5) (See Reference 29)

Fig. III-1-2-5 Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles



Note 1: Formulated by the Defense Minister and approved by the Prime Minister.

(2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control of the Military

Responses against ballistic missiles require the government to assess the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating the specific situation and international circumstances. In addition to the SDF destroying the missile, it is also necessary to alert and evacuate the people for their protection, undertake diplomatic activities, information gathering by the departments concerned and reinforce readiness for emergencies.

In view of the gravity of such incidents and the necessity of action by the Japanese government as a whole, Prime Ministerial approval (Cabinet decision) and orders by the Minister of Defense are required so that the Cabinet and Minister of Defense can sufficiently fulfill their responsibilities. Furthermore, the participation of the Diet is also defined with a provision in the law on reporting to the Diet.

(3) Operational Efforts

a. Responses to Ballistic Missiles through Joint Operations

In cases where a BMD Joint Task Force is formed to deal with incoming ballistic missiles, the Commander of the Air Defense Command is to serve as Commander, and various postures for effective defense are to be taken under a unified command through JADGE, etc. Furthermore, the GSDF will play a leading role in dealing with damage caused by the impact of ballistic missiles.

b. Japan–U.S. Cooperation in Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Further cooperation with U.S. forces in Japan as well as with the U.S. government is required for efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Thus, related measures were agreed upon at the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in 2005, 2006, and 2007.

Also, at the Japan–U.S. defense ministers meeting in November 2007, with progress in development of the BMD system, both Japan and the United States agreed to advance cooperation with a focus on operational aspects.

(See Chapter 2, Section 3)

3. Missile Defense of the United States and Japan–U.S. BMD Cooperation

(1) Missile Defense of the United States

The United States aims to develop a multi-tier missile defense system in which interception systems suited for each of the 1) boost phase, 2) mid-course phase and 3) terminal phase of the ballistic missile flight path are combined for complementary missile defense. These systems are being deployed as they become available[32].

(See Fig. III-1-2-6)

Japan and the United States have developed close coordination concerning ballistic missile defense, and a part of the missile defense system possessed by the United States is being deployed in our country in a step by step manner.

Specifically, in June 2006, the USFJ deployed mobile radar for BMD at the ASDF Shariki sub base (Aomori Prefecture)[33]. Also, BMD capability equipped Aegis destroyers have been forward deployed in Japan and surrounding areas since December 2006. Furthermore, in October 2006, Patriot PAC-3 were deployed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture, and in October 2007, a Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS)[34] was deployed at Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture.

The development of a part of the U.S. missile defense system in our country will serve to secure the safety of the people of Japan.

(2) Japan–U.S. Joint Development of Improved Interceptor Missiles, etc.

In 1998, the government decided to commence Japan–U.S. joint cooperative research on a sea-based upper-tier system in FY1999.

This cooperative research was not aimed for the BMD system that started to be deployed in FY2004. Rather, this Japan–U.S. joint technical research has been conducted bearing in mind improving the capabilities of interceptor missiles for the far future, and the design, prototype production and necessary testing of four major components[35] of the interceptor missiles were completed.

Fig. III-1-2-6 Example of U.S. Multi-layered Defense Concept Against Ballistic Missiles



ABL: Airborne Laser: Airborne deployed system for the interception of ballistic missiles at the boost phase
GMD: Ground-based Mid-course Defense System: An interception system for long range ballistic missiles at the mid-course phase from a fixed silo on the ground
SMD: Sea-based Mid-course Defense System: An interception system for intermediate range ballistic missiles from a sea-based Aegis-equipped destroyer
THAAD: Terminal high Altitude Area Defense System: An interception system for short- to medium-range ballistic missiles from a movable launcher at the terminal phase
MEADS: Medium Extended Air Defense System: A missile system under development by the United States, Germany, and Italy as a replacement for the Patriot PAC-3

Fig. III-1-2-7 Outline of the Japan–U.S. Joint Development of Advanced Interceptor Missiles for BMD



In December 2005, the Security Council and Cabinet made the decision to use those results as a technical foundation for the development of an improved interceptor missile because prospective solutions to issues faced at the time were gained as a result of the Japan–U.S. joint technical research, and joint development has been ongoing since June 2006. The commencement of joint Japan–U.S. development of Aegis BMD weapon system components is planned for FY2010 to add commander and operator support functionality and to improve system availability to the Aegis BMD combat system under development by the United States. For this reason, approximately 21.1 billion yen was appropriated for the joint development of the future BMD system in the budget for FY2010.
(See Fig. III-1-2-7) (See Reference 31)

(3) Relationship to the Three Principles on Arms Exports

Japan's BMD program consists of capability improvements to the Aegis destroyers and Patriot system possessed by Japan, and does not conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

On the other hand, with regard to the Japan–U.S. joint technical development, which is aimed for improved BMD capability for the future, it will be necessary to export arms concerned with BMD from Japan to the United States as part of development. In accordance with the Chief Cabinet Secretary's statement made in December 2004, it was determined, when the transition to joint development was decided in December 2005, that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply under the condition that strict controls are maintained and a framework for the provision that arms required to be exported to the United States would be developed through coordination with the United States.

In June 2006, letters concerning the provision of arms and arms-related technology to the United States were exchanged, which established a framework to provide arms and arms-related technology under tight controls —for example, prohibiting use for other purposes and prohibiting the transfer to third countries without Japan's consent in advance.
(See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

(4) Strengthening Japan–U.S. Cooperation on BMD

Since the decision was made to introduce BMD systems to Japan, efforts have been continuously made to strengthen Japan–U.S. BMD cooperation. Specifically, letters concerning BMD cooperation were exchanged between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on BMD cooperation was signed between the Japan Defense Agency and the U.S. Department of Defense in 2004. Furthermore, in June 2006, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan exchanged a letter concerning BMD cooperation that included cooperation on Japan–U.S. joint development.

4. Response to North Korean Missile Launch

On March 12, 2009 (Japan time, the same shall apply hereinafter in this section), contact was received from the International Maritime Organization that it had received communication from North Korea of an intended test launch of a communications satellite.

As the actions of North Korea were in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, the government requested that North Korea stop the launch, and further verified the response policy toward North Korean missile launches at the Security Council on March 27 of the same year.

Further, based on Article 82 Section 2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (currently Article 82 Section 3), the Minister of Defense issued the "Order for destruction measures against ballistic missiles". The SDF formed the BMD Joint Task Force and deployed two Aegis Destroyers (*Kongo* and *Chokai*) to the central Sea of Japan as well as Patriot PAC-3 units to bases in the Tohoku region (Iwate and Akita prefectures) and the Tokyo metropolitan area (Saitama and Chiba prefectures, and Tokyo) to prevent missiles landing in Japanese territory.

Right after a PAC-3 test launch

At 11:30 AM on April 5 of the same year, one missile was launched from North Korea toward the east and is calculated to have passed over the Tohoku region to the Pacific Ocean at approximately 11:37. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF swiftly communicated[36] information regarding this missile launch collected from Shared Early Warning and the various SDF radar units to the Prime Minister's Office. Further, aerial reconnaissance was carried out to verify whether any harm had been caused in the Tohoku region.

On April 6 of the same year, the Minister of Defense issued the order to terminate the "destruction measures against ballistic missiles" and recalled the units. On May 15, comprehensive and expert analysis carried out on the missile launched by North Korea was made public[37].

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

The Reliability and Effectiveness of Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense

Interest in the ballistic missile threat in Japan increased as a result of the North Korean missile launch incident in April 2009, but at the same time voices were raised regarding concern over the reliability and effectiveness of Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Here we will explain the understanding of the Ministry of Defense regarding the reliability and effectiveness of the BMD system.

The BMD has the capability to destroy ballistic missiles by interceptor before they hit targets and is the only way to prevent the damage intended by the launching party. This capability has been made possible by great leaps forward in recent years in related technology such as the sensor technology required to detect and track a distant warhead traveling at extremely high speeds, the technology to analyze and transmit vast amounts of data at high speed, and the technology to accurately guide the interceptor to strike the warhead.

The proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear warheads, is a shared concern of the international community. Both Japan and the United States now possess interception capability, and the nations of Europe and the Middle East are moving forward towards its adoption.

Japan takes the multi-tiered defense approach that the SM-3 Aegis destroyers, capable of protecting an area with a radius of several hundred kilometers, cover the whole region of Japan, and the Patriot PAC-3 systems, capable of protecting an area with a radius of tens of kilometers and suitable for base protection, cover relatively important spots. Both systems performed well in flight tests carried out by Japan, the United States, and other countries.

For instance, according to the public information of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, 16 out of 20 SM-3 interceptors successfully hit their targets in the past tests. This result includes the flight tests carried out by Japan.

Regarding the Patriot PAC-3 systems, while all test results are not publicly available from the U.S. government at this time, ballistic missile mock ups were hit successfully in two flight tests carried out by the SDF in the United States (in September 2008 and September 2009). Further, according to the public announcement by the U.S. government, Patriot PAC-3 systems deployed in the field when the United States and its allies conducted an armed attack against Iraq in 2003 successfully hit all the ballistic missiles within their strike range.

Note: It should be noted, however, that the percentage of successful hits in flight test may not be a sole indicator, as in general the reliability of a state-of-the-art technology progresses through repeated tests.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense and SDF have been carrying out the development of an advanced SM-3 missile with improved interception capability, as well as strengthening information, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities regarding precursors of launching ballistic missiles, and improving operational capabilities to deploy units more rapidly and to sustain a longer readiness posture.



Actual target images captured by the SM-3 infrared seeker

(An SM-3 test flight carried out by the Aegis destroyer *Myoko* in October 2009)

2. Response to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Since Japan is highly urbanized, small-scale infiltrations and attacks can pose a serious threat to peace and security. Such cases may take various forms including illegal actions by armed agents[38], and destructive actions by guerillas and special operations forces, which constitute a form of armed attacks on the territory of Japan.

1. Responses to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

(1) Basic Concept

Possible forms of armed attack on Japan can include 1) destruction of facilities and attacks on people by irregular forces such as guerillas and 2) subversive activities, assassination of important figures and raids on operation centers by regular forces such as special operations forces. In the event of armed attack on Japan by guerilla or special forces, Japan will respond with defensive operations.

(2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

In operations to respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations forces, an intelligence gathering posture is established to detect the attacks at the earliest possible time to capture or destroy them. It is important at this time to quickly gain control of the situation to minimize damage from assault.

a. Search and Detection of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

Efforts will be made to detect various types of vessels and submarines that transport guerillas or special operations forces at an early stage, and interdict them at sea through patrols[39] in surrounding waters by escort ships or aircraft. When the possibility of infiltration into Japanese territory by guerillas and special operations forces is suspected, GSDF patrol units will engage in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas.

In the event of an infiltration, patrol and air units will search and detect the guerillas or special operations forces. Furthermore, as required, a guarding posture will be established for the prompt deployment of guarding units to secure key facilities.

b. Capture and Defeat of Guerillas and Special Operations Forces

In the event that guerillas or special operations forces are detected, combat forces will be promptly assembled in the area to besiege them, upon which they will be captured or destroyed.
(See Fig. III-1-2-8) (See Reference 31–32)

2. Response to Armed Agents

(1) Basic Concept

While the police assume primary responsibility for responding to illegal activities of armed agents, the SDF will respond in accordance with situational developments.
(See Fig. III-1-2-9) (See Reference 32–33)

(2) Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Police

a. Establishing the Framework for Strengthening Cooperation

For the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the JDA and the National Public Safety Commission, to provide cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised, enabling its application to illegal activities by armed agents[40]. In addition, local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces.

Fig. III-1-2-8 Example of Operations for Coping with Guerillas and Special Forces



Furthermore, guidelines were jointly formulated with the National Police Agency in 2004 for dealing jointly with public security dispatches in the event of armed agent concerns.

SDF personnel supporting convoys together with police personnel during a joint exercise with the police

b. Joint Exercises with the Police

By July 2005, the GSDF divisions/brigades and each prefectural police force, which are parties to the local agreements, had conducted joint simulation exercises to strengthen mutual cooperation at the local level in preparation for dealing with armed agents. Based on the results of these joint simulation exercises, joint field exercises were carried out through FY2009 between all divisions and brigades and the police of all prefectures starting with the field exercises between the GSDF Northern Army and the Hokkaido prefectural police to confirm cooperation procedures in cases of security operations.

Fig. III-1-2-9 Basic Concept for Responding to Armed Agents



3. Response to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been strong recognition of the danger of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapon proliferation and the means for transporting such weapons, as well as related equipment and materials, to terrorists and rogue states. In the event that such weapons of mass destruction are used, it is likely there will be indiscriminate mass casualties and contamination of an extensive area. The sarin gas attack[41] on the Tokyo subway in 1995 and the incidents of mail in the United States containing anthrax[42] in 2001 are evidence of the fact that these weapons have already been used.

(1) Basic Concept

In the event of the use of NBC weapons in Japan in a way that corresponds to an armed attack, the SDF will abate the armed attack and rescue victims under the category of defense operations. Furthermore, in the event of the use of NBC weapons in a way that does not correspond to an armed attack but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the armed attack and assist victims in cooperation with related agencies.

Furthermore, when the incident does not fall under the category of defense operations or public security operations, the SDF will conduct disaster relief dispatches and civilian protection dispatches to conduct intelligence gathering concerning the extent of the damage; decontamination activities; transport of the sick and injured; and medical activities led by the chemical protection units of the GSDF and medical units of the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF.

(2) Initiatives of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in Response to NBC Weapons

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have improved the capability for responding to NBC weapon attacks. Specifically, the Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit was formed under the Central Readiness Force, and there has been an increase of chemical protection unit personnel, improvement of NBC reconnaissance vehicles, chemical surveillance devices, decontamination vehicles, personnel protection equipment, portable automatic biological sensors, chemical protection clothing and research and development for NBC warning devices and decontamination kits is ongoing. Also, the GSDF has designated personnel to take initial action in the event of special-type disasters in order to allow operations to begin within approximately one hour. The MSDF and ASDF have also acquired protective equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

(3) Response to Substances Related to Nuclear and Radiation Weapons

Substances related to nuclear and radiation weapons have various effects on the health of those exposed to them even when this is not visibly apparent. Thus, appropriate protection and exposure control is required taking into consideration the characteristics of such substances.

In the event that a response to such substances is necessary, the SDF will coordinate with related organizations to conduct operations using protective masks and chemical protection vehicles, including the measurement of the contamination situation from radioactive materials and the transportation of the sick and injured.

Fig. III-1-2-10 Image of Future Response to Biological Weapons



Notes: 1. Aerosol: microscopic solid or liquid particles floating in the atmosphere.
2. Triage: determination of the medical treatment priority of victims.

(4) Response to Biological Weapons

Biological agents used to make biological weapons have certain incubation periods, and it is difficult to determine whether a disease is caused by biological agents based on the initial symptoms alone. For this reason, in the event that biological agents are dispersed secretly, anthropogenic causes may be suspected only after damage has occurred and spread. Thus, it is anticipated that detection before the damage has spread will be extremely difficult.

An exercise to handle terrorism using biological agents

Response in the event of an outbreak of such damage will be carried out primarily by medical institutions, the police, and fire departments. The SDF will be responsible mainly for detecting and identifying biological agents, decontamination, the transportation of patients, and medical activities.
(See Fig. III-1-2-10)

An exercise to handle terrorism using chemical agents

(5) Response to Chemical Weapons

Unlike biological agents, the outbreak of injury with chemical agents used to make chemical weapons is generally fast so a rapid initial response at the time of injury is exceedingly important.

Response using chemical protection clothing and vehicles is possible when handling chemical agents, and the chemical protection units and medical units of the GSDF will detect the chemical agents using detection devices, carry out identification and decontamination, the transportation and treatment of victims, and medical activities in the contaminated areas.

Even when the situation does not require handling by the SDF, the SDF will lend personnel protection equipment and dispatch chemical protection unit personnel as liaison officials to the relevant agencies.

3. Response to Aggression on Japan's Offshore Islands

According to the 2004 NDPG, the geographical features of Japan are considered vulnerable from a security perspective, due to narrow lands, long coastlines and many islands. In particular, invasion of these islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack against Japan.

In order to respond to aggression on islands, it is important to detect signs at an early stage through activities routinely conducted by the SDF including patrols and intelligence gathering. Response to this aggression has many points in common with ground defense strategy, but if signs of aggressions are detected in advance, operations will be conducted to prevent invasion of the enemy forces, and when no signs of aggression are detected in advance and

An air cushion landing craft carrying a tank

islands are occupied, operations will be conducted to defeat the enemy. These operations will enable the SDF to swiftly concentrate troops to prevent and destroy enemy forces through the mobile transportation and deployment of forces through joint operations.

4. Warning and Surveillance of the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan and Response to Violation of Airspace and Armed Special Operations Vessels

In order for the SDF to respond swiftly to not only a full-scale invasion situation but also new threats and diverse contingencies, it is extremely important to routinely conduct warning and surveillance activities in Japan's territorial waters and airspace as well as engage in intelligence gathering and processing.

For this purpose, the SDF is engaged in various activities directly linked to ensuring the peace and security of Japan.

1. Warning and Surveillance in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan

A P-3C patrol aircraft carrying out surveillance operations.

The MSDF patrols the sea areas surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea about once a day, using P-3C patrol aircraft. Furthermore, warning and surveillance activities are conducted with the flexible use of destroyers and aircraft as required, such as for surveillance of a possible missile launch. Thus, a state of readiness is maintained for responding quickly to situations in areas surrounding Japan. As an additional measure, GSDF coastal surveillance units and MSDF security posts conduct 24-hour warning and surveillance activities in the major sea straits.

2. Warnings and Emergency Takeoffs (Scrambles) in Preparation against Violation of Territorial Airspace

The ASDF conducts daily 24-hour surveillance of Japan's territorial and adjacent airspace using nationwide radar, E-2C early warning aircraft and E-767 early warning and control aircraft. Furthermore, some fighters are always kept on standby for immediate takeoff (scramble). When any aircraft suspected of violating Japan's territorial airspace are detected, scrambled fighters will approach them to assess the situation and monitor the aircraft as necessary. In the event that an airspace violation does occur, an evacuation warning will be issued.

In FY2009, there were 299 scrambles by the ASDF[43].

(See Fig. III-1-2-11, 12) (See Reference 32–33)

3. Response to Submarines Submerged in Japan's Territorial Waters

With respect to foreign national submarines navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters[44], an order for maritime security operations[45] will be issued promptly. The submarine will be requested to navigate on the surface of the water and show its flag, in accordance with international law, and in the event that the submarine does not comply with the request, it will be requested by the SDF to leave Japanese territorial waters.

(See Reference 32–33)

The MSDF is enhancing capabilities for detecting, identifying and tracking foreign submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan, as well as making Japanese government intentions clear to these submarines, and improving capabilities for responding to them in shallow water areas.

Fig. III-1-2-11 Number of Scrambles in the Last Decade and its Breadown



Fig. III-1-2-12 Example of Flight Patterns of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean Aircraft Against Which Scrambles Were Directed



4. Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

(1) Basic Concept

The Japan Coast Guard, as a police organization, is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious armed special operations vessels (unidentified vessels). However, in the event that it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to respond to a situation, an order for maritime security operations will be issued in a timely manner and the SDF will respond in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.
(See Reference 32–33)

Taking into consideration lessons learned and reflecting on the unidentified vessel incident off the Noto Peninsula in 1999[46] and the unidentified vessel incident in southwest Kyushu in 2001[47], the government has taken all necessary precautionary measures in order for effective and safe measures to be taken against unidentified vessels, while the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies.

(2) Ministry of Defense and SDF Efforts to Respond to Unidentified Vessels

a. Enhancement of Equipment

The MSDF is taking the following steps: 1) deployment of missile boats with improved capability[48]; 2) establishment of the MSDF Special Boarding Unit[49]; 3) equipment of destroyers with machine guns; 4) furnishing forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nose shells)[50]; and 5) improving the sufficiency ratio of essential military vessel personnel.

b. Measures for Strengthening Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

The Ministry of Defense and Japan Coast Guard carry out regular mutual training, information exchange, joint exercises, etc. In 1999, the (then) Defense Agency prepared the “Manual on Joint Strategies concerning Unidentified Vessels” with the Japan Coast Guard stipulating the communications protocol and initial response procedures for when unidentified vessels are discovered, and the division of responsibility (joint response procedures), etc., before and after orders are issued for maritime security operations.

Based on the manual, the MSDF and the Japan Coast Guard carry out joint exercises for pursuit and capture guidelines for unidentified vessels and communications, etc., in order to strengthen cooperation.

5. Response to Large-Scale and Unconventional Disasters

The SDF conducts a variety of operations when disasters such as natural disasters occur including search and rescue for disaster victims and ships or aircraft in distress, flood control, medical treatment, prevention of epidemics, water supply and transportation of personnel and goods. The SDF currently plays a major role in diverse contingencies.

1. Outline of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Types and Frameworks of Disaster Relief Dispatches

a. Dispatches upon Request (General Form of Disaster Relief Dispatch)

In principle, disaster dispatch is carried out at the request of prefectural governors and other officials[51]. This is because prefectural governors and other officials assume primary responsibility for disaster control measures and are in a position to grasp the overall conditions of the disaster, and it is considered most appropriate for dispatches to be made upon their request in consideration of disaster relief capabilities within the prefecture or municipality including police and fire fighting.

Municipal mayors can ask governors to request a disaster relief dispatch by the SDF. In the event that mayors are unable to make such a request to the prefectural governor, they can inform the Minister of Defense, or those designated by the Minister of the disaster conditions.

After receiving such requests from governors, the Minister of Defense or other personnel designated by the Minister can immediately dispatch units as necessary according to the disaster situation.

Under circumstances of particular urgency when there is no time to wait for a request, the Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister may authorize an exceptional dispatch (discretionary dispatch). In order to render discretionary dispatches even more effective, the Disaster Prevention Plan[52] was amended in 1995 to establish the basis[53] for SDF unit commanders and other officials to order discretionary dispatches. Procedures from the request for SDF disaster dispatch up to its withdrawal are shown in Fig. III-1-2-13.

b. Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch

When an alert[54] is issued based on the Law Concerning Special Measures for Large-Scale Earthquakes Countermeasures[55], the Minister of Defense is authorized to order an earthquake disaster prevention dispatch based on the request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister), even prior to the occurrence of an earthquake.

Fig. III-1-2-13 Flow of Events from the Point of Request to Dispatch and Withdrawal



Notes: 1. SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel will be summoned if necessary.
2. Units are all withdrawn together.
3. Disbandment of SDF ready reserve personnel and SDF reserve personnel.

c. Nuclear Disaster Dispatch

When a nuclear emergency alert is issued based on the Special Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures[56], the Minister of Defense is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

(2) Authority of SDF Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches

Under the Self-Defense Forces Law and other legislation, the authority of the officers of units requested for disaster relief dispatches, earthquake disaster prevention dispatches, or nuclear disaster dispatches to conduct effective operations is stipulated.

(See Reference 32)

2. Initial Operations Posture and Implementation Status of Disaster Relief Dispatches

(1) Initial Response to Disasters

Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster, the SDF maintains a posture for initial response to ensure disaster relief operations are conducted promptly. The GSDF maintains a state of readiness in 157 bases and stations placed throughout the nation and has designated personnel, vehicles, and helicopters (including video broadcast helicopters) as well as units for unexploded bomb disposal and chemical protection as initial response units to be ready to move within a target standard of one hour. The MSDF has vessels designated for emergency dispatch at each base in addition to aircraft on standby alert, and the ASDF is prepared with its rescue and transportation aircraft on standby alert.

In the event that information is received of the occurrence of a strong earthquake greater than level 5 on the Japanese seismic scale, the SDF will swiftly dispatch aircraft in its discretion to gather site information and is in the position to transmit this information to the Prime Minister's Office. Also, depending on the circumstances, liaison officers will be dispatched to the concerned local public authorities for information gathering purposes.

The SDF has formulated various contingency plans for responses to large-scale earthquakes, which are under consideration at the Central Disaster Management Council. For instance, because of concern of massive humanitarian and material damages in addition to damage to the central political, government, and financial functions of the capital, the Contingency Plan for Tokyo inland earthquakes stipulates that each Self-Defense Force shall systematically cooperate to respond in an organized manner. The GSDF shall send up to 110,000 personnel to disaster-stricken areas, the MSDF shall dispatch up to 60 ships and about 50 aircraft, while the ASDF shall operate about 70 aircraft, including reconnaissance, rescue and transportation planes.

Further, a variety of efforts including exercises will be carried out as part of regular operations to improve the effectiveness of such plans.

(See Fig. III-1-2-14, 15)

(2) Implementation Status of Disaster Dispatches

a. Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF uses its aircraft to transport emergency patients from isolated islands and remote areas with insufficient medical facilities (transportation of emergency patients). In FY2009, out of a total of 559 cases of disaster relief operations, 353 cases involved the transportation of emergency patients with as many as 340 cases being dispatches to such isolated islands as the Nansei Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures), the Goto Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture), the Izu Islands, and the Ogasawara Islands representing a majority of cases.

Furthermore, in the event that aircraft of other organizations are unable to respond, due to reasons including a short flight range, SDF aircraft will handle transportation of emergency patients from vessels navigating areas of ocean far from the mainland.

Fig. III-1-2-14 State of Readiness for Disaster Dispatches (Standard)



b. Firefighting Support

In FY2009, there were 86 dispatches of firefighting support, the second largest number of dispatches after transportation of emergency patients. Within this category, response to fires in areas nearby SDF facilities were the highest in number, with 73 cases in FY2009. Furthermore, upon the request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF also conducts aerial firefighting activities in locations where firefighting conditions are difficult, such as mountain and forest areas.
(See Fig. III-1-2-16) (See Reference 34)

c. Response to Natural Disasters

In July 2009, heavy rain hit western Japan due to the increased activity of the rainy season front, and cases of people becoming missing or isolated occurred. For this reason, requests for disaster dispatch were made by the Governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture to the commander of the 17th Infantry Regiment on the 21st of July, by the Governor of Fukuoka prefecture to the commander of the 4th Division on the 24th of July, and by the Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture to the commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment on July 27. In the Katsusaka

Fig. III-1-2-15 Response to a Direct Earthquake the Capital (Example)



Fig. III-1-2-16 Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (FY2009)

Description	Number of dispatches	Personnel	Vehicles	Aircraft	Vessels
Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters	11	12,684	1,958	16	19
Transporting emergency patients	353	1,809	9	386	0
Search and rescue	48	11,548	1,001	216	93
Assisting firefighting	86	4,965	642	147	1
Other	61	2,694	299	120	13
Total	559	33,700	3,909	885	126

Pass, Ishihara, and Manao in Hofu City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, a major landslide occurred causing many people to be isolated or become missing. Therefore, after processing the request for disaster dispatch from the prefecture, the conditions of the affected area were confirmed by helicopter and liaison personnel were dispatched to the prefectural government and Hofu city hall in order to properly meet the needs of the affected area. Further, isolated people were rescued from a special nursing home located in Manao and the injured there were transported by helicopter along with the doctors to neighboring hospitals.

SDF personnel conducting fire extinguishing activities during a disaster dispatch for a forest fire

In Yamaguchi City, water supply was interrupted over a wide area due to heavy rain, and many people were forced to stay in evacuation areas, disrupting their daily lives. For this reason, SDF water supply trucks and outdoor bathing kits were brought to elementary schools and hospitals from outside the prefecture to carry out water supply and bathing support. As a major mudslide also occurred in Chikushi District in Fukuoka prefecture due to the heavy rain isolating approximately 110 citizens, these people were transported by aircraft to a nearby middle school. Further, in Sasebo city, Nagasaki Prefecture, water supply pipes were broken by a landslide stopping water supply to 15,000 homes. SDF ships able to transport vast clean water supplies were brought to

[COLUMN]

VOICE

The Exhausting Efforts of Related Organizations During the Severe Rain in Hofu City, July 21, 2009

Hofu City Fire Department, Assistant Chief, Ichiro Aoki

On July 21, 2009, heavy rain due to the rainy season front fell continuously from early morning, reaching a total of over 220 mm by noon, and leading to landslides on a scale not seen before which took the lives of 14 people.

With cooperation from the SDF and police, search and rescue activities and evacuations via relay transport were carried out. Injured persons who could not be moved were rescued by the 13th Squadron of the GSDF.

Despite the exhaustive efforts of these organizations, nine individuals remained missing, and a major search and rescue operation was carried out on July 22 between the SDF, police, and fire department.

The effort lasted until July 28, during which precautions had to be taken against secondary disasters at the various affected areas due to the soft ground and poor weather. However, the deployment of over 1,100 SDF personnel gave us strength and enhanced morale allowing us to complete the operation, and for this I am extremely grateful.

Rescue activities using a UH-1J

SDF personnel conducting rescue activities during a disaster dispatch for the torrential rains in Chugoku and northern Kyushu regions

SDF personnel searching for missing persons

Ainoura port, and the water was offloaded to water supply trucks for water supply operations to 19 locations including municipal elementary schools and community centers.

After the operations were completed, a letter of gratitude was delivered to the SDF by the governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture in August of the same year. The total deployment for these disaster dispatches reached 9,690 personnel, 1,620 vehicles, 16 aircraft, and 19 ships.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Cooperation with Police and Fire Departments during the "July 2009 Disaster Dispatch for Heavy Rain in the Chugoku and North Kyushu Regions"

Yasufumi Nagao, Assistant Chief, Civil Disturbance Unit, Anti Riot Squad,
Yamaguchi Prefectural Police Department at the time of the disaster
(Currently Guard Measures Officer and Assistant Director, Guard Measures Section,
Police Division, Yamaguchi Prefectural Police Headquarters)

The heavy rains of July 2009 in the Chugoku and North Kyushu regions caused severe damages in the prefecture including the loss of 22 lives. We were engaged in rescue operations together with personnel from the GSDF 17th Infantry Regiment and the fire department. We were greatly encouraged by the sight of the troops involved in rescue operations, who were soaked up to their chests in muddy water and were pushed on by their sense of duty to rescue the victims despite the danger of secondary disasters occurring as the rain continued to fall. I hope to continue to work hard in operations with shared goals together with the related organizations in the future.

In front of a map of the prefecture

SDF personnel searching for a vehicle caught in a landslide

SDF personnel conducting rescue activities during a disaster dispatch in Hofu City

SDF personnel working to prevent the spread of foot and mouth disease

In August 2009, cases of people being isolated or missing occurred in Hyogo and Okayama Prefectures due to the heavy rain from Typhoon 9. Subsequently, requests for disaster dispatch were made by the governor of Hyogo Prefecture to the commander of the 3rd Artillery Unit and by the governor of Okayama Prefecture to the 13th Artillery Unit on August 9. In response, search and rescue operations were carried out for people missing due to a landslide in Sayocho, Shiso City, Hyogo Prefecture. Further, water supply was interrupted there and in Mimasaka City, Okayama Prefecture due to the heavy rain, affecting the daily lives of the citizens, and water supply support was carried out. A letter of gratitude was sent in December of the same year after the completion of operations by the governor of Hyogo Prefecture regarding the SDF operations. As a result of carrying out these support operations, the total scale of the deployment reached 2,990 personnel and 330 vehicles.

In another case, in February 2010, tsunami warnings were issued over a huge region along the Pacific coast from Hokkaido to Okinawa due to the danger of a tsunami arriving from the earthquake that occurred on the coast of central Chile. In response, aircraft of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces were used from across the nation to confirm whether any damage occurred due to a tsunami, while the same confirmation was also made from land in the Tohoku region. Further, in order to strengthen cooperation with related municipalities, liaison personnel were dispatched to 20 prefectures including the prefectural governments of Aomori, Iwate, and Miyagi Prefectures, and 40 cities including the cities of Kesennuma, Ishinomaki, and Kamogawa. In addition, ground forces were deployed beforehand to various parts of the Tohoku region in order to cope promptly with the damage caused by the tsunami. The scale of this deployment reached 1,020 personnel, 200 vehicles, and 77 aircraft.

An outbreak of foot and mouth disease occurred in April 2010 in Miyazaki Prefecture affecting livestock such as cows and pigs. As a result of the spread of the disease, a request for disaster dispatch was made by the governor of Miyazaki Prefecture to the commander of the 43rd Infantry Regiment on May 1 of the same year. Because emergency measures were required to prevent further outbreaks, for approximately three months (88 days) from May 1 to July 27, the scale of the dispatch was gradually increased, while sterilization operations were carried out on livestock burial grounds and warehouses for cleanup (total of 138 locations) and 24 hour a day vehicle disinfection operations were carried out at sterilizing points (total of 15 locations).

The activities managed by the SDF in these operations were highly regarded by many, including the governor of Miyazaki Prefecture and other leaders of cities and towns concerned. The scale of the disaster dispatch in handling this outbreak of foot and mouth reached to approximately 18,720 personnel and approximately 4,140 vehicles (including facilities' vehicles and so on).

3. Efforts for Preparation for Disaster Relief

(1) Efforts in Preparation for Disaster Relief

In order to respond to various disasters with speed and accuracy, the SDF carries out various disaster prevention drills including joint disaster prevention exercises in addition to formulating disaster relief plans. The SDF also actively participates in local government disaster prevention drills.

In particular, a Ministry of Defense Comprehensive Disaster Prevention Exercise was carried out during the disaster prevention week of August 30 through September 5, 2009 so that disaster dispatch could be carried out swiftly and effectively in times of disaster due to major earthquakes. Specifically, this included 1) participation in the "Disaster Prevention Day" government headquarters management exercise (exercise for responding to a direct earthquake in the capital), 2) an independent Ministry of Defense disaster operations headquarters management exercise, 3) SDF comprehensive disaster prevention training coordinated with an eight city and prefecture joint disaster prevention exercise, 4) an exercise coordinated with Shizuoka Prefecture's comprehensive disaster prevention exercise, and 5) participation in comprehensive disaster prevention exercises carried out by related local governments.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

A message from the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture

Shigefumi Matsuzawa, Governor of Kanagawa

As the head of a local government, who bears the responsibility for the safety and security of the prefectural citizens, I would like to express the deepest gratitude to the members of the Self-Defense Forces who are working hard for the maintenance of the security and peace of our nation every day, and I would also like to express my heartfelt respect for their energetic performance of the diverse and challenging missions including contribution to the international society in terms of peacekeeping operations and disaster dispatches.

In Kanagawa Prefecture, it has long been said that the Tokai earthquake and the West Kanagawa earthquake are soon to occur, and there is also concern regarding the possible occurrence of an earthquake directly under the capital. For this reason, earthquake disaster prevention measures are ranked as one of the most important issues for the prefectural government. "Disaster reduction goals" have been stipulated to reduce damages from earthquakes, and a Kanagawa Prefecture earthquake disaster prevention strategy is being prepared to achieve them. Coordination with the SDF is essential to promote these earthquake disaster prevention measures.

As is clear from the disaster dispatch operations for the Iwate-Miyagi Inland earthquake and the earthquake originating on the northern shore of Iwate Prefecture both occurring in the 2008, the role of the SDF will be vital in reducing damages to the greatest extent possible and achieving swift recovery in the event that a major earthquake or other emergency situation occurs.

I intend to work toward the further development of Kanagawa Prefecture so that its 9 million citizens can live in safety and security through continued close coordination with the SDF.

(2) Cooperation with Local Governments

It is also important for the SDF to strengthen cooperation with local governments in peacetime in order to conduct disaster relief operations smoothly.

For this reason, the SDF participates in a number of disaster prevention drills and is proceeding with the strengthening of cooperation with local governments including enhancing information liaison systems and consistency with disaster control plans.

A UH-1 replenishing its water supply for fire extinguishing activities

Specifically, 1) the post of Liaison and Coordination Officer for Citizen Protection and Disaster Relief Operation Countermeasures was created at the SDF Regional Cooperation Headquarters to work at ensuring cooperation with local governments in peacetime.

Also, 2) in addition to assigning an SDF officer to the department in charge of disaster prevention for Tokyo, mutual exchange is being carried out between administrative officials of both the GSDF Middle Army and Hyogo Prefecture. Further, 3) in response to requests from local governments, retired SDF officers with knowledge in disaster prevention are being endorsed. As of the end of May 2010, the total number of retired SDF officers working in disaster prevention in local governments are 180 individuals in 44 prefectures and 103 municipalities throughout the country.

Personnel related cooperation with local governments using the knowledge of SDF personnel is a very effective method to improve cooperation with those governments.
(See Reference 35)

The Ministry of Defense, and the SDF believe that carrying out efforts such as the following are important in order to carry out operations more effectively during disaster dispatch in local governments as well.

a. Securing Staging Areas and Heliports

In order for units to carry out operations, space is required for the headquarters on the ground and for lodging, parking, and the staging of material (the staging area)[57]. Further, as it is possible that vehicle operations become limited during disasters, a heliport[58] is required near the affected area for transporting the emergency patients and materials and fighting fires using helicopters. Relations with municipalities are being strengthened on a daily basis through such means as promoting the addition of the securing of such staging areas and heliports to regional disaster prevention plans. Further, it is necessary to clearly delineate staging areas and heliports from evacuation areas on a regular basis and inform the local populace. Research into these points is currently being considered for the future.

b. Marking Building Numbers

In order to efficiently carry out operations such as the gathering of intelligence and the transportation of people and materials by aircraft, it is useful to mark numbers on the rooftops of facilities such as prefectural offices and schools to identify buildings important for disaster prevention,.

c. Securing Facilities for Liaison and Coordination

In order for SDF liaison personnel to carry out liaison and coordination smoothly during disaster dispatches, it is necessary to secure an area, parking lot, etc., in the buildings of the local municipality for the liaison personnel to carry out their operations and communications.

Currently, through cooperation with each local municipality, 13 cities and prefectures are moving toward taking the necessary measures to clarify the securing of facilities for SDF liaison and coordination in their regional disaster prevention plans.

d. Arrangements for Materials and Equipment

It is important to prepare a disaster prevention map which indicates the location of evacuation areas, heliports, etc., so that they can be used by all disaster prevention organizations. Furthermore, the maintenance of firefighting equipment for aerial firefighting by helicopter and the securing of water resources such as reservoirs is required, and each municipality is moving forward with the preparation of these measures.

(3) Development of a Response Manual for Various Disasters

Clarifying basic responses in advance and consolidating the recognition of parties concerned is an effective way of responding more promptly and appropriately to disasters that occur in various forms. For this purpose, in November 2000, the Defense Agency and SDF developed a response manual[59] for various types of disasters

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of the Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron (ASDF Personnel)

Technical Sergeant Kazuyuki Fujii, Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron

I work as an emergency medical technician in the Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron's medical team. The Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron is outfitted with the world's cutting edge medical container for patient transport, a medical evacuation unit capable of being carried on the C-130H transport, able to transport severely injured patients to medical facilities far away while providing medical care onboard when necessary. In other words, it is like an onboard intensive care unit (ICU). Since the squadron's inauguration at ASDF Komaki Airbase in October 2006, we have been training daily in preparation for deployment.

In the disaster prevention training the other day that envisioned a Tokyo inland earthquake we carried out the complete process, applying the required care before takeoff and then airlifting the patient to a region with an advanced medical facility while monitoring their condition in flight.

While it is best that a situation that requires our deployment never occur, if we are deployed, we will use all of our knowledge and technology in combination with the evacuation capability of the aircraft to carry out the airlift to the best of our abilities.



Technical Sergeant Fuji training in the medical evacuation unit (left)

The medical evacuation unit onboard a C-130H

which compiled issues to be noted for each type of disaster. Copies of this manual were distributed to relevant organizations and local public bodies.

(4) Response to Nuclear Disasters

The Special Measures Law on Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures was enacted based on lessons learned from the critical accident that occurred at the uranium processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999. In accordance with this, the Self-Defense Forces Law was partially revised[60].

Following the nuclear criticality accident at Tokaimura, the ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF have provided transport support, assistance for evacuating residents and monitoring of airborne and seaborne radiation levels in comprehensive nuclear disaster prevention exercises conducted primarily by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry since 2000. This serves to improve effectiveness including a review of cooperation guidelines between government agencies and local bodies at the time of a nuclear disaster. Further, the Mid-Term Defense Program states that in addition to nuclear disasters, capabilities for responding to NBC will be strengthened in order to deal with other special disasters[61].

6. Response to Other Events

1. Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities

(1) Operations for Guarding SDF Facilities

When there is a danger of a terrorist attack on facilities and areas of the SDF and USFJ within Japan and in the event that it is deemed particularly necessary to prevent damage, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard facilities and areas (guarding operations).

SDF personnel coordinating with the U.S. military during a guarding operation exercise

Part of the authority given to police officials under the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials are applied correspondingly to SDF personnel dispatched for guarding operations[62]. Further, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel have authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of this law. (See Reference 32–33)

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF exchange opinions concerning guarding operations with the police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of such operations. In addition, exercises for guarding operations have been conducted at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan since 2003.

(2) Use of Weapons to Guard SDF Facilities in Normal Circumstances

The authority for use of weapons in the course of guarding SDF facilities[63] within Japan has been stipulated[64].

2. Maintaining Posture to Transport Japanese Nationals Overseas

In the event of disasters, insurgency, and other emergencies overseas, the Minister of Defense may transport overseas Japanese nationals upon request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and subsequent consultations. In such cases, the SDF receive the Japanese nationals from diplomatic establishments abroad at an airport or a sea port in the country of deployment, and have the custody of them to safely guide them to transport aircraft and ships. All service branches of the Self-Defense Forces maintain operational readiness, with the GSDF designating

helicopter unit and escort unit[65] personnel, the MSDF designating transport ships and air units, and the ASDF designating airlift units and personnel.

Since the transport of overseas Japanese nationals needs to be carried out through close coordination among the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, joint exercises are carried out using transport aircraft and vessels. The Ministry of Defense participates in the exercise for the transportation of Japanese nationals abroad, in the annual multinational joint exercise "Cobra Gold" in Thailand, with participation from local Japanese nationals and employees of the Japanese Embassy in Thailand. Through such exercises, our implementation of the coordination procedures with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and operational skills for the SDF overseas have been improved, which have been contributing to enhance our capabilities to carry out the mission. Transport of overseas Japanese nationals has been assigned as an SDF primary mission since January 2007.

3. Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

In the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF will provide materials and services as rear area support and conduct rear area search and rescue activities or ship inspection activities as stipulated in the Law to Ensure Security for Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspections Operations Law.

Furthermore, these activities were designated a primary mission of the SDF in January 2007.

(See Chapter 2, Section3-2)

4. Responses to "New-Type Flu"

SDF personnel supporting quarantine operations for the new-type flu at the airport

Based on the government's revised action plan for countermeasures against the new-type flu[66], in March 2009, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF prepared an MOD Contingency Plan for countermeasures against the new-type flu[67] with the goal of expressing the policy for the necessary stance and measures needed for swiftly and effectively carrying out new-type flu countermeasures.

As its basic policies, this plan stipulates 1) that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF collaborate and cooperate closely with related organizations under normal circumstances, 2) that in the case of an outbreak of the new-type flu, they will carry out their duties flawlessly, and 3) carry out the new-type flu countermeasures upon requests from relevant organizations while ensuring the safety of SDF personnel. Further, specific examples of SDF activities include epidemic control measures for poultry[68], transportation of Japanese nationals overseas, quarantine support by medical officers, transportation of relief supplies, and diagnosis/treatment at the National Defense Medical College Hospital and SDF hospitals.

In order to make this plan effective, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF are proceeding with the consideration of specific operational procedures. Given this situation, in August 2009 the Joint Staff presented the specific implementation procedures for each Self-Defense Force in the event of a new-type flu outbreak and prepared "SDF Operational Procedures for New-Type Flu Measures" conducive to the swift execution of each operation.

Furthermore, in June 2010, the Ministry of Defense prepared the "Ministry of Defense Operational Continuity Plan for the New-Type Flu" so that functions can be maintained and necessary operations continued without interruption in the case of an outbreak of the new-type flu.

Note that the Ministry of Defense and SDF deployed approximately 1,260 personnel from the National Defense Medical College and medical officers from the SDF to quarantine stations at the airports in Narita, Kansai, and Chubu at the request of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare from April through June of the same year and carried out quarantine support as a measure against the new-type flu (A/H1N1).

5. Military Intelligence Collection

In order for the effective operation of defense capabilities to deal with new threats and diverse situations, it is ever more necessary to acquire signs of various situations in advance and collect, analyze and share information promptly and appropriately. In this context, broader and more comprehensive intelligence capabilities are essential for Japanese national security.

In consideration of this, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF comprehensively analyze and assess a variety of information, and have diversified the means of collecting intelligence. Some examples of intelligence collection activities include: 1) collecting, processing and analyzing radio waves on military communications and radio waves emitted from electronic weapons , which are transmitted from overseas; 2) collecting and analyzing high-resolution commercial satellite imagery data[69]; 3) ISR activities by ships and aircraft and so on; 4) collecting and organizing a variety of open source information; 5) information exchanges with defense authorities of other nations; and 6) intelligence activities conducted by defense attachés and other officials[70]. Moreover, in order to enhance the capability of collecting a variety of intelligence, and comprehensively analyzing and assessing information by responding to the security environment and technical trends, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF develop capable personnel, improve equipment and devices for intelligence collection as well as strengthen the capability of intelligence organizations such as the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, which supports the above-mentioned intelligence capabilities.

Section 3. Preparation against Full-Scale Aggression

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Nagashima inspecting the 3rd Air Defense Missile Group (Chitose)

The main mission of the SDF is to defend Japan against direct and indirect aggression in order to ensure the peace and independence of Japan as well as to maintain national security. The peace, safety and independence essential to the entire country cannot be secured by wishing alone. Defense capability lies in the definitive guarantee of security, which itself represents the resolve and ability of a nation to exclude invasion; its function cannot be substituted by any other measures. Furthermore, even now in the region around Japan, there remain unclear and uncertain factors. When we consider the scale of the loss to civilian lives and assets in the event that a full-scale invasion should occur, we see the critical nature of personal and material preparation to deal effectively with that invasion.

Japan's SDF have consistently been committed to improving and maintaining readiness and defense capabilities, developing the necessary equipment as well as continuing their warning and surveillance activities in surrounding sea areas and airspaces; Japan is thus prepared for a full-scale invasion. Demonstrating the readiness of the SDF in this way helps to prevent aggression.

In the event of full-scale aggression against Japan, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will respond promptly and effectively by means of a joint operational structure to act in a coordinated and integrated manner. With a focus on this objective, operations to be employed in response to full-scale aggression are classified as follows: 1) operations for air defense, 2) operations for guarding the waters surrounding Japan, 3) operations for land defense, and 4) operations for securing the safety of maritime traffic. In implementing these operations, U.S. forces will support operations employed by the SDF and conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF, including operations which employ strike capabilities in accordance with the "Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation."

This section explains the outline of typical operations which may be conducted by the SDF to defend the nation in the event that full-scale aggression occurs.

(See Chapter 2, Section 3-2)

1. Air Defense Operations

Because of Japan's geographical characteristics of being surrounded by water, as well as general modern warfare trends[71], in the event of an armed attack on Japan, such attacks are therefore likely to begin with surprise air attacks using aircraft and missiles, and such air attacks are likely to be repeated countless times.

An SDF personnel rushing toward a F-15 for a scramble

Air defense operations are characterized by adequacy of the initial response having a significant effect on the overall operation. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a prompt response posture in

peacetime, continuously collect relevant information, and exercise combat strength promptly and comprehensively from the initial stage of operations.

Operations for air defense can be divided into overall operations led by the ASDF, and local operations conducted by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF to defend their respective bases and units.

In terms of overall air defense operations, efforts will be made promptly in response to enemy air strikes to intercept enemy aircraft as far from Japanese territory as possible to prevent the enemy from acquiring air superiority [72], to prevent damage to the Japanese people and territory, to inflict heavy damage on the enemy and to deter serial air assaults.

(See Fig. III-1-3-1)

(1) Detecting Intruding Aircraft

The entire airspace surrounding Japan is under constant surveillance by means of air warning and control unit radar and early warning and control aircraft so as to detect intruding aircraft as early as possible.

Fighter (F-15) taking off

Fig. III-1-3-1 Example of Air Defense Operations



Notes: 1. Aircraft with alternative control capabilities for defense ground environments, with early warning and control functions in waters distant from national land.
2. Keeping armed fighters on standby in order to immediately respond to approaches by enemy aircraft.

(2) Identifying the Detected Aircraft

Detected aircraft are identified as enemy or friend according to the JADGE[73] system, etc.

(3) Interception and Destruction of the Enemy's Aircraft

In the event that an aircraft is identified as an enemy aircraft, the air warning and control unit assigns destruction targets to aircraft standing-by on the ground or in the air, as well as to surface-to-air missile units. The enemy aircraft is then destroyed by guided and controlled fighter aircraft or surface-to-air missiles.

2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas

Firing a 5-inch cannon

Armed attacks on Japan can be made by vessels against Japanese ships and land, roughly coincident to air attacks, due to the island geography of Japan. Operations of transport vessels are also predicted to enable large-scale ground forces to land on Japanese territory.

Operations for defending sea areas surrounding Japan will consist of responses on the open sea, nearshore waters and major straits, and air defense in

Fig. III-1-3-2 Strategy for Defense in Sea Areas Surrounding Japan



the surrounding sea areas. The cumulative result of these operations provides protection to surrounding sea areas by obstructing enemy invasion, and destroying and exhausting the enemy's military strength.
(See Fig. III-1-3-2)

(1) Defense on the Sea

The MSDF patrols vast sea areas using patrol aircraft and patrols navigation sea areas mainly with destroyers. In the event that an enemy surface ship or submarine attempting to attack Japanese ships is detected, it will be destroyed by using MSDF destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations), supported by fighters and others as the situation requires.

(2) Defense in Coastal Areas

The MSDF patrols the vicinity of major ports and harbors using destroyers, minesweepers, patrol aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft for the early detection of enemy offensives. In order to ensure the safety of ships and coastal areas, primarily destroyers, submarines, patrol aircraft, fighter aircraft and surface-to-ship missiles will crush such offensives (anti-surface ship

P-3C aircraft flying in formation near Mount Fuji

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Commissioning of the Final Wooden Minesweeper

On February 26 2010, the final wooden minesweeper Takashima was commissioned. Including the Takashima, the MSDF has to date built 110 wooden minesweepers, which have disposed of sea mines, unexploded bombs, and so on.

From now on, construction will move toward minesweepers that use fiber-reinforced plastic (FRP), rather than wooden minesweepers.

Q: Why were minesweepers made from wood?

A: Ships were made from wood rather than iron as wood is not influenced by magnetism, thus ensuring the safety of the ship against mines which explode in response to a ship's magnetic reaction.

Q: Why the change from wood to FRP?

A: Like wood, FRP is a material which does not hold a magnetic charge. Technological advances have made possible minesweepers that use FRP with greater structural strengthen than those made of wood. We have therefore switched to FRP.

Q: What are the benefits of FRP?

A: It is projected that the lifespan of ships can be extended over that of traditional wooden minesweepers. Consequently, the life cycle cost (LCC) is reduced.

The commissioned minesweeper *Takashima* in training

and anti-submarine operations).

Further, the MSDF will remove mines laid by enemy using minesweepers (anti-mine operations).

(3) Defense in Main Straits

MSDF destroyers, patrol aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft patrol major straits, to both detect enemy surface ships or submarines attempting to pass the sea areas at an early stage, and to destroy them primarily by destroyer, patrol aircraft, submarine, fighter aircraft and surface-to-ship missiles (anti-surface ship and anti-submarine operations). As the situation requires, mines will be laid in main sea areas using minesweeping mother ships, submarines, and aircraft (mine-laying operations).

(4) Air Defense in Surrounding Waters

Air defense for ships in surrounding waters will be performed by destroyers (anti-air operations) and will receive support from fighters as necessary.

3. Operations for Land Defense

In the event of an attempt to occupy the island nation of Japan, the invading country will acquire air and sea superiority on the invading fronts and then land ground troops by ship, airborne troops by aircraft, etc.

However, it will be difficult for invading ground and airborne troops to demonstrate a systematic fighting force

Fig. III-1-3-3 Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces



during movements by ship and aircraft, and before and after landing. Land defense operations must take advantage of this weakness to destroy enemy forces as early as possible by countering them between the sea and coastal areas, as well as at landing sites, etc.
(See Fig. III-1-3-3)

Type 03 medium range surface-to-air missiles being fired

(1) Defense in the Nearshore Waters

The ASDF, GSDF, and MSDF will endeavor, as much as possible, to destroy enemy ships transporting ground troops and such, whilst at sea using destroyers, submarines, patrol aircraft, fighters, and surface-to-surface missiles, and through doing so, eliminate the strength of the enemy, forcing it to abandon its invasion plans.

Further, the ASDF and GSDF will endeavor to destroy enemy aircraft transporting ground troops in the air using fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

(2) Defense in Coastal Areas

Minesweeping mother ships will lay sea mines and amphibious mine-laying equipment will lay coastal mines to obstruct and counter the mobilization of landing enemy forces.

The response to enemy forces planning a landing will concentrate the use of tanks, anti-tanks and special artillery [74], etc., deployed close to the coast. In the event that an enemy lands, the enemy invasion will be obstructed and destroyed through mobile striking ability [75] provided predominantly by special artillery of the units, anti-tank missiles, and tanks. Fighting in the area will be supported by fighters.

Enemy airborne assaults [76] and helicopter-based assaults [77] conducted in coordination with the landing of ground troops will be destroyed in the early stages mainly through special artillery of the units and mobile striking ability.

Further, anti-air warfare (local) will be conducted using anti-aircraft firepower starting with surface-to air missiles.

(3) Inland Defense

In the event that the SDF is not able to destroy enemy ground troops immediately after their landing, an enemy invasion will be prevented by pre-deployed units in inland areas with the support of fighters (holding operations). In the meantime, to the utmost extent, units will be assembled from other areas to launch counterattacks to eliminate invading enemy ground troops.

(4) Countermeasures to be Implemented throughout the Stages of Operations

Throughout each of these stages, efforts will be made using destroyers, submarines, fighters and patrol aircraft, and by the ASDF using fighters to obstruct ocean transport ships providing reinforcements to enemy ground troops and to cut off maritime logistical support lines, while the necessary air defense, intelligence activities, transportation of troops and supplies, and other operations are performed.

Troops firing a Howitzer with live ammunition

4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic

The sea lane is the lifeline of Japan, a country that relies on foreign sources for most of its food and resources. In the event that there has been an armed attack against Japan, the sea lanes will not only secure the foundation of Japan's survival and prosperity, but will also serve as a foundation for maintaining the capacity to continue war, as well as a foundation for when U.S. forces come to provide support for defending Japan. Therefore, operations to secure the safety of sea lanes are important.

There are cases when operations to secure the safety of sea lanes are performed in the few hundred nautical miles surrounding Japan, and cases when sea lanes[78] are established.

In the event that they are performed in the few hundred nautical miles surrounding Japan, various types of operations will be combined, such as anti-surface ship, anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, and anti-mine operations, while patrols, ship escort, strait and harbor defense, and so on are performed, thus securing the safety of the sea lanes.

In the event of operations following the establishment of sea lanes, shipping routes over a region of approximately 1,000 nautical miles will be created, and the sea lanes established will be patrolled continuously to quickly detect and respond to disturbances from enemy surface ships, submarines, etc. In addition, Japanese vessels will be escorted as necessary.

Air defense of Japanese ships traveling in maritime traffic routes will be conducted by destroyers (anti-air warfare). In this case, depending on the circumstances, support will be provided by fighters.

The destroyer *Yubetsu* firing an anti-submarine rocket

Section 4 Anti-Piracy Efforts

Acts of piracy are a serious threat to the preservation of public safety and order at the sea. To maritime countries such as Japan in particular, which rely upon marine transport for a great deal of the food and resources that form the basis of their survival and prosperity, it is a problem which cannot be ignored. In the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea[79], it is provided that all countries are to cooperate to suppress acts of piracy over the greatest possible area. It is equally necessary for Japan to proactively fulfill its international responsibility.

1. Basic Concept

Primarily, it is the Japan Coast Guard which will respond to acts of piracy. However, when it is recognized to be either impossible or considerably difficult for the Japan Coast Guard to respond, the SDF shall address the problem.

2. Situation regarding the Incidence of Acts of Piracy and Efforts by the International Community

In contrast to the decreasing trend in the number of cases of piracy in sea areas such as those of Southeast Asia, in the region off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden there are repeated and increasing cases perpetrated by pirates armed with weapons including machine guns and rocket launchers. The pirates off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden are a threat to the international community including Japan, and a challenge which should be dealt with urgently. (See Fig. III-1-4-1)

Fig. III-1-4-1 Incidents of Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden (Comparison with Number of Incidents in Southeast Asia)



Notes: 1. The data is based on a report by the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
2. There have been 110 incidents of piracy off the Coast of Somalia/Gulf of Aden in 2010, as of July 31.

An example of a skiff, a type of ship often used in pirate activities

In successive resolutions[80] beginning with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816 which was adopted in June 2008, each country has been requested to take action to suppress acts of piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and requested in particular to dispatch military vessels and aircraft to the region.

So far the countries which have dispatched military vessels to the seas off the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden include the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Canada, Russia, Turkey, Singapore, India, China, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Kenya, Australia, Pakistan and Bahrain. Soon after, the EU also decided in December 2008 to begin operations (Operation ATALANTA), to deal with piracy, involving the escorting of World Food Program (WFP) ships, and surveillance in the region. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also resumed its counter-piracy operations in March 2009.

3. Japan's Efforts

(1) Anti-Piracy Response through Maritime Security Operations

An SDF personnel on the lookout

Establishing new legislation and then taking action is the principle of the SDF's anti-piracy response. However, with the repeated and increasing number of cases of piracy, and the necessity to urgently protect the lives and assets of the Japanese people, as an emergency measure until new laws can be developed, pursuant to the provision of Article 82 of the Self-Defense Force Law, and with the authorization of the Prime Minister based on Cabinet approval, on March 13 2009, the Defense Minister ordered the commencement of security operations at sea (maritime security operations). It was determined that necessary action can be taken to protect ships connected with Japan from acts of piracy off the Coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.

Upon the issue of this order, on March 14, two destroyers *Sazanami* and *Samidare* embarked from Japan, and on March 30 began escorting ships connected with Japan.

In order that anti-piracy activities are more effectively conducted over a large area of sea, on May 15, the order was also given for P-3C fixed-wing patrol aircraft to be dispatched. Thus on May 28, two P-3Cs embarked from Japan to begin warning and surveillance in the Gulf of Aden on June 11. To guard the P-3Cs and other equipment, it was necessary to make use of the capabilities of the GSDF. Hence, as well as carrying out those guarding activities, GSDF officials are also active as air command personnel. This is the first time that a force dispatched abroad has been formed as a joint task force combining the MSDF and GSDF. Furthermore, in order to support these activities, the ASDF has organized an air transport unit composed of the C-130H and U-4 aircraft.

(See Fig. III-1-4-2)

Fig. III-1-4-2 SDF Counter piracy Operations (Image)



(2) Development of Laws for Anti-Piracy Activities

Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in order for Japan to respond appropriately and effectively to acts of piracy by punishing, deterring, and policing such acts regardless of the nationality or registry of the individuals or ships involved, the "Bill [Law] on Penalization of Acts of Piracy and Measures against Acts of Piracy" (hereinafter, referred to as the "Anti-Piracy Measures Law") was introduced to the ordinary session of the Diet. It was passed on June 19, and enacted on July 24, 2009. Under this law, the Minister of Defense determined, with the approval of the Prime Minister, to implement anti-piracy operations for a period of one year from that day.

With the duty of Maritime Security Operations, it had been possible to protect only ships connected with Japan. After the enactment of the new law, however, it made it possible to protect ships of all nations from acts of piracy, regardless of their registry. Furthermore, if there were no other means to stop the advance of ships engaged in acts of piracy such as approaching private ships, it could also make it possible to use weapons in a rational manner, to the extent required.[81] An outline of this law is shown as in Reference 35.

(See Fig. III-1-4-3)

On July 6, in order to replace the dispatched destroyers, the destroyers *Harusame* and *Amagiri* embarked from Japan and on July 28 commenced duty in the region based on the Anti-Piracy Measures Law.

Fig. III-1-4-3 Comparison between Maritime Patrol Activities and Counter-Piracy Operations

Behavioral Patterns	Maritime Patrol Activities	Counter-piracy Operations
Issue of instructions and orders	In cases where it is particularly necessary to protect lives and properties, and to maintain security on the sea	When specifically necessary to combat acts of piracy
Procedure for issuance of instructions and orders	The Minister of Defense shall issue an order upon approval of the Prime Minister	• The Minister of Defense shall issue an order upon approval of the Prime Minister • The Minister of Defense shall submit an outline of operations to the Prime Minister to gain his/her approval
Report at the Diet	No provisions	The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet without delay, when he/she has approved counter-piracy operations or when a mission has been completed
Ships and vessels to be protected	Japan-affiliated ships	All ships and vessels
Authority of self-defense forces	Application of Article 16 (a request for cooperation to ships in the vicinity), the first clause of Article 17-1 (on-the-spot inspection, and questioning the crew), and Article 18 (route change, spotting the ship) of the Japan Coast Guard Law (Article 93 of the Self-Defense Forces Law)	Application of Article 16 (a request for cooperation to ships in the vicinity) and Article 18 (route change, stopping the ship) (Article 8 of the Anti-piracy Law (draft))
Use of weapons[1]	By applying Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties, the use of weapons can be allowed only when it is used for self-protection, the protection of others, or for preventing interference with official duties, to such an extent as is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation	• Some as on the left • In addition, when countering acts of piracy, including such acts as approaching excessively close to a ship or following a ship, if any party perpetrating such acts of piracy continues their acts despite the countermeasures of others, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to such an extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation

Note 1: By applying Article 95 of the Self Defense Forces Law (Use of weapons for guarding weapons, etc.), the use of weapons can be allowed in either operation.

(3) Daily routine of Self-Defense Forces Engaged in Anti-Piracy Operations

Traveling back and forth across the Gulf of Aden, the two destroyers currently dispatched escort commercial ships. First, escort duties involve, meeting with the commercial ship to be escorted, at an assembly point, one of which is prescribed to both the east and west of the Gulf of Aden. Then, in order to effectively protect the commercial ship (all of which differ in their abilities), from pirates, an appropriate formation is arranged. When the convoy is navigating across the Gulf of Aden, the destroyers defend in front and behind the escorted ships, while patrol helicopters belonging to the destroyers observe the area surrounding the convoy from the sky. In this way, whether day or night, all possible means are taken to ensure the safety of the convoy, while passage through the Gulf of Aden is secured in approximately one and a half days. On board the destroyers are eight officers of the Japan Coast Guard[82], so that as necessary, the SDF can operate in collaboration with the JCG, enabling judicial policing activities.

The 4th Marine Division destroyer *Onami* performing escort activities for passenger ship *Asuka II* in the Gulf of Aden, while a P-3C carries out warning and surveillance duties.

The P-3Cs whose base of operations is situated in the Republic of Djibouti use their cruising capability to perform warning and surveillance activities over

Vice Defense Minister Kazuya Shimba observing the air fleet dispatched for anti-piracy

Troops protecting a P-3C

the Gulf of Aden, which has an extensive area comparable with that of Japan. The P-3Cs, when launched from Djibouti, work to confirm whether or not any suspicious ships are present among the myriad vessels navigating the Gulf of Aden. At the same time, they provide intelligence to the destroyers working on escort activities and foreign warships, as well as to commercial ships navigating the surrounding area. In addition, they immediately address in fine detail requests such as confirmation as to whether or not the area is safe. The SDF, which has dispatched the two P-3Cs, collaborates with the other countries that have similarly dispatched patrol aircraft to the area, performing warning and surveillance activities which

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Anti-Piracy in Somalia's Gulf of Aden (voice of a marine safety officer)

Japan Coast Guard 1st Somalia Dispatch Investigation Unit Chief Yukihiro Takeuchi
(Currently Deputy Director, Guard and Rescue Department International Criminal Investigation Division)

The Japan Coast Guard's Somalia Dispatch Investigation Unit is primarily engaged in judicial policing activities in cases where pirates have been captured, with its eight unit members on board the MSDF destroyers dispatched to the Gulf of Aden to facilitate the process. Their dispatch is a first for the Japan Coast Guard in many ways. In particular, concerns were raised regarding the issue of on-site coordination, due to the format in which they were to be active on board MSDF destroyers. However, the two sides were quick to gain a mutual understanding. This was helped by their similarities; they both consider the ocean to be their place of work, and felt the sense of responsibility that securing the safety of the sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden was in the national interest. The concerns therefore had proven unfounded. The Surface Unit of the MSDF and Dispatch Investigation Unit of the JCG are confident that they can continue to combine their strengths to fulfill their mission.

Fig. III-1-4-4 Deployed Unit Formation



(4) Achievements of Self-Defense Force Activities

The commercial ship escort activities which began on March 30, 2009 have been painstakingly continued, amid the harsh environment of the Gulf of Aden, with its swirling sand clouds and hot sun bearing down. As of July 31, 1,089 ships have been protected by the destroyers, passing safely through the Gulf of Aden, with not one ship suffering damage at the hands of pirates. This area of sea is a major artery not only to the economy of Japan, but also to that of the whole world, and the sense of safety that has been produced by the escort activities carried out by the SDF is thought to be considerable.

Since commencing operational flights on June 11, 2009, the number of times the P-3Cs have been engaged in the flight missions reached as many as 276 as of July 31, and total flight time amounting to 2,100 hours. 19,000 boats have been identified, while 2,300 instances of intelligence have been provided to ships navigating the surrounding area and other countries engaged in anti-piracy activities.

In particular, the P-3Cs engaged in warning and surveillance within the Gulf of Aden share information with the forces dispatched by each of other countries, such as the United States and those of the EU, as well as other relevant organizations. Their contribution to the anti-piracy effort has been substantial, amongst other things, due to on-board investigation conducted by warships based on information they have received from Japanese P-3Cs. For example, thanks to the activity of a P-3C on September 20, 2009 in finding a suspicious vessel during warning and surveillance operations, and the information subsequently provided, helicopters associated with a German warship fired warning shots at the ship in question, which was in the process of fleeing, thus forcing it to stop. This was followed by an on-board investigation by small motor boats from an Australian warship, which ultimately led to the seizure of a large quantity of weapons and ammunition, including rocket launchers

and AK-47 assault rifles. In cases like this, the information gathered by the SDF P-3Cs, once provided to other countries engaged in regular anti-piracy operations, can bear results that include the suppression of acts of piracy, and the disarmament of ships suspected of being pirate ships.

(5) Trends in Piracy

Incidents of piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in 2010 numbered approximately 110 as of July 31. Bearing in mind that approximately 150 cases had occurred during the same period in 2009, the number

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of Captain Nakahata who has Achieved the 100th Escort.

Commander of the 3rd Dispatch Surface Unit for Anti-Piracy Measures (at the time)
Captain Yasuki Nakahata (Currently Joint Staff Office C4 System Division Chief)

In January 2010, we, the 3rd Dispatch Surface Unit for Anti-Piracy Measures, reached the milestone of 100 escort operations conducted off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, totaled since the start of escort duties based on maritime security operations by the 1st dispatch, in March of last year. After that escort was complete, I received encouraging messages via video phone from the Defense Minister and Vice Defense Minister, as well as from Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, Daizo Kusuda. It was a feeling that blew away even the fatigue caused by the tense nature of escort work.

With escort duties, it is by no means the number that is important. Whether the ships to be escorted are large or few in number, each and every time, the important thing is to exert all of one's strength to secure the safety of those ships, and to do one's very best to ensure that not even one finger is laid on them by the pirates. Therefore, on the first occasion, just as on the 100th, and even the 101st, one must attend to escort duties with completely the same attitude. I tell this to myself with just as much conviction as I do to my subordinates.

This time, we were able to complete our duty and return back to Japan safely, full of feelings of achievement and fulfillment. This is all thanks to the support and cooperation granted us by an extremely large number of people both on location and in Japan, and I would like to take this opportunity to express to them my heartfelt thanks.

Video meeting with Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Senior Vice Minister of Defense Shimba

Commemorating the achievement of 100 anti-piracy escorts

has clearly decreased; however, these incidents are still occurring at a high rate.

With regard to the ocean regions in which incidents of piracy have primarily occurred, while incidents were concentrated in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, many incidents were seen to occur off the east coast of Somalia and the seas surrounding the Seychelles in 2009, and in 2010, incidents have begun to occur in the east part of the Gulf of Aden, the central Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea.

In this regard, it is possible to assume that the area where piracy occurs has shifted to ocean regions other than the Gulf of Aden where it had been comparatively limited, because of the deployment of vessels engaged in antipiracy and patrol aircraft by the various nations including Japan to the Gulf of Aden in 2009 and the later activity of the vessels of the various nations off the coast of Somalia.

The various nations involved continue to be highly concerned over the piracy on the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, with the EU extending the time limit for operations in June 2009 to the end of 2010, while NATO extended its limit until the end of 2012 in March of the same year.

However, in addition to the trend in an average year in which cases of piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden increase around the spring and fall when the waves are gentle, another trend has been seen recently, in which pirate activity is expanding from the Gulf of Aden where the warships of various countries are concentrated, to the eastern seas of Somalia, and this is causing continued concern to all countries. A significant factor behind the appearance of pirates in Somalia is the fact that the country itself is in a sustained state of

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of Dispatched Anti-Piracy Air Commander (from the perspective of joint task forces)

1st Dispatched Anti-Piracy Air Command Captain Hiroshi Fukushima
(Currently: 201st Air Training Squadron Commander)

Captain Hiroshi Fukushima in Djibouti

As the commander of the 1st Dispatched Anti-Piracy Air Command, I assumed anti-piracy duties off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden in 2009.

Accurate and prompt identification by Japan's P-3Cs over a wide region of sea is contributing significantly to the prevention of acts of piracy. By cooperating with the dispatched forces of other countries, this has led to the seizure of numerous weapons, including rocket launchers.

The foremost special characteristic of the current dispatched force is the fact that this is the first time such a force dispatched abroad has been an integrative force composed of both the GSDF and MSDF, due to the requirement for GSDF know-how to protect the P-3Cs based at Djibouti International Airport. In addition, an ASDF air transport unit is also formed when necessary.

Originally, with this being the first joint force to be dispatched abroad, there was an element of trial-and-error involved. However, all members of the force recognized the importance of their duties, and the difficulties were overcome through a deepening of mutual understanding.

The current deployment, I believe, is a model case for joint operations, having made use of the strengths of each of the three Self-Defense Forces, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF.

anarchy, with the function of governing institutions failing. Amid these circumstances, in June 2009, the EU extended its period of activity in the area until the end of 2010, while NATO determined in March of the same year to extend its term until the end of 2012.

(6) Continuation of Anti-Piracy Operations

As stated above, numerous acts of piracy off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden continue to occur, and in April of this year, an attempted pirate attack was committed against a Japanese ship. The situation therefore remains in the balance. In addition to calls from organizations such as the Japanese Shipowners' Association for all possible measures to be taken to continue countering piracy, on an international level, NATO, the EU, and others have also expressed their hopes to Japan for further efforts to be made.

Under these circumstances, and in light of the fact that the Japan Coast Guard has difficulty in responding to piracy in the area of ocean in question, the Minister of Defense gained the Prime Minister's approval on July 16

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of Gratitude for Escort Activities

Since the SDF commenced escort activities in the Gulf of Aden in March 2009, a large number of messages of gratitude toward the SDF have been received from crews of commercial ships that have been escorted, and from shipping businesses, both domestic and foreign. A few of them are introduced here.

Yujiro Kita, the Captain of the automobile carrier *Lyra Leader*

"We feel considerable fear and uneasiness when we have to pass through waters where acts of piracy occur frequently. Whenever navigating, I have to be on the bridge around the clock with tension to keep on watch. When the Self-Defense Forces began engaging in anti-piracy measures, we were very thankful and it was so reassuring that I almost cried when I saw a helicopter with the Japanese flag hovering overhead and we were able to communicate by waving our hands. I am overwhelmed with gratitude to the Self-Defense Force members who escorted us as well as to the Japanese government."

Koji Miyahara (The Japanese Shipowners' Association Chairman)

So far, escort forces from the 1st through 5th dispatches have been sent, providing us with anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. I wish to express my deepest gratitude first of course for the understanding of the Japanese people, and then for the understanding and support of those associated with the Diet.

To the commercial ships which pass through the region, the safety provided by the destroyers and patrol aircraft of the MSDF, is more reassuring that anything else. When I think about the hardships of the MSDF officials and Maritime Safety Officials engaged in escort activities in the region amid the intense heat and tension, I find the sense of gratitude hard to bear. I pray from my heart that they continue to be mindful of their health, and safely fulfill their duties without incident.

to continue anti-piracy operations for one year, and took the decision to continue the anti-piracy measures from July 24 onward.

(7) Evaluation of Efforts by Japan

In a public opinion poll[83] concerning the SDF and defense issues conducted by the Cabinet Office in January 2009, a total of 63.2% of people responded that we should be engaged in anti-piracy activities, compared to which 29.1% responded that it was not necessary to do so.

The awarding ceremony for the IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea

The anti-piracy operations undertaken by the SDF have received high praise from the international community, including words of gratitude from leaders of various countries. The MSDF, currently engaged in anti-piracy activities off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, has received many messages from the captains of ships which it has escorted, as well as from the ship-owners, expressing their gratitude at having been able to navigate safely across the Gulf of Aden as well as their request for continued safeguarding. The number of such messages as a total from the 1st to 3rd dispatch has already reached 800.

On November 23, a bravery award was conferred by the International Maritime Organization. As this demonstrates, the SDF has maintained complete safety and succeeded in accomplishing its mission in escort activities to date without any acts of piracy occurring[84].

Notes:

1) In Japan, the term "emergency legislation" has no fixed concept; it is rather ambiguous. For example, in the past, a study on legislation concerning operations of the SDF, in which defense operation orders shall be delivered pursuant to Article 76 of the Self-Defense Forces Act was conducted as emergency legislation study. This white paper regards emergency legislation as legislation for responses to situations that have been developed since 2003.
2) A situation in which an external armed attack on Japan emerges, or an imminent danger is clearly acknowledged.
3) A situation where an armed attack has yet to emerge, but circumstances are growing increasingly strained and an armed attack is expected.
4) The Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of State and the People in Armed Attack Situations etc.
   See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/jitai_h.html>
5) Independent administrative agencies, the Bank of Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), other public institutions, and corporations engaged in public service operations, including the provision of electricity, gas, transportation, communications, and other services.
6) An emergency response situation. (A situation arising due to actions that may kill or injure many people which uses methods equivalent to those used in an armed attack situation, or a situation where it is recognized that the relevant actions represent a clear and present threat that necessitate an emergency response by the state). Alternatively, a contingency situation other than an armed attack situation that may have a significant impact on the security of the nation and its people.
7) Based on the framework established under the Armed Attack Situation Response Law, and on individual emergency legislation that was prepared, measures were created to protect peoples' lives, etc., to minimize the effects of armed attacks on their lives, etc., and to implement necessary measures so that the SDF and U.S. Forces might smoothly and effectively take necessary actions to terminate armed attacks against Japan. In addition, this kind of individual emergency legislation required the guarantee of appropriate implementation of international humanitarian laws.
8) Law concerning Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations.
   See <http://kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo.html>.
9) The responsibilities of national and local governments to minimize the effects on peoples' lives, measures for the cooperation of the Japanese people and related to evacuation of residents, measures related to relief of evacuated residents, and measures related to responses to armed attack disasters.
10) The Law concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, etc. in Armed Attack Situations. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/presiding/law/yujihousei/002b.html>.
11) The Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc. See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/beigun.html>.
12) The Agreement to Amend the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning the Reciprocal Provision of Logistics Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA).
   See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/acsa/acsa_gaiyo.html>.
13) The Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities, etc.
   See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/koukyou.html>.
14) The Law concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and other Detainees in Armed Attack Situations.
   See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/houan/youkou/040224_4.pdf>.

15) The Law concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law.
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/houan/youkou/040224_5.pdf>.

16) There are four Geneva Conventions:
1) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (Convention I); 2) The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (Convention II); 3) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention III); 4) The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Convention IV).

17) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/treaty159_11a.pdf>.

18) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/k_jindo/pdfs/giteisho_02.pdf>.

19) This exercise was conducted in the Kyushu region, with the participation of about 41,800 personnel, about 1,170 vehicles, about 300 aircraft, and 6 naval vessels.

20) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/050325shishin.pdf>.

21) The Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/buryokutaio/kokumin_hogo.pdf>.

22) The Prime Minister will assume the position of the Director of the Countermeasures Headquarters, although these positions will be legally prescribed as separate entities.

23) Police officers, coast guard officers or assistant coast guard officers.

24) Based on Article 22, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the SDF Law, a special unit shall be organized to carry out a specific duty, or the required troops will be placed under the authority of a commander outside of their usual command structure. This unit shall be made up of members of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF, or a combination of two or more of the branches of the SDF.

25) GSDF Commanding General of Army and Central Response Readiness Force Headquarters; MSDF Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet and Commandant Regional District; ASDF Commander of Air Defense Command, Commander of Air Support Command and Commander of Air Defense Force, ASDF and so on.

26) Vessels equipped with Aegis air defense systems, which automatically process a series of activities including target search, detection, identification/classification and attack using high performance computers.

27) The Patriot PAC-3 system is one of the air defense systems for countering airborne threats. Unlike the conventional type anti-aircraft PAC-2 missiles, which mainly target the interception of aircraft, the PAC-3 missiles are designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.

28) Developed since FY1999, radar which enables the detection and tracking of ballistic missiles (formerly referred to as FPS-XX).

29) Fire Unit (the minimum fire unit of surface-to-air fire units).

30) These refer to objects other than aircraft which are recognized to cause grave damage to human life and property when they fall to earth such as ballistic missiles.

31) A specific example of SDF activity is deployment, upon receipt of the appropriate directive from the Minister of Defense, of Patriot PAC-3 units by the ASDF and Aegis destroyers by the MSDF in order to respond to ballistic missiles and prepare for ballistic missiles launched toward Japan. In the event that missiles are launched toward Japan, based on the aforementioned directive, these can be destroyed.

32) The United States is steadily enhancing its missile defense systems with research and development while deploying systems as they become technically feasible in what is referred to as the evolutionary spiral development method.
33) The radar was later on moved to the U.S. Forces Shariki Communication Site.
34) A ballistic missile information processing system.
35) The four components are the nose cone, second-stage rocket motor, kinetic warhead, and infrared seeker.
36) On the day before the actual launch, incorrect information pertaining to the launch was released due to inefficient handling of information by the Ministry of Defense and SDF. At the time of the actual launch, information was properly collected and transmitted via a multiple checking system for the Shared Early Warning (SEW), including a check by the Chief of Joint Staff.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/approach/defense/bmd/20090515-1.html>
37) For further information about the North Korean missile launch.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/approach/defense/bmd/20090515.html>.
38) Refers to persons engaging in illegal acts such as subversive activities in Japan while possessing weapons with significant killing power, those cooperating with such persons, etc.
39) To systematically patrol a specific area for purposes such as prevention of surprise attack and information collection.
40) The Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations which was concluded between the former Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission.
41) An incident in which members of Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters, claiming the lives of 12 people. The SDF conducted decontamination operations of the trains and stations as well as supported police forensics.
42) Since September 2001, postal mail containing anthrax was delivered to individuals including members of the U.S. Senate and those related to the mass media.
43) Ratio by country of emergency scramble subject aircraft: Russia, approximately 66%; China, approximately 13%; Taiwan, approximately 8%; North Korea, approximately 3%, and others, approximately 10%.
44) Including territorial waters and inland waters.
45) Maritime security operations (Article 82 of the SDF Law) refer to actions taken at sea by the SDF with the particular need to protect lives or property, or maintain peace and order. Prime Ministerial approval is required.
46) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered two unidentified vessels in a surveillance operation in Japanese territorial waters east of the Noto Peninsula and west of Sadogashima Island. These were suspected to be North Korean spy ships disguised as Japanese fishing vessels. The two vessels were pursued around the clock by patrol vessels, destroyers and aircraft but fled to outside the air defense identification zones (ADIZ). They are presumed to have reached a port in the northern part of North Korea.
47) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in a surveillance operation and monitored it with patrol vessels and aircraft. The vessel did not stop despite repeated orders by the Japan Coast Guard. As a result, the JCG fired warning shots after alerting the vessel. However, the vessel continued to make its getaway and made an armed attack on the patrol ship which fired shots in self-defense. The vessel subsequently exploded from possible self-destruction and sunk. Based on facts revealed in the investigation process the vessel was identified as a North Korean spy ship. Further, in 2002, a patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered an unidentified vessel in waters approximately 400km north-northwest off the Noto Peninsula (beyond the exclusive economic zone of Japan) in a surveillance operation. The vessel was tracked and observed by patrol vessels of the Japan Coast Guard, destroyers and aircraft.

48) Six vessels have been commissioned since March 2004 with the following main improvements: 1) Speed improved from 40 knots to 44 knots, 2) fitted with 12.7mm machine guns, 3) bullet-proof measures implemented on the bridge and 4) fitted with night vision devices.

49) A special unit of the MSDF newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance, and disarm suspicious vessels in the event of on-board inspections under maritime security operations.

50) A non-bursting shell launched from 76mm gun fitted on destroyers whereby the flat front edge of the shell prevents scattering.

51) The Director General of the Japan Coast Guard, the Director General of the Regional Maritime Safety Headquarters, and the Director of Airport Administrative Office may request disaster dispatch.

52) The Ministry of Defense Disaster Prevention Plan.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/bousai.html>.

53) Unit commanders may make a dispatch in the event that 1) intelligence gathering is necessary in order to provide information to relevant organizations and bodies, 2) it is deemed impossible for the prefectural governor to make a dispatch request and immediate rescue measures are required, 3) life saving rescue operations occur or a fire or disaster occurs in the vicinity of Ministry of Defense facilities.

54) See <http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/law/014-1.html>.

55) The Prime Minister issues an earthquake alert with the endorsement of the Cabinet in the event that an earthquake has been predicted and when it is deemed necessary to urgently implement emergency earthquake disaster prevention measures.

56) See <http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/law/002-1.html>.

57) Parks and playgrounds close to the disaster site are suitable for assembly areas. For example, for lodging and the activities of forces on the scale of one GSDF regiment, approximately 15,000m^2 is required (an area approximately one-third the size of Tokyo Dome) and a division requires in excess of approximately 140,000m^2 (an area approximately three times the size of Tokyo Dome).

58) While heliport sizes differ according to the type of helicopter and the nature of activities, as a rough estimate, each helicopter requires a circle area with a radius of 50 to 100 m.

59) Manual for Responses to Disasters in Urban Areas, Hilly and Mountainous Areas, Islands and Special Disasters.
See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/pdf/hyoushi02.pdf>.

60) 1) SDF units can be dispatched to provide assistance upon a request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, 2) SDF personnel dispatched for nuclear disaster relief may exercise necessary authority, 3) special units may be temporarily formed when necessary for nuclear disaster relief dispatches, and 4) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel may be called up for service in the event of nuclear disaster relief dispatches.

61) Special-type disasters may be caused by terrorist or armed attacks using weapons of mass destruction.

62) Limited to the case where there are no police officials at the scene, SDF personnel on duty are authorized to make enquiries, undertake evacuation measures and enter property in addition to their authorized duties of preventing and controlling crimes and usage of weapons.

63) Facilities and equipment for the storage, accommodation or maintenance of SDF weapons, ammunition, explosives, ships, aircraft, vehicles, wired telecommunications equipment, wireless telecommunications equipment or liquid fuels, barracks, harbors, and airports.

64) SDF personnel may use weapons to the extent deemed to be reasonably necessary in situations within applicable facilities in the event that it is considered that the use of such weapons is required to execute duties or to protect themselves or others. Weapons must not be used to cause harm to other people except in cases of self-defense or acts of emergency evacuation.

65) Units temporarily organized to be dispatched along with transport units (SDF aircraft or ships) to guide and protect Japanese nationals overseas on site.
66) See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/ful/kettei/090217keikaku.pdf>.
67) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/2009/03/17b-02.pdf>.
68) Domestic birds such as chickens, ducks and quails.
69) In order to enhance Japan's capability for gathering image intelligence, five intelligence-gathering satellites have been launched so far. The Ministry of Defense has properly utilized the information provided by these satellites.
70) As of the end of May 2010, 49 defense attachés (SDF personnel temporarily transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) are posted to diplomatic missions overseas in 38 locations. Utilizing their experience as SDF personnel, these attachés are engaged in military information gathering through exchanges with defense-related personnel of the host country, as well as military attachés from other nations.
71) In modern warfare, air operations play a vital role in determining the success or failure of an operation. Therefore, it is essential to secure air superiority ahead of, or concurrently with, land and sea operations.
72) A state in which various strategies can be executed without incurring damage from the enemy due to the security of air superiority.
73) An automated nationwide command and communications system to deliver and process commands, and track information.
74) Long-range and large-caliber howitzers and rockets will be used to destroy or intercept infantry, light armored vehicles and facilities.
75) Operations to defeat enemy attack through a charge by tanks and armored vehicles.
76) Assault units which parachute to the ground from transport aircraft in the vicinity of important terrain to conduct offensives. These units are specially formed, equipped, and trained to be able to move quickly by air over long distances.
77) Assault units that are delivered to the vicinity of important terrain by transport helicopters to conduct offensives. Compared to airborne offensives, the attack criteria are simple and easily executed.
78) Relatively safe sea areas established to enable maritime traffic. The area and width of sea lanes vary according to the threat aspect.
79) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/Mofaj/Gaiko/Kaiyo/law.html>
80) Other resolutions include resolutions 1838, 1846 and 1851 adopted in 2008, and Resolution 1897 adopted in 2009.
81) The Law defines the following acts committed for private ends on the high seas (including exclusive economic zones as provided in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) or territorial waters as well as internal waters of Japan by the crew or the passengers of a ship (except for warships and other government ships) as "acts of piracy": 1) seizing another ship in navigation or taking control of the operation of another ship by rendering persons irresistible by assault, intimidation or any other means; 2) robbing property on board another ship in navigation or obtaining or causing others to obtain an unlawful profit by rendering persons irresistible by assault, intimidation or any other means; 3) kidnapping a person on board another ship in navigation for the purpose of taking the person hostage to demand a third person to deliver any property or to take any other unobligated action or to waive that person's right; 4) demanding a third person to deliver any property or to take any other unobligated action or to waive that person's right by taking a person, on board a robbed ship or a ship whose control is taken or kidnapped on board another ship in navigation, hostage; 5) breaking into or damaging another ship in navigation for the purpose of

committing the acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs 1), 2), 3) and 4) above; 6) operating a ship and approaching in close proximity of beleaguering or obstructing the passage of another ship for the purpose of committing the acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs 1), 2), 3) and 4) above; 7) preparing weapons and operating a ship for the purpose of committing the acts of piracy as referred to in subparagraphs 1), 2), 3) and 4) above.

82) Where necessary, judicial policing activities including arrest and questioning are carried out.

83) Survey conducted on 1,781 applicable individuals. The response "It is not necessary" was the total of "I tend to feel that it is not necessary" and "It is not necessary", while "We should be engaged in" was the total of "I tend to feel that we should be engaged in" and "We should be engaged in."

84) Since 2006, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a special U.N. organization, whose purpose is to encourage international cooperation in relation to maritime issues, has been conferring this award annually in order to gain international recognition for the successes of individuals and organizations who have braved the dangers of the open sea and performed astounding work. (The official name is the "IMO Award for Exceptional Bravery at Sea").

Part III

Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 2

Strengthening of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 1. 50th Anniversary of the Conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty
Section 2. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements
Section 3. Basic Frameworks Supporting the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements
Section 4. Measures Relating to the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan



Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Gates holding a Japan–U.S. joint press conference

Section 1. 50th Anniversary of the Conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

The year 2010 is a milestone in that it is the 50th year since the signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty[1] between Japan and the United States on January 19, 1960. For this memorable year, Japan and the United States have resolved to further expand and develop the security cooperation between the two countries, while also promoting a process for deepening the Japan–U.S. Alliance, with the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements at its core.

1. Consultations for the 50th Anniversary of the Conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

Since the signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty down to the present day, Japan and the United States have resolved to develop cooperative relations on the security front and consolidate the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements which form the core of their alliance.

In marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Japan and the United States acknowledged the necessity of further strengthening the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, and further improving the effectiveness of their responses to the unclear and uncertain elements confronting both countries in the Asia-Pacific region. This sort of recognition has been shared through the consultations between the two countries.

1. Exchanges at Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers' Meetings

At the Japan–U.S. defense ministers' meeting[2] in October 2009, Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa stated that the Japan–U.S. Alliance is the foundation for not only the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, but also for responding to global challenges. He also gave voice to the recognition that it will be necessary to carry on with unflagging efforts in order to maintain and elevate such trust and effectiveness in the future. Moreover, he also stated that he would like to promote examinations of specific cooperation items for the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. In response to this, Secretary of Defense Gates stated that the Japan–U.S. Alliance is the cornerstone to the United States' policy for Northeast Asia. He also said that while Japan and the United States are faced with complex circumstances in this region, cooperation in the fields of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief — areas in which Japan demonstrates leadership — offer a chance to strengthen Japan–U.S. cooperation. He also stated that it has been noted that friendly relations and the alliance between Japan and the United States have developed dramatically compared with in the past.

2. Exchanges at Japan–U.S. Summit Meetings

At the Japan–U.S. summit meeting[3] on November 13, 2009, as part of efforts to deepen the Japan–U.S. Alliance, then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed starting a consultation process to deepen this alliance for the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, to which President Barack Obama consented. Furthermore, in relation to the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements Prime Minister Hatoyama stated his intent to promote cooperation which included not only traditional areas of cooperation such as extended deterrence, information security, missile defense, and space, but also new challenges, to which President Obama also agreed.

2. Pronouncements for the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

On January 19, 2010, which marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, respective statements were released by then Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama[4]. In addition, the "2+2" members released the Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (Joint Statement). (See Reference 45–47)

1. Prime Minister Hatoyama's Statement

The following recognitions and resolutions were expressed in then Prime Minister Hatoyama's statement.

- ○ The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements have contributed significantly to Japan's peace and development under freedom and democracy, as well as to the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, since the end of World War II until today.
- ○ Given the severe conditions in the security environment surrounding Japan, the deterrence provided by the U.S. Forces based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, together with Japan's Self-Defense Forces, continues to serve an essential role to maintain Japan's peace and security.
- ○ Under a security environment in which there still exist uncertainty and instability, the presence of the U.S. Forces based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty will continue to function as a public good by creating a sense of security to the countries in the region.
- ○ For the year commemorating the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Japan will work jointly with the United States to further deepen the Japan–U.S. Alliance, with the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements at its core, in order to adapt to the evolving environment of the 21st century.

2. President Obama's Statement

The following recognitions and resolutions were expressed in President Obama's statement.

- ○ Over the 50 years since the two countries signed the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the indestructible partnership between Japan and the United States has brought about prosperity and peace for the two countries, while the Japan–U.S. Alliance has ensured unprecedented benefits for the Asia-Pacific region.
- ○ The United States' commitment to Japan's security is unshakable, and the two countries' cooperation is a critically important part of their engagement with the world.
- ○ It is time for the two countries to undertake to renew the Japan–U.S. Alliance for the 21st century and enhance the bonds that unite the two nations.

3. "2+2" Joint Statement

The following recognitions and resolutions were expressed in the Joint Statement.

- ○ The Ministers affirmed that the U.S.–Japan Alliance plays an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of the two countries, as well as regional peace and stability. They also resolved to further develop the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements as well as expand into new areas of cooperation.
- ○ The impact of bases on local communities such as Okinawa will be reduced while supporting current efforts to maintain deterrence, including the appropriate stationing of U.S. Forces. Doing so will enhance security and ensure that the Japan–U.S. Alliance continues to serve as a cornerstone for stability in the region.
- ○ Japan and the United States will strengthen regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, while also recognizing the significance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance in the global context. The statement also reaffirmed

the commitment to cooperate closely in responding to global threats.

○ For the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to adapt the Japan–U.S. Alliance to the evolving environment of the 21st century. The Ministers will intensify the dialogue which is underway to further promote and deepen Japan–U.S. security cooperation in wide-ranging areas.

3. Process for Deepening the Alliance

1. Historical Background

Japan and the United States have traditionally developed security cooperation based on factors such as the security environment surrounding Japan.

Following the end of the Cold War, Japan and the United States announced the Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Declaration) in 1996. The Declaration reaffirms the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance in light of the state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region following the Cold War. It also calls for a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (Former Guidelines), and the promotion of cooperative relations between the two countries in fields such as studies concerning ballistic missile defense; the consolidation, realignment, and reduction of U.S. military facilities and areas in Okinawa; and the attainment of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

At next year's "2+2" meeting in 1997, new Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) were approved as part of the promotion of cooperative relations indicated within the Declaration from the previous year. These indicated the general framework and orientation for the roles and modalities for cooperation and coordination between Japan and the United States in everything from periods of normalcy to states of emergency based on the changes in the state of affairs following the Cold War.

Afterwards, in light of the further changes to the security environment due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Japan and the United States have been enhancing consultations related to security since 2002. Through these Japan–U.S. consultations, the direction of the Japan–U.S. Alliance was arranged through three stages. These stages are: confirmation of strategic objectives common to both countries, including enhancing peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region (first stage), the examination of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States for accomplishing the common strategic objectives (second stage), and the examination of a force posture realignment (third stage). Their contents were finalized at the "2+2" meeting in May 2007.

Concurrent with these bilateral policy consultations, the two countries have also strengthened cooperative relations concerning responses to specific issues. For ballistic missile defense, by way of example, in light of North Korea's apparent advancement in the development of nuclear weapons and missiles since 1998, Japan and the United States have implemented cooperation in wide-ranging areas that include everything from technical development to the operation of units. Moreover, for their response to North Korea, at the Japan–U.S. defense ministers' meeting held on May 30, 2009 the two sides affirmed their policy of continuing with close cooperation not only between the three countries of Japan, the United States, and the ROK, but also with China, Russia, and the international community. There is gathering momentum for developing cooperation between Japan and the United States in a manner which incorporates other countries as well. In addition, various measures have been taken to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines. Based on the results of the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan and the United States, the two countries are promoting examinations of joint operation plans and bilateral cooperation plans, as well as joint operations which include improving the effectiveness of various mechanisms beneath the Guidelines.

As the above demonstrates, the cooperative relations between Japan and the United States have born

numerous results thus far. The process to deepen this alliance which Japan and the United States embarked upon to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty will further strengthen initiatives based on these results, and the two countries will also strive to further expand areas of cooperation.

2. Future Policy

Japan and the United States have decided to enhance dialogue in order to further promote and deepen Japan–U.S. security cooperation over a broad range of areas in the future. This is grounded in the previously mentioned recognition shared at bilateral consultations, Prime Minister Hatoyama's statement, and the determinations expressed in the Joint Statement, and is designed to make the Japan–U.S. Alliance even more unshakable. Therefore, for the future Japan will promote specific consultations with the United States at the ministerial-level, and at the working-level under orders from ministers.

At present, consultations are being carried out between Japan and the United States over what sort of specific cooperation is possible in order to advance the process of deepening the Japan–U.S. Alliance. This includes cooperation for areas such as extended deterrence, information security, missile defense, and space which were also taken up at the Japan–U.S. summit meeting on November 13, 2009, as well as individual security areas including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and cyber issues.

For example, with regard to the security environment in the region centered around East Asia, based on the discussions at the Japan–U.S. consultations held since 2002 which will be described later in Chapter 2, Section 3, Japan and the United States shared a common recognition which forms the foundation for the common strategic objectives incorporated into the Joint Statement from the "2+2" meeting in 2005. Moreover, at the Japan–U.S. foreign ministers' meeting on January 12, 2010 there was an agreement over the recognition of starting the process of deepening the alliance by jointly performing analyses of the security environment in East Asia and examinations of the capabilities of the United States and Japan. It is conceivable that in the future Japan and the United States will confirm their awareness of circumstances based on the changes in regional circumstances, and exchange opinions regarding areas of cooperation in which they should move forward and what sort of posture they should each promote.

Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense released its Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) on February 1, 2010, and its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) on April 6. In terms of the process of formulating documents pertaining to these security policies, Japan is also moving forward with the task of reviewing its National Defense Program Guidelines, with close exchanges of opinions being held between Japan and the United States. The two sides will continue to exchange opinions from a strategic perspective. With regard to the United States' extended deterrence in particular, the "2+2" Joint Statement from May 2007 says that "U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security," and states that "The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities —both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities— form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan." Through the process for deepening the alliance as well, both Japan and the United States continue to share an awareness concerning the importance of extended deterrence. Moreover, in light of the formulation of the release of the 2010 QDR and NPR, the conventional debates are being further deepened.

With regard to information security, on March 30, 2010 the establishment of a new consultation framework in the form of the Bilateral Information Security Consultation (BISC) comprising relevant ministries from both Japan and the United States was agreed on at the Japan–U.S. foreign ministers' meeting. It is conceivable that the sharing of information between Japan and the United States will be further promoted through this consultation, while further enhancing their information security posture.

(See Section 2, and Section 3-2 and 3)

4. Projects Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

The period around this important juncture for the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is not just an excellent opportunity to strive to deepen the alliance, as has previously been noted. The Ministry of Defense and SDF also consider it first to be an excellent opportunity to explain to the Japanese people the significance of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and the present state of Japan–U.S. security cooperation, and second, an excellent opportunity to further strengthen cooperative relations with U.S. Forces. It has been decided to carry out projects commemorating the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty with the cooperation of the United States.

The projects shown in Figure III-2-1-1 have been carried out by mid June. For their part, the Ministry of Defense and SDF will plan and carry out events to

MSDF–U.S. Navy Junior Officer Symposium in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

Fig. III-2-1-1 Events Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

Period(2010)	Events, etc.
January 19	Commemoration celebration at the MSDF Headquarters, Yokosuka District
January 19	Commemoration ceremony at U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo
January 19	Opening Ceremony for Alliance Park (Atsugi)
January 19	Commemoration reception by the Defense Attaché in Tokyo (Tokyo)
January 19	Full dress decorations and naval illumination decorations (Yokosuka, Sasebo, Katsuren)
January 21	Speech by the ASDF Chief of Staff at a Tufts University security seminar supported by U.S. Army headquarters
March 3	Attendance of the GSDF Chief of Staff and Commandant of United States Marine Corps in a memorial service on Iwo-to
May 14–17	Japan–U.S. joint port call (Black Ship Festival, Shimoda)
May 18–22	Japan–U.S. joint port call (Katsuren)
May 29–30	Japan–U.S. joint port call, and opening and cruise of Japanese and U.S. vessels to the general public (Yokohama)
June 9	MSDF–U.S. Navy Junior Officer Symposium in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (Hawaii)
June 11	Japan–U.S. joint panel discussion by MSDF–U.S. Navy Officer candidates (Etajima)
June 22	Seminar in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty held by the National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo)
June 24	Joint commemorative tree planting with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman upon the Joint Staff Chief of Staff's visit to the United States (Washington)
June 24	JASDF and U.S. Fifth Air Force: Completion of commemorative logo mark marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty
June 26–27	Japan–U.S. joint port call (Harumi)
July 8–11	Japan–U.S. joint port call (Hakodate)
July 9	Commemorative tree planting at a senior level seminar between the JASDF, U.S. Pacific Army, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific marking the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (Hawaii)
July 10–26	Japan–U.S. joint port call (Kagoshima)
July 23–26	Japan–U.S. joint port call, and opening and cruise of Japanese and U.S. vessels to the general public (Sendai)
August 2–7	Japan–U.S. joint port call (Aomori: Nebuta Festival)

make the most of the two opportunities mentioned above. This will be done throughout the year, and extend from the organization of the central government all the way down to field units in each of the Self-Defense Forces. This is oriented toward efforts capable of strengthening the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

[Special Feature]

Chronology of Japan–U.S. Alliance (1945–1970)

After the end of the war in August 1945, Japan began its advance from ruin to reconstruction. Although the United Nations was established, the post-war international community edged ever closer toward the Cold War, through the formation of a range of security organizations by both East and West, and the Korean War of June 1950. With this, Japan (which had recently enacted its constitution in May 1947) returned to the international community with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and concluded the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty with the United States. The minimum required defense capability for national defense was arranged, and a course selected to rely on the significant military strength of the U.S. and maintain the nation's peace and independence. In July 1954, the Defense Agency and Self-Defense Forces were inaugurated.

Japan subsequently became a member of the United Nations in December 1956, and then in 1960, although the ongoing discussions divided public opinion, a new version of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty with more equal contents was concluded. From the late 1950s through the 1960s, diplomatic relations with countries such as those of Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea were successively normalized. As the diplomatic and security bases were gradually stabilized, Japan eventually approached the era of high economic growth.



Defense capabilities improvement

1st Defense Program FY1958–60	2nd Defense Program FY1962–66	3rd Defense Program FY1967–71

Establishment of the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces

[Special Feature]

Chronology of Japan–U.S. Alliance (1970–1990)

Through the era of high economic growth, in the 1970s, Japan became the 2nd largest economy in the Western world. During this period, the domestic government and economy became comparatively stable, and the intense opposition to the SDF and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty which had reached a scale not seen before, gradually began to subside.

Meanwhile, in the international community, the Cold War continued, fluctuating between periods of tension and peace. At the same time, serious setbacks caused by changes in international politics (typified by the Oil Crises), and the Vietnam War led to the might of the United States failing to remain the overwhelming element it was at the close of World War II. As a result, the United States began to vehemently demand of its Western Bloc allies, Japan included, defense efforts corresponding to their economic strength. With the 1972 Nixon visit to China and the ensuing closeness between those two nations, a large change became evident amid interstate relations during the Cold War.

With trends such as these, Japan established National Defense Program Guidelines for the first time in 1976 (1976 Guidelines), and determined to establish objectives for its military capabilities, and strive harder toward their steady improvement.

Meanwhile, with regard to Japan–U.S. relations, the "Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation" were established between the two nations in 1978, and the way ahead paved to further concretize defense cooperation between Japan and the United States (based on the Security Treaty). Consequently, in the same year, Japan–U.S. joint exercises commenced in earnest, while discussions were entered regarding cooperation



The return of Okinawa [Jiji Press]

between the two nations should events in the Far East outside of Japan have a serious effect on the safety of the country. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements therefore came to hold a greater importance, not only for relations between the two nations, but for a much wider region.

In 1978, Japan began cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, within the scope of the Status of Forces Agreement. Then in 1987, with the conclusion of the Special Measures Agreement, it was decided that the range of this cost sharing be enlarged.

As a result of the deepening relations between Japan and the United States, in the 1981 joint U.S.–Japan communiqué, the two nations declared for the first time that they were in an "alliance relationship."

[Special Feature]

Chronology of Japan–U.S. Alliance (1990–2010)

Due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Cold War ended, and the possibility of a global-scale war breaking out decreased substantially. On the other hand however, regional conflicts became more complicated and diverse, while incidents arrived in succession which posed a challenge to post-Cold War security, such as the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and intensification of international terrorism.

International Situation

- 96.3 Continuous exercises in waters near China and ROK
- 93.3 North Korea declares withdrawal from NPT
- 91.12 Dissolution of Soviet Union
- 91.7 Signing of START I
- 91.3 Breakup of WPO military organization
- 91.1 Start of Gulf War
- 90.8 Iraq invasion of Kuwait
- 89.12 End of Cold War
- 03.3 Use of military force against Iraq
- 03.1 North Korea declares withdrawal from NPT
- 01.9 Terrorist attacks on the U.S.
- 98.8 Missiles fired by North Korea
- 09.5 Nuclear test by North Korea
- 09.5 Missiles fired by North Korea
- 09.4 Missiles fired by North Korea
- 06.10 Announcement by North Korea of nuclear testing

Japan–U.S. Related

- 95.11 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) established
- 96.4 U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security
- 96.4 Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic (ACSA) concluded
- 96.12 SACO final agreement
- 97.9 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation (New "Guidelines")
- 05.2 SCC joint announcement (joint strategic objectives)
- 05.10 SCC document US–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future (role duty ability)
- 06.5 SCC document "United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"
- 09.5 Guam Agreement enacted
- 10.1 "2+2" joint announcement on 50th anniversary of the signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

Domestic Situation

- 91.4 Dispatch of MSDF minesweeping unit to the Persian Gulf
- 92.6 PKO Law established
- 92.9 UNTAC dispatched
- 95.9 Assault on Japanese girl by U.S soldiers
- 95.11 Cabinet decision of National Defense Program Guidelines (95 Guidelines)
- 99.5 Establishment of the Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan and the New Guidelines Related Law
- 01.10 Establishment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law
- 01.12 Start of oil supply activities in the Indian ocean
- 03.6 Establishment of the 3 Laws for Emergencies
- 03.7 Establishment of the Iraq Special Measures Law
- 03.12 Dispatch to Iraq
- 04.11 Cabinet decision of National Defense Program Guidelines (04 Guidelines)
- 07.1 Ministry of Defense inaugurated
- 09.12 Cabinet decision on 2010 improvement of defense capability

Defense capabilities improvement	1976 Guidelines FY1977–1995	1995 Guidelines FY1995–2003	2004 Guidelines FY2004–

Japan–U.S Joint Security Statement
[The Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

After the end of the Cold War, there were a variety of discussions between Japan and the United States with regard to the modality of their defense arrangements. Meanwhile, there was an increase in calls within Japan, for a reduction in U.S. bases (which for many years had been concentrated in Okinawa), triggered by the incident which occurred in Okinawa in 1995, of a young girl being assaulted. However, the significance of the Japan–U.S. security arrangements was affirmed under the complicated and unstable international conditions which existed after the Cold War, and momentum grew regarding their clear necessity.

Consequently, in 1996, the leaders of the two nations announced the "U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security". As well as reaffirming the importance of the Japan–U.S. security arrangements after the Cold War, it indicated the internal and external modality of the Japan–U.S. Alliance as the 21st Century approached, by for instance, confirming that the two sides would collaborate not only in the Asia-Pacific Region, but also on a global scale.

After the Joint Declaration, the SACO Final Report was drawn up at the end of 1996. In addition to the move toward rearrangement and integration of the U.S. bases in Okinawa (beginning with Futenma Air Station), a review of the "Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation" was conducted in 1997. As a result, it was confirmed that work to concretize the cooperation between Japan and the U.S. (in the event of armed attacks against Japan or other nearby incidents) would be advanced. It was also confirmed that under normal circumstances, the two nations would work together closely in other fields, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, PKO, and dealing with large-scale disasters.

At present, the cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States boasts a range which extends across regional and global-scale activities. In particular, as the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty marks its 50th anniversary, discussions are underway to deepen the alliance in order to adapt to the evolving environment of the 21st Century.

Section 2. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements constitute one of the pillars of Japan's national defense. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements also serve as the foundation of the Japan–U.S. Alliance, and are indispensable not only to maintaining the peace and security of Japan, but also that of the entire Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States resulting from their alliance is proving to be extremely significant for effective responses to the diverse security challenges occurring throughout the world. Furthermore, the Japan–U.S. Alliance is playing an increasingly important role by advancing the shared fundamental values in the international community such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a capitalist economy. Japan will further develop the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and expand cooperation into new areas.
(See Fig. III-2-2-1)

This section explains the current significance of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements for Japan's security.

Fig. III-2-2-1 Major Milestones in Security Cooperation between Japan and the United States

1951	The era of the former Japan–U.S. Security Treaty	The former Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is signed
1952		The treaty enters into force
1958	Revision of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the new Japan–U.S. Security Treaty	Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on the revision of the treaty)
1960		The new Japan–U.S. Security Treaty is signed and enters into force
1968		Ogasawara Islands are returned to Japan
1969		Sato-Nixon Talks (agreement on the renewal of the new Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the return of Okinawa to Japan)
1972		Return of Okinawa to Japan
1976	Establishment of the former guidelines and expanding Japan–U.S. Defense cooperation	Agreement on the establishment of Sub-Committee for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation
1978		Establishment of the former Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (the Former Guidelines)
1991	End of the Cold War and establishment of the new guidelines	Collapse of USSR and end of the Cold War
1993		North Korea withdraws from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
1996		Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (Hashimoto-Clinton Talks)
		SACO Final Report
1997		Establishment of the new Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (the New Guidelines)
2001	Japan–U.S. relations since terrorist attacks in the United States	Terrorist attacks in the United States
2003		Japan–U.S. Global Alliance (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
2006		Formulation of the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
		Japan–U.S. Alliance of the New Century (Koizumi-Bush Talks)
		North Korea conducts nuclear test
		Japan–U.S. Alliance for the World and Asia (Abe-Bush Talks)
2007		Irreplaceable Japan–U.S. Alliance (Abe-Bush Talks)
2009		(North Korea conducts nuclear tests)
		Japan U.S. Summit (Hatoyama-Obama summit)
2010		50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty

1. The Significance of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Maintenance of Japan's Security

In the current international community, a watertight defense system capable of responding to every contingency, ranging from all types of armed attacks, from the use of nuclear weapons to military threats or intimidation, is necessary to secure the peace, security, and sovereignty of the nation. In today's globalized international community, it is impossible even for a superpower like the United States to guarantee its security by acting alone. Therefore, it would be practically impossible for Japan to ensure its national security solely through independent efforts given its population, land, and economy. Moreover, such a strategy would not be politically appropriate and would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Consequently, Japan maintains an alliance with the world's dominant military superpower, the United States, with whom it shares the aforementioned basic values as well as the goal of maintaining the peace and security of the world. In addition, the United States has strong economic ties with Japan and also has a shared interest in the Asia-Pacific region.

Specifically, Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty designates that Japan and the United States will take bilateral action in the event of an armed attack against Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack means that an attacker must be prepared to confront not only the military power of the SDF, but also the overwhelming military strength of the United States when planning such an act. As a result, the opposing nation becomes aware that they will suffer grievously if they carry out an invasion and such desires are stopped at the planning stage. In other words, this serves to deter attacks.

Japan intends to effectively utilize the deterrence of the power of the U.S. military in addition to maintaining adequate Japanese defense forces in order to create a seamless posture and secure Japan's safety.

2. Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty provides for the use of facilities and areas by the U.S. Forces within Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan, and also for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East. This provision is based on the recognition that the security of Japan is closely tied to the peace and security of the Far East region to which Japan belongs.

Even in the post-Cold War era of today, the region is still facing elements of instability including North Korea's development and deployment of WMD and missiles, the division of the same race in the Korean peninsula, as well as the Taiwan issue. In such a security environment, the presence of U.S. Forces stationed in Japan provides deterrence against unexpected contingencies caused by unclear and indeterminate regional factors, providing a great sense of security to the nations of the region, and thus fulfill a role as a public good.

Also, the close bonds of cooperation based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements also constitute the foundation of the United States' commitment to the peace and security of the region. These arrangements are complemented by the alliances the United States has built with other countries such as South Korea and the Philippines as well as the friendly relations it has developed with other countries in the region, and continue to play an important role in preserving the peace and security of the region in the post-Cold War security environment.

Japan–U.S. Summit meeting (June 28, 2010) [Cabinet Public Relations Office]

3. Improvement of International Security Environment

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are the foundation for a comprehensive and friendly cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, not only in the defense area but also in a wide range of areas, including political, economic, and social aspects. The friendly relationship between Japan and the United States, founded on their security arrangements, also forms the basis for Japan's foreign policy. It contributes to Japan's ability to implement positive measures to maintain the peace and security of the international community, including promoting dialogue and cooperation on multinational security and cooperating with the United Nations in all areas of its operations.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the international community has been increasingly concerned about new kinds of threats and diverse contingencies, such as international terrorist attacks and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and methods for their transportation. In this international environment, the strong bonds forged between Japan and the United States are playing an important role in achieving effective cooperative measures that can improve the security of the international community.

In particular, under the auspices of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and U.S. Forces are working together in peacetime in a variety of areas to improve the levels of coordination. This kind of close coordination forms the foundation for every kind of international collaboration, such as antipiracy, undertaken by the SDF and U.S. Forces, and is resulting in the heightened operational effectiveness of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

Peace and prosperity of the international community is closely linked to that of Japan. Accordingly, by cooperating with the United States, which possesses preeminent international operational capabilities, Japan is able to advance its measures to improve the international security environment. This in turn is enhancing the security and prosperity of Japan.

2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

1. Significance of Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ)

The security environment surrounding Japan remains challenging. Given that environment, in order for the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements to continue to fulfill the roles described above, it is necessary that U.S. military presence in Japan is secured which functions adequately as a deterrent that contributes to Japan's defense as well as regional peace and security, and that a posture is maintained in Japan and the surrounding area so that the USFJ can respond swiftly and expeditiously to emergencies.

For this purpose, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Japan allows the stationing of the U.S. military in Japan. This results in the necessity for opposing nations to be prepared to find themselves in direct confrontation with U.S. Forces in addition to the SDF when attacking Japan as mentioned previously. Thus the USFJ serves as a deterrent against aggression towards Japan. Further, the realization of a stable USFJ presence is necessary for a swift Japan–U.S. joint response based on Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in the event of an armed attack on Japan. Additionally, the actions of the USFJ in the defense of Japan will be assisted by the timely reinforcement of other U.S. Forces, and the USFJ forms the foundation for such support.

In order for the USFJ to carry out the above role, it is necessary that all the services of the U.S. Forces, including the USFJ, are functionally integrated. For instance, the U.S. Forces holds a primarily offensive role as a "spear" when responding to armed aggression on Japan in cooperation with the SDF. When the U.S. Forces function in this way, it can be expected that the U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marines stationed in Japan work as one to function adequately.

Note that while Article 5 of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty stipulates the obligation of the United States to defend Japan, Article 6 allows for the use by the United States of facilities and areas in Japan for maintaining

the security of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East, and overall Japan–U.S. obligations are kept in balance. This point is in contrast to the North Atlantic Treaty which stipulates only joint defense of contracting nations.
(See Fig. III-2-2-2)

2. USFJ Facilities and Areas and the Local Japanese Communities

In order for USFJ facilities and areas to fully exert their capabilities, it is vital to gain the cooperation and understanding of the local communities. Meanwhile, the social environment in the surrounding areas has changed a lot through, for example, their urbanization over the past several decades since the conclusion of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. In light of such changes, it is necessary to reduce the impact of the facilities and areas as much as possible in order to gain the acceptance and support of the public in the true sense as well as to allow them to perform to the best of their capabilities.

Fig. III-2-2-2 Deployment Map of USFJ



Our national land is narrow with limited plains and there are many cases where USFJ facilities and areas are located close to urban and business areas. In such areas, factors including the existence of those facilities and areas and the takeoff and landing of U.S. Forces' aircraft have a considerable impact on the residents' living environment and local development. It is therefore necessary to make efforts to reduce the burden according to the real situation of each local area.

3. USFJ in Okinawa

In comparison to areas such as the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, and Guam, Okinawa is located close to countries in East Asia. Consequently, when it is necessary for units to respond rapidly in the region, U.S. Forces stationed in Okinawa are able to do so swiftly. In addition, Okinawa has the geographic advantage that it has a certain distance from countries neighboring Japan. Thus the stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa —including the U.S. Marine Corps which is in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies and is capable of high mobility and rapid response— with its geographical characteristics, contributes greatly not only to the security of Japan but also to the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region.

Meanwhile, many USFJ facilities and areas are located within Okinawa Prefecture, including airfields, maneuver areas, and logistics support facilities. As of January 2010, about 74 percent of the land area of the USFJ facilities and areas nationwide (for their exclusive use) was concentrated in Okinawa. Utmost efforts must therefore be given to ease the burden on Okinawa while keeping in mind the aforementioned security considerations.

(See Fig. III-2-2-3, Section 4)

Fig. III-2-2-3 Significance and Role of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa

4 Significance and role of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa —the strategic position of Okinawa

1. Reasons for stationing U.S. Marines in Okinawa
❍ Okinawa is closer to the regions of East Asia than mainland U.S.A., Hawaii, and Guam.
➔ The U.S. forces in Okinawa can respond swiftly when an emergency deployment is called for in the region
❍ Further, Okinawa has the geographical advantage of being at a reasonable distance from surrounding countries.

2. Significance and role of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa
❍ Due to their high mobility and swift response[1], the Marines stationed in Okinawa play a diverse role in securing the peace and security of the region, such as in their response to the earthquake in Java, Indonesia in May 2006, in addition to defending Japan.
➔ The stationing of U.S. Forces, beginning with the U.S. Marines in charge of first response for a variety of contingencies and capable of high mobility and rapid response, in Okinawa with its geographical characteristics, contributes greatly to the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific region

Note 1: The U.S. Marines make use of all fighting elements (air, ground, and maritime) when training or carrying out operations and are capable of swiftly responding to diverse contingencies.

Section 3. Basic Frameworks Supporting the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

From the time that the current Japan–U.S. Security Treaty was concluded to the present day both Japan and the United States have developed their alliance in response to the changing security environment through constant effort to ensure effective cooperation with the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, the significance of which was described in the previous Section, as the basis. That effort took place in the form of close policy consultations between Japan and the United States, and has borne fruit in the form of a variety of efforts related to defense cooperation by both nations.

This section explains the basic frameworks that support the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, such as the forums of Japan–U.S. consultations and the agreements that have resulted from them, and the Japan–U.S. security cooperation arrangements.

Fig. III-2-3-1 Major Fora for Japan–U.S. Security Consultations

Consultative Forum	Participants		Purpose	Legal Basis
	Japanese Side	U.S. Side		
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ("2+2" Meeting)	Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense	U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense[1]	Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security	Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960 in accordance with Article IV of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty
Security Subcommittee (SSC)	Participants are not specified[2]	Participants are not specified[2]	Exchange of view on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the United States	Article IV of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and others
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)[3]	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of Bureau of Operational Policy, Ministry of Defense; Representative from Joint Staff[4]	Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representative from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff, PACOM	Study and consideration of consultative measures to Japan and the United States including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies	Established on July 8, 1976 as a sub-entry under the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reorganized at the on June 28, 1996 Japan–U.S. vice-ministerial consultation
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee (once every two weeks in principle)	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense; and others	Deputy Commander of USFJ, Minister and Counselor at the U.S. Embassy, and others	Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement	Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement

Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meeting are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice-minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
4. Then Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997.

Fig. III-2-3-2 Japan–U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2006)

Date	Type of Consultation/ Place	Participants	Outline and Results
January 17, 2006	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	• Agreed on the significance and importance of the U.S.–Japan Security Arrangements and on the acceleration of activities for successful realignment of U.S. Forces • Minister of State for Defense Nukaga announced expectations of deliberation on the new U.S.–Japan Alliance • Exchanged opinions on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq and crimes committed by U.S. military personnel in Japan
April 23, 2006	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	• Discussed the cost of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam
May 1, 2006	Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting)/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Foreign Minister Aso Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice	• Confirmed the importance of the U.S.–Japan Alliance and the importance of international cooperation regarding the fight against terrorism, and reconstruction and democratization of Iraq • Appreciation expressed by the U.S. for Japan's support including the dispatch of SDF personnel • Exchanged opinions on Iran's nuclear issue and the situations in North Korea and China • Final agreement to the realignment of forces, and an announcement of the document titled "United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"
May 3, 2006	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	• Exchanged opinions on the specific measures to implement the finalized realignment plan
June 4, 2006	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld	• Confirmed the significance of the final agreement on the U.S. Forces realignment
April 30, 2007	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Kyuma Secretary of Defense Gates	• Agreed on steadily implementing the respective realignment initiatives, securing information, enhancing operational cooperation in areas such as information sharing in BMD, and continuing to deliberate on the roles, missions, and capabilities
May 1, 2007	Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting)/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Kyuma Foreign Minister Aso Secretary of Defense Gates Secretary of State Rice	• Confirmed the steady implementation of the U.S. Forces realignment according to the Roadmap of May 2006 • Confirmed the enhancement of BMD cooperation and operational cooperation, especially regarding intelligence cooperation • Reconfirmed that the commitment of the United States to Japan's defense through various U.S. military capacities remains unchanged • Disclosed the document titled "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States–Japan Security and Defense Cooperation"
August 8, 2007	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Koike Secretary of Defense Gates	• Agreed on the early realization of the U.S. Forces Realignment following the Roadmap of May 2006 which was created through U.S.–Japan consent • Exchanged opinions on the enhancement of information security and the fight against terrorism
November 8, 2007	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Ministry of Defense	Minister of State for Defense Ishiba Secretary of Defense Gates	• Discussed the transformation of the Japan–U.S. Alliance adapting to the future along with specific topics such as replenishment-related activities in the Indian Ocean and the U.S. Forces realignment • Concerning the BMD, both countries confirmed their continuous cooperation; the deliberation of their roles, missions, and capabilities; and the importance of enhancing the effectiveness of their bilateral cooperation
May 31, 2008	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Ishiba Secretary of Defense Gates	• Agreed on continuous closely knit cooperation for the peace and stability of the international community such as resuming replenishment support in the Indian Ocean • Reconfirmed the steady implementation following the Roadmap of May 2006 and exchanged opinions on future plans
May 1, 2009	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Hamada Secretary of Defense Gates	• Confirmed the necessity of continuing consultations at a high level with regard to a number of issues involving the U.S. and Japan, including response to North Korea; the commitment of the U.S. to the defense of Japan; continuous progress in the realignment of the U.S. Forces; continuing U.S.–Japan dialogue regarding the QDR and the National Defense Program Guidelines • Exchange views on assistance to Afghanistan/Pakistan, counter-piracy measures, F-X, etc.

Fig. III-2-3-2 Japan–U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (Since 2006)

Date	Type of Consultation/ Place	Participants	Outline and Results
May 30, 2009	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Hamada Secretary of Defense Gates	• Continued discussions between Japan and the U.S. confirmed regarding response to North Korea including diplomatic efforts, strengthened expansion deterrence, and MD • Views exchanged regarding U.S. restructuring and F-X
October 21, 2009	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Ministry of Defense	Minister of State for Defense Kitazawa Secretary of Defense Gates	• Defense Minister Kitazawa stated the desire to move forward with specific items of cooperation for the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty while confirming the importance of the Japan U.S. Alliance • Views exchanged regarding regional posture, U.S. military restructuring, and HNS • Agreement reached to strengthen cooperation in MD and information security
May 25, 2010	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting/ Washington, D.C.	Minister of State for Defense Kitazawa Secretary of Defense Gates	• Regarding the issue of the relocation of Futenma Air Station, agreement reached for both countries to continue to work closely together to find a solution • Regarding the sinking incident of the ROK vessel, Minister of Defense Kitazawa announced that Japan also denounces North Korea and intends to work closely with international society including the U.S. and ROK. • Regarding the recent activities of Chinese vessels, Minister of Defense Kitazawa explained his desire for wide ranging Japan–U.S. cooperation under the given conditions, and Secretary of Defense Gates shared his opinion regarding the importance of cooperation • Regarding the Japan–U.S. alliance, agreement was reached for steady cooperation across a wide range of areas. Agreement was also reached to strengthen ties between the defense ministries.

1. Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

1. Major Forums for Japan–U.S. Consultations on Security

Close policy consultations on security are conducted through diplomatic channels as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels of the Governments of Japan and the United States through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ("2+2" meeting), the Security Subcommittee (SSC) and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). The framework of these consultations is shown in Fig. III-2-3-1.

In addition, the Ministry of Defense organizes Japan–U.S. defense ministerial meetings between the Japanese Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense as necessary where discussions are made with a focus on defense policies of the respective governments and defense cooperation.

The results of Japan–U.S. policy consultations (Cabinet level) are shown in Figure III-2-3-2.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has held working-level meetings when necessary and exchanged information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. The importance of these opportunities has further increased as Japan–U.S. defense cooperation has been enhanced in recent years.



Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Gates

Joint Chief of Staff Oriki and U.S, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to increased credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, through further enhancement of close collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is proactively involved in these activities.

2. Background to the Japan–U.S. Consultations

Both Japan and the United States have utilized the consultative framework described above for 50 years since the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty was signed until the present for consultations pertaining to defense cooperation.

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements ensured Japan's security as part of the Free World throughout the Cold War, and at the same time contributed to the peace and security of the region. Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, as a result of a variety of discussions between Japan and the United States in the face of changes in the international security environment, the Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was announced at the April 1996 Japan–U.S. summit meeting in Tokyo. In addition, based on that, both Japan and the United States established new Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) in September 1997, and

Fig. III-2-3-3 Background of Japan–U.S. Consultations



implemented various measures.

As is shown in Figure III-2-3-3, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Japan and the United States have pursued new postures to deal with the changing security environment including emerging new threats such as international terrorist activities and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Since the December 2002 Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" meeting) Japan and the United States have held consultations, including at the working level, as part of strategic discussions relating to both countries' security from the perspective of improving effectiveness in response to the changes occurring in times like these. Based on the basic policy to maintain deterrence and capabilities and to reduce burdens on local communities, as shown in its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), Japan has been actively engaging in these consultations in order to maintain its security.

These Japan–U.S. consultations have confirmed strategic objectives common to both countries (first stage), examined Japan–U.S. roles, missions, and capabilities to achieve the common strategic objectives (second stage) and examined force posture realignment based on the roles, missions, and capabilities of both countries (third stage) and have established the direction of the Japan–U.S. Alliance gradually and comprehensively. The results of the studies at each stage were released. The first stage results were released in the Joint Statement of the February 2005 "2+2" meeting, the second stage results were summarized in the report titled "U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" prepared at the October 2005 "2+2" meeting, and the third stage results were summarized in the "United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" (Roadmap) from the May 2006 "2+2" meeting.

ASDF Chief of Staff Hokazono, who was awarded a U.S. Legion of Merit and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force Schwartz

MSDF Chief of Staff Akahoshi, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Roughead, (right), and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force Schwartz (center)

GSDF Chief of Staff Yoshifumi Hibako and U.S. Chief of Staff of the Army Casey

At present, both parties agreed in the summit meeting between then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and President Barack Obama[5] on November 13, 2009, to promote the process of deepening the Japan–U.S. alliance, through continued bilateral cooperation in terms of security issues, but also in various areas such as disaster prevention and the environment, mainly in the Asia-Pacific region. This policy was announced in statements from Prime Minister Hatoyama and President Obama on January 19 this year, and was confirmed in the "2+2" meeting Joint Statement on the same day.

(See Section 1, this Section 2-3, Section 4, Reference 37–41 and Reference 45–47)

2. Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure Their Effectiveness

It is necessary for both Japan and the United States to discuss and decide the roles each will fill in case of an armed attack on Japan or other situation in advance in order to respond rapidly in that event. There is a framework pertaining to those roles between Japan and the United States, the Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation (Guidelines) and the various policies for ensuring its effectiveness. Based on that framework and the changing security environment surrounding Japan, both Japan and the United States continuously study cooperation plans for the two countries, and hold consultations on them.

Here is an overview of the framework.

1. The Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation

In 1996, the reexamination of the Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation[6] was mentioned in the Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security. Based on this, Japan and the United States both reviewed the previous guidelines in order to enhance credibility towards Japan–U.S. security, and a new version of the Guidelines was acknowledged at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) ("2+2" meeting) in September 1997. The outline is as follows. (See Reference 38)

(1) Objectives of the Guidelines

The Guidelines aim to create a solid basis for more effective and more credible Japan–U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, and in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

(2) Matters for Cooperation Prescribed in the Guidelines

a. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields under normal circumstances. Such cooperation includes information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning, and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing bilateral exercises and training; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism.

b. Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations[7] while U.S. forces conduct operations to supplement and support the SDF's operations. Both parties will respond based on respective concepts of operations in a coordinated manner.

(See Reference 52)

c. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The Governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan[8] from occurring.

(See Reference 53)

(3) Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines

In order to promote Japan–U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation, the two countries need to conduct consultative dialogues throughout the spectrum of security conditions mentioned above. In addition, both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to accomplish such objectives. To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information and intelligence-sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

a. Comprehensive Mechanism

The Comprehensive Mechanism has been created so that not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also the relevant agencies of the respective governments conduct bilateral works based on the Guidelines under normal circumstances. In the comprehensive mechanism, bilateral work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted so as to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. III-2-3-4)

Fig. III-2-3-4 Structure of Comprehensive Mechanism



Fig. III-2-3-5 Framework of Coordination Mechanism



b. Coordination Mechanism

The coordination mechanism, established in 2000, is being set up in normal circumstances so that the two countries may coordinate their respective activities in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.
(See Fig. III-2-3-5)

2. Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

(1) Measures for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to properly take necessary measures, including legal ones, regarding Japan–U.S. cooperation in case of armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan. From this perspective, it is necessary for the Government of Japan as a whole to collaborate in advancing bilateral work between Japan and the United States, including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning of the Guidelines in peacetime.

Based on this, laws such as the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (1999) and the Ship Inspection Operations Law (2000) are being established in light of Japan–U.S. cooperation in areas surrounding Japan.

Also, measures are being taken to facilitate U.S. force operations as a part of strengthening of security cooperation legislation for situations such as armed attacks. (See Part III, Chapter1, Section1)

(2) Outline of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law

The Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan establishes the measures (response measures)[9] that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides for the types, measures, and other matters of ship inspection operations implemented by Japan in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. Its outline is as follows.

The Prime Minister, facing a situation in areas surrounding Japan and deeming it necessary to adopt measures including such SDF activities as rear area support[10], rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations, must request a Cabinet decision on such measures and on a draft basic plan of response measures. The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct response measures.

In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of Defense will draw up an implementation guideline (including designation of implementation areas), obtain approval for the guideline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, and ship inspection operations.

Heads of relevant administrative organizations will implement response measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the organizations to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. In addition, the heads of relevant administrative organizations may ask persons other than those from the national government to cooperate as necessary in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan[11].

The Prime Minister reports to the Diet without delay when the Cabinet has made a decision or approved its revision, or when the response measures have been completed.

(3) Rear Area Support

Rear area support means support measures, including the provision of goods, services, and conveniences, given by Japan in rear areas to U.S. Forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 1 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

As rear area support, the SDF provides goods and services, including supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport activities, and base activities.

(4) Rear Area Search and Rescue Operations

Rear area search and rescue operations mean operations conducted by the SDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan to search and rescue those who engage in combat and are stranded in rear areas (including transporting those rescued). (Article 3, Paragraph 1, Item 2 of the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan).

If one does not engage in combat but still faces a mishap he/she will be also rescued. In addition, if there is anyone in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the implementation area in which the SDF

is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue that person, after having obtained approval from that foreign country. However, this is limited to cases in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and are expected to be conducted in those waters throughout the period during which the SDF conducts rescue activities.

(5) Ship Inspection Operations

Ship inspection operations mean operations conducted by Japan in situations in areas surrounding Japan to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others [12]) and to request, if necessary a change of sea route, or destination port or place, for the purpose of strictly enforcing the regulatory measures concerning trade or other economic activities to which Japan is a party. These activities are conducted based on the U.N. Security Council Resolution or the consent of the flag state [13] in the territorial waters of Japan or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ [14]) (Article 2 of the Ship Inspection Operations Law).

3. Japan–U.S. Agreements Based on Japan–U.S. Consultations

Japan and the United States have utilized the bilateral consultations described in 1 of this Section in recent years, as shown in Fig. III-2-3-6, to engage in consultations pertaining to security aspects of the future of the Japan–U.S. alliance, including force posture realignment. As a result, various agreements, including the May

Fig. III-2-3-6 Overview of Japan–U.S. Consultations



2006 agreement on force posture realignment, were concluded to strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance in the future. Those agreements are summarized here.

1. Common Strategic Objectives (First Stage)

The common strategic objectives to be pursued by both Japan and the United States were confirmed in the Joint Statement of the February 2005 "2+2" meeting and its overview is described below.

○ Region: maintenance of security in Japan, strengthening peace and stability in the region, peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, welcoming China's responsible and constructive regional role and development of a cooperative relationship with China, peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, improvement of transparency of China's military affairs, constructive involvement by Russia, and assistance to a peaceful, stable and vibrant Southeast Asia

○ World: promotion of fundamental values such as democracy in the international community, engagement in international peace cooperation activities, reduction and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to transport these weapons, prevention and eradication of terrorism, and improvement in the effectiveness of the U.N. Security Council

At the "2+2" meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reconfirmed their respective commitments to these common strategic objectives, and highlighted the following strategic objectives (outline) that will advance the interests of both countries.

Fig. III-2-3-7 Japan–U.S. Cooperation in Japan's Defense and Response to Situations in Area Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) Including Response to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies



- ○ Achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks
- ○ Further encourage China to act as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and its demonstrated actions;
- ○ Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum
- ○ Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia
- ○ Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among Japan, the United States, and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense
- ○ Continuing to build upon partnerships with India
- ○ Ensuring Afghanistan's successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization
- ○ Contributing to the reconstruction of a unified and democratic Iraq
- ○ Achieving swift and full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747 which are aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements
- ○ Achieving broader Japan–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation

2. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (Second Stage)

(1) Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

The basic concepts on such primary areas indicated in the SCC document as "defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies" and "efforts to improve the international security environment" are shown in Figures III-2-3-7 and III-2-3-8. With due consideration to the increasing importance of these two areas, Japan and the United States will develop their respective defense capabilities and maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

(2) Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

The SCC document reconfirmed the necessity to strengthen the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation. The document pointed out specific examples of key areas for further enhancement in the current security environment, as described in Fig. III-2-3-9.

This list of key areas is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation, and other areas of operation that are not explicitly listed above remain important.

(3) Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

It is important for Japan and the United States to intensify their postures of security and defense cooperation so that the two countries are capable of dealing with diverse challenges in the new security environment. For this purpose, the two countries identified essential steps that can be taken in peacetime, which are listed in Fig. III-2-3-10.

(4) Enhancement and Expansion of Japan–U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

Japan and the United States agreed to enhance and improve the effectiveness of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation indicated in the Guidelines, as well as cooperation in other fields, if necessary, that are not specified in the Guidelines. See Section 2 of this Chapter.

Japan and the United States emphasized at the "2+2" meeting held in May 2006 that the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation should be strengthened and improved, and that the two countries emphasized the importance of examining the scope of security and defense cooperation to ensure a robust relationship and enhance the alliance's capabilities.

Fig. III-2-3-8 Japan–U.S. Cooperation for Improving the International Security Environment



Fig. III-2-3-9 Examples of Activities to be Improved in Japan–U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

	Example of Area
1	Air defense
2	Ballistic missile defense
3	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other proliferation prevention activities
4	Anti-terrorism measures
5	Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic
6	Search and rescue activities
7	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities and improvement of capabilities and effectiveness of such activities by using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and patrol aircraft
8	Humanitarian relief operations
9	Reconstruction assistance activities
10	Peacekeeping activities and capacity building for other nation's peacekeeping efforts
11	Guarding operations for important infrastructure including USFJ facilities and areas
12	Disposal and decontamination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other measures against WMD attack
13	Mutual logistic support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes enhanced or combined efforts of air and maritime transportation (including transportation by high speed vessels (HSV).
14	Transportation, use of facilities, medical support and other activities for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
15	Use of ports, airports, roads, sea, airspace, and frequency bands

Fig. III-2-3-10 Essential Measures for Enforcing Bilateral Security and Defense Posture

Category	Item	Content
Measures to be addressed by governments as a whole	Close and continuous policy and/or operational coordination	• Close and continuous policy and operational coordination conducted at all levels of the Japanese and U.S. governments, ranging from unit-level tactics to strategic consultations, is essential for responding to diverse security issues[1] • Improvement of effectiveness of comprehensive and bilateral coordination mechanisms by clarifying functions based on the "Guidelines"
	Developing bilateral contingency planning	• Continuance of bilateral planning for armed attack situations in Japan and mutual cooperation planning for situations in areas surrounding Japan, conducted under the "Guidelines" taking the changing security environment into account • Reflection of Japan's legislation dealing with contingency (providing a strengthened basis for contingency use of facilities, including airports and seaports by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in the plannings mentioned above) • Close coordination with relevant ministries, agencies, and local authorities, and conducting detailed surveys of airports and seaports
	Enhancing information sharing and/or intelligence cooperation	• Enhancement of information and intelligence sharing and cooperation for national strategy to unit-level tactics • Additional measures to protect shared confidential information among relevant ministries and agencies
Measures to be addressed by the SDF and U.S. Forces	Improving interoperability[2] between the SDF and U.S. Forces	• Maintenance of regular consultations to maintain and enhance interoperability • Enhancement of connectivity between SDF and U.S. Forces headquarters
	Expansion of training opportunities in Japan and the United States	• Expansion of bilateral training and exercise opportunities (including the expansion of shared use of training facilities in Japan of the SDF and U.S. Forces) • Expansion of training for SDF members and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland
	Shared use of facilities by the SDF and U.S. Forces	(To be specified when force posture is realigned)
	Ballistic missile defense (BMD)	• Constant information gathering and sharing, and maintenance of readiness and interoperability • If appropriate, U.S. Forces will additionally deploy supplemental capabilities to Japan and SIASJ and adjust their operations

Notes: 1. Close policy consultations on security are conducted between Japanese and U.S. government officials through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) at the ministerial level (so-called "2+2" meeting), Japan–U.S. defense ministerial meeting, the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), and others. As for operations, there exist a comprehensive mechanism and a bilateral mechanism under the Guidelines. (See this chapter, Section 3)
2. The term "interoperability" refers to the commonness and duality of tactics, equipment, logistics support in the implementation guidelines for various operations.

Furthermore, in the joint statement made at the "2+2" meeting held in May 2007, the two countries reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with the alliance transformation vision indicated in the October 2005 SCC document, and highlighted as follows:

○ Redefinition of the SDF's primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan

○ Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture the forces of the two countries to operate together in a regional crisis

○ Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)[15]

○ Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group

○ Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operations, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations

○ Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities

3. The USFJ and other Force Posture Realignment (Third Stage)

(1) Guiding Precepts for Force Posture Realignment

In the October 2005 "2+2" Joint Statement, the following items were listed as guiding precepts for force posture realignment of the USFJ based on the previously described first and second stages.

- ○ Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters is a core capability of critical importance to Japan and the United States.
- ○ Both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.

Fig. III-2-3-11 The Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the SDF

1. Realignment in Kanto Area

[Yokota]
- ❍ Establishment of the bilateral and joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
- ❍ Return of portions of airspace, and collocation of U.S. Forces and SDF controllers to the Yokota RAPCON facility, etc.
- ❍ Civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the United States)

[Sagami General Depot (SGD)]
- ❍ Establishment of facilities along with the transformation of headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan (support facilities, including a training center)
- ❍ Return of some portions of land in front of JR Sagamihara Station (approximately 15ha)
- ❍ Return of land for underground rail and road (approximately 2ha)
- ❍ Joint use of a specific area (approximately 35ha) of open space in the western side of SGD)



[Relocation of the Air Defense Command of JASDF]
- ❍ Relocation of the Air Defense Command and relevant units
- ❍ Aiming to start operation in FY2010

[Camp Zama]
- ❍ Transformation of headquarters U.S. Army, Japan
- ❍ Relocation of the headquarters of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force
- ❍ Return of portions (1.1ha) of housing area
- ❍ Joint use of heliport

2. Realignment in Okinawa

[Shared Use]
- Camp Hansen is used for JGSDF training
- JASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces, while taking into account the noise impact on local communities

[Land Returns]
- ❍ The remaining facilities and areas in Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base
- ❍ A detailed consolidation plan is being developed

Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 (total return, approximately 16ha)

Naha Port (total return, approximately 56ha)
- A replacement facility will be constructed in the Naha Port and Harbor Plan Urasoe-Pier district

Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) (total return, approximately 274ha)



Futenma Air Station (total return, approximately 481ha)
1. Base facility for helicopters—The Futenma Replacement Facility will be constructed in the area from Oura Bay to the coastal area south of Camp Schwab
2. Base facility for aerial refueling tankers—Relocation to Iwakuni (deploy on a rotational basis to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam)
3. Base function for contingency use—Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Air Bases and others

[Relocation of U.S. Marine Corps]
III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), approximately 8,000 personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate to Guam (The affected units will relocate from Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, Futenma Air Station, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area)

Legend: Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base
(Land area as of January 1, 2010)

Fig. III-2-3-11 The Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and the SDF

3. Relocation of Aircraft



Note: Portion of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni

Fig. III-2-3-12 Major Realignment Schedule shown in the Roadmap

Time	Implementation Plans for Realignment
By Summer 2006	**Necessary arrangements and facility modifications will be made for deployment of a U.S. X-Band Radar system to JASDF Shariki Base**
By October 2006	**Portions of Yokota airspace to be returned will be identified**
From 2006	**Shared use of Camp Hansen, which requires no facility improvements, will start**
By March 2007	Consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa will be developed
From FY2007	**Development of annual plan for training relocation**
By U.S. FY2008 (October 2007–September 2008)	**U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed**
By September 2008	**Portions of Yokota airspace will be returned to Japanese control**
July 2009 (or the earliest possible date thereafter)	Permanent site for field-carrier landing practice facility will be selected
FY2009 (April 2009–)	**Comprehensive study, including conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace, will be completed**
FY2010	JASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units will relocate to Yokota
By FY2012	The headquarters of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force will relocate to Camp Zama
By FY2014	Futenma Replacement Facility will be completed. Part of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa (III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their dependents) will relocate to Guam. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni.

Note: Items written in boldface show completed measures.

- ○ Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces.
- ○ Dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can reduce burdens of training on local communities.
- ○ Shared military use of both U.S. and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.
- ○ Adequate capacity of facilities and areas is necessary. Capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements, and can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
- ○ This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
- ○ Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.
- ○ Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of U.S. facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.

(2) Force Posture Realignment Outline

Based on the above precepts, specific force posture realignment proposals were listed in the May 2006 Roadmap. Figures III-2-3-11 and III-2-3-12 show the overview of that realignment. Furthermore, the following items list the concepts relating to each of those realignment proposals.

- ○ The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package.
- ○ Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- ○ Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- ○ The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: 1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and 2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

4. Japan–U.S. Bilateral Training and Exercises

Bilateral training and exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. Forces are categorized as command post exercises, in which hypothetical situations are set up, with the objectives of improving the decision making abilities of officers and the ability of staff to make adjustments, and field exercises, in which actual units move in training areas or sea and air space with the objective of improving overall coordination between Japan and the United States. These kinds of training are useful for enhancing their respective tactical skills[16]. Bilateral training and exercises are also indispensable as a means of facilitating mutual understanding and close communication under normal circumstances, thereby improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth conduct of Japan–U.S. bilateral actions. In addition, it is important for the SDF to conduct necessary trainings for collaboration and coordination between

Japanese and U.S. personnel coordinating during an exercise

the SDF and U.S. Forces in normal circumstances so that the SDF may carry out the missions conferred by the Law concerning the Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and other laws. Such efforts serve to maintain and enhance the credibility and deterrent effect of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

Japanese and U.S. vessels navigating parallel to one another

Therefore, the SDF has conducted a variety of bilateral training and exercises with U.S. Forces by now, and maintains a policy to enhance these training and exercises in the future. For example, units from the SDF and U.S. Forces participated in the Japan–U.S. Bilateral Joint Training Exercise (a command post exercise) in January 2010. With the cooperation of relevant ministries, Japan–U.S. bilateral response to defense of Japan was exercised and the SDF's responses and Japan–U.S. cooperation were examined assuming various situations such as situations in areas surrounding Japan. The purpose of this was to maintain and enhance integrated joint operation capabilities. Furthermore, Japan–U.S. Joint Regional Army command post exercises, special anti-submarine exercises, Japan–U.S. Joint Fighter combat training, and others, continue as efforts to improve interoperability at the military service and unit levels.
(See Reference 53)

5. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States

The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[17] between Japan and the United States is that if one side requests the provision of goods or services, the other side should provide them[18]. The Agreement is designed to positively contribute to the smooth and effective operation of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and to efforts for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as bilateral training and exercises in peacetime, U.N. peacekeeping operations, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations.
(See Fig. III-2-3-13)

Fig. III-2-3-13 Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA)

Significance of reciprocal provision of supplies and services

In general, supplies and services necessary for unit operations are replenished by the units themselves. However, in such cases where units of allied nations are operating together, the reciprocal provision of supplies and services on site would enhance the flexibility of the operations.

Scope of application of the ACSA



6. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology

Japan proactively promotes cooperation in areas of equipment and technology while bearing in mind the maintenance of Japan's technology and production base and the mutual cooperation principle based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

In view of the progress in technological cooperation between Japan and the United States, the improvement of technological level, and other factors, Japan decided to transfer its military technology to the United States despite the provisions of the Three Principles on Armed Exports and related regulations. And, in 1983, Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America[19]. In June 2006, the Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America[20] was concluded to replace the foregoing Exchange of Notes.

(See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 2)

Under these frameworks, the Government of Japan decided to provide the United States with 19 items of arms and military technology, including portable surface-to-air missile (PSAM) technology and weapon technologies related to joint technological research on BMD.

Japan and the United States consult with each other at forums such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and conduct cooperative research and development regarding the specific projects agreed upon at the forums. Since 1992, the two countries have concluded the joint project agreement, and conducted 18 joint projects (14 of which have been completed). Japan–U.S. cooperation in military equipment and technology is significant for improving interoperability and reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the future.

(See Reference 55)

7. Measures to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of the USFJ

The stationing of the USFJ forms the core of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and also demonstrates the deep commitment of the United States to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. The USFJ greatly contributes to the peace and stability of Japan and the region in various ways. In particular, their presence is considered to function as a visible deterrent. Thus, the Government of Japan tries to enhance the credibility of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements by actively taking various measures to ensure the smooth stationing of the USFJ.

(See Section 2-2)

1. Japan's Measures, etc., Based on the Status of Forces Agreement

Matters pertaining to USFJ facilities and areas and the status of the USFJ are stipulated in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which has provisions regarding facilities and areas for the use of the USFJ (USFJ facilities and areas), satisfying labor requirements of the USFJ, etc.

(1) Provision of USFJ Facilities and Areas

Japan provides facilities and areas for the USFJ under the provisions of the SOFA, in accordance with agreements reached through the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee between the governments of Japan and the United States, at no cost to the United States.

The Government has concluded lease contracts with owners of private and public land on which these facilities and areas exist in order to ensure the stable use of necessary USFJ facilities and areas. However, should

the Government be unable to obtain the approval of land owners, it will acquire a title to use[21] under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land[22], after compensating the landowners for any loss they may suffer in the process.

(2) Satisfying Labor requirements of the USFJ

The USFJ requires manpower (labor) to maintain its forces, and SOFA stipulates that the labor requirements of the USFJ shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Government of Japan.

As of the end of FY2009, 25,812 USFJ local employees (hereinafter referred to as the "employees") work at USFJ facilities and areas throughout Japan, working as office workers at headquarters, engineers at maintenance/supply facilities, members of security units and fire departments on base, and staff of welfare/recreational facilities. They perform functions essential for the smooth operations of the USFJ, and support its activities.

The Government of Japan hires these employees in accordance with the provisions of SOFA. The Ministry of Defense supports the stationing of the USFJ by performing administrative work for personnel management, payment of wages, healthcare, welfare, etc.

2. Cost Sharing for the Stationing of the USFJ

Japan plays an important role in bearing the costs for the stationing of the U.S. Forces in Japan to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.

Fig. III-2-3-14 Outline of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

Item	Outline	Ground
Costs for Facilities Improvement Program (FIP)[1]	❍ Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc., have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the GOJ since FY1979 and provided to the USFJ	Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
Labor costs	❍ Welfare costs, etc., since FY1978 and portion of pay that exceeds the pay conditions of national public employees since FY1979 have been borne by the GOJ (USFJ differential, language allowance, and portion of the retirement allowance, which exceeds the pay standard of national public employees were abolished in FY2008, upon the provision of measures to avoid drastic changes in payments)	Within the Framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
	❍ Eight kinds of allowances such as adjustment allowance have been borne by the GOJ since FY1987	Special Measures Agreement (FY1987)
	❍ Basic pay, etc., have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since FY1995)	Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)
Utilities costs	❍ Electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage and fuel costs (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the GOJ since FY1991 (by gradually increasing the costs borne by the GOJ, the total amount has been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since FY1995)	Special Measures Agreement (FY1991)
	❍ The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (FY1996) has been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since FY2001	Special Measures Agreement (FY2001)
	❍ The GOJ will bear the costs for fuel etc., equivalent to the FY2007 budget of 25.3 billion yen for FY2008, and those equivalent to 24.9 billion yen, a reduction of 1.5% from the FY2007 budget for FY2009 and 2010	Special Measures Agreement (FY2008)
Training relocation costs	❍ Additionally required costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the GOJ have been borne by the GOJ since FY1996	Special Measures Agreement (FY1996)

Note 1: Concerning the costs for FIP, the Government of Japan formulated the "Criteria for adopting FIP projects" to make an effort for efficiency in the implementation of FIP as follows:
1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, and others), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily considering necessity, urgency, and other factors.
2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profit-oriented (shopping malls and others).

Due to soaring prices and wages in Japan since the mid-1970s, and changes in the international economy, the United States has felt considerable pressure in bearing the costs for the stationing of the USFJ. In consideration of such circumstances, and with a view to making efforts to the greatest extent possible within the framework of SOFA, the Government of Japan began to bear labor costs such as welfare costs (costs for the employee's welfare) in FY1978. Then in FY1979, due to the suddenly stronger yen against the dollar, Japan began to bear costs for facilities improvement programs.

Furthermore, as the labor costs soared due to changes in economic conditions that affected both countries, employment stability of the employees was adversely impacted, and there was even concern that it would affect the activities of the USFJ. Therefore in 1987 the governments of Japan and the United States agreed on a special measure in Article 24 of SOFA (the Special Measures Agreement)[23] as a provisional measure for an exception to the cost principle in SOFA. Based on this agreement, the Government of Japan would bear labor costs such as the adjustment allowance (currently replaced by the regional allowance), and as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) was revised later on, the costs borne by the Government of Japan expanded to cover labor costs for base pay, etc., and utility costs from FY1991, and its financial responsibility further expanded to cover training relocation costs from FY1996.

Still, Japan carefully considered its own difficult financial situation in relation to the costs borne by Japan for the stationing of the USFJ and they peaked in the FY1999 budget (annual expenditure base) and have since been declining.

Under the new SMA put into effect in May 2008, the framework of the previous SMA will be maintained for the sharing of labor costs and training relocation costs; while costs such as those for utilities will be reduced at a fixed rate. The new agreement also states that the U.S. Government will make further efforts to reduce its expenditures. Furthermore, an agreement was made between the U.S. and Japanese Governments for a comprehensive review of cost sharing for the stationing of the USFJ in order to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness.

(See Figure III-2-3-14, 15)

Fig. III-2-3-15 Outline of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ (FY2010 Budget)



Notes: 1. The grand total has dropped by 2.4% from the previous year.
2. Numbers in parentheses represent the relative composition within the whole.

Section 4. Measures Relating to the Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

In order to ensure the stability of the U.S. Forces stationed in Japan (the significance of which is described in Section 2), the Ministry of Defense is maintaining its U.S. Forces-based deterrence through a number of measures —including force posture realignment of the U.S. Forces in Japan— and continuing to make efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of communities living near USFJ facilities and areas by reducing the burden on such communities in locations such as Okinawa.

The U.S. Forces realignment outlined in the previous section in particular, is an extremely important effort to maintain deterrence while reducing the burden on local communities, such as Okinawa. The Ministry of Defense will steadily advance the U.S Forces' realignment operations described in the Roadmap, based both on the perspectives of security and that of reducing the burden on local communities.

This chapter will describe measures to gain genuine acceptance of the USFJ by the Japanese people.

1. Stationing of U.S. Forces in Okinawa

As of January 2010, approximately 74% of the USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) is concentrated in Okinawa Prefecture, occupying approximately 10% of the land area of the prefecture, and 18% of the main island. The Cabinet regards the issues associated with the concentration of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa as some of the most important issues, and they are being addressed as such by the whole Government. For some time, the Ministry of Defense has also been implementing a range of measures to facilitate the resolution of problems, and making the maximum possible efforts while striving for harmony between the accomplishment of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty objectives and the desires of the local community.

1. Pre-SACO Efforts for Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction of USFJ Facilities and Areas

When Okinawa was returned to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km^2 for exclusive use by the USFJ under the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. However, their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment and reduction on the grounds that promotion and development of the region, as well as planned growth are restricted and the lives of residents are seriously affected.

In view of these circumstances, both countries have continued their efforts to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, focusing on items that are strongly requested by local communities. In light of the items identified by the joint statement issued by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan and then President Richard Nixon of the United States in 1972, a plan for the realignment and consolidation of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa was authorized by the SCC held in 1973, 1974, and 1976. In relation to the so-called 23 issues, it was agreed in 1990 that both sides would proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the return of land. Furthermore, regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues strongly emphasized by the residents of the prefecture (the return of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104), under the agreement reached at the Japan–U.S. Summit of 1995 it was agreed that efforts would be made to resolve these issues.

(See Reference 50)

2. Outline and Current Situation regarding SACO

Public interest in Okinawa-related issues heightened across the country in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995 as well as the refusal of then Governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land.

Fig. III-2-4-1 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report

[Return Land]

1. Already Returned

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Aha Training Area (Return of total area)	• Completed in December 1998 (cancellation of joint use)
Sobe Communication Site (Return of total area)	• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including communication facilities such as antennas and others to Camp Hansen • June 2006: Land to which the Special Measure Law for USFJ Land was applied (approx. 236 m²) was returned • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Sobe Communication Site totally returned [approximately 53 ha])
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (Return of total area)	• October 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the return of the Sobe Communication Site • July 2006: Partially returned (approximately 138 ha) • December 2006: Remaining portion (approximately 53 ha) returned (Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield totally returned [approximately 191 ha])
Senaha Communication Station (Return of most areas)	• March 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return after the relocation of communication systems including antennas and others to Torii Communication Station • September 2006: Partially returned (approximately 61 ha excluding the microwave tower portion) • October 2006: The microwave power portion consolidated into Torii Communication Station

2. Process for Return in Progress

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Northern Training Area (Return of more than half the area)	• April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on land return following the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones (HLZ) and others • December 1998–March 2000: Environmental survey (past year survey) • November 2002–March 2004: Environmental survey (continuous environmental survey) • February 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the change of agreement in April 1999 (HLZs: from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation from 75 m to 45 m in diameter) • February–March 2007: Environmental impact assessment document was released and examined • March 2007: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of the HLZs (Phase I: three out of six) • July 2007: Construction of HLZs started • January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of the HLZs (Phase II: the remaining three HLZs)
Gimbaru Training Area (Return of total area)	• June 2007: The mayor of Kin-cho announced acceptance of the return conditions for the Gimbaru Training Area • January 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on land return after the HLZ was relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities were relocated to Camp Hansen • December 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of HLZ and Mud Removal Facility and the site development of Fire Fighting Training Facility • June 2009: Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of Fire Fighting Training Facility • November 2009: HLZ was furnished

3. Specific Measures Stated in the "Japan–U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
MCAS Futenma (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	See Fig. III-2-4-4, "Background for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)" * May 2006: Completion of the FRF (having two runways laid out in a "V"-shape) by 2014 aimed at in the Japan–U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

Fig. III-2-4-1 State of Progress of the SACO Final Report

Camp Kuwae (Return of most areas → Return of total area)*	• July 2002: Youth center was furnished • March 2003: Part of northern side returned (approximately 38 ha) • January 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital and other related facilities • December 2006: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of the Naval Hospital • February 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of support facilities (HLZ, etc.) of the Naval Hospital • December 2008: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the construction of support facilities (Utility) of the Naval Hospital • May 2009: Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (BEQ, etc.) • October 2009, Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the construction of related facilities of the Naval Hospital (Water tank facility) * May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Makiminato Service Area (Return of partial area → Return of total area)*	* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Naha Port Facility (Return of total area → Return of total area)*	* May 2006: Described as total return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation
Housing Consolidation Camp Zukeran (Return of partial area → Return of partial area)*	(Phase I: Golf Range Area) • April 1999: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • July 2002: Two highrises were furnished • July 2006: An underpass was furnished (Phase II: Sada Area) • February 2002: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • September 2005: Two highrises, 38 townhouses, and others were furnished (Phase III: Eastern Chatan Area) • March 2004: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • June 2008: 35 townhouses and others were furnished (Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area) • March 2005: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to an agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and others • February 2010: 24 townhouses constructed in Upper Plaza Area were furnished * May 2006: Described as partial return in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

[Adjust Training and Operation Methods]

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104	• Relocated to five maneuver areas in mainland Japan in FY1997
Parachute Drop Training	• Relocation training conducted at Iejima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000

[Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives]

1. Already Implemented

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	• Furnished in July 2000

2. Implementation Underway

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp at Kadena Air Base	• September 2008: Rinse Facility was furnished • February 2009: The Japan–U.S. Joint Committee came to agreement on the relocation of Navy Ramp

3. Specific Measures Stated in "the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"

Name of Facility (Project)	State of Progress
Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base*	* May 2006: United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation stated that the KC-130 squadron would be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and that the aircraft would regularly deploy on a rotational bases for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam

Considering that the burden on the people of Okinawa should be reduced as much as possible and shared by the whole nation, the Government has, for the sake of the future development of Okinawa, decided to put even greater efforts towards the realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas, and to do its utmost to take measures for regional development in Okinawa. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture, and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) between Japan and the United States in 1995.

Since then, the issues on Okinawa were intensely discussed for about one year, and the so-called SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

Fig. III-2-4-2 Facilities and Areas Relating to the SACO Final Report



Fig. III-2-4-3 Changes in Number and Area of USFJ Facilities and Areas (exclusive use) in Okinawa



The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land (the total return of six facilities, including MCAS Futenma, and the partial return of five others, such as the Northern Training Area), the adjustment of training and operational procedures (the termination of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 and the dispersion of similar live-fire training into maneuver areas on mainland Japan), the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and the improvement of operational procedures regarding the Status of Forces Agreement. The land to be returned based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km^2) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, exceeding the amount of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report, which is roughly 43km^2.

The facilities and areas relating to the SACO Final Report, as well as major progress, are described in Figures III-2-4-1 and III-2-4-2.

As a result of the above efforts, the number of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) in Okinawa, as well as the land area, have changed, as described in Figure III-2-4-3.
(See Reference 51)

3. History and Current Status of U.S. Forces Realignment in Okinawa

In efforts relating to realignment of U.S. Forces too, measures have been implemented to reduce the burden on the local communities in Okinawa Prefecture. The details of these are as follows.

(1) Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma Replacement Facility, etc.

MCAS Futenma fulfils the following functions relating to the aerial capabilities of the U.S Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa (USMC in Okinawa):

1) Transport of Marine ground forces by helicopter, etc.
2) Operation of air refueling aircraft
3) A base for accepting aircraft in emergency

However, since the air station is situated in an urban area, its prompt return has been strongly desired by the local residents, due to problems such as the safety of the community, noise, and traffic. Therefore, arrangements are being made toward the goal of returning the air station, by implementing each of the following steps, with regard to the functions of MCAS Futenma.

a. Transport of Marine Ground Forces by Helicopter, etc.

(a) Situation Regarding Planning Based on the SACO Final Report

In the SACO Final Report compiled in December 1996, it was agreed that within 5–7 years, after adequate replacement facilities had been completed, MCAS Futenma would be completely returned.

Progress regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) subsequent to the report is described in Figure III-2-4-4. Based on this, as well as the occurrence of a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter crash in Ginowan City in August 2004, in order to resolve the unease of the residents living in the vicinity, an investigation was conducted into methods to realize relocation and return of MCAS Futenma as early as possible, through a process of negotiation between Japan and the United States in relation to the realignment of the USFJ.

(b) Basic Concept of the Study of the FRF in the Roadmap

The U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa consist of air, ground, logistics, and command elements, and the interaction of those elements in actual operations is necessary. Therefore, it was determined that the FRF needs to be located within Okinawa Prefecture so that rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be located near the other elements with which they train or operate on a regular basis.

Based on recognition of the above, in the SCC document prepared in October 2005 the initiative to “locate

Fig. III-2-4-4 Background for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station

Month & Year	Background
April 1996	Prime Minister Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador Mondale held a meeting and the total return of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma (MCAS Futenma) was announced. SACO Interim Report. ➔ The airfield will be returned within five to seven years after the completion of an adequate replacement facility
December	SACO Final Report ➔ A maritime facility will be constructed off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa (one that can be dismantled)
November 1999	Governor of Okinawa Inamine stated that he had chosen the Henoko coast region of Nago city as a candidate for the facility relocation on the condition that it would be for joint military civilian use
December	Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF "Government Policy on Relocation of MCAS Futenma" (Cabinet decision) ➔ Construction in the "Nago city Henoko coastal region in the water area of Camp Schwab"
July 2002	"Basic Agreement Regarding the Use of Replacement Facilities" concluded. "Regarding the Basic Plan for Replacement Facilities for MCAS Futenma" prepared. ➔ scale, construction methods, and specific construction site decided
November 2003	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visits Okinawa
April 2004	The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure started (abolished in 2007)
August	A U.S. Force helicopter crashed into a university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa
October 2005	"2+2" Joint Statement ➔ Agreement on a new plan (an L shape plan connecting the coastal area of Camp Schwab with the adjacent water area of Oura bay)
April 2006	"Basic Agreement Regarding the Construction of the MCAS Futenma Replacement Facility" concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency, the Mayor of Nago, and the village mayor of Ginoza ➔ Agreement was reached by creating flight paths that do not fly over the surrounding region (the V shape plan)
May	"2+2" Joint Statement. ➔ Final adjustments made for the "Japan–U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation", V shape plan approved "Basic Confirmation Regarding the Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Okinawa" concluded between the Director General of the Defense Agency and the governor of Okinawa "GOJ Efforts for USFJ Force Structure Realignment and Others" (Cabinet decision) Cabinet decision of December 1999 was abolished
August	Establishment of the Council on Measures for Relocation of MCAS Futenma
June 2007	Environmental survey of existing conditions started
August	EIA procedure started
March 2008	Survey based on the EIA scoping document started
May 2009	"The Guam Agreement" approved by the Diet
September	Conclusion of a three-party coalition government agreement between the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the People's New Party ➔ Agreement on reviewing the modalities for the U.S. Forces realignment and U.S. Forces bases in Japan
November	Establishment of the Ministerial-Level Working Group on the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station. Japan–U.S. summit meeting. ➔ Agreement on resolving the relocation of Futenma Air Station expeditiously through the working group
December	Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies convened, Exploratory Committee for the Okinawa Bases Issue established
January 2010	"2+2" Joint Statement ➔ Confirmation of efforts to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, including Okinawa
May	"2+2" Joint Statement. ➔ Intention to locate the Futenma replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters was confirmed "Government Efforts Related to Items Authorized by the United States–Japan Security Consultative Committee on May 28, 2010" (Cabinet decision)

the FRF in an 'L'-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay" was approved. Then, based on negotiation and agreement with the local municipalities (beginning with Nago City), it was decided to stipulate in the Roadmap that the FRF be located in a configuration that "combines Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays." In regard to construction of this replacement facility, "a Memorandum of Basic Understanding" was exchanged between the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and then Director General of the Defense Agency in May 2006.
(See Reference 41)

(c) Review of Destination for MCAS Futenma Relocation

With the change of government in September 2009, it was decided that the details of prior Japan–U.S. agreements relating to the realignment of the USFJ would be reviewed. In particular, the entire government has carried out intense studies on the FRF, from the perspective of maintaining deterrence, while aiming to eliminate the risk posed to residents near MCAS Futenma and reducing the burden on Okinawa.

After the change of regime, the process whereby the proposal for the Futenma Air Station replacement facility specified in the roadmap was decided has been verified within the government. Then, in a meeting held on November 10 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada and U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos, the establishment of a "cabinet level working group on the FRF"[24] (WG) as a process related to this verification by the Japanese and U.S. Governments was agreed. The cabinet level WG was held on November 17 and December 4, and based on the fundamental concept pervading the whole of the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan (of maintaining deterrence, while reducing the burden on local communities such as Okinawa), consultation was conducted relating to the verification process, including an exchange of explanations into areas such as political conditions within Japan.

Based on the discussions carried out at the WG, on one hand the Government recognized the significance of past agreements between Japan and the United States, while on the other it was forecasted that the completion of relocation would become ever more distant, when considering the effects exerted on national politics if the relocation was forced (based on the FRF plan described in the Roadmap). Consequently, it was determined that further study of the issue would be performed by the entire Government.

Based on the above, on December 28, 2009 the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues (formed of committee members from the three ruling parties) was established with the Chief Cabinet Secretary as chairman, under the Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies[25]. The Committee engaged in active discussion in areas including verifications relating to details about the course of decision of the FRF plan as set out in the Roadmap, and wide-ranging review of the various options, on a zero-basis and without any specific premise. Not only had the Committee held meetings eight times by March 8, 2010, but on February 10 and 11, 2010 the Committee visited Guam to observe the site.

As a result of these studies, in a joint "2+2" announcement made on May 28, 2010, the intention to locate the MCAS Futenma replacement facility in the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and the adjacent waters was confirmed, while it was agreed with the U.S. that a range of concrete measures would be taken to reduce the burden on Okinawa. Details regarding the location, configuration, and construction method for the MCAS Futenma replacement facility were studied by experts from the governments of both the United States and Japan until the end of August this year; the subsequent verification and validation would be completed by the time of the next "2+2."

During the deliberation process which led to these conclusions, first of all, it was determined that from a security perspective, the USFJ deterrence (which includes the Marine Corps) cannot be lessened at this time, while there remains instability and uncertainty in the East Asian security environment. Furthermore, there was concern that the functions of the Marine Corps would be weakened if the helicopter units associated with MCAS

Futenma were to be detached from the other Marine units stationed in Okinawa and moved abroad or out of the prefecture. Therefore, the conclusion was reached that the MCAS Futenma replacement facility had to be within Okinawa Prefecture.

In addition, the decision to locate the Futenma replacement facility in the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and the adjacent waters was one which prioritized the reduction of the burden and the elimination of risk to local communities, due to the fact that Futenma could not be returned unless a decision was made on the replacement facility.

On the same day as the "2+2" Joint Statement, Cabinet approval was given for immediate governmental efforts pertaining to the items agreed in the "2+2". These are outlined as follows.

- ○ The Government will proceed with verification and validation of the relocation plan for MCAS Futenma, based on the joint announcement.
- ○ The burden incurred by the concentration of bases in Okinawa Prefecture is to be reduced and the duties of the Alliance are to be fulfilled by Japan as a whole. Meanwhile, the dispersal of bases to outside of Okinawa Prefecture or abroad, and the streamlining and reduction in size of USFJ bases, will continue to be addressed in order to further deepen the Japan–U.S. Alliance.
- ○ Furthermore, specific measures are to be implemented swiftly, such as the relocation of training outside Okinawa Prefecture, environmental measures, and the joint/shared use of facilities between the U.S. Forces and SDF.
- ○ It was clarified that at the same time, further efforts would be made to gain the understanding of concerned local public entities, beginning with Okinawa Prefectural Government,

In the future, the Government will do its utmost to reduce the burden on the local community in Okinawa and eliminate the danger of MCAS Futenma.

(See Reference 48, 49)

b. Operation of Air Refueling

Air refueling aircraft KC-130 (12 in total) are to be relocated from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni (in Yamaguchi Prefecture) under the Roadmap as well as the SACO Final Report. They will be regularly deployed on a rotational basis to the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Kanoya Base (in Kagoshima Prefecture) and Guam for training and operations. Consultations are being held between Japan and the United States pertaining to training and operations at Kanoya Base.

c. A Base for Accepting Aircraft in Emergency

Use by U.S Forces of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) Nyutabaru Air Base (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki Air Base (in Fukuoka Prefecture) in case of emergency will be enhanced. When site surveys are completed, facility improvements for this will be made according to necessity before Futenma Air Station is returned. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support bilateral training activities, which should be expanded according to the studies on roles, missions, and capabilities.

Furthermore, the improvement of use of civilian facilities by U.S. Forces in case of emergency will be examined in the Japan–U.S. efforts of planning-study, and appropriate measures will be taken in order to realize the return of Futenma Air Station.

d. Efforts to Eliminate Risk at Futenma Air Station

In August 2007, the Ministry of Defense announced various measures as part of efforts to remove risks at Futenma Air Station such as 1) improving approach and takeoff routes, and avoiding areas of high residential density as much as possible, 2) expanding clear zones[26] and other measures for safe return from traffic patterns

of MCAS Futenma when there is engine trouble[27], 3) improving facilities to increase the visibility of runways at night, and 4) developing automatic flight control systems rather than relying on eyesight. The Ministry of Defense has been steadily implementing these measures, and in May 2009, the efforts were all completed.

Inhabitants near MCAS Futenma have indicated that the Ministry of Defense is not following the traffic patterns described in the efforts. The Ministry of Defense therefore purchased and installed aircraft route observation equipment and cameras, and in January 2010 commenced continuous helicopter flight situations assessment.

(2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, the personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam[28] and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned. Due to this realignment in Okinawa, it is planned that approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will be relocated from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. U.S. Marine Corps Forces remaining in Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.

Fig. III-2-4-5 Breakdown of Cost of Relocating U.S. Forces to Guam

	Project	Sources	Amount	
Cost borne by Japan	Administration buildings, instruction buildings, barracks, and QOL facilities	(Direct) fiscal spending	$2.8 billion (maximum)	
	Family housing	Equity investment	$1.5 billion	$2.55 billion
		Loan, etc.	$0.63 billion	
		Cost reduction by improved efficiency	$0.42 billion	
	Utilities (electricity, water and waste water, and solid waste disposal)	Loan, etc.	$0.74 billion	
	Total		$6.09 billion	
Cost borne by the United States	Helidromes, communication facilities, training support facilities, maintenance and refilling facilities, fuel and ammunition warehouses, and other basic facilities	(Direct) fiscal spending	$3.18 billion	
	Roads (high-standard roads)	Loan or (direct) fiscal spending	$1 billion	
	Total		$4.18 billion	
Aggregate amount			$10.27 billion	

Notes: 1. The details of the projects are based on the estimates at the planning stage, and the amount and schemes are subject to change.
2. Japan is committed to sharing cost not according to the ratio to the total amount but based on the amount required for each of the facilities and infrastructures.
The cost will be further examined. Under the Agreement, Japanese direct fiscal spending is up to 2.8 billion dollars in U.S. 2008 fiscal year (real value has been converted using the dollar-based purchasing power in the relevant fiscal year).
3. As for family housing, the cost was reduced by $0.42 billion (by improved efficiency) from $2.55 billion to $2.13 billion.
4. As for equity investment and loans, the amount spent will be recovered through rents and fees paid by the United States.
5. The cost of moving the Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam and the cost for the Corps' activities in Guam are not included in the aggregate amount of $10.27 billion.
6. Direct fiscal spending by both the U.S. and Japan includes infrastructure development projects.

As for the costs of relocating U.S. Forces to Guam, the Government of Japan held consultations with the United States with a view that each side should share an appropriate portion of the costs. At the Japan–U.S. defense summit meeting held in April 2006, both sides agreed on the sharing of the costs linked to provision of facilities and infrastructure associated with the relocation of U.S. Forces to Guam, as described in Figure III-2-4-5.

(See 3 of this Section)

The relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam is extremely important for advancing the realignment of U.S. Forces and reducing the burden on Okinawa. The Ministry of Defense has held constant consultations on how to implement the Roadmap with the U.S. Government, with the intention of steadily carrying out the realignment of U.S. Forces in accordance with the Roadmap.

Consequently, with regard to projects for which Japan takes measures in the form of direct cash contributions (so-called Mamizu projects [29]), in order to legally guarantee that actions taken by Japan and the United States such as the provision of funding over multiple years by Japan are on a more solid footing, the Japanese government signed the Guam Agreement (Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel

Fig. III-2-4-6 Details of *Mamizu* Projects in FY2010 budget



Note: Areas subject to the projects are conceptual and do not indicate specific sites.

and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam) on February 17, 2009, which was then enacted on May 19 of the same year.
(See Fig. III-2-4-6) (See Reference 44)

(3) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

a. Return of Significant Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base

USFJ facilities and areas are located in densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base (approximately 1,500ha in total). Following the relocation and return of Futenma Air Station, and the relocation of III MEF personnel to Guam described above, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

The Roadmap has stipulated the development of a detailed consolidation plan for the six candidate facilities (Camp Kuwae, Camp Zukeran, Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha Port, and Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1), and is currently under consultation between Japan and the United States.
(See Section 3-3)

b. Steady Implementation of the SACO Final Report

The steady implementation of the SACO Final Report prepared in 1996 is important because it aims to sufficiently maintain the capabilities and readiness of the USFJ and to reduce impacts of operations of U.S. Forces on local residents of Okinawa. In the Roadmap, Japan and the United States agreed to the possibility that the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.

c. Joint Use of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

The SDF has only a limited number of facilities in Okinawa, including Naha Air Base, and most of them are located in urbanized areas with some operational restriction. Therefore, the joint use of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the training environment for SDF units in Okinawa, and facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between the SDF and U.S. Forces. It will become possible to improve readiness and contribute to maintaining the safety of local residents at a time of disaster.

Based on such concepts, it was decided that Camp Hansen would be used for Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) training, and training commenced in March 2008. The ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. Forces while taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(4) Link among Realignment Initiatives

Within the overall realignment package in the Roadmap, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are linked. Specifically, consolidation and land returns in the south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.

The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: 1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and 2) Japan's financial contribution to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure in Guam.

4. Efforts for the Use of Returned Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas

Regarding the return of private and public land used for USFJ facilities and areas (land used by the USFJ), the Ministry of Defense has been taking measures to restore vacated land to its original state by removing buildings, structures, and so on.

Furthermore, benefits are to be provided to the owners of sites in Okinawa Prefecture, under the Special Measures Law for the Return of Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa, and in addition, under

the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development, benefits are provided for the owner of large-scale vacated land or designated vacated land.

Pursuant to the Policy toward Tasks in Each Field Related to Promotion and Facilitation of Utilizing Returned Land Used for Futenma Air Station, formulated in December 2001, related municipalities have been making efforts to establish returned land use plans. In February 2006, Okinawa Prefecture and Ginowan City established a basic policy for the use of returned land used for Futenma Air Station. The Ministry of Defense will continue efforts to promote and facilitate the utilization of vacated land in coordination and cooperation with related ministries and prefectural and municipal governments.

2. Stationing of the USFJ in Regions other than Okinawa

In regions other than Okinawa, the Ministry of Defense is implementing measures to secure the stable presence of the USFJ by maintaining the USFJ deterrence and trying to reduce the burden on local communities. This

Fig. III-2-4-7 Facilities and Areas Related to the Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture



section will explain the current situation regarding measures of this kind, such as the realignment of U.S. Forces, including the question of how they are being executed in each of the regions, excluding Okinawa.

1. Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

The ideal state of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture has been discussed between Japan and the United States due to the strong desire from local public and other organizations for their return. As a result, the basic concept pertaining to the return of 6 facilities and areas (including Naval Communication Facility Kamiseya in Yokohama), as well as the construction of approximately 700 housing units for U.S. Forces families in the Yokohama area of the "Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex" were agreed in October 2004, in the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee.

The construction of these U.S. Forces family housing units 1) paves the way to the large-scale return of six USFJ facilities and areas in the prefecture, extending to approximately 419 ha; 2) solves the current housing shortage faced by the U.S. Navy in Japan, and is thus vital to attaining the objectives of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense is continuing to coordinate with the United States and local public entities and others, and striving toward the realization of this goal, through procedures such as environmental impact statement (EIS) process.

(See Fig. III-2-4-7)

2. Current Situation Regarding the Realignment of the USFJ

(1) Improvement of U.S. Army Japan Command and Control Capacity

To have enhanced mobility and readiness as well as to enable joint missions, the headquarters of U.S. Army Japan (USARJ) at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) was activated as the headquarters of the I Corps (Forward)/ USARJ in December 2007 and the reorganization [30] took place at the end of September 2008. This reorganization is based on the global realignment of the U.S. Army as part of the overall transformation of U.S. Forces. The reorganized USARJ headquarters in Japan will continue to hold the same core mission of defending Japan and maintaining the peace and security of the Far East.

To enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters that unitarily controls mobile operation units and specialized units will be relocated to Camp Zama [31] by FY2012 so that it can strengthen coordination with the reorganized USARJ headquarters.

In accordance with the transformation of USARJ headquarters, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD, in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In addition, measures will be implemented for more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and the SGD, including partial return of facilities and areas. The partial return of land (approx. 17 ha) at SGD facilities and areas was approved by the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee in June 2008.

(2) Yokota Air Base and Airspace

a. Establishment of the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)

Enhancement of coordination between headquarters, combined with the transition to a joint operations structure, is quite important from the perspective of ensuring flexible and rapid responses of the SDF and U.S. Forces. The headquarters of the USFJ located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important role in the various mechanisms [32] under the Guidelines. Therefore, along with the relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command as mentioned below, the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) [33] is to be established and it is planned to commence operations at the BJOCC during FY2010.

b. Relocation of ASDF Air Defense Command

The ASDF Air Defense Command located in Fuchu City, Tokyo has an air defense mission as well as a function as a headquarters for ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations. In the case of air defense and BMD, response time is very short. Therefore, it is quite important for the SDF and U.S. Forces to immediately share necessary information. Thus, in FY2010, ASDF Air Defense Command and its relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base, where the headquarters of U.S. 5th Air Force is located, and construction/installation work[34] is being conducted. This arrangement and the establishment of the above-mentioned BJOCC will make it possible to enhance coordination between headquarters of the SDF and U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.

c. Yokota Airspace

At Yokota Air Base, U.S. Forces conduct radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata Prefecture. To facilitate the operation of civilian airplanes that enter the airspace, however, the following measures are pursued.

Fig. III-2-4-8 Yokota Airspace



(a) Establish a program in FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of procedures for transiting Yokota airspace.

(b) Develop procedures in FY2006 for the temporary transfer of responsibility for air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities, when not required by military purposes.

(c) Return air traffic control of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese authorities by September 2008 after having identified the returned to be returned by October 2006.

(d) Complete a study[35] of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace by FY2009.

In response, the procedure mentioned in (b) as above started in September 2006. With regard to (c), the themes of 1) identification of the airspace portions to be returned by September 2008 and 2) collocation of U.S. Forces and SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (Yokota RAPCON) facility were mutually agreed by the Governments of Japan and the United States in October of the same year.

With regard to measure 1) above, the area adjacent to the west side of Haneda Airport was reduced by about 40% on September 25, 2008 and the control operation was returned to Japan. With respect to measure 2) above, the collocation of U.S. Forces and Japanese controllers started in May 2007. The lessons learned here are to be taken into account when considering (d), which is at present, being advanced.

(See Fig. III-2-4-8)

d. Civilian-Military Dual Use of Yokota Air Base

At the Japan–U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, it was agreed that the feasibility of a civilian-military dual use of Yokota Air Base would be bilaterally studied by both governments. A Liaison Conference was then established as a working panel attended by relevant ministries and agencies (the Cabinet Secretariat; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; the Defense Agency (now reorganized as the Ministry of Defense); and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (then)) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Since then, discussions have been made.

The Governments of Japan and the United States have conducted a study, starting in October 2006, of the specific conditions and modalities in the study group, with the understanding that the dual use will not compromise military operations and safety of Yokota Air Base[36]. Based on further coordination and the outcome of the study, both governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions.

(3) Measures relating to U.S. Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Base and Iwakuni Air Base

a. Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carriers

The presence of the U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in maintaining the regional peace and stability, including the safety of maritime traffic, in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. aircraft carriers are the core capability of the Fleet. In order to ensure the long-term forward deployment capabilities of aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft, it is necessary to secure an operational base in Japan. The nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington is currently forward deployed to Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture).

Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have excellent combatant and operational capabilities. Since they are driven by energy generated in a nuclear reactor, there is no need to replenish fuel, and they are able to maintain the high speeds necessary for the operation of aircraft. Having a strong U.S. Navy presence continuously maintained in areas surrounding Japan by deploying the nuclear carrier George Washington would contribute to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Furthermore, it would symbolize the deep commitment of the United States to the Japan–U.S. Alliance.

The U.S. Navy vows that it will continue to ensure that all of its nuclear-powered warships (including the nuclear carrier *George Washington*) adhere to the relevant safety policies. For example, the nuclear reactor will

normally be shut down while the aircraft carrier is anchored, and repair work and fuel changes will not be carried out in Japan. The Government of Japan intends to continue taking all possible measures to ensure safety.

With regard to the nuclear aircraft carrier *George Washington*, since September 2006, working level talks for disaster prevention and safety measures pertaining to nuclear aircraft carriers have been underway between Japan and the United States. Since 2007, organizations such as government agencies, Yokosuka City, and the U.S. Navy have been participating in joint Japan–U.S. training, and the nuclear aircraft carrier George Washington has been taking part as of 2008.

b. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing

When the U.S. aircraft carrier is in port in Yokosuka, Atsugi Air Facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture) is currently used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Facility is located in the center of an urban district, noise of carrier jets taking off and landing particularly has been a problem for a long time.

Such problems should be resolved as soon as possible in order to stably maintain the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and the operations of carriers under the arrangements from now into the future.

After the completion of the runway relocation project at MCAS Iwakuni, the safe operations of aircraft will be possible in a less intrusive manner that is more conducive to the living environment of the surrounding communities.

In consideration of these matters, Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni. This relocation, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C and C-2 aircraft (59 aircraft in total), will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.

The relocations will be 1) conducted after the runway is moved offshore to mitigate impacts of the increased operations at MCAS Iwakuni due to this relocation. Related measures will also be taken, including 2) the relocation of MSDF EP-3 and other aircraft from MCAS Iwakuni to Atsugi Air Facility, 3) the regular rotational deployment of KC-130 aircraft (which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to MCAS Iwakuni) to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam, and 4) the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam.

It is expected that the area requiring residential noise-abatement work (so-called first category area) will decrease from approximately 1,600ha to 500ha. Thus, the noise around MCAS Iwakuni will be alleviated. Furthermore, safety will be improved as the runway will be relocated offshore and approach and takeoff routes will be established above the water.

As for field-carrier landing practice (FCLP), a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent FCLP facility is to be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site at the earliest possible date. In addition, the SCC document confirmed that U.S. Forces will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent FCLP training facility is identified.

c. Iwakuni Runway Relocation Project

In response to requests of Iwakuni City and other local governments, the Governments of Japan has decided to proceed with the project to relocate the runway approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore) to solve the problems associated with the operations, safety, and noise, and to ensure the stable use of MCAS Iwakuni. Part of the new runway is already complete, and has commenced operation, while the remaining parts are planned for completion by the end of FY2010. After the completion of this project, the safe operations of aircraft will be possible in a less intrusive manner that is more conducive to the living environment of the surrounding communities.

d. Resumption of Commercial Aviation at Iwakuni Air Station

Considering that the local public entities, including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, have been working together to request the resumption of commercial aviation operations, the Government of Japan and the United States have been engaged in discussions to identify such issues as the relations between commercial aviation resumption and the operations of U.S. Forces and to study its feasibility. As a result, in October 2005, it was agreed that commercial aviation operations of four round trips per day would be allowed as long as such operations do not compromise U.S. military operational requirements.

Since it was then agreed in the Roadmap that portions of the future civilian air facility would be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni, bilateral coordination has been carried out, and the Ministry of Defense explained the location of commercial aviation facilities to the local public entities in May 2007.

(4) Ballistic Missile Defense

As confirmed in the examination on roles, missions and capabilities, Japan and the United States will continue close coordination on ballistic missile defense (BMD) as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities.

In June 2006 the new U.S. Forward Based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) Radar System (AN/TPY-2; hereafter referred to as the "X-Band Radar System") with the sophisticated capability to search and track ballistic missiles was deployed to ASDF Shariki Air Station (in Aomori Prefecture) and operations commenced[37]. The data obtained by the X-Band Radar System will be shared by the two countries. Thereby, the capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for protecting Japanese nationals and coping with damage will improve.

Also in October 2006 U.S. Army Patriot PAC-3 capabilities were deployed to Kadena Air Base and Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, and in addition, Aegis-equipped cruisers, which are forward-deployed in the Western Pacific region, have been installed with BMD capabilities over some phases since August 2006.

This deployment of U.S. Forces' BMD capabilities to Japan contributes to the improvement of our country's defense against missile attacks, the maintenance of deterrence of the USFJ and the safety of Japanese citizens.

(5) Training Relocation

As for training relocation[38], aircraft from three U.S. military facilities — Kadena Air Base, Misawa Air Base (in Aomori Prefecture), and Iwakuni Air Station — participate in bilateral training with the SDF at the following SDF facilities: Chitose (in Hokkaido), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru for the time being.

Since March 2007, USFJ have conducted training relocation exercises from Misawa Air Base, Iwakuni Air Station, and Kadena Air Base to JASDF Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru Air Bases. Based on the past site surveys, the Ministry of Defense, is now making necessary improvements to infrastructure to facilitate the training relocation at the SDF facilities .

Efforts to ensure the smooth implementation of the training relocation are presently underway in order to support the USFJ (cooperating with the JASDF) and achieve the safety and peace of mind of the local residents during the training periods. These efforts include the establishment of local contact headquarters by concerned Regional Defense Bureaus, establishment of liaison with concerned government institutions, and support for local residents.

3. Initiatives for Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of the USFJ

In order to smoothly implement the realignment of the USFJ based on the Roadmap, the "Law Concerning Special Measures on Smooth Implementation of the Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and related SDF Forces[39] ("USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law") was enacted in August 2007.The following is a general description of that law.

1. Realignment Grants

During a period of time before and after the implementation of realignment (10 years in principle), realignment grants will be awarded to help cover the expenses of projects[40] which contribute to increasing the convenience of the lives of residents of local municipalities[41] affected by the realignment, and to stimulate local industry. To this end, they will be awarded in accordance with progress in steps of the USFJ realignment, after the Defense Minister designates the specified defense facilities and neighboring municipalities affected by realignment.[42]

Based on the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, in October 2007, 14 defense facilities and 33 municipalities were designated, and by 2008 further 6 municipalities had been additionally designated. At present, 39 municipalities have been designated to receive realignment grants.

2. Exceptional Subsidy Rates for Public Projects, etc.

Due to the large-scale relocation of forces, some municipalities must promptly carry out public projects (such as improvement of roads and harbors). Therefore, exceptional subsidy rates have been set for such projects. The public works, as mentioned above, will be implemented by the national government or prefectures and, in some cases, will be beyond the areas of certain municipalities. In these cases, public works may be infeasible with the realignment grants. Therefore, the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law provides such measures as the establishment of a Council for Local Development concerning Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and Related SDF Forces in order to promote industrial development of the areas consisting of municipalities with particularly heavy burdens and surrounding municipalities (Special Area for Development concerning Realignment)[43].
(See Figure III-2-4-9)

Fig. III-2-4-9 Exceptional Subsidy Rates for Public Projects (examples)

Project Name[1]	Ordinary Grant Rates	Exceptional Subsidy Rates	
		Mainland	Okinawa
Roads	1/2	5.5/10	Rate prescribed by the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development (9.5/10 and others)
Harbors	1/2 (4/10)[2]	5.5/10 (4.5/10)[2]	
Fishing ports	1/2	5.5/10	

Notes: 1. In addition, waterworks, sewage, land improvement, and facilities for compulsory education are treated as exceptions.
2. The figures in parentheses show the examples of subsidy rates for the construction and improvement of small-scale water facilities, outlying facilities, and berthing facilities specified by the ordinance of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism as provided for in Article 42.1 of the Port and Harbor Law.

3. Measures Such as Special Provisions over Operations of the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC)

(1) Sharing of the Cost of Relocating U.S. Forces to Guam

The relocation of U.S. Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa outside the prefecture has been strongly desired by the residents of Okinawa Prefecture. It is important to realize at an early date the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps from Okinawa to Guam, which enables the reduction of burdens on Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence capabilities of the USFJ. Therefore, the Government of Japan has actively and energetically approached the United

States to negotiate the relocation. As a result, the two countries agreed to share the costs of the relocation.

If the United States alone undertakes the development of necessary facilities and infrastructure in Guam, the task is expected to take a very long time. Therefore, the Government of Japan decided to support the United States in its development of necessary facilities, including Marine headquarters buildings, barracks and family housing, and infrastructure (electricity, water and wastewater systems, and solid waste disposal). In doing so, Japan will bear the cost for the relocation on the basis of actual requirement of facilities and infrastructure, and not based on a certain percentage of the total costs, which the United States claimed.

Also, the development of family housing and infrastructure for Marine personnel will introduce private sector initiatives and utilize means such as equity investment and loans so that the Government of Japan's financial expenditures are reduced as much as possible. The funds for the projects will be recovered by rents and service charges to be paid by the U.S. side in the future.

The agreed amounts of the costs of relocation to Guam to be shared by Japan and the United States are based on the estimates prepared by the U.S. side at the stage of study, and are only approximations. Therefore, it will be necessary for the Government of Japan to actively examine concrete project schemes and the detailed calculation of costs. Therefore, the Government of Japan will take budgetary measures after thorough examinations have been made in cooperation with the Japan Finance Corporation (JFC) [44] and after efforts have been made to reduce the amount of costs required. (See Fig. III-2-4-5) (See Section 3-3)

(2) Outline of Special Financial Operations of the JFC

To properly and stably implement long-term overseas projects for which private-sector initiatives are utilized, it will be necessary to utilize the capability of the JFC which has expertise and experience in this field. Therefore, a special provision to the JFC's operations was provided that adds U.S. Forces Realignment Expenditure Financial

Fig. III-2-4-10 Image of Project Scheme of Family Housing for Which Private Finance Initiative is Utilized



Notes: 1. SPE: Special Purpose Entity.
2. $1 in the U.S. housing privatization project.
3. Assuming a similar scheme for private projects related to infrastructure.

Service and authorizes the JFC to conduct financial services for facilitating the USFJ realignment as exceptional operations so that the JFC can conduct such operations as equity investments and loans that will be needed for projects to facilitate the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam, and furthermore, a special provision that the Government of Japan will take special financial measures for such operations.
(See Fig. III-2-4-10)

4. Measures for USFJ Local Employees

Under the USFJ realignment, some USFJ facilities and areas will be returned, and U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa will be relocated to Guam. Since this may affect the employment of USFJ local employees, the Government of Japan will take measures to maintain their employment, including education and skill training.
(See Section 3-7)

5. Validity of the Law

Although the law shall be valid for 10 years, measures including special operations of the JFC shall remain effective for a considerable length of time even after its term has passed.

4. Measures to Alleviate the Effects Caused by USFJ Facilities and Areas

1. Efforts to Conserve the Environments Around USFJ Facilities and Areas

In the "2+2" meeting of September 2000, based on the recognition that environmental conservation is important, the governments of both nations agreed to make ensuring the health and safety of residents in the vicinity of USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. Forces personnel and their families and other such parties a common objective, and made the "Joint Statement of Environmental Principles."[45] In order to follow up on this announcement, discussions between Japan and the United States were intensified. Specifically, the concerned ministries and agencies have been working together to address the issue of discussions relating to the strengthening of collaboration in periodical reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS)[46], information exchange pertaining to the environment, and dealing with environmental pollution. The "2+2" meeting of May 2006 also confirmed the importance of Japan–U.S. cooperation in order to improve application of SOFA, including the appropriate consideration given to the environment.

2. Other Measures

In addition to the measures outlined above, Japan is engaged in steps (see III-4-3) for improvement of the living environment in regions surrounding USFJ facilities and areas. It also provides municipalities with base grants[47] which have alternate features in terms of fixed asset taxes.

Moreover, in the vicinities of USFJ facilities and areas, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. military personnel and others have affected local areas and their residents. The Government of Japan has requested USFJ to take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence, such as educating military personnel and others, and enforcing strict discipline among them. The Government of Japan is cooperating USFJ in these preventive measures; at the same time it has taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by the incidents and accidents.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Exchange With Local Communities and U.S. Forces Personnel

Understanding and cooperation from the residents living near U.S. bases is vital for the stationing of the USFJ. Since FY2008, the Ministry of Defense has been holding Japan–U.S. exchange events in the vicinity of U.S. bases in each region, which contribute to interaction between USFJ personnel and their families, and local residents through sports and culture.

In FY2009, the Japan–U.S. Joint Concert was held near Yokota Air Base (Fussa City). Junior high and high-school students from the local city and U.S. high-school students and U.S. military bands (which usually never have the opportunity to meet) interacted with one another in a mixture of broken English and Japanese, deepening their friendship, while showcasing the results of practice together before a multitude of spectators. Comments by the Japanese and American students which took part included "it was a great experience" and "I'd like to do it again." The performance was highly regarded by the spectators too. In addition, an English-language musical theater exchange was held by the elementary, junior high and high-school students from around Misawa Air Base (Misawa City), as was a futsal competition by elementary school students from around U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo (Sasebo City). Both were praised by the local residents. Exchanges such as these are conducive to deepening mutual understanding.

In future, the Ministry of Defense would like to proactively promote Japan–U.S. exchange events such as these, to deepen the interaction between the local residents around U.S. bases and USFJ personnel and their families.

Concert by junior high and high-school students (Fussa)

English-language musical by elementary, junior high and high-school students (Misawa)

Futsal exchange by elementary-school students (Sasebo)

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Deterrence

In general, deterrence plays the military role of "deterring the act of attack itself, by taking a stance indicating that a military response will be taken and damage caused, in the event that an enemy should attack." In order to make deterrence work, the deterring party is required to possess both the intention and ability to execute a military response, and to make the other party recognize this fact. In order to instill confidence in this intention and ability, it is assumed that the various abilities must be improved, corresponding to the level of anticipated attack.

The concept of deterrence is frequently classified into deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by punishment is based on the threat of a strike that cannot be endured, and causes the enemy to abandon its attack by encouraging calculation of costs. Deterrence by denial is based on the ability to physically prevent specific enemy actions, and causes it to abandon attack by encouraging consideration of its ability to achieve objectives. Looking at the methods employed allows further classification into nuclear deterrence via nuclear weapons, and conventional deterrence through conventional weapons.

The U.S. possesses the ability to realize comprehensive deterrence through military capabilities of all types, including nuclear and non-nuclear striking and defense capacities. The Nuclear Posture Review published in 2010 cites a deterrence concept encompassing not only nuclear weapons, but also conventional military forces and missile defense. These capabilities are not solely for the deterrence of attacks toward the United States itself (basic deterrence); they are considered core to deterrence of attacks toward its allies such as Japan as well.

- Deterrence by Punishment
  Deterrence through threat of a strike that cannot be endured (e.g., nuclear deterrence)
- Deterrence by Denial
  Deterrence through the ability to physically prevent objective achievement (e.g., NATO's conventional military forces during the Cold War)

U.S. Deterrence Ability

- Nuclear forces
- Conventional military forces
- Missile defense
- Anti-WMD capabilities
- Integrated command, control and communications system

⇒

- Deterrence of attacks toward the U.S. (Basic deterrence)
- Deterrence of attack toward allies and friendly nations (Extended deterrence)

Notes:

1) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/jyoyaku.html>.
2) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/youjin/2009/10/21.html>.
3) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/president_0911/index.html>.
4) See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-50th- anniversary-signing-us-japan-treaty-mutual-cooperation-security>.
5) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/visit/president_0911/index.html>.
6) The former Guidelines were created in 1978. These guidelines stipulate the cooperation between Japan and the United States to effectively achieve the goals stated in the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty.
7) Operations conducted to interdict an enemy's offensive and to prevent their purpose from being achieved. Offensive operations mean aggressive forms of operations to search for and defeat enemies.
8) Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, including situations that could develop into a direct armed attack against Japan if left unaddressed. (Article 1 of the Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan).
9) Law stipulating ship inspection operations and other necessary measures to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan to implement rear area support, rear area search and rescue operations, and ship inspection operations conducted in relation to situations in surrounding areas (Article 2 of the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan).
10) The term "rear area" refers to Japan's territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (including the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles, or approximately 370 km, from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which no combat operations are conducted at that time and no combat operations are expected to be conducted throughout the period when the rear activities are carried out, and the space over these international waters.
11) If any person other than the central government who had been requested to cooperate suffers a loss as a result of such cooperation, the Government shall take necessary fiscal measures for the loss.
12) Warships and such vessels that are possessed or operated by foreign governments that are exclusively used for non-commercial purposes.
13) The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
14) Article 1 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf.
See <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H08/H08HO074.html>.
15) The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Military Information. The agreement was signed and concluded by Japan and the United States on August 10, 2007.
See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/usa/hosho/kyotei_0708.html>.
16) The capabilities required to operate a unit of a certain size in addition to the use of individual items of equipment.
17) The official title is the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.
18) The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food, water, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oil and lubricant, clothing, communications, medical services, base support, storage, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance,

airport and seaport services, and ammunition (only in armed attack situations and anticipated situations). (Provision of weapons is not included.)

19) The Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

20) The Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Arms and Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America.

21) The official title is the Law for Special Measures Regarding the Use and Expropriation of Land, etc., Incidental to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

22) The term "title" means a legal cause that justifies a certain act.

23) The Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning New Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

24) Those dispatched from Japan included the Minister for Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada, Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koichi Takemasa, and Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Kazuya Shimba, while those dispatched from the United States included U.S. Ambassador to Japan John Roos and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Wallace Gregson.

25) In the tripartite coalition agreement of September 2009, it was stated that "Regarding the measures which require coordination, it is confirmed that discussion will be held at tripartite leader level in the Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies, and the results will be consulted in the Cabinet Meeting, and finally the decision will be made."

26) Area to ensure safety of takeoff and landing by removing obstacles.

27) Two elliptical shaped corridors located on both sides (north and south) of the runway are established at Futenma Air Station to regularize the flow of landing helicopters.

28) Units to relocate include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.

29) In Japanese *Mamizu* projects in 2010, continuing from 2009, approximately 46.8 billion yen was budgeted for expenses relating to utilities and site improvement projects, construction projects, and design projects.

30) According to the United States there were approximately 70 personnel there as of the end of September 2008.

31) An agreement was reached at the Japan–U.S. Joint Committee on March 5, 2009 about the joint use of land, such as the GSDF Central Readiness Force Headquarters building.

32) See Section 3-2.

33) Concerning air defense and BMD, the BJOCC will fulfill functions to facilitate bilateral actions for the defense of Japan by making close coordination between headquarters and share information of SDF and U.S. Forces thereby improving interoperability.

34) In the FY2010 budget, approximately 5.6 billion yen on a contracted basis and approximately 30.9 billion yen on an annual expenditure bases has been appropriated as expenses relating to the construction of buildings including the ASDF Command Headquarters, and acquisition of equipment and materials.

35) This study will be conducted as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military demand for use of Japanese airspace.
36) According to the Roadmap, the study will be completed by the Study Group within 12 months of commencement.
37) The radar was thereafter transferred to the neighboring U.S. Shariki Communication Site.
38) USFJ aircraft conduct bilateral exercises at SDF facilities in order to improve interoperability and reduce the impact of training activities on the areas surrounding USFJ air bases.
39) See <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/announce/H19HO067.html>.
40) The scope of specific projects includes 14 projects identified by Article 2 of the enforcement ordinance of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, including educational, sports, and cultural projects.
41) Under the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law, changes in the composition of units of those naval vessels that conduct operations in synchronization with USFJ air wings subject to realignment (replacement of the aircraft carrier at Yokosuka Naval Base with a nuclear aircraft carrier) will be treated in the same way as the realignment of the USFJ.
42) 9.3 billion yen in the FY2010 budget.
43) The Council is chaired by the Defense Minister, and composed of those designated by the Prime Minister from the Chief Cabinet Secretary; the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister of Finance; Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare; Minister of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries; Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; Minister of Environment; and the Ministers of State.

    As for public works projects under the Development Plan for Special Area for Development concerning Realignment that have been deliberated and approved at the Council, the percentage of costs borne by the Government, or grant rate, will apply to the seven projects concerning road, ports, fishing ports, water supply, sewage system, land reform, and facilities for compulsory education that should be immediately implemented in consideration of the content and degree of adverse influences caused by the realignment of the USFJ on local communities and funding will be higher than those for ordinary cases.

    Surrounding municipalities are limited to those for which development measures are considered necessary in conjunction with municipalities with heavy burdens in consideration of natural, economic and social conditions.
44) The Japan Bank for International Cooperation merged with National Life Finance Corporation, etc., on October 1, 2008, to become the Japan Finance Corporation. The name The Japan Bank for International Cooperation has been retained in an effort to maintain its international credibility and so on.
45) Consisting of four items, 1) environmental governing standards, 2) information sharing and access, 3) response to environmental contamination, 4) environmental consultation.
46) The Japan Environmental Governing Standards were drawn up by the USFJ with an objective of guaranteeing that the activities and facilities of the USFJ can protect the health of citizens and the natural environment. It establishes handling and storage methods for environment polluting materials.
47) Furnished by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

Part III

Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 3

Improvement of the International Security Environment

Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities
Section 2. Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
Section 3. Efforts Towards Security Frameworks and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region
Section 4. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

Section 1. Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

At present, the international community faces a range of global-scale problems, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, complex and various regional conflicts and international crimes. With deepening mutual dependency among states and regions stemming from the advancement of the telecommunications network and the globalization of the economy, there is a concern that even events that could occur far from Japan may pose a threat or impact on Japan.

In light of the difficulty for a single country to respond to and solve these global threats and the need to take an approach to addressing these threats not only on the military operations, but also on various other fields, it is widely recognized that the international community need to join hands in coping with these threats.

Under such situation, Japan's defense and security goals set forth in the "2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)" are to improve the international security environment and to reduce potential threats to Japan. As a result, the NDPG also states that Japan shall promote diplomatic efforts including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and, proactively and on its own initiative, Japan shall cooperate with nations of the world in order to cooperatively undertake enhancement of the international security environment, or in other words, international peace cooperation activities.

This chapter explains the Ministry of Defense and the SDF's efforts for international peace cooperation activities.

(See Fig. III-3-1-1) (See Reference 56)

Fig. III-3-1-1 International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF

1. Proactive Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities on Japan's Own Initiative

1. Significance of Stipulating International Peace Cooperation Activities as One of the Primary Missions of the SDF

Amid the current security environment, the peace and security of the international community is considered to be closely linked to the peace and security of Japan. Based on this notion, for the SDF to take part in international peace cooperation activities, proactively and on its own initiative, improvements need to be made to education

and training, stand-by postures of assigned units and transportation capabilities. These improvements should be made upon stipulating international peace cooperation activities, which used to be regarded as supplementary activities[1], as a primary mission[2], and in 2007, international peace cooperation activities and activities responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan were stipulated as one of the primary missions of the SDF, alongside the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

2. History of Japan's Efforts to Support International Peace Cooperation Activities

The Persian Gulf War became a major turning point for Japan to recognize the need to provide military personnel contribution for international cooperation. The SDF dispatched a MSDF minesweeping unit to the Persian Gulf in 1991 to ensure the safe passage of Japanese commercial vessels. For Japan, this dispatch meant an international contribution on the humanitarian arena with the purpose of peaceful and humanitarian support for the reconstruction of devastated, and war-affected countries, as well as to ensure the safe passage of Japanese commercial ships. In 1992, the International Peace Cooperation Law[3] was enacted and Japan subsequently dispatched GSDF engineer units to Cambodia in September as the country's first participation in the U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). Since then, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have participated in various international peace cooperation activities. Currently a total of approximately 400 personnel are assigned to such activities, including approximately 350 to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2 to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), 6 to the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), and 46 to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

The 9/11 attacks on the United States in 2001 led to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law[4] (after that law expired it was succeeded by the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law[5]), and the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) conducted replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean for about eight years, with a short interval.

In 2003, Japan enacted the Iraq Special Measures Law[6], and the GSDF provided medical care, water supply, and assistance for the recovery and improvement of public infrastructure, such as schools and roads in Samawah, Iraq, and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) transported supplies for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance from its base in Kuwait.

These kinds of participation by the SDF in international peace cooperation activities contribute to the maintenance of peace and security of the international community including Japan's own. It also contributes to enhancing Japan's credibility with other nations as it provides opportunities to demonstrate the capabilities of the SDF through missions with international organizations such as the United Nations and forces of other countries.

(See Fig. III-3-1-2)

3. Continuous Efforts to Carry out Prompt and Accurate International Peace Cooperation Activities

In order to undertake international peace cooperation activities proactively and on its own initiative, the SDF must continue peacetime efforts to establish various systems. Since July 2007, the GSDF has designated candidates from regional armies in rotation for possible missions assignments, in order to maintain a posture allowing them to respond promptly and continuously to operational requirements. In March 2008, the GSDF established the Central Readiness Regiment under the Central Readiness Force, so that the advance unit can quickly carry out preparations for deployment for the main unit that is to follow it. In August and September 2008, in an effort to improve readiness, the Central Readiness Force, together with the Air Support Command of the ASDF, carried out a series of exercises for international peace cooperation activities.

In 2009, the SDF participated in the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) in order to participate more actively in United Nations peacekeeping operations[7].

The SDF also promotes the improvement and enhancement of equipment for international peace cooperation activities. The GSDF has improved a range of vehicles fitted with bullet-proof glass and run-flat tires[8] as well as high capacity generators to enable troops to carry out operations in areas with underdeveloped infrastructure. And, in order to ensure that activities can be carried out under diversified environments, the engines of transport helicopters (CH-47JA) are upgraded. Equipment including a sniper locator is also under development. The MSDF has improved transport ships and destroyers equipped with helicopters for helicopter operations overseas. The MSDF is conducting operational studies on portability and deployability of the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) to promote the effective operation of fixed-wing patrol aircrafts overseas. The ASDF promotes the acquisition of aviation satellite phones in order to maintain the command communication between aircraft and the ground controllers, and countermeasure dispensers for transport aircraft. These equipments are also useful for responding to domestic contingencies.

The GSDF is promoting communication among the deploying units and their families to ensure the readiness of units and their personnel for their international peace cooperation activities with peace of mind. The International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit at Camp Komakado (Shizuoka Prefecture) conducts education to GSDF personnel to be deployed to international peace cooperation activities, and also supports training related to international peace cooperation activities.

The Ministry of Defense established a new educational institution for peacekeeping under the Joint Staff College in March 2010, scheduled to conduct education to the SDF personnel, officials of the related ministries and other personnel related to international peace cooperation activities.

Fig. III-3-1-2 Summary Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities

Item	International Peace Cooperation Law	Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Expired on July 31, 2009)	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (Expired on January 15, 2010)
Purpose	❍ Proactive contribution to U.N.-centered efforts toward international peace	❍ Proactive contribution to the efforts by the international community to support and encourage the self-reliant efforts by the Iraqi people toward the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan through the reconstruction of Iraq	❍ Proactive contribution to the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism ❍ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international community including Japan
Provisions in the SDF Law	❍ Provision under Article 84-4 (Chapter 6) of the SDF Law	❍ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	❍ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major Activities	❍ International peacekeeping activities ❍ International humanitarian assistance ❍ International election monitoring activities ❍ Supplies cooperation for the above-mentioned activities	❍ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ❍ Support activities for ensuring security	❍ Replenishment support activities
Areas of Operation	❍ Areas excluding Japan (including the high seas) (A ceasefire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement by the receiving country are required)	❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (consent of the agency in charge of administration is required in such countries and in Iraq)[1] ❍ High seas and the airspace above[1]	❍ Territories of Japan ❍ Territories of foreign countries (limited to the Indian Ocean States) (consent of such countries is required)[1] ❍ High seas (limited to the Indian Ocean, etc.) and the airspace above[1]
Diet Approval	❍ In principle, prior approval in the Diet session is required for the SDF to conduct peace keeping missions[2]	❍ To be discussed in the Diet within 20 days from the day since the SDF initiates such measures[2]	❍ [3]
Diet Report	❍ Prompt report on the details of the operation plan is required	❍ Report on the details of operation plan is required without delay	❍ Report about the details of operation plan is required without delay

Notes: 1. Limited to areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.
2. In case the Diet is closed, an approval shall be promptly requested in the Diet at the earliest session.
3. As prescribed by Law, (1) The category and nature of operations shall be limited to supply. (2) The area of operations is prescribed, including foreign territories, it is not considered necessary to once again obtain the approval of the Diet. Therefore there are no provisions relating to the Diet approval.

4. Welfare and Mental Health Care of Deployed SDF Units

It is extremely important to make necessary arrangements so that deployed SDF personnel, who are expected to fulfill their assigned duty under severe working conditions while being far away from their home country and their families, can effectively carry out the assigned duty while maintaining both their physical and mental health.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have taken a series of measures to ease the anxiety of SDF members deployed overseas for participation in international peace cooperation activities and the anxieties of their families in Japan so that the members can devote themselves to their assigned duties with peace of mind.

Welfare services are provided for the deployed SDF members to support them to maintain close bonds with their families in Japan. Specifically, direct communication between the deployed SDF members and their families in Japan is ensured via video conference system, and they can also communicate through recorded video correspondence. Moreover, briefing sessions for families of the deployed members are held to provide them with a variety of information, and family support centers and family counseling rooms have been established to respond to various questions raised by the families.

The SDF also offers mental healthcare services, such as a course on stress reduction methods for SDF members with scheduled deployments when engaging in overseas missions, and deployed SDF members can consult with designated counselors who have completed specialized training. Such counselors provide deployed members with sufficient mental care. The Ministry of Defense is prepared to assign medical officers to the SDF units engaged in overseas missions and send qualified psychiatrists (mental healthcare support teams, etc.) from Japan and evacuate sickened personnel for full treatment if necessary. Upon completion of the mission or return of mission personnel, ad-hoc special health examinations and mental health checks will be conducted.

Dispatched personnel making satellite phone calls from Haiti

5. Debates on So-called General Law

In recent years, there has been debate in the Diet and at other venues over “general law” that governs international peace cooperation activities.

While no specific actions have been taken so far by the Government toward enacting a “general law,” it is necessary to examine various issues including what specific activities Japan should engage in, as Japan actively assists in ensuring peace and stability of the international community.

2. Efforts to Support U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, etc.

As a way to maintain peace in the world’s regions of conflicts, the United Nations carries out 15 peacekeeping operations including ceasefire monitoring, election monitoring, and reconstruction assistance and 12 political and peace building missions (as of May 2010) in their mission to prevent the recurrence of conflict following cease fire agreements. (See Fig. I-1-4-2)

International organizations, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO) conduct relief and reconstruction activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective and from the viewpoint of stabilizing affected countries.

Japan, in a bid to fulfill a role commensurate to its international status and responsibilities, has been cooperating both in terms of funding and personnel, with global efforts being led by the United Nations to build a peaceful and stable international community.

In order to help improve the international security environment, based on the International Peace Cooperation Law, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have actively engaged in international peace cooperation activities by sending troops.

In August 2010, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Japan and held talks with Defense Minister Kitazawa on Japan's efforts in support of U.N. peacekeeping activities. The Secretary-General showed appreciation for the SDF's contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities, and expressed his expectations for future contributions.

1. Outline of International Peace Cooperation Law

The International Peace Cooperation Law, enacted in 1992, is designed to further contribute to global efforts led by the United Nations to achieve international peace through upgrading Japan's capability of swift cooperation in

Fig. III-3-1-3 Basic Policy on Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Forces (Five Principles)

1. Agreement on a ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to armed conflicts
2. Consent for the undertaking of U.N. peacekeeping operations as well as Japan's participation in such operations shall have been obtained from the host countries as well as the parties to armed conflicts
3. The operations shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any of the parties to armed conflicts
4. Should any of the requirements in the above-mentioned guideline cease to be satisfied, the International Peace Cooperation Corps may suspend International Peace Cooperation Assignments. Unless the requirements are satisfied again in a short term, the Government of Japan may terminate the dispatch of the personnel engaged in International Peace Cooperation Assignments.
5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.

Fig. III-3-1-4 International Peace Cooperation Activities Conducted by the SDF

Duration	International Peace Cooperation Activities (Types of Activities)	Region
Sep. 1992 – Sep.1993	Cambodia (U.N. peacekeeping operation)	Southeast Asia
May 1993 – Jan. 1995	Mozambique (U.N. peacekeeping operation)	Africa
Sep. 1994 – Dec. 1994	Rwanda (International humanitarian assistance)	Africa
Feb. 1996 –	The Golan Heights (U.N. peacekeeping operation)	Middle East
Nov. 1999 – Feb. 2000	Timor-Leste (International humanitarian assistance)	Southeast Asia
Oct. 2001	Afghanistan (International humanitarian assistance)	Central Asia
Feb. 2002 – Jun. 2004	Timor-Leste (U.N. peacekeeping operation)	Southeast Asia
Mar. 2003 – Apr. 2003	Iraq (International humanitarian assistance)	Middle East
Jul. 2003 – Aug. 2003	Iraq (International humanitarian assistance)	Middle East
Mar. 2007 –	Nepal (U.N. peacekeeping operation)	South Asia
Oct. 2008 –	Sudan (U.N. peacekeeping operation)	Africa
Feb. 2010 –	Haiti (U.N. peacekeeping operation)	Latin America

Bold frame: Ongoing international peace cooperation activity.

1) U.N. peacekeeping operations[9], 2) humanitarian international relief operations[10], and 3) international election monitoring activities.

The law stipulates a set of basic guidelines (so-called 5 principles for participation) for Japan's participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force.
(See Fig. III-3-1-3, 4)

2. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

(1) Background

A major earthquake struck Haiti on January 13, 2010, causing the deaths of over 200,000 people. As part of the emergency relief carried out by the international community in response, Japan deployed an international disaster relief medical team consisting with primarily civilian doctors as well as the SDF international disaster relief medical unit on January 14. (See 3 of this Section)

On January 19, 2010, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1908 to increase the strength of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which had been underway since 2004 to gain stability of the political and social unrest in the country, to support efforts for immediate recovery, reconstruction, and stability following the earthquake, and requested member states to send troops.

In response, Japan responded to the United Nations on January 25 that it was prepared to send an SDF engineer unit to the mission in addition to the international disaster relief teams already deployed, in consideration of the major damage from the earthquake in Haiti, and to make further contribution in the field.

On January 25, Defense Minister Kitazawa issued instructions to each Chief of Staff to collect information, coordinate with related organizations, and to form a unit in preparation to support the international peacekeeping operation of MINUSTAH. After receiving a formal request from the UN on January 19 to dispatch an SDF engineer unit, the Japanese Government decided to send a GSDF engineer unit (about 350 personnel) to MINUSTAH with a Cabinet approval on February 5.



Situation of the disaster area in Haiti

A commemorative photograph between then Prime Minister Hatoyama and Minister of Defense Kitazawa at the departure ceremony

Commander of the first deployment of the Haitian International Disaster Relief Deployment receiving a report from a unit member after arriving in Haiti

(2) SDF Activities

With the Cabinet approval on February 5, Defense Minister Kitazawa issued the operation order for the international peacekeeping activities in Haiti on the same day. The first detachment was organized primarily from troops of the Central Readiness Force, and began to deploy from Japan to the disaster site

Working to prepare the WFP supply warehouse

Repairing refugee camp waste water facilities

Evaluating the earthquake readiness of U.N. related facilities

on the following day, February 6, and completed the deployment by February 14. The GSDF unit began its relief operation as one of the U.N. PKO units on February 16, besides their own camp construction adjacent to the combined campsite of the PKO units in Port-au-Prince, the capital city of Haiti. After the deployment of the 1st detachment, the 2nd detachment organized primarily from members of the Northern Army began its deployment to Haiti from February 24, and took over duties from the 1st detachment on March 19. Starting on August 7, the 3rd detachment, organized primarily members from the Northeastern Army, deployed to Haiti to take over the mission. These deployments to Haiti were accomplished quickly by utilizing civilian transport, in addition to VIP transporter aircraft and ASDF C-130H cargo planes, that shuttled between Miami in the United States and Port-au-Prince since the beginning of the international disaster relief operation. The GSDF unit is equipped with heavy equipment such as bulldozers, hydraulic shovels, and truck cranes, and is assigned with recovery and reconstruction tasks to remove the massive amounts of rubble from the earthquake and preparing sites for displaced populations. The initial mission of the unit was for the civil work for the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) at the Port-au-Prince airport, and that was followed by a number of tasks, such as building and repairing refugee camps, repairing the road to the border to the Dominican Republic, and cleaning up city roads and the rubbles of destroyed government buildings.

Words of appreciation have been conveyed to the GSDF units for their sincere activities from residents of the ravaged Haiti and from people within the United Nations.

The UN also requested Japan to send construction experts who could assess whether buildings damaged in the earthquake could continue to be used or not, and 3 technical officials of the Defense Ministry were sent as members of the unit, including architects with first-class certification. The 3 officials conducted inspections on 40 buildings, including U.N. facilities, from March 19 to April 9.

Japan was the only nation able to accommodate the U.N. request, and the 3 officials received significant recognition from the United Nations for their work attitudes and the quality of their reports.

The GSDF units have been cooperating with the forces of other countries in the reconstruction support efforts in Haiti. For example, they have been cooperating with Brazilian engineer units of MINUSTAH. Regarding the relations with the U.S. Forces, the SDF has promoted operational cooperation such as on the use of U.S. bases as relay bases between Haiti and Japan, and coordination on the use of Haiti International Airport.

(3) Features of this Deployment

The massive earthquake in Haiti caused huge damage, killing more than 200,000 people, mainly in Port-au-Prince. The international community, centering on the U.N., has been providing support, responding to Haiti's tragic situation.

The support of SDF troops this time was an integral part of the international support, for the purpose of providing the best support in the incalculable damage in the affected area, and the SDF carried out international disaster relief operations with its medical units deployed immediately following the earthquake (see 3 of this Section). Further, in response to the request to send troops to the international peacekeeping operations in Haiti for recovery and reconstruction, the SDF deployed to the region more swiftly compared to prior missions.

In the past it often took several months of preparation for the SDF units to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations, since it took a certain amount of time to select personnel, give vaccinations, and prepare necessary equipment. However this time the first detachment departed Japan within two weeks after receiving the order from the Defense Minister to begin preparations. The reasons that enabled this kind of rapid deployment were the establishment of the GSDF Central Readiness Force in 2006, with duties as rapid response to peacekeeping operations and other types of requirements, and the accumulated experience of overseas deployments. The Central Readiness Force provides personnel to deploy units, which are prepared in advance in normal times, including vaccinations.

(See Fig. III-3-1-5, 6, 7, 8)

3. The United Nations Mission in Sudan

(1) Background to Japan's Decision to Send Personnel to UNMIS

In Sudan, the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. Based upon this agreement, UNMIS was formed to support the implementation of the CPA and to perform ceasefire surveillance, etc. In addition to the military section that performs ceasefire surveillance, etc., UNMIS has a civilian section in charge of election support and humanitarian assistance coordination. UNMIS is a multi-functional, large-scale U.N. peacekeeping operation that involves more than 10,000 people.

In October 2008 the Cabinet decided to dispatch SDF personnel to the UNMIS headquarters, and two SDF officers were dispatched to serve as members of the UNMIS headquarters. In addition, one officer was dispatched to serve as a Defense Attaché at the Japanese Embassy in Sudan, and to support the activities of the UNMIS headquarters personnel. In April 2009, the two members of the second detachment at the headquarters were replaced by the third detachment, who is recurrently engaged in the assignment.

Since Sudan is the largest country in Africa, bordering nine countries, its stability is crucial to the improvement of the security environment of Africa as a whole. Furthermore, in light of the fact that terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda had located their bases in Sudan, Japan's proactive involvement on its own initiative in international efforts for the stability of Sudan by dispatching SDF officers to UNMIS is of great significance from the viewpoint of the effort against terrorism and the security of Japan. Moreover, not only Group of Eight (G8) countries but also Asia-Pacific countries have been deeply involved in various issues facing Africa; thus, participating in UNMIS will help to strengthen cooperation between Japan and these countries. It will also expand the SDF's

Dispatched personnel coordinating activities at UNMIS headquarters

Fig. III-3-1-5 Haiti and the Surrounding Area



Fig. III-3-1-6 Organization of MINUSTAH



Note: Figures in the blue squares show the number of Japanese personnel dispatched to MINUSTAH.

Fig. III-3-1-7 Overview of the Haiti International Relief Unit



Fig. III-3-1-8 Status of Activities by SDF Units for Haiti PKOs (2010)

(As of August 5, 2010)

	Details of Activities	Duration
1	Land clearing for World Food Programme (WFP) storage area	February 16
2	Rubble removal for the Nader Art Museum	February 22–March 19
3	Maintenance on WFP drainage facilities in area adjacent to the SDF camp	March 22–March 25
4	Rubble removal from Madan Gano canal	March 25–March 26
5	Construction of U.N. camp site for the use of other countries	February 24–March 29
6	Forklift transport for U.N. WFP (to Jacmel in the southern country)	March 30
7	Land clearing assistance for the Tabarre Issa refugee camp (in support of the Brazilian contingent)	March 27–April 1
8	Container transport for Pakistan contingent	April 3
9	Repairs to the Mt. Goyavier telecommunications tower installation road	March 29–April 5
10	Building safety inspection for U.N. facilities	March 11–April 9
11	WFP container transport	April 9
12	Rubble removal for a collapsed Ministry of Finance and Economy branch office	March 24–April 12
13	Equipment transport assistance for the Brazilian contingent	April 21, April 23
14	Drainage facilities repair assistance for the Delmas refugee camp	April 7–April 23
15	Land clearing assistance for a school (IMEC)	April 26
16	Assistance for expanding the site of the MINUSTAH logistic facilities	First stage: March 30–April 2; Second stage: April 10–April 26
17	Crane assistance for the Peruvian contingent	April 15–April 19, April 27
18	Crane assistance for moving containers for the Integrated Logistics Operation Center	May 6, May 13
19	Land clearing for Construction site of Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications branch office	May 19–May 21
20	Land clearing for Peruvian contingent camp	May 24
21	Road repairs to the Dominican Republic border	March 29–May 28
22	Material transport and handling support for the Brazilian contingent	June 10–11

Fig. III-3-1-8 Status of Activities by SDF Units for Haiti PKOs (2010)

(As of August 5, 2010)

	Details of Activities	Duration
23	Container crane support to the Philippine contingent	June 21
24	Dismantling and rubble clearing of the collapsed revenue office building	June 3–22
25	Gutter construction at Camp Delta	June 21–July 1
26	Dismantling and rubble clearing of a collapsed school (joint operation with the ROK contingent)	June 8–July 1
27	Setting-up assistance of generator for the Nepalese contingent	July 9
28	Demolition of collapsed prison and rubble removal	May 26–July 12
29	Roller assistance for road repairs on Croix-des-Bouguets Road	July 13–14
30	Transport of engineering equipment to Onamin bridge	July 13–16
31	Towing assistance for constructing a fuel tank for the Nepalese contingent	July 21
32	Construction of drainage facilities for the Jordanian police	July 20–22
33	Extract gravel for camp	July 12–23
34	Transport assistance of equipments for the Integrated Logistic Operation Center	July 22–23
35	Construction of drainage facilities for Bangladeshi police	July 23–26
36	Dismantling and rubble clearing of Signo Tuberculosis Sanitarium (joint operation with the ROK contingent)	July 8–31
37	Transport of aggregate for maintaining camp	August 4
38	Construction of drainage facilities	From May 10
39	Rubble removal for roads in Port-au-Prince	April 9–May 14, May 31–June 3, June 9–18, June 30–July 4, From July 8
40	Maintenance and repair of the border road to the Dominican Republic	June 18 (conducted to accommodate daily requests)
41	Civil work of the site for the Malpase orphanage	From June 21
42	River Bank construction works for Onamin Bridge	From July 23
43	Dismantling and rubble clearing of Bourdon School	From July 26
44	Construction of drainage facilities for the Bolivian contingent	From August 4

Note: Camp Delta: the base holding the military headquarters for MINUSTAH.

approach to international peace cooperation and is useful from the perspective of human resources development and improving practical capabilities of the SDF.
(See Fig. III-3-1-9)

(2) Activities of Dispatched Personnel

In line with the policy of the United Nations that personnel at headquarters work without arms, in the same manner as mentioned below for UNMIN, the SDF officers dispatched to UNMIS do not carry weapons, and are dispatched on an individual basis.

One SDF officer in Sudan is undertaking coordination duties within UNMIS relating to the general logistical demands of the military sectors in the Logistics Office of the Military Component[11] Headquarters located in the capital, Khartoum. The other officer is managing the database at the Joint Information Analysis Center in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

GSDF officers have earned high acclaim from UNMIS personnel for their discipline, professionalism, and sincere approach to their work.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel who Participated in the Haiti PKO

Lieutenant Colonel Hiroyuki Ogura
(Deputy Commander for the First International Relief Team to Haiti),
Central Readiness Force Headquarters, GSDF

After I finished the site survey as an investigator of the International Relief Team to Haiti, I participated in relief support activities, as the deputy commander of the First International Relief Team to Haiti on site. After the Defense Minister's instructions to make preparations were issued on January 25 this year, I left Japan for Haiti on January 30. While I coordinated with the local United Nations bodies and other organizations, I made preparations to receive the main group, and accepted the first wave of the group that arrived on February 7.

As the entire team wanted to cooperate in Haiti's recovery as soon as possible, we began our engineering activities immediately, even before our own water needs for our livelihood were assured. This dispatch, deployed in just two weeks from the request by the United Nations, was highly praised on the site for being the fastest deployment in the history of U.N. PKO.

We have been cooperating with troops from many other countries on site. Our neighboring country South Korea has also dispatched an engineering unit, and we are promoting cooperation such as mutual visits to each other's units. Engineering units from Japan and South Korea experienced such cooperation during the PKO activities in Timor-Leste as well, and we are confident we can cooperate with each other to perform our duties also in Haiti.

Lt. Colonel Ogura being interviewed on site

A group photograph at the base for the Haitian International Disaster Relief Deployment

4. United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)

(1) Background of Japan's Decision to Send Personnel to UNMIN

After the civil war between the Nepalese Government then and the Maoists (Communist Party of Nepal Unified-Maoists) in a bid to capture power, an accord aimed at achieving permanent peace was signed in November 2006 thanks to repeated peace talks under the new government formed in May 2006. Subsequently, a comprehensive peace agreement was reached, marking the end of the conflict.

In response to a request from the Nepalese Government and a recommendation by the Secretary-General of United Nations, UNMIN was established in January 2007 through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1740. Nepal's Constituent Assembly election was held in April 2008 and marked the transition from a monarchy to a

Fig. III-3-1-9 Sudan and the Surrounding Area



federal democratic republic, representing a certain degree of progress in Nepal's peace process. Nevertheless, some issues remain unsolved, such as the integration of the national army and Maoists militia groups. In May 2010, the United Nations extended UNMIN's tenure until September 15, 2010, at the request of the Nepalese government.

Situated between China and India, Nepal occupies an important strategic position, and its stability is crucial to the security of the Asian region as a whole.

The Government of Japan, in response to a request by the United Nations for the dispatch of arms monitors to UNMIN operations, decided to dispatch personnel to the mission, and in March 2007, six GSDF officers were dispatched to UNMIN. In March 2010, the fourth team consisting of six members replaced the third team to continue arms-monitoring duties. In addition, the Ministry of Defense and the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office respectively, dispatched two liaison personnel for coordination with relevant local agencies and information collection.

(See Fig. III-3-1-10)

(2) Activities of GSDF Officers at UNMIN

The GSDF officers dispatched to UNMIN do not carry weapons, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations. Further, whereas arms-monitoring and headquarters personnel were deployed on an individual basis together with units in personnel deployments for U.N. peacekeeping operations prior to the UNMIN deployment, for the first time, only

Personnel dispatched to UNMIN patrol the city

Fig. III-3-1-10 Location of Arms Monitors in UNMIN



Note: Dispatched in rotation to Maoist camps, etc., from UNMIN headquarters in Kathmandu.

military observers were individually deployed in the case of UNMIN.

SDF officers are being dispatched to seven Maoist camps and barracks of the Nepalese military for monitoring of the management of arms and armies.

SDF officers have earned high acclaim from U.N. staff in Nepal and UNMIN arms monitors of participating nations for their discipline, professionalism, leadership, and sincere approach to their work.

5. The U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

(1) Background to Japan's Decision to Send Troops to UNDOF

The U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been undertaking peacekeeping operations in a zone called the Area of Separation (AOS), set up in the Golan Heights between the opposing troops of Syria and Israel based on a ceasefire agreement. UNDOF's mission is to monitor the ceasefire between the two countries and the implementation of measures stipulated under an agreement between the countries over the separation of their opposing troops. The SDF has been providing logistical support for UNDOF operations.
(See Fig. III-3-1-11, 12)

For Japan, as a country that relies on the Middle East for the majority of its oil imports, stability in this region is crucial. Japan's participation in UNDOF operations is significant because it marks Japan's personnel contribution to the international efforts for peace in the Middle East. The participation is also significant for Japan to develop human resources for international peace cooperation activities.

The Government of Japan decided in December 1995 to dispatch SDF units and other personnel to UNDOF. In February 1996, the first transport unit of 43 personnel was sent to the Golan Heights replacing a Canadian transport unit. Since then, an SDF unit has been dispatched approximately every six months on a rotating basis. However, the rotation system has changed so that only the rotation of personnel is conducted with the unit maintained, and the Golan Heights Transport Unit was newly organized in February 2008.

Fig. III-3-1-11 Map of the Golan Heights and Its Vicinity



Fig. III-3-1-12 Organizational Structure of UNDOF



(2) SDF Operations

The dispatched SDF transport unit is in charge of transporting daily goods and materials needed for UNDOF operations from the harbors, airports and commodities markets of Israel, Syria and Lebanon to the UNDOF camps. The unit also provides logistical support, including repairs of roads and removal of snow from streets in plateau areas with an altitude of more than 2,800 meters. The transport unit stayed at the same camp as Indian forces, which replaced Canadian forces in March 2006. Members of the SDF and Indian forces jointly provide meals and other services to troops.

The ASDF flies a C-130H transport plane and a U-4 multipurpose assistance plane to the Golan Heights every six months to transport goods and materials for the transport unit.

Two SDF personnel were initially sent to the UNDOF headquarters to be in charge of planning and coordination of transport and other UNDOF logistic support operations, and also to be responsible for publicity and budget-related works, and that was increased to three in 2009. The SDF personnel are assigned to the UNDOF headquarters for about one year, and are replaced by other SDF personnel after completing their assignment. The SDF personnel as of the end of May 2010 are in the 15th dispatch.



Personnel deployed for UNDOF coordinate with personnel from the militaries of other nations

Japan had initially intended to complete its participation in UNDOF operations within two years. However, participation has continued until now after taking into consideration various factors, such as strong requests from the United Nations, high evaluation of past Japanese operations by the United Nations and relevant countries, and the importance of Japan's personnel contribution to peace in the Middle East, an issue that greatly affects Japan's national prosperity. Japan's contribution to UNDOF has been deepened with the SDF dispatch of the Golan Heights Transport Unit 29 times, totaling approximately 1,250 personnel.

6. Consideration of dispatching officers to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

(1) Background, etc., of Consideration

After the end of the war for independence, a peace agreement was reached in April 1999 and consecutive U.N. missions have been established in Timor-Leste. In May 2002 Timor-Leste achieved independence. As the security situation deteriorated in 2006, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was established in August of the same year to restore and maintain public order. After the establishment of UNMIT, a presidential election was held in April 2007, and subsequently the presidential runoff vote and a national assembly election were conducted in May and June respectively in the same year. While there was an attack on the president by an armed group in February 2008, UNMIT has contributed to the stability of Timor-Leste steadily, so that the security situation has been improving since that incident and the National Police of Timor-Leste is gradually resuming policing responsibilities.

Former Prime Minister Hatoyama held talks with President of Timor-Leste Ramos-Horta on March 16, 2010, and expressed that Japan would positively consider deploying military liaison officers to UNMIT. These unarmed military liaison officers are deployed around Timor-Leste and are gathering information on the situation around the country. Currently, related ministries are coordinating with the United Nations and other related organizations in preparation for the deployment of SDF personnel to UNMIT by around the fall of this year.

7. Dispatch of Instructors to the PKO Center in Africa

In a joint press conference held in June 2008 the then Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the United Nations announced their intention to enhance the capacity of the PKO center in Africa, including sending SDF personnel as instructors. Following this, two GSDF officers were dispatched to the PKO center in Egypt (Cairo Regional Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa: CCCPA) during November 21–30, 2008. The aim of this dispatch was to support the peacekeeping efforts undertaken by the African nations themselves. It was the first time that SDF instructors had been dispatched to a foreign educational and training institution for PKO. The dispatched SDF personnel delivered lectures on the importance of building relationships with local residents in international peace cooperation activities. They incorporated specific case studies into

Dispatched personnel lecturing at the CCCPA

their talks based on the experience in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq as well as lessons learned from domestic and international disaster relief operations. They made efforts to make the lectures simple enough to be understood even without specialist knowledge of military-civilian cooperation, which was highly commended by CCCPA staff as well as the audience.

This evaluation was followed by another request for sending instructors in May 2009; and a GSDF officer was dispatched to the CCCPA accordingly between May 22 and June 6, 2009. The GSDF also sent two officers to the peacekeeping school in Bamako, Mali from August 28 to September 5. In response to a third request from the CCCPA to dispatch instructors in April 2010, the first female GSDF officer was sent from April 11 to 16. In July a second request for instructors was received from the peacekeeping school in Bamako, and a GSDF officer was sent from August 14 to 30.

These GSDF officers provided desktop exercises relating to peacekeeping activities for participants including military and civilian personnel from African nations and gave instruction and advice on what they had learned about cooperation between the military and civilians through humanitarian activities in Iraq and a variety of U.N. peacekeeping activities.

3. International Disaster Relief Operations

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF are determined to step up international disaster relief operations from the viewpoint of humanitarian contributions and improvement of the international security environment for the purpose of contributing to the advancement of international cooperation.

To this end, the SDF maintain their readiness to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster relief operation plans, whenever a situation in which their operations are deemed necessary arises. The SDF has been proactively conducting international disaster relief operations which fully utilize the capabilities of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, while taking into consideration specific relief requests by the governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries.
(See Fig. III-3-1-13)

1. Outline of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams

Since the enactment of the International Disaster Relief Law[12] in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations.

In 1992, the International Disaster Relief Law was amended to enable the SDF to participate in international disaster relief operations and to transport its personnel and equipment. Since then, the SDF has maintained its readiness for international disaster relief operations with self-sufficient capabilities, including relief operations and medical treatment, and with the use of its own equipment, organizations, and the benefits of regular training.

2. International Disaster Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF's Posture

Judging from the past experience of SDF dispatched to various disaster sites in Japan, the SDF's capabilities in international disaster relief operations encompass 1) medical services, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention, 2) transport of goods, patients, and disaster relief personnel by helicopter, and 3) ensuring

Fig. III-3-1-13 International Disaster Relief Operations and Others by the SDF

Duration	International Disaster Relief Operations and Other	Region
Nov.–Dec. 1998	International disaster relief operations in response to a hurricane that hit Honduras	Latin America
Sep.–Nov. 1999	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in quake-hit northwestern Turkey	Middle East
Feb. 2001	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in India	South Asia
Dec. 2003–Jan. 2004	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in quake-hit southeastern Iran	Middle East
Dec. 2004–Mar. 2005	International disaster relief operations after a large-scale earthquake off Indonesia's Sumatra Island and consequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean	Southeast Asia
Aug. 2005	International disaster relief operations for a Russian mini-submarine accident off Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia	North Pacific
Oct.–Dec. 2005	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in Pakistan and other countries	South Asia
Jun. 2006	International disaster relief operations in response to a major earthquake in central Java Island in Indonesia	Southeast Asia
Oct. 2009	International disaster relief operations in response to the disaster off the coast of Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia	Southeast Asia
Jan.–Feb. 2010	International disaster relief operations in response to the large-scale earthquake in Haiti	Latin America
Aug. 2010–	International disaster relief operations in response to major flooding in Pakistan	South Asia

water supplies using water-purifying devices. Also, the SDF uses transport planes and transport ships to carry disaster relief personnel and equipment to the affected area. International disaster relief operations conducted by the SDF may take different forms according to factors such as the scale of the disaster, the degree of damage, and the requests of the governments of affected countries or international organizations. For example, it provided air transport and medical support after the major earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, after receiving a request from the Government of Haiti and consultations with the Foreign Minister.

The Central Readiness Force and regional units of the GSDF maintain their readiness to ensure that they can carry out international disaster relief operations in an independent manner anytime the need arises.

The MSDF and ASDF maintain their readiness to dispatch fleet and air-support units, respectively, to transport supplies to units participating in international disaster relief operations, including their own, as the need for disaster relief arises.

Defense council on the International Relief Team to Haiti

3. International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti

(1) Background, etc., of the Dispatch

The major earthquake that struck Haiti on January 13, 2010 was said to have been "the worst humanitarian crisis in 10 years," killing more than 200,000 people mostly in Port-au-Prince, the capital city of Haiti.

International support has been being offered mainly through the United Nations in response to this tragedy in Haiti, and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF reacted immediately, sending a survey team of two members the next day on the 14th, and subsequently took the following actions after receiving a request from the Haitian Government and consultations with the Foreign Ministry.

(2) Activities of the SDF

First, the SDF conducted airlift missions by ASDF C-130H transport aircraft. As Port-au-Prince Airport was closed to takeoffs and landings by commercial aircraft, immediately after the earthquake occurred it became necessary to quickly ensure means to transport support personnel and materials. For that purpose, a C-130H transport aircraft that happened to be in Arizona for training was sent quickly, on the 15th, to Florida, where it was poised on standby, and prepared to be ready to provide air transport from the United States to Port-au-Prince. The aircraft transported a Japanese international disaster medical relief team made up of civilians, doctors, etc., from Florida to Port-au-Prince. On its return flight, with many affected local people waiting at the airport for evacuation from Haiti to the United States, the aircraft carried 34 people to Florida as part of its rescue activities in the international disaster relief activities.

SDF personnel transporting a U.S. victim

SDF personnel examining local disaster victims

Secondly, the International Disaster Relief Team SDF Medical Assistance Team of about 104 personnel, including 13 doctors was dispatched to provide emergency medical treatment for residents injured by falling debris, etc., in the earthquake or who fell ill from infectious diseases as a result of the worsening hygiene. The Medical Assistance Team was operational in Leogane city, approximately 40km from Port-au-Prince, and treated 2,954 patients from January 23 to February 13.

The Japanese international disaster medical relief team that had been brought over by the ASDF C-130H transport aircraft conducted its activities in an Episcopal nursing school in Leogane city, and the SDF Medical Assistance Team took over and continued those activities. The SDF withdrew from the facility as a Japan Red Cross medical team took over there. In that manner, Japan was able to provide seamlessly continuous relief activities. In addition to that, the SDF Medical Assistance Team conducted medical activities there by coordinating with not only nearby troops from Canadian Forces and U.S. Forces but also civilian organizations such as NGOs.

(3) Evaluations

These SDF responses drew appreciation from the United States for transporting the disaster victims, and from the Haitian government and high ranking U.N. officials of the local mission for the medical assistance activities. Many of the local residents who received medical care as well expressed their thanks for the dedicated service and kind attitude of the SDF personnel.

4. International Disaster Relief Activities for the Padang, Indonesia Earthquake

(1) Background.

A magnitude 7.5 earthquake (according to the Japan Meteorological Agency) struck offshore of Padang on West Sumatra in Indonesia on September 30, 2009, killing more than 1,000 people and causing major damage. The Ministry of Defense and SDF received a request from the Indonesian government and consultations from the Foreign Ministry, and began medical activities consisting of emergency treatment for residents who were direct or indirect victims of the earthquake, on October 5.

SDF personnel examining local patients

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a Member of the International Disaster Relief Team (ASDF officer)

Major Makoto Takebe, 401st Squadron, 1st Tactical Airlift Group
(Currently assigned to the 12th Flying Training Wing, 12th Flying Training Squadron)

In January this year, I, as commander of the Haiti International Disaster Relief Airlift Unit, directed Airlift Unit personnel and carried JICA medical teams, Haiti International Disaster Relief Team members, materials, and victims of the disaster in the Republic of Haiti by C-130H transport aircraft between Homestead Air Force Base in the United States and the Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti.

After completing training in the United States, we suddenly received an order to join the international disaster relief activities at the initial stage of deployment, and we were embarrassed by many unclear factors, such as support posture, points of contact for coordination, and operational procedures. But with the tireless effort of the Airlift Unit personnel, and much support from U.S. Air Force personnel, and the joint coordination offices of the SDF, we were able to perform our duties promptly and accurately. The many words of thanks received from Americans and Haitians living in the United States encouraged the members of the Airlift Unit, and increased the feelings of accomplishment and success that they felt toward the missions.

The range of activities for the SDF has become global, and the nature of those activities has been diversifying. At the same time that we aim to improve our capabilities (knowledge, technical skills, languages, etc.) to respond quickly and flexibly to any type of situation, we should convey the accumulated experience of our overseas duties to our successors, and would like to contribute to improving the capabilities of the SDF, whose mission has been more globalized.

Major Takebe coordinating with the U.S. military at Homestead Air Force Base (5th from the left)

(2) Results of the Activities

The dispatched medical assistance team was made up of 12 people, including 3 doctors, and they conducted medical activities in Kudu Ganting village in Pariaman near Padang, West Sumatra, and the surrounding area, treating 919 patients until October 17. During that period in Padang and in the capital city Jakarta, the integrated coordination office personnel of about 20 people gathered information on the needs for assistance and coordinated with related organizations.

(3) Evaluation of these Activities

The mayors and residents of the local cities expressed their thanks for the international disaster relief activities, and the head of national disaster management agency and the Indonesian ambassador to Japan also expressed their deep gratitude.

Ministry of Defense Meeting Concerning the Dispatch of the JDRT to Pakistan (August 20, 2010)

5. Response to Flooding in Pakistan

Record torrential rains in Pakistan since the latter half of July 2010 caused large-scale water damage, killing more than 1,600 people, and affecting 15.4 million

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a Member of the Haiti International Disaster Relief Team (GSDF medical officer)

Major Kosuke Hatanaka, Medical Officer, 13th Brigade Headquarters
(Haiti International Disaster Medical Assistance Team Treatment Unit Leader)

We began medical activities based in a nursing school in Leogane, Haiti, taking over JICA activities 10 days after the earthquake occurred in Haiti on January 13 this year. For the first week or so we treated many people with external injuries such as broken bones and sprains, then as the hygienic situation got worse, patients with infectious diseases such as colds, gastroenteritis, and malaria increased. During the approximately 3 weeks of our activities we treated 2,954 patients, and there were particularly many requirements for orthopedic surgery, internal medicine, and gynecology. During our stay there were cases that we could not handle by ourselves, but we dealt with them in cooperation with nearby U.S. and Canadian Forces and U.S. NGO facilities. After the middle of February the Japan Red Cross took over medical activities from us, and we completed our duties smoothly.

We were aware this time of the extreme importance of close links with civilian medical groups, and the militaries and NGOs of other countries in the international disaster relief activities. I believe it was a very valuable experience for me to expand the scope of my ability in disaster medical treatment.

Major Hatanaka giving an ultrasound examination to a local patient

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Factors that Allowed Prompt Dispatch to the U.N. Haiti PKO

The dispatch of SDF personnel to the U.N. PKO mission in Haiti, where the International Disaster Relief Team had already been dispatched, was particularly noteworthy because the dispatch was accomplished in a short period of two weeks from the request by the United Nations, for in the past operations, it took the SDF several months to prepare for PKO dispatches.

The factors that made that possible included the structure for close communication and cooperation with related organizations such as other ministries, agencies, and the United Nations that had been built and that was put into use immediately after the earthquake occurred, as well as the training that used the accumulated know-how, and the high motivation and sense of responsibility of the personnel, who are always in a state of readiness. In addition, in terms of organization, the newly established Central Readiness Force, and in particular the newly formed Central Readiness Force Regiment, tasked with the role of being the advance unit for international peacekeeping cooperative activities, etc., and maintenance of the designated posture of the armies of the GSDF (rotation among each of the armies of the GSDF), etc., as the results of the various types of policies that the Defense Ministry and SDF have been pursuing cannot be overlooked. Furthermore, although the means of deployment to the site were limited in the chaotic conditions right after the disaster, the joint operational structure between the GSDF and ASDF enabled an ASDF C-130H transport aircraft that had been in training in the United States to transport the GSDF contingent from the United States to Haiti.

In addition to these factors, the continuous cooperation and support received from the U.S. Forces after the disaster onset was very important. The information from the U.S. Forces on the security situation and the condition of airports and ports in Haiti contributed to decision making for dispatching the SDF troops to Haiti. Also, the transport of personnel and materials was conducted via Miami in the United States, and the U.S. made a beneficial cooperation with the SDF in the use of Haiti International Airport, and the use of the bases and in the air-traffic control.

Colonel Shirakawa (right) of the International Disaster Relief Team shakes hands with Colonel Yamamoto of the International Relief Team to Haiti

First-dispatch Unit personnel traveling by ASDF C-130H from the U.S. Homestead Air Force base in Florida to arrive at Haiti International Airport

The GSDF Engineering Unit repairs a road near the border with the Dominican Republic

people. The Ministry of Defense received a request from the government of Pakistan to send helicopters, and together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sent a team to investigate the situation.

Based on the request for consultation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 19, the Defense Minister issued an order the next day on the 20th to commence international disaster relief activities, and Japan sent a helicopter unit consisting of three UH-1 utility helicopters and three CH-47 transport helicopters to be based in Multan, Pakistan, to transport materials and depending on the conditions personnel, in the disaster area. In addition, Japan dispatched one LST and six C-130H aircraft to transport the helicopters.

4. Activities Responding to International Terrorism

1. Efforts of International Community

Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the international community has continued its fight against terrorism not only on the military front but also on diplomatic, police, judicial, intelligence and financial fronts. However, the threat of terrorist attacks still prevails in the international community, and the international community has been taking a unified stance in efforts to eradicate terrorism.

Strongholds of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda are believed to exist along the national border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Afghanistan continues to serve as a production center for narcotics, a source of major funding for terrorist activities, international forces including the U.S. military have conducted Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to counter Al-Qaeda and Taliban operations in the region, and to eradicate terrorism. Many countries have been deploying troops to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to support the reconstruction and maintenance of public security in Afghanistan[13]. Additionally, in order to block and deter the movements of terrorists that have escaped to the ocean, as well as the movements of weapons, ammunition, and narcotics that are a major funding source for terrorists, European, U.S., Pakistani, and other warships are engaged in maritime interdiction operations against suspicious ships in the Indian Ocean, by radio inquiries and on-the-spot inspections. (See Fig. III-3-1-14)

2. Background and Significance of Japan's Efforts in the Fight Against Terrorism

International terrorism is a global threat, and it is important for Japan to cooperate with the international community in making appropriate efforts for its prevention and eradication. From this perspective, Japan has made a variety of efforts[14] to enhance anti-terrorist measures. Since December 2001, with occasional lapses, the MSDF had been conducting maritime replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean as one of such efforts to support the counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations by military vessels from countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, as well as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (and

A replenishment ship engaged in replenishment activities

An onsite inspection by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kusuda

Fig. III-3-1-14 Outline of Major SDF Fuel Replenishing Sites and Flow of Terrorists and Weapons (Image)



Note: From the start of the replenishment activities in February 2008 to the end of the activities in January 2010, the number of replenishment activities by area was: 122 times in the Gulf of Oman, 19 times in the North Arabian Sea, 3 times in the Gulf of Aden, and 1 time in the Persian Gulf, making Oman the most frequent replenishing site.

later the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law following the expiration of the former law)[15]. These replenishment activities allowed the military vessels of those countries to receive supplies of fuel and water without returning to port, so that they could continue their activities over a broad range at sea.

Although these replenishment activities continued for about eight years, with a temporary break by the expiration of the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in recent years, the number of replenishments has declined compared to the earlier period, along with the significance of the replenishment activities. Because of this situation, the Government did not extend the term of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, and while continuing anti-terrorist measures mainly in the form of civil assistance to Afghanistan[16], replenishment support activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law were concluded when the law expired on January 15, 2010.

3. The Results of Replenishment Support Activities by the Maritime Self-Defense Force

Based on the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (and the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law following the expiration of the former) since December 2001, with an interruption in the middle, until January 2010, about 13,300 personnel (about 2,400 personnel) had participated in the replenishment activities, and the JMSDF replenished military vessels of all countries engaged in anti-terrorist measures with ship fuel, fuel for helicopters on ships, and water. They supplied 1) fuel for military vessels 939 times (145 times) amounting to about 510,000KL of fuel (about 27,005KL), 2) fuel for helicopters on ships 85 times (18 times) amounting to

about 1,200KL (about 210KL), and water 195 times (67 times) amounting to about 11,000 tons of water (about 4,195 tons). (The figures in parentheses represent the results under the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law from January 2008 to January 2010.)[17]
(See Fig. III-3-1-15)

Prime Minister Hatoyama attended the return ceremony when the last replenishment unit based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, the 7th dispatch consisting of the destroyer Ikazuchi and replenishment ship Mashuu returned to Harumi wharf in Tokyo Bay on February 6, 2010.
(See Reference 57, 58)

Fig. III-3-1-15 Vessels on Missions (June 2009 – End of Missions in February 2010)



4. Evaluation of the Replenishment Support Activities

In order to continue the activities on the wide area of sea without returning to ports for supplies of fuel and water, military vessels have to rely on the replenishment of supplies at sea. The MSDF conducted replenishment activities at sea for military vessels of other countries engaging in anti-terrorism maritime interdiction activities. The prevention of movement of terrorists and drugs over the ocean by those activities had a certain effect on limiting the freedom of movement of terrorists and materials, as well as their financing within Afghanistan.

In addition to requiring high levels of operational skills and ability, replenishment activities had been conducted under very severe weather conditions at sea, where the temperature is high throughout the year, with daytime temperatures at 40ºC, and at 70ºC on deck, with humidity as high as 90%.

Minister of Defense Kitazawa reviewing the troops at the return ceremony

The fact that the crewmembers were able to conduct replenishment activities in an orderly fashion under these conditions was attributed to their daily training and the earnestness with which they performed their duties while maintaining a strong sense of responsibility and strict discipline, though efforts to deal with the heat and improve the crew's welfare also had an effect

Through these activities, it was confirmed that the MSDF replenishment skills are extremely reliable, and by advancing the accumulation and sharing of

know-how and knowledge, the MSDF improved its capability to provide replenishment at sea continuously over a long period of time.

5. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq

1. Details of Japan's Efforts to Support Iraqi Reconstruction

Since May 2003, the international community has been proactively engaged in activities to help rebuild Iraq, following the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483[18] and subsequent resolutions.

Japan began dispatching SDF units to the Middle East in December 2003 based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, or the Iraq Special Measures Law, approved in the Diet in July of the same year. The dispatched SDF units conducted humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in cooperation with support provided by Official Development Assistance from December 2003 to December 2008. The SDF units also assisted troops of foreign countries in their efforts to restore security and stability in Iraq as support activities for ensuring security with a scope which would not affect the units' humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities.

2. Achievements of SDF Operations based on the Iraq Special Measures Law

Since December 2003, based on the Iraq Special Measures Law, the SDF had provided humanitarian and reconstruction support, such as medical care, water supply, reconstruction and improvement of public infrastructure such as schools and roads, and transportation of personnel and aid materials for the local people facing hardship. These activities helped Iraq rebuild proactively. In June 2006, the Government of Japan determined that activities of the GSDF in Al-Muthanna province should be concluded, considering that the reconstruction in Al-Muthanna province had shifted to the stage of being conducted on Iraqi people's own initiative. In September of the same year, the GSDF concluded its operations which had lasted up to approximately two and a half years.
(See Reference 59)

Moreover, in order to cooperate for the stability and reconstruction of Iraq, the ASDF units provided air transport support for the GSDF units dispatched to Al Muthanna Province as well as for the United Nations, and other multinational forces. Following the Government's November 2008 decision to terminate air transport support within the year considering the objects of Japanese activities were accomplished, the air transport mission, which had lasted for about five years ended in December 2008.

The transportation achievements until the completion of the mission resulted in 821 operations with the transportation of approximately 46,500 personnel and 673 tons of goods and materials.

Japan received high evaluation from the international community and the Iraqi people for its cooperation in rebuilding Iraq. These activities not only strengthened trust in Japan, but were also meaningful to make Japan–U.S. relationship closer and more effective in the matter of security, because Japan cooperated with the United States in these activities.

3. Evaluation of Japan's Efforts by the International Community

(1) Evaluation in Iraq

At the meeting with Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Hashimoto on her visit to Iraq on December 21, 2008, Iraq's Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, expressed his gratitude for the role and contribution of Japan's SDF during its mission in Iraq as well as economic assistance through yen loans.

On January 28, 2009, when a special envoy of the Prime Minister visited Baghdad and had talks with President Talabani, Vice-President al-Hashimi, and Vice-Prime Minister Saleh, he was told that the Iraqi people

would never forget Japan's contribution to the reconstruction and stability of Iraq, including the dispatch of the SDF, during this time of difficulties which Iraq has faced.

(2) Evaluation by the United Nations

U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon sent a letter to Prime Minister Aso in December 2008 expressing his appreciation for the Japanese Government's important contribution through the transport support provided by the SDF to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). He also expressed the significance of the ASDF operations, stating that the air transport support provided by Japan in such severe operational circumstances was an important and reliable means for moving deployed personnel and transporting cargo from Kuwait to United Nations offices in Baghdad and Erbil, and that, consequently, UNAMI and United Nations agencies could expand their activities in Iraq."

(3) Evaluation by Other Countries

The U.S. President expressed his appreciation for Japan's activities in Iraq in a letter addressed to Prime Minister Aso in January 2009 by saying that the United States was grateful to the Government and people of Japan for their involvement in the efforts to reconstruct and restore stability to Iraq. The President also noted that Japan's SDF had contributed to the successes that were now being enjoyed by the Iraqi people.

Section 2. Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

In the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), making proactive efforts on Japan's own initiative to help improve the international security environment is stated as a major role of defense. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF proactively promote security dialogue, defense cooperation and exchanges, while taking part in international peace cooperation activities.

1. Significance and Transitions of Security Dialogue, Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Since the end of the Cold War, awareness regarding the importance of preventing meaningless arms races, and contingencies and the escalation of such events through means such as increasing the transparency of military capabilities and defense policies, and enhancing mutual trust through dialogue and exchanges between defense officials and through various joint exercises between military units has grown. Today is an age when mutual cooperation and dependence among nations continue to grow in the international community. It is widely recognized that the international community should work together in responding to new threats and diverse contingencies.

In recent years, in particular, defense exchanges have deepened in terms of quality and have expanded in terms of quantity with the aim of proactively improving the security environment. Specifically, this includes: 1) the increasing significance of establishing and strengthening cooperative relations with the international community, as well as confidence-building; 2) demonstrating a global expansion of exchanges wherein the countries targeted for exchanges extend over Japan's neighboring countries; 3) the increasing importance of promoting not only goodwill exchanges but also practical ones, and action-oriented ones in addition to dialogues, with defense exchanges developing and deepening from simple exchanges to the stage of carrying out defense cooperation, according to the partner country; and 4) with regard to multilateral security frameworks, organizations on the security front in the Asia-Pacific region are moving from a stage of dialogue and trust-building to a stage of establishing an intraregional order and the formation of common norms.

Under such circumstances, the Ministry of Defense must continue to implement defense cooperation and exchanges strategically based on policies grounded on the characteristics of each country and region. This is to be conducted by utilizing limited resources effectively and efficiently in order to proactively carry out

Fig. III-3-2-1 Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Stage	Examples of Specific Initiatives
Defense Exchanges Defense Cooperation Strength of Relationship	❍ Student exchange, educational and research exchange, equipment and technology exchange ❍ High level and working-level exchanges between defense authorities ❍ Unit exchanges in each service branch, mutual visits of naval vessels and aircrafts ❍ Goodwill exercises (Example: Japan–Russia Joint Search and Rescue Exercises, etc.) ❍ Various types of cooperation in non-traditional security areas (including joint exercises) (Examples: Cobra Gold, ARF DiREx, Cambodia and Timor-Leste PKOs, cooperation with the Australian Army on-site for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq, cooperation for anti-piracy operations (NATO, EUNAVFOR)) ❍ Agreements on the security of information ❍ Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements ❍ Formulating joint contingency plans, etc. ❍ Joint exercises premised on joint responses (Examples: Japan–U.S. Bilateral Exercises, Japan–U.S. Joint Command Post Exercises, Japan–U.S. Joint Anti-Submarine Exercises, Japan–U.S. Joint Fighter Exercises) ❍ Joint responses in the event of a Japanese emergency

initiatives conducive to improve the future international security environment. When it comes to the countries and regions surrounding Japan in particular, the Ministry of Defense is required to eliminate feelings of antipathy and vigilance against Japan, foster a harmonious and cooperative atmosphere with a future-oriented perspective, and promote proactive exchanges and dialogue in bilateral and multilateral fora. What is more, it is essential to foster an overall sense of harmonious cooperation through mutual cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as disaster relief and counter-terrorism. It is also necessary to continue making efforts in order to create an intraregional order and common norms.

This section describes defense cooperation and exchanges in which the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have currently been engaged. The next section will describe initiatives for regional security frameworks and cooperation.

(See Figs. III-3-2-1, 2, and 3)

Fig. III-3-2-2 Security Dialogues and Defense Exchanges

Classification	Type	Significance	Outline
Bilateral	Exchange of defense ministers and high-level officials	Improving and reinforcing mutual trust and cooperation through frank exchanges of views on regional situations and national defense policies that are important common interests to every country, and that subsequently enhance defense exchanges	• Dialogue and mutual visits between Japan's Defense Minister and defense ministers from other countries • Dialogues and mutual visits between Japan's Senior Vice-Minister for Defense; Parliamentary Secretary for Defense; Vice-Minister of Defense; Chief of Staff, Joint Staff; GSDF, MSDF, ASDF Chiefs; and their counterparts in foreign countries
	Regular consultation between defense officials	Paving the way for high-level dialogues and exchanges through continuous and direct exchanges of views between national defense policy-makers, and contributing to the enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries	• Consultation between Director-General-level officials, Deputy Director-General-level officials, and their counterparts • Dialogue between Japan's Joint Staff, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, and their counterparts in foreign countries
	Exchange between units	Contributing to the improvement and enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation between related countries through joint exercises and events for exchanges	• Personnel exchanges • Mutual visits of training squadrons, aircraft, and joint exercises for search and rescue operations
	Exchange of students	Other than the original educational purposes, deepening the understanding of other countries' defense policies and the situation of their defense units as well as building mutual trust through the promotion of relatively long-term personnel exchanges, and establishing human networks.	• Mutual acceptance of students • Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations
	Research exchanges	Deepening mutual understanding between researchers of both countries through frank exchange of options for the maintenance and promotion of defense exchanges	Research exchanges between Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies and military-related research organizations in other countries
Multilateral	Security dialogue	Deepening mutual understanding on the recognition of situations and on security perceptions among related countries, and discussing multilateral issues efficiently and effectively	• ARF dialogue • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by the Defense Ministry • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by the Japanese Government • Multilateral dialogue sponsored by Japan's private sector
	Joint exercises and seminars	Improving defense abilities and contributing to improvement and enhancement of mutual trust and cooperation through joint exercises and seminars	• Personnel exchanges • Joint exercises, and seminars related to disaster relief, minesweeping, and submarine rescue operations

Fig. III-3-2-3 From Exchanges and Dialogue to Cooperation and the Construction of an Intraregional Order



2. Promotion of Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

1. Japan–Australia Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Australia is an important partner for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region: Japan and Australia are allies of the United States and share not only fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalist economies, but also strategic stakes and interests in the security sector. In particular, the norm that different countries should work in concert to address global challenges is one that has been becoming widespread in the international community in recent years. Therefore, as responsible countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan and Australia are strengthening mutual cooperation and collaboration focused primarily on non-traditional security areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities.

In terms of Japan–Australia bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation[19], the first such joint declaration in the realm of security with a country other than the United States, was announced at the Japan-Australia summit meeting in March 2007 and has been making steady progress since then. Based on this joint declaration, the Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("2+2") were held two times, in June 2007 and December 2008. Such consultations have never before been carried out by Japan with a country other than its ally the United States, and embody enormous significance in terms of strengthening future security cooperation at the political level between Japanese and Australian foreign affairs and defense authorities.

Given the uniform recognition concerning security cooperation at such high levels, the two sides are currently moving to a stage of more practical and specific cooperation. To date, Japan and Australia have taken part in the 1992 U.N. PKO in Cambodia, and since then have deepened collaboration in the U.N. PKO in Timor-Leste and the international relief activities following the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean. When such activities are carried out by the SDF and Australian Defence Force (ADF), enabling

Fig. III-3-2-4 Leading Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

1. Recent defense exchanges and cooperation with Australia		
High-level talks between heads of state and defense	07. 3	Japan–Australia Summit Meeting(Tokyo) *"Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation" announced
	07. 6	First Japan–Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations "2+2" (Tokyo)
	07. 6	Japan–Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo)
	07. 9	Japan–Australia Summit meeting (Canberra) *Action plan prepared to implement the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation • States directions for revision of the Memorandum on Japan–Australia Defense Exchange
	08.12	Second Japan–Australia "2+2" meeting (Tokyo) *Joint statement released
	08.12	Japan–Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) *Memorandam on Japan–Australia Defense Exchange revised • 1) Promotion of cooperation in international peace cooperation activities, 2) improvement of cooperation and collaboration in peacetime including implementation of strategic policy discussions and expansion of exercises, and 3) strengthening of trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia as well as of cooperation in multilateral frameworks
	09. 5	Japan–Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, the 8th Shangri-La Dialogue) *Both countries agreed to deal with the North Korean nuclear tests in a unified manner *Agreement reached to accelerate the study on cooperation in logistics, expand joint exercises, and strengthen trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia
	09.12	Japan–Australia Summit Meeting (Tokyo) *Revision of the action plan to implement the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation • Agreement reached to work toward a treaty regarding Japan–Australia logistics cooperation
	10. 5	Third Japan–Australia "2+2" meeting (Tokyo) *Discussions carried out regarding 1) Japan–Australia security cooperation (welcoming the signing of the ACSA, the expediting of negotiations regarding a Japan–Australia treaty on protecting classified information, etc.), 2) Japan–U.S.–Australia cooperation, 3) the Korean patrol vessel sinking incident, 4) military nuclear disarmament and non proliferation, 5) regional architecture, and 6) regional posture
	10. 5	Japan–Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) *Views exchanged regarding 1) the security policies of both nations, 2) Japan–Australia defense cooperation, and 3) the regional security posture
	07. 2	Visit to Australia by MSDF Chief of Staff
	07. 3	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Army
	07. 8	Visit to Australia by GSDF Chief of Staff (5th PACC)
	08. 4	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Navy
	08. 5	Visit to Australia by ASDF Chief of Staff
	09. 8	Visit to Japan by Australian Deputy Chief of Army (6th PACC)
	10. 4	Visit to Japan by Australian Chief of Air Force
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	08. 2	10th Japan–Australia Politico-Military Consultations (PM)
	08. 9	13th Japan–Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM)
	09.10	14th Japan–Australia Military-Military Consultations (MM)
	10. 3	11th Japan–Australia Politico-Military Consultations (PM)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	07.10	Deployment of multipurpose support aircraft (U-4) to Australia
	08. 7–8	Participation in the Australian hosted multinational joint maritime exercise "Kakadu 2008"
	08. 9	Deployment of maritime patrol aircraft (P-3C) to Australia
	09. 9	Implementation of Japan–Australia joint exercises
	10. 6	Multi-purpose assistance aircraft (U-4) deployed to Guam (exchange with Australian Air Force units as part of Japan–U.S.–Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions)
Japan–U.S.–Australia trilateral cooperation	07. 4 08. 4 09.11	Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF)
	07. 6	Japan–U.S.–Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 6th Shangri-La Dialogue)
	07.10 09. 9	Japan–U.S.–Australia joint exercises
	10. 6	Japan–U.S.–Australia High-level Trilateral Discussions (Guam: ASDF Chief of Staff Hokazono, Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Australian Chief of Air Force)
	07. 5 08. 2	Pacific Global Air Mobility Seminar (PGAMS)

reciprocal provision of supplies and services such as water, food, fuel, and transport through an established framework would further facilitate and consolidate the strategic partnership between Japan and Australia. Furthermore, facilitating and strengthening cooperation like this would dramatically improve the effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations and international disaster relief activities conducted by Japan and Australia together. This would serve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region, while also being conducive to an intraregional order through cooperation. Therefore, a decision was reached at the Japan–Australia summit meeting held in December 2009 to begin negotiations on an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)[20]. Based on this development, negotiations were held between Japan and Australia and the ACSA and its Procedural Arrangement were signed at the 3rd Japan–Australia "2+2" held in May of this year. Further, the understanding that the ACSA established a foundation for close defense cooperation between the SDF and the ADF and that the signing of the ACSA expressed a will of both countries to strengthen defense cooperation were shared at the Japan–Australia "2+2," and at the Japan–Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting, which were held on the same day of the signing ceremony. To date, Japan has only concluded an ACSA with the United States. The conclusion of Japan's first ACSA other than the one concluded with the United States on the premise of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements is considered to have enormous significance for Japan's future defense cooperation and exchanges. The approval of the Diet is necessary in order to conclude the ACSA and domestic law needs to be revised quickly for its implementation.

At the same time, trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia has been increasing in recent years. As was previously mentioned, Japan and Australia are both allies of the United States, and simultaneously share fundamental values. They have been collaborating and cooperating closely in order to resolve the various challenges the Asia-Pacific region and the international community are facing. In order to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of such collaboration and cooperation, it is important that trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia be promoted in a manner which includes the United States, whose presence is indispensable for regional peace and stability. Under this recognition, the first Japan–U.S.–Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting was held on the opportunity afforded by the 6th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (Shangri-la Dialogue)[21] in June 2007. At the working level, the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), which is a Director-General-level meeting between the three countries, has been held three times in April 2007, April 2008, and November 2009, with consultations being carried out on such issues as trilateral defense cooperation. Furthermore, in May 2007 and February 2008, defense officials from Japan, the United States, and Australia held the Pacific Global Air Mobility Seminar (PGAMS). At the seminar, views were exchanged on future trilateral air lift cooperation. At the seminar in February 2008, the loading exercise of a GSDF CH-47J onto a U.S. Air Force's C-17 was conducted. Moreover, in September 2009, a trilateral exercise using patrol aircraft (P-3C) was conducted for the second time since October 2007 among the MSDF, U.S. Navy, and Royal Australian Navy and Air Force.

For the future, it will be important to further strengthen defense cooperation and exchanges between Japan and Australia focusing mainly on non-traditional security areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and which includes trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and Australia.



Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Australian Minister for Defence Faulkner exchanging documents related to the signing of the ACSA

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Efforts to Improve International Security Cooperation

Colonel Tim Gellel, Australian Defence and Armed Services Attaché

What Happens Twice Will Happen Thrice

Japan is a critically important strategic partner for Australia. Over the past decade, the very strong Australia–Japan defence relationship has moved towards a more practical focus, with successful operational cooperation in East Timor (2002–2004), reconstruction in Iraq (2004–2006), Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations in Aceh (2005) and Sumatra (2009), and more recently counter-piracy cooperation in the Gulf of Aden.

… So We Should Not Rest on Our Laurels

Working together, our national defence forces have made significant contributions to international peace and security. But each of those missions was difficult to predict, and we cannot rest on past achievements. We must continue to work hard to prepare for our next combined deployment by building upon the lessons learned from our previous experience.

On 19 May 2010, our two governments signed an Acquisitions and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) which builds upon the very successful 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, and the 2005 and 2008 Memoranda on Defence Cooperation. As the next step to deepen practical cooperation, both sides will need to exercise and test the ACSA frequently so that we become familiar with its operation before having to implement it on operations. As is the case with any effective relationship, we will need to continue to work very hard together to ensure our future success.

Colonel Tim Gellel (front) of the Australian army at the Japan–Australia defense ministers' meeting

2. Japan–Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is one of the neighboring countries which has historically maintained the closest relations with Japan in economic, cultural, and other areas. Moreover, it is also a country that is extremely vital to Japan from a geopolitical perspective. Just like Japan, the ROK shares fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalist economies. The two countries also share many strategic interests as allies of the United States, such as permitting the stationing of U.S. armed forces. Therefore, the fact that the two countries collaborate closely on not only the economic front, but also the security front, has enormous significance for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Mutual understanding and trust has been promoted, as evidenced by the fact that almost every year since 1994 the defense ministers of Japan and the ROK have made reciprocal visits.

In the meantime, both Japan and the ROK are confronted with wide-ranging and complex security challenges. These include not only the North Korean nuclear and missile issues, but also counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, responding to large-scale natural disasters, anti-piracy measures, and maritime security.

Therefore, for the two countries to effectively respond to such security challenges it is important to carry out more broad-ranging and concrete defense cooperation, not just exchanges to promote mutual understanding and trust.

Under such a recognition, at the Japan–ROK Defense Ministerial meeting in April 2009, Japan and the ROK signed the first Memorandum of Intent regarding Defense Exchanges between the Ministry of Defense of Japan and the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea [22], which was the first consensus document for security areas between Japan



Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Nagashima and ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Tae Young

Fig. III-3-2-4 Leading Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

2. Recent defense exchanges and cooperation with Korea		
High-level talks between heads of defense	09. 4	Japan–Korea Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) *Exchange of views regarding the issue of North Korea and defense exchange between Japan and Korea *"Statement of Intention Regarding Japan–Korea Defense Exchange" signed
	09.12	Visit to Korea by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Nagashima (Seoul) *Met with the Korean Minister of Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Seoul)
	10. 6	Japan–Korea Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore)
	10. 7	Visit to Korea by Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Nagashima (Seoul) *Meetings with the Vice-Minister of Defense, Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National Security, etc.
	08.10	Visit to Korea by MSDF Chief of Staff
	09. 6	Japan–Korea Defense Vice Ministerial Meeting (Seoul)
	09. 7	Visit to Korea by ASDF Chief of Staff Hokazono
	09. 8	Visit to Japan by Chief of Staff, Korean Army (6th PACC)
	09.10	Visit to Korea by ASDF Chief of Staff Hokazono
	09.11	Visit to Korea by GSDF Chief of Staff Hibako
	10. 2	Visit to Korea by Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Oriki
	10. 4	Visit to Korea by MSDF Chief of Staff
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	09.10	17th Japan–Korea Working-level Defense Dialogue (Assistant Vice Minister talks)
	09.10	3rd Japan–Korea Working-level Defense Dialogue Working Group (Department chief-level talks)
	09.12	9th Japan–Korea Security Dialogue (Discussions by foreign affairs/defense representatives)
Unit-level exchange, etc.	08.10	Japan lower enlisted exchange (Korea, Ground)
	09. 5	Visit to Korea by MSDF Commander Maizuru
	09. 5	Visit to Korea by Commander of the Western Air Defense Force
	09. 7	Japan–Korea joint search and rescue exercise
	09. 9	Japan–Korea commanders' course student exchange (Japan, Korea, Air)
	09.10	Japan–Korea basic level officer exchange (Japan, Ground)
	09.11	GSDF officer candidate training (Korea)
	09.11	Japan–Korea mid-level officer exchange (Japan, Air)
	09.11	Japan–Korea lower enlisted exchange (Japan, Ground)
	10. 1	Visit to Korea by Commanding General of the Western Army
	10. 3	Japan–Korea basic level officer exchange (Korea, Ground)
	10. 4	Japan–Korea mid-level officer exchange (Korea, Air)
	10. 7	Japan–Korea mid-level officer exchange (Japan, Air)
Japan–U.S.–Korea trilateral cooperation	09. 5	Japan–U.S.–Korea Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 8th Shangri-La Dialogue) *Exchanged opinions regarding the handling of North Korea's nuclear tests and the importance of close cooperation between the three nations
	09. 7	13th Japan–U.S.–Korea Working-level Defense Dialogue
	10. 6	Japan–U.S.–Korea Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 9th Asia Security Summit) *Views exchanged regarding the sinking incident of the Korean patrol vessel

and the ROK. In light of the prior tradition of exchange between Japan and the ROK, the memorandum lays out the future orientation for exchanges at each level, as well as cooperation in different areas such as international peace cooperation tasks. Based on this, the 17th and 18th military-to-military talks at the Director-General/Councilor-level were held in October 2009, with the 8th Politico-Military talks which included officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was held in December of the same year. As these and other examples show, the two nations are deepening defense cooperation and exchanges.

Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Ryoichi Oriki and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lee Sang Hee (at the time)

Furthermore, as both Japan and the ROK are allied with the United States and playing an indispensable role for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and the ROK has been developing in recent years much the same way as it has between Japan, the United States, and Australia. At the 9th IISS Asian Security Summit in June 2010, the third Japan–U.S.–ROK-Trilateral Defense Ministerial meeting was held following on the previous year. At this meeting, they supported the ROK's efforts in the wake of the sinking of the ROK patrol vessel and condemned North Korea, also confirming to consider trilateral cooperation in the areas of information sharing, PSI, etc. Further, agreement was reached to move forward with cooperation in the areas of humanitarian aid and disaster relief. In July the same year, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Nagashima followed up his December 2009 visit with another visit to the ROK to hold discussions with ROK Defense Vice-Minister Chang Soo-man and others, and they agreed on the importance of defense cooperation between Japan, the United States, and the ROK after the sinking of the patrol ship.

Japan considers it important to continue developing future-oriented cooperative relations with the ROK in the field of security into the future.

3. Japan–India Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

India is located in the center of sea lanes which connect Japan with the Middle East and Africa, making it an extremely important country in a geopolitical sense for Japan, which relies on maritime transportation for most of its trade. Furthermore, Japan and India share fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalist economies. They also have a common interest in the peace, stability, and prosperity of Asia and the world, and have constructed a strategic global partnership. Therefore, in recent years Japan and India have been strengthening relations in security areas in particular. In October 2008, Prime Minister Singh of India visited Japan and the two Prime Ministers signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India (Joint Declaration)[23], which is a joint declaration regarding the area of security coming after similar declarations with the United States and Australia. The Joint Declaration specifies that cooperation will be conducted between the two Defense Authorities by way of, for example, meetings between the Defense Ministers, meetings between the Vice-Minister of Defense of Japan and the Defence Secretary of India including Defense Policy Dialogue, military-to-military talks at the Director General/Joint Secretary-level, and service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises. The declaration serves as a guideline for future cooperation in security areas between Japan and India. Furthermore, Japan-India Defense Ministerial meetings were held between Indian Minister of Defence A.K. Antony and Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa when Minister of Defence Antony visited Japan in November 2009, and when Ministry of Defense Kitazawa visited India in April 2010. On these occasions they exchanged opinions on regional security conditions, maritime security, and the two countries' defense cooperation and exchanges. At the meeting in November 2009 a joint

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Japan's Efforts in Response to the Sinking of the Korean Patrol Vessel

On March 26, 2010, the Korean Navy patrol vessel Cheonan was sunk in the Yellow Sea near the Northern Limit Line. A team of military and civilian experts from four countries, the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Sweden conducted a joint investigation and reported the results of the investigation on May 20, that the patrol vessel had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo.

Japan had received detailed explanations of the report contents in advance from the ROK, and so expressed strong support for the ROK and at the same time strong criticism for North Korea. In addition, Japan took the position that the attack by North Korea on the Korean patrol vessel was inexcusable in terms of regional and international peace and stability, and actively called for a response from the international community. As a result, a summit statement at the Muskoka G8 Summit was issued in June, as well as a U.N. Security Council presidential statement in July, and a clear message was sent by the international community regarding the North Korean attack.

Based on the results of investigation reported by the joint investigation team, the Defense Ministry ordered the SDF to re-examine its readiness, to continue to gather information, and to make every effort to conduct surveillance activities, in order to maintain readiness. In addition, Japan, the United States, and the ROK held defense discussions at the IISS Asia Security Summit (Shangri-La Conference) in June this year confirming the importance of cooperation and coordination between the three countries. Japan also received an invitation from the United States to send observers to the joint training exercise Independent Spirit conducted by the United States and the ROK from July 25 to 28 in response to the incident, and Japan sent four MSDF officers as observers. The SDF officers boarded the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier George Washington to observe the training by the U.S. and Korean militaries.

The Ministry of Defense will continue to maintain strong cooperative relations with Korea, looking to the future for regional peace and stability, and at the same time will continue to maintain close coordinating and cooperative relations with related institutions of Japan and other nations, including the United States.

Ministry of Defense Meeting Concerning the Dispatch of the JDRT to Pakistan (August 20, 2010)

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier *George Washington* during the maritime drill [U.S. 7th Fleet]

press release was announced, which reached an agreement over promoting defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries across various levels and fields.

Both Japan and India have shared the view to promote cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and disaster relief. With the interest of strengthening concrete cooperation in the field of maritime security in particular, the two sides held the first Japan–India

Maritime Security Dialogue in October 2009. In December 2009 the then Prime Minister Hatoyama visited India. Together with the Indian Prime Minister Singh, he formulated the Action Plan to promote security cooperation between Japan and India. In the Action Plan, both sides decided to hold a Subcabinet "2+2" Dialogue with a participation from the Defense and Foreign Ministries. The first subcabinet "2+2" Dialogue was held in Delhi in July 2010. The Action Plan includes items for the actual promotion of cooperation in maritime security such as cooperation in anti-piracy activities and the holding of joint exercises at sea. In April 2009 Japan took part in "Malabar 09"[24], a multilateral joint naval exercise organized by India being held for the second time since 2007. Here various tactical exercises such as anti-aircraft, anti-submarine, and anti-ship tactics were carried out in an effort to build both cooperative relations and capacity between the SDF and the Indian forces with regard to maritime security.


Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Indian Minister of Defence Antony

Fig. III-3-2-4 Leading Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

3. Recent defense exchanges and cooperation with India		
High-level talks between heads of defense	06.12	Japan–India Summit Meeting(Tokyo) *"Joint Statement Towards Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership" announced
	07. 8	Japan–India Summit Meeting (Delhi) *"Joint Statement on the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership" announced Japan–India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) *Views were exchanged regarding the war on terror, regional posture, and bilateral defense exchange, and agreement was made to develop defense exchanges
	08.10	Japan–India Summit Meeting(Tokyo) *"Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India" announced *"Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India" announced. It was announced that both Defense Ministries would proceed with cooperation based on Defense Ministerial Meetings, Defense Policy Dialogues, Military-Military talks between the ministries at Director General-level, and a framework for military exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises.
	09.11	Japan–India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) *Views were exchanged regarding bilateral defense cooperation and exchanges, as well as the regional security posture (Release of a "joint press release")
	09.12	Japan–India Summit meeting (Delhi) *Joint statement announced entitled "A New Stage of Japan–India Strategic and Global Partnership" *Action plan prepared to move forward with Japan–India security cooperation (sub-cabinet "2+2" dialogues and implementation of joint exercises were announced)
	10. 4	Japan–India Defense Ministerial Meeting (Delhi) *Views exchanged regarding defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries and maritime security. Both sides shared the view to deepen bilateral cooperation in the areas of antipiracy, U.N. PKO, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
	07. 4 08. 8 09. 8 10. 7	1st Japan–India Defense Policy Dialogue (Administrative Vice Minister-level) (Tokyo) Visit to Japan by Indian Navy Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Indian Army Chief of Staff (6th PACC) 1st Japan–India Subcabinet "2+2" Dialogue (Delhi) 2nd Japan–India Defense Policy Dialogue (Delhi)
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	09. 2 09.10 10. 4	6th Japan–India Comprehensive Security Dialogue, 5th Military-Military Talks 1st India–Japan Maritime Security Dialogue 7th Japan–India Comprehensive Security Dialogue 6th Japan–India Military-Military Talks
Unit-level exchange, etc.	07. 4 07. 9 09. 4	Japan–U.S.–India joint exercise Multinational joint maritime exercise "Malabar 07-2" "Malabar 09"

4. Japan–China Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

China's outstanding economic development and the modernization of its military capabilities in recent years have raised its presence within the international community. While pending issues such as gas fields in the East China Sea exist between Japan and China, comprehensive promotion of the "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests"[25], and further deepening friendly and cooperative relations are common interests of both countries. Furthermore, from the standpoint of continuing to promote defense exchanges in a continuous and stable manner without being affected by political circumstances by bolstering mutual understanding and trust between Japan and China by striving to improve transparency in respective defense policies, is indispensable for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Both Japan and China have heretofore worked to advance mutual trust and understanding at various levels. In particular, there has been a broad array of high level exchanges including the two Japan–China Defense Ministerial meetings held in one year, in Beijing in March 2009 and in Tokyo in November 2009.

Exchanges between units have also developed in recent years. Thus far, the Chinese destroyer Shenzhen called at in Tokyo Bay from November to December 2007, the MSDF destroyer Sazanami visited Zhanjiang in China's Guangdong Province in June 2008, and the Chinese training vessel Zhenghe visited Kure and Etajima in November 2009. At the Japan–China Defense Ministerial meeting in November 2009, the two Ministers shared

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Japan–China Defense Officials Exchange Project

Chairman Yohei Sasakawa, The Sasakawa Japan–China Friendship Fund

The Sasakawa Japan–China Friendship Trust has been carrying out a mutual visit and training program for active-duty field officer level personnel from Japan and China since FY2001. The aim of this program is to build stable Japan–China relations for the future and promote trust building in security areas for the two countries. The training has consisted of on-site reviews of ground, naval, and air units and courtesy visits to leaders, lectures on national defense policies, and frank exchanges of opinions through direct dialogue. It also incorporates variegated content related to fields such as history, society, and culture, thereby providing opportunities to come to a multi-faceted understanding of the partner country. In the exchanges over the past nine years, 102 field officer level SDF personnel have visited China, while 187 field officer level personnel from the PLA have visited Japan from China. The substance of the exchanges has also progressed from its initial formal nature, and in recent years officials have even held frank discussions over meals at each other's bases and aboard naval vessels, and shown one another the latest equipment. The fact that this project has continued even during tense relations between the Chinese and Japanese governments and when security exchanges have fallen into arrears, and that the private sector has amply played a leading role in it, deserves particular emphasis.

The year 2010 marks the 10th year for the program. It is hoped that this program will continue to contribute to the peace of both countries by linking the SDF and PLA together through understanding and trust into the future.



The 9th team of SDF field-grade officers to visit China

the view that exchanges between the army corps of the GSDF and those of the PLA would be carried out, and in June 2010 a group represented by the commander of the Jinan Military Region visited Japan. Both Japan and China are striving to strengthen mutual trust and improve the transparency of defense policies through such efforts.

When it comes to recent Japan–China defense exchanges, there is rising momentum not just for strengthening mutual trust and understanding, but also for working to gradually expand areas of cooperation underneath the notion of comprehensively promoting their "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests." Specifically, in November 2009 at a meeting between Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and Defense Minister Kitazawa, the two sides decided to examine and exchange opinions to explore future cooperation in specific areas. Such cooperation would include holding joint exercises concerning search and rescue at sea,

Fig. III-3-2-4 Leading Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

4. Recent defense exchanges and cooperation with China		
High-level talks between heads of defense	07. 8	Japan–China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) *Agreed to the understanding that further development of Japan–China defense exchanges was important *Announced the "Japan–China Defense Ministries Joint Press Release," the first such document between the defense ministries of Japan and China
	07.12	Japan–China Summit Meeting (Beijing) *Established the "Promotion of Exchange and Mutual Trust" as one of the three pillars to substantiate the "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests" *Agreed on strengthened exchange in the realm of security (deployment of MSDF vessels, mutual visits by young officers of the SDF and the People's Liberation Army).
	08. 5	Japan–China Summit Meeting (Tokyo) *Agreed to strengthening high-level exchange including at the Defense Minister-level, visits by MSDF vessels, and the swift establishment of a communications mechanism between the defense ministries *Announced the "China–Japan Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a 'Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests'"
	09. 3	Japan–China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Beijing) *Carried out discussions regarding Japan and China's defense policies, Japan–China defense exchange, and regional situation, and agreed to proceed with exchanges at each level and in each area, and to move forward with dialogue and cooperation in peacekeeping operations, disaster relief operations, and anti piracy activities. *Released a "joint press release" including 10 items of common understanding regarding upcoming principle exchanges
	09.11	Japan–China Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) *Announced a "joint press release" *Agreed to such items as a visit to China by the Defense Minister, joint training for search and rescue at sea, exchange between the army corps of the GSDF and those of the PLA (starting in 2010), Senior Officials Defense Dialogues and Staff talks, and the exchanging views toward the sharing of experience and cooperation regarding humanitarian aid and disaster relief *Held the first ever joint press conference
	08. 9 08.10 09. 2 09. 7 09.11 10. 2	Visit to Japan by commander of the PLA Air Force Visit to Japan by commander of the PLA Navy Visit to Japan by the deputy chief of General Staff Headquarters Visit to China by MSDF Chief of Staff Visit to China by ASDF Chief of Staff Hokazono Visit to China by GSDF Chief of Staff Hibako
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	09. 3 10. 7	11th Japan–China Security Dialogue (Foreign/Defense Ministry Director General-level talks) 2nd joint working group meeting on a maritime communications mechanism between the defense ministries of Japan and China
Unit-level exchange, etc.	 07.11–12 08. 6 09.11 08. 9 09. 3	<Mutual visits by ships> *Visit to Japan by the Chinese vessel *Shenzhen* *Visit to China by the MSDF vessel *Sazanami* *Visit to Japan by the Chinese training vessel *Zhenghe* <Company-grade junior officer exchanges> *Visit to Japan by a Chinese company-grade junior officer exchange group *Visit to China by a Japanese company-grade junior officer exchange group

sharing experience and cooperation with regard to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the prompt establishment of a maritime communication mechanism between the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities. A joint press release[26] encompassing these points of consensus was announced, and the first joint press conference was held after the meeting. Among those, in light of the increased activities of the Chinese Navy in recent years, the establishment of a maritime communication mechanism between the defense organizations of Japan and China is an urgent task. Japan is working to encourage China regarding the implementation of specific discussions.

Hereafter it is essential to strive to promote mutual trust and understanding between Japan and China at various levels and in a wider range of areas, while also actively promoting concrete cooperation in non-traditional security areas. As a result of efforts to promote concrete discussions with the Chinese, discussions were held on this topic between the defense authorities of Japan and China in July 2010.

Minister of Defense Kitazawa and Chinese Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie

Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Commander General Xu Qiliang and ASDF Chief of Staff Kenichiro Hokazono

5. Japan–Russian Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Russia has great influence on the security of Europe, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region and is a neighboring country of Japan. It is therefore very important for Japan to deepen defense exchanges with Russia and promote relations of trust and cooperation.

As Japan–Russia relations have continuously been developing in wider areas, the Ministry of Defense has been steadily carrying out exchanges with Russia at various levels in accordance with the memorandum on Japan–Russia defense exchanges signed in 1999 (revised in 2006). Consultations between Director-General-level and Councilor-level defense officials, the Japan–Russia Bilateral Working Group meetings which confer over how to promote overall defense exchanges, and annual meetings based on the Japan–Russia Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas are all held in an ongoing manner.

Exchanges with Russia were relatively low key in 2009. Even so, the Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army visited Russia in March, exchanges between units wherein Russian Ground Force observers were admitted to GSDF drills were carried out in September, and exchanges between officials in charge of medical affairs were conducted in October. For the future, Japan will further intensify these exchanges and work to promote mutual understanding and trusting relations in an ongoing manner.

6. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries

Southeast Asian countries are located in an area deemed strategically important for maritime traffic that connects Japan with the Middle East and Europe, and they also have close economic relations with Japan. Not only are bilateral dialogues important for the region, but so too is cooperation at multilateral security frameworks for the Asia-Pacific region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). As will be described in the next section, international cooperation is indispensable when it comes to the non-traditional security issues which have been actively discussed in recent years, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, and

Fig. III-3-2-4 Leading Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

5. Recent defense exchanges and cooperation with Russia		
High-level talks between heads of defense	06. 1	Japan–Russia Defense Ministerial meeting (Moscow) *Memorandum on Japanese Russian defense exchange revised
	06. 5 07. 6 08. 3 08. 4 10. 6	Visit to Russia by GSDF Chief of Staff Visit to Russia by ASDF Chief of Staff Visit to Japan by Russian Ground Forces Commander in Chief Visit to Russia by Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Visit to Japan by Air Force Commander in Chief
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	06. 4 07.12 08. 4 08. 5 10. 7	7th Japan–Russia Defense Officials Consultations (Tokyo) 8th Japan–Russia Defense Officials Consultations (Moscow) 4th Japan–Russia Security Talks (Tokyo) 9th Japan–Russia Defense Officials Consultations (Tokyo) 5th Japan–Russia Security Talks (Moscow)
Working-level exchange	08. 7 09.10	Visit to Japan by the Surgeon General of the Russian Federation Armed forces Visit to Russia by the Director General for Health and Medicine
Unit-level exchange, etc.	06.10 06.10 07. 8 07.12 08. 9 08. 9 08.11 08.11 09. 3 09. 9–10 10. 7	Visit to Russia by the Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army Visit to Japan by Russian Navy vessels (8th Japan–Russia Search and Rescue Exercises) Visit to Russia by MSDF vessels (9th Japan–Russia Search and Rescue Exercises) Visit to Japan by the Commander, 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army of the Russian Air Force Deployment of GSDF observers to Russian Ground Forces exercises Visit to Japan by Russian navy vessels (10th Joint Japan–Russia search and rescue exercises) Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Russian Far Eastern Military District Visit to Russia by the Commanding General of the ASDF Northern Air Defense Force Visit to Russia by the Commanding General of the GSDF Northern Army Participation by Russian Ground Forces observers in GSDF exercises Visit to Russia by MSDF vessels (11th Joint Japan–Russia search and rescue exercises)

peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Promoting trust and cooperative relations for various security challenges through the framework of bilateral and multilateral dialogues with these countries is meaningful for both Japan and Southeast Asian countries. What is more, debate has been actively carried out in recent years through these bilateral and multilateral frameworks with regard to the construction of security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region. For its part, the Ministry of Defense proactively explains its stance toward improving the regional security environment. It is also actively working to build cooperative security architecture in the region with Southeast Asian countries.

In concrete terms, Japan has held meetings at the Minister-level and Vice-Minister-level with Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. At such meetings, Japan has engaged in active exchanges of opinions regarding defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries in each case and security cooperation architecture in the region. Furthermore, in January 2010 Vice-Minister of Defense Kimito Nakae visited the ASEAN Secretariat for the first time as Vice-Minister of Defense, and held discussions with Deputy Secretary General of ASEAN Sayakane Sisouvong. Also, in May of the same year, Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shimba visited Laos, Cambodia, and Timor-Leste to exchange views regarding practical cooperation including cooperation in nontraditional security issues and assistance in capacity-building efforts, while making efforts to strengthen bilateral defense cooperation and exchange with each nation.

Vice-Minister of Defense Nakae in a meeting

Fig. III-3-2-4 Leading Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

6. Recent defense exchanges and cooperation with ASEAN countries		
High-level talks between heads of defense	10. 5	Visit to Cambodia by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shimba
	08. 2 10. 1 10. 6	Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy Visit to Indonesia by Vice Minister of Defense Nakae Visit to Indonesia by Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Oriki
	10. 5	Visit to Laos by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shimba
	09. 8 10. 1	Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Royal Malaysian Navy Visit to Malaysian by Vice-Minister of Defense Nakae
	09. 5	Visit to the Philippines by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kishi
	09. 2 09. 5 09. 9 09.11 09.12 10. 2 10. 6	Japan–Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (45th Munich Security Conference) Japan–Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 8th Shangri-La Dialogue) Visit to Japan by the Chief of Army, Singapore Army Japan–Singapore Vice-Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) Japan–Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) *Views were exchanged regarding the defense policies of both countries, defense exchange, and the regional security posture *Memorandum on Defense Exchanges signed Visit to Singapore by MSDF Chief of Staff Japan–Singapore Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 9th Shangri-La Dialogue)
	09.12 10. 8	Visit to Thailand by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shimba Visit to Japan by the Commander of the Thai Royal Navy
	09. 2 09. 3 10. 5	Visit to Japan by the Timor-Leste Secretary of State for Defense Japan–Timor-Leste Defense Ministerial Meeting (Tokyo) *Views were exchanged regarding the acceptance of exchange students at the National Defense Academy in 2010 and beyond and the promotion of defense exchange through multilateral meetings such as the Tokyo Defense Forum Visit to Timor-Leste by Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shimba
	09. 5 09. 5 10. 1 10. 2	Japan–Vietnam Defense Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 8th Shangri-La Dialogue) *Work to prepare a defense exchange memorandum of understanding was begun and agreed regarding mutual visits and strengthening exchange in the realm of education, etc. Visit to Vietnam by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kishi Visit to Vietnam by Vice-Minister of Defense Nakae Visit to Vietnam by MSDF Chief of Staff
	09. 8 10. 3	6th PACC (visit to Japan by the following) Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army, Vice Commander of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces and Commander of the Royal Cambodian Army, Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army, Chief of Staff of the Malaysian Army, Commander of the Philippine Army, Commander of the Singapore Army, Commander of the Sri Lankan Army, Commander of the Royal Thai Army, Chief of Staff of the Vietnam People's Army, 2nd Meeting of Senior Defense Officials on Common Security challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo, attended by the following) Brunei Vice Minister of Defense, Cambodian Minister of Defense, Indonesian Vice Minister of Defense, Laotian Vice Minister of Defense, Malaysian Vice Minister of Defense, Philippine Vice Minister of Defense, Vietnamese Vice-Minister of Defense
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	10. 6	1st Japan–Cambodia Politico-Military Consultations 1st Japan–Cambodia Military-Military Consultations
	10. 8	4th Japan–Philippine Politico-Military Consultations 4th Japan–Philippine Military-Military Consultations
	09. 9	10th Japan–Singapore Military-Military Consultations
	09. 9	8th Japan–Thailand Politico-Military Consultations, 8th Japan–Thailand Military-Military Consultations
	10. 4	6th Japan–Vietnam Foreign/Defense Ministry Dialogue, 6th Japan–Vietnam Defense Ministry Dialogue
Unit-level exchange, etc.	09. 5	Participation in the U.S. and Philippines sponsored ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (Philippines)

With regard to the ARF framework, in June 2009 Japan served as the co-chair of the ARF Peacekeeping Expert's Meeting together with Cambodia, and is planning to co-host the 2nd ARF Disaster Relief Exercise 2011 (ARF-DiREx 2011) with Indonesia in March 2011. As these and other cases indicate, Japan is actively working to participate in security dialogues and contribute to the development of concrete cooperation in the region, while also playing a leading role in improving the regional security environment.
(See Fig. III-3-2)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

International Exchanges at the National Defense Academy of Japan —Exchange Students from Timor-Leste—

The National Defense Academy of Japan (NDA) is home to nearly 90 exchange students. The acceptance by the NDA of exchange students from Asian countries has been a tradition since 1958, when the first students were received from Thailand. In recent years, there has been an increased number of graduate exchange students, and exchanges have diversified, expanded and are now conducted reciprocally. Six personnel are reciprocally dispatched between the NDA and Military, Navy, and Air Force Academies of the United States every year for four months. Discussions about student exchanges are also underway with several other academies, including with France.

This year the NDA welcomed four new personnel from Timor-Leste. Last year Ambassador Iwao Kitahara invited the Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, to the NDA to speak to all of the academy's students. The Prime Minister spoke of the independence movement, the coup d'état disturbance that took place while he was working as the first prime minister to create the nation's foundation, and that he wants to send youth to the NDA to be trained as well-regulated, top-level military officials. Timor-Leste is one of the places that the SDF currently conducts PKO activities. The Prime Minister's request surely comes from the reputation of the SDF built through their activities, as a force that works for the benefit of citizens and with solid regulations, rather than pointing guns at them. Studying abroad in Japan is a good option when training upper level military officials during the current era of democracy, and I hope that the four students will have a good experience at the NDA that meets their expectations.

President Makoto Iokibe of the National Defense Academy of Japan

Exchange students from Timor-Leste and NDA President Makoto Iokibe

7. Japan–U.K. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

Being a major power that has influence in the European region as well as the rest of the world, the United Kingdom has historically maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan shares the same strategic interests with the United Kingdom, as both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relationship, it is extremely important for Japan that Japan and the United Kingdom further defense exchanges by cooperating on global issues such as international peace cooperation activities and countermeasures against terrorism and piracy, as well as by exchanging information relating to the regional situation.

During a Japan–U.K. summit meeting in January 2007 with the United Kingdom, the Japan–U.K. Joint Statement was announced, which encompasses cooperation in security areas. Moreover, in January 2004 the Defense Ministers for both countries signed a memorandum on bilateral defense cooperation in order to develop bilateral defense exchanges in various sectors, thereby advancing the two countries' resolve to promote defense exchanges at all levels and in various fields.

Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shimba and U.K. Minister of State for Defence Equipment and Support, Lord Paul Rudd Drayson

8. Defense Cooperation and Exchanges with European Countries

Europe shares fundamental values with Japan such as democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and capitalist economies. Moreover, it serves as the central core in working to address shared challenges to global security, focusing primarily on non-traditional security areas such as counter-terrorism and combating piracy, as well as international peace cooperation activities. Therefore, developing defense cooperation and exchanges with the countries of Europe provides a foundation for Japan to actively take part in global challenges, and is important for both Japan and Europe. Under this recognition, Japan is deepening its cooperative relations with European countries and organizations, such as France, Germany, Italy, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by utilizing the forum of multilateral security dialogues. In May 2010, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kusuda visited Belgium and France and exchanged views with officials at NATO, EU, and the French Ministry of Defense.

(See Figs. III-3-2-4 and 5) (See Reference 60)

Italian Vice-Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto chatting with Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shimba

Former MSDF Chief of Staff Akahoshi and Commander of the French Pacific Fleet Bichot

Fig. III-3-2-4 Leading Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

7. Recent defense exchanges and cooperation with the United Kingdom		
High-level talks between heads of defense	04. 1	Japan–U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London) *A defense cooperation document was signed
	06. 1	Japan–U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (London) *Verified that high-level and working-level defense exchange was proceeding
	09. 2	Japan–U.K. Defense Ministerial Meeting (at the 45th Munich Security Conference) *Exchanged views regarding defense policy
	09. 5	Views were exchanged between the Minister of Defense and the Secretary of State for Defence (Singapore, 8th Shangri-La Dialogue)
	05. 6	Visit to the U.K. by MSDF Chief of Staff
	07. 4	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff
	08. 1	Visit to Japan by U.K. Chief of Naval Staff
	09. 5	Visit to the U.K. by MSDF Chief of Staff
	10. 5	Visit to the U.K. by ASDF Chief of Staff Hokazono
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	09.11	10th Japan–U.K. Politico-Military Consultations, 6th Japan–U.K. Military-Military Consultations
Unit-level exchange, etc.	09. 6	Japan–U.K. unit exchange (U.K., Ground)
	09. 7	Japan–U.K. unit exchange (Japan, Ground)
	10. 2	Exchange of research and development personnel (Japan, Ground)

Fig. III-3-2-4 Leading Defense Exchanges and Cooperation

8. Recent defense exchanges and cooperation with European nations and others		
High-level talks between heads of defense	10. 5	Visit to Belgium by ASDF Chief of Staff Hokazono
	10. 5	Visit to Belgium by Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kasuta
	09. 5	Visit to France by MSDF Chief of Staff
	09.12	Visit to Japan by French Chief of the Defence Staff
	10. 5	Visit to France by Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Kasuta Visit to France by ASDF Chief of Staff Hokazono
	09. 2	Japan–Germany Defense Ministerial Meeting (at the 45th Munich Security Conference)
	09. 3	Visit to Japan by the Chief of Staff, German Army
	10. 2	Visit Japan by Italian Vice-Minister of National Defense
	10. 4	Visit to Japan by the Commander in Chief, Romanian Armed Forces
	10. 6	Visit to Japan by Chief of the Turkish Navy
	09. 6	Visit to Japan by the Canadian Deputy Minister of Defense
	10. 6	Visit to Canada by MSDF Chief of Staff
	09.12	Visit to the Republic of Djibouti and the Kingdom of Bahrain by Senior Vice Minister of Defense Shinba
	09. 8	6th PACC (attended by the following) Chief of the Land Staff, Canadian Forces Land Force Command General of the Army, Chilean Army Chief of Army, New Zealand Army
Regular discussions between defense ministry representatives	09. 5	7th Japan–Canada Military-Military Consultations
	10. 3	6th Japan–Canada Politico-Military Consultations
	09. 6	11th Japan–France Politico-Military Consultations, 12th Japan–France Military-Military Consultations
	10. 6	12th Japan–Germany Politico-Military Consultations
	09.10	5th Japan–New Zealand Military-Military Consultations
	10. 5	4th Japan–Pakistan Security Dialogue, 5th Japan–Pakistan Military-Military Consultations
	09. 5	9th Japan–NATO subcommittee meeting

Fig. III-3-2-5 Japan's Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years)

Defense Minister-level Exchanges of Ministers and High-level Defense Officials

2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
		International conferences and others		
	Japan U.S. Australia	Visits		
	The Philippines	Acceptance of visits		
	New Zealand			
	India			
	ROK			
	Singapore			
	NATO			
	Belgium		Singapore	
The Philippines	Italy		U.K.	
New Zealand	Thailand		Germany	
Mongolia	Pakistan		Vietnam	
Indonesia	India		Australia	
Australia	Australia[1]	Canada	Mongolia	
Singapore	Germany	ROK	Japan U.S. ROK	
Mongolia	France	France	Singapore	
Indonesia	ROK	Singapore	China	Japan U.S. ROK
Russia	Malaysia	U.K.	Singapore	ROK
U.K.	China	Australia	India	U.K.
India	Luxembourg	New Zealand	China	Singapore
Canada	Singapore	Cambodia	Timor-Leste	India
New Zealand	NATO	Australia[1]	ROK	Australia[1]

Exchanges of Working-level Officials

Country	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
ROK	●	◎◎●	◎●	◎●	
China	▲◎		▲	◎	
Russia	●	●	◎●		
Australia	◎●●	●	◎●	●	◎
New Zealand	●	●	●	●	
Singapore		●	●	●	
Thailand	◎●	◎●		◎●	
Vietnam		◎●	◎●		◎●
The Philippines	◎●	◎●			◎●
Indonesia		●			
Cambodia					◎●
India	◎●	△	◎●	◎●	◎●
Pakistan	◎●	●		◎●	◎●
U.K.	◎●	◎●	●	◎●	
France	◎●	◎●	◎●	◎●	
Germany	◎●		◎●		◎●
Canada	●		◎	●	◎
NATO	◎	◎	◎	◎	

◎ Working-level officials' meetings between foreign affairs/defense authorities
● Working-level officials' meeting between defense authorities
▲ Vice-minister-level meetings between Japan and China
△ Defense policy dialogue between vice defense ministers of Japan and India

Note 1: In addition to the defense ministerial meeting, "2+2" meetings were held between the Defense and Foreign Ministers of Japan and Australia.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

A Staff Talks with NATO and the EU

Major Taiichi Yokogi, Defense Division, Joint Staff
(Currently assigned to the 21st Squadron, 4th Air Wing)

The Joint Staff carried out staff talks (Staff Officer consultations) with NATO and the EU in March 2010, in which I had the opportunity to take part. The purpose of these staff talks is to contribute to bolstering and strengthening trusting and cooperative relations with one another. Active and assertive initiatives to improve the international security environment are regarded as major roles in defense capabilities, and as such the Joint Staff is seeking to instantiate these by carrying out staff talks.

Through this round of staff talks we shared recognition with regard to our reciprocal security environments, while also bringing up topics like piracy and other threats facing Japan and the world and international initiatives to deal with them. In addition, there was a mutually shared recognition that the Joint Staff, NATO, and the EU would hold staff talks on a regular basis in the future.

While Japan and Europe are separated by no small amount of distance, it is believed that their further cooperation in the future will be essential. From this standpoint, I feel that the staff talks were extremely significant.

A group photograph at NATO staff talks (Major Yokogi on the left)

Section 3. Efforts towards Security Frameworks and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region

1. Significance of Multilateral Security Dialogue

To ensure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to utilize the Japan–U.S. Alliance as an axis, while enhancing bilateral and multilateral dialogue frameworks of the region in a complementary and multilayered manner. In particular, with respect to future cooperation in the region, a lively discussion has been taking place by various nations in the region. Prime Minister Naoto Kan and former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama have proposed a long-term vision of the "East Asian Community." Australia advocates the "Asia Pacific Community." In addition to ministerial meetings in the fields of economy, finance, energy and environment, debate is also underway on the construction of regional frameworks in the field of security and others as well. Multilateral security efforts in the Asia-Pacific region are anticipated to further deepen security cooperation in the region, while efforts are already advancing from dialogue and confidence-building stages to concrete cooperation ones.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of a MSDF Officer Regarding the Symposium for Senior Petty Officers Held in Japan

Chief Petty Officer Kazuyasu Hatanaka, Senior Corporal, MSDF

An MSDF Senior Corporal acts as a facilitator for MSDF petty officers, giving orders to the MSDF petty officers and maintaining unit discipline, and working to boost morale.

I have worked as an MSDF Senior Corporal in the Maritime Staff Office since June 2008.

In October of last year we held the Third Western Pacific Naval Symposium for Senior Petty Officers.

From overseas 25 persons from 10 countries participated in the symposium, and 30 senior corporals of major units from around the country and other personnel joined from Japan. The three-day symposium commenced with a presentation on the navies of various nations that introduced naval equipment and education. During the discussion session, participants discussed problems that senior petty officers are tackling in each country's navy, including the character, capacity, and training required for petty officers to execute leadership as well as education for younger unit members.

Moreover, further understanding was acquired about Japan and the MSDF by using cultural training and naval review training to introduce Japanese culture and the equipment and personnel of the MSDF. At the same time, the symposium contributed significantly to cultivating mutual understanding between naval petty officers in the Asia-Pacific region. I plan to refine my own leadership skills and continue to train admirable classes of personnel in the future on a level equal or higher than that of the navies of other countries.

Naval petty officers of each country receiving an explanation

Under such circumstances, Japan believes that it is of great importance to construct multilayered frameworks in security areas and to steadily work to deepen concrete regional cooperation. Japan takes initiative to advance regional security cooperation.

2. ASEAN Regional Forum

At the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting and ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in 1993, the foreign ministers from 17 countries and from the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU), agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. Since its first ministerial meeting in 1994, the ARF has held its regular ministerial meeting annually. The number of ARF members has gradually increased annually and currently comprises 26 countries and one union[27].

Personnel that participated in the ARF-Voluntary Demonstration of Response (ARF-VDR) exercise

At present, the ARF is different from a security organization typically seen in Europe, such as NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); however, the ARF is of significance because it provides opportunities for both foreign and defense officials to attend various inter-governmental meetings on security.

The Ministry of Defense believes that it is necessary for defense officials among ARF member countries to enhance mutual confidence so that the ARF can become a forum to generate a sense of community among Asia-Pacific countries, and thereby stabilize the region's security environment. To this end, the Ministry has been continuing its efforts to deepen mutual understanding within the ARF through continuous participation, encouraging ARF members to increase the transparency of their defense policies while explaining Japan's policies and efforts, and promoting frank discussion among defense officials.

In addition, in recent years nontraditional security areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peacebuilding have been discussed as common regional security challenges.

Every year, the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (CBM/PD), and the ARF Security Policy Conference are held in addition to the Foreign Ministerial Meeting. Following the ministerial meeting in 2002, Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) have been held and also the ARF Defense Officials' Dialogue (DOD) meetings have been held ahead of the main meeting. In the maritime security field, an Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ISMMS) has been held annually co-hosted by Japan, Indonesia, and New Zealand, since March 2009. Japan utilizes these various opportunities to promote concrete cooperation and rule-making.

Furthermore, efforts for more practical cooperation in the fields above are now being made. In the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief fields, for instance, ARF General Guidelines for DR Cooperation have been approved as guidelines posed on international cooperation and ARF strategic guidance for HA-DR is currently being drafted that lays down procedures for more detailed cooperation. In May 2009, the first disaster relief field training exercise was conducted in the Philippines, and Japan's dispatch was on the largest scale following the Philippines, with nearly 100 people; MSDF medical, epidemic-prevention, and water supply units; one MSDF rescue amphibian (US-2); and two ASDF transport aircraft (C-130). This exercise was significant

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel that Participated in Multinational Joint Training (ARF-VDR)[1]

Major Masaru Moronaga, Education and Training Section, Ground Staff Office
(Currently assigned to the Research and Development Command)

I participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Voluntary Demonstration of Response (AFR-VDR) in Luzon Island in the Philippines in May last year. There, I worked as the planning and communications director of the unit that was participating from the GSDF.

This exercise was the first field exercise held under the ARF framework. The exercise envisioned a major disaster resulting from a large-scale typhoon, whereupon maritime search and rescue drills, medical activities, construction activities, etc., were conducted by disaster relief personnel from the participating countries (26 countries[2], 2 organizations, and approximately 500 people). Nearly 100 personnel from Japan, including Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces participated in the exercise.

Because this was the first exercise and due to the short four-month period of time between the first planning session and the actual exercise, I was frantic making arrangements via telephone and email with the host and participating nations until just before the actual exercise. However, these efforts proved to be worthwhile, as we were able to collaborate and cooperate smoothly with personnel from the participating nations at the exercise to execute the operations.

I felt that through this experience the building up of a series of processes —from planning to execution of the exercise— while cooperating with troops and private organizations of various nations with disparate cultures and customs will lead to promoting defense cooperation between relevant nations. I also felt sincerely proud as a representative of Japan of the activities in which we were engaging.

We are currently preparing for the second round of exercise (planned to be jointly hosted between Japan and Indonesia in Indonesia in March 2011), and I plan to organize an exercise that will be even more fruitful based on this experience.



Major Moronaga (front-center) coordinating activities at the airfield

A rescue amphibian US-2 landing in the Gulf of Manila

1) Voluntary Demonstration of Response.
2) There were 26 participating countries and 2 organizations, including Japan, Philippines, United States, Australia, EU, Indonesia, Brunei, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Korea, Singapore, China, and Sri Lanka.

because the ARF moved from the level of opinion exchanges to the level of conducting a field training. Japan will co-host the 2nd ARF disaster relief exercise (ARF-DiREx 2011) with Indonesia in March 2011.

In this way, the nations of the Asia-Pacific region has been undertaking a process of discussing concrete cooperation and coordination methods in various different fields after having set certain rules, and then conducting training and exercises and providing feedback on various cooperation and coordination in the region. This process leads to improving the capacity for addressing issues such as natural disasters in the region, as well as promotes mutual understanding an confidence building between participating nations. Therefore, Japan believes it important to further advance these types of efforts.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Frameworks in the Asia-Pacific for Addressing Large-scale Disasters

The Asia-Pacific region is hit frequently by numerous large-scale disasters, and disasters in the region account for nearly 70% of all deaths from natural disasters in the world. The lessons learned teach us the importance of being able to provide effective assistance during the early stages of a disaster. In order to provide such assistance, it is vital to advance organic and effective cooperation with the militaries of multiple countries so as to address disasters in the region on a daily basis, and to construct multilateral frameworks that allow for taking prompt response. We must work to improve readiness.

The ARF, the current regional security cooperative framework, has been constructing various forms of cooperative frameworks for disaster relief; however, the creation of a registry system for disaster relief capabilities and a multilateral cooperative framework remains a future issue.

Based on this, the concept for a multilateral cooperative framework related to disaster relief was presented by the GSDF at the August 2009 Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC). In addition, the Ministry of Defense is advancing opinion exchanges with related ministries and agencies as well as relevant countries at international conferences such as the ARF, aiming to construct a disaster relief asset registry system and multilateral cooperative framework for times of disaster.



GSDF Chief of Staff Hibako delivering the opening remarks at the joint opening of PACC and PAMS

3. Efforts towards the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)

In addition to the ARF, The ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), ministerial level meeting between defense authorities in the ASEAN countries, has been held since May 2006. In addition to this, the establishment of the ADMM-Plus was decided at the 4th ADMM in May 2010. The ADMM-Plus will include eight new member states outside ASEAN, and the 1st ADMM-Plus will be held in October 2010 in Vietnam, which currently chairs ASEAN. Until the establishment of the ADMM-Plus, there had been no multilateral cooperation framework in the area of security for the Asia-Pacific region other than the ARF, and there was no government-hosted meeting in which defense ministers participated. The establishment of the ADMM-Plus will build a ministerial level cooperation framework among defense authorities in the region, and therefore, is highly significant. Japan will actively participate in this framework in accordance with the decision of ASEAN.

4. Participation in Pacific Partnership 2010

In this way, security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region in recent years has not only seen an increase in mutual understanding and trust, but also an accumulation of concrete and practical cooperation. Yukio Hatoyama, then Prime Minister, announced his vision of the "East-Asian community" structure initiative based on the accumulated cooperation carried out through these frameworks. As part of those efforts, Prime Minister Hatoyama gave a speech entitled, "Japan's New Commitment to Asia —Toward the Realization of an East Asian Community" in November 2009 at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies when he attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit meeting in Singapore. It was during this speech that Prime Minister Hatoyama also expressed Japan's participation in the United States-organizing Pacific Partnership (PP) 2010.

The PP has been held since 2007, where vessels mainly led by the U.S. Navy visit the various countries of the region to conduct such activities as medical activities and cultural exchanges. The cooperation of national governments, militaries, international organizations, and NGOs is promoted on those visits. It also strengthens partnerships among partner nations and facilitates international disaster relief activities.

Japan dispatched several personnel, including medical officers from the MSDF since 2007 to conduct surveys and research. Japan participated in PP 2010 with its MSDF LST Kunisaki as well as medical teams from the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. Moreover, in cooperation with NGOs, the SDF carried out medical activities for approximately 1,700 people in Vietnam and approximately 2,700 people in Cambodia, and held cultural exchanges in local schools.

Participation in PP 2010 had the important purpose of promoting mutual understanding and cooperative relationships between partner nations, improving the international security environment, and helping to strengthen

An NGO which conducts examinations of residents in Vietnam

An SDF personnel teaching Cambodian elementary school students kendo (Japanese fencing)

the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, therefore, serving the important purpose of ensuring peace and security of Japan. Furthermore, participation will also serve to improve the medical and transport proficiency and skills for the SDF in carrying out international disaster relief activities and international peace cooperation operations. In addition, it will make available valuable opportunities to learn know-how for coordinating and collaborating with civilian organizations.

5. Multilateral Security Dialogue Hosted by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

1. Tokyo Defense Forum

As Japan's own effort for considering security in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministry of Defense has held since 1996 the Asia-Pacific Defense Forum (Tokyo Defense Forum) with the participation of officers in charge of defense policy (Director Generals from defense ministries and general-class officers) from the countries of the region. At the Forum, defense policy and confidence-building efforts of each country have been discussed.

At the 14th forum in October 2009, opinions were exchanged on "Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Relief" and "National Defense Policies" with the participation of 23 countries, the EU, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and others. In addition, in July 2009 the 8th Sub-committee of the Tokyo Defense Forum was held with the participation of 24 countries, the EU, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Japanese Shipowners' Association (JSA) under the theme of national military cooperation against piracy and armed robbery at sea, where experiences were shared and views were exchanged in order to gain clearer understanding on the role of military forces.

Defense Minister Kitazawa delivering an address at the Tokyo Defense Forum

2. Japan–ASEAN Vice-Defense Ministers' Meeting

In March 2009, the Ministry of Defense held the Meeting of Senior Defense Officials on Common Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region (Japan–ASEAN Vice-Defense Ministers' meeting) in Tokyo. Based on the awareness that Japan–ASEAN cooperation in security lags behind that of the economy, this meeting is held with the purpose of creating a foundation for strengthening multilateral and bilateral relationships through building human networks between Japanese and ASEAN vice-ministerial level officials. At the first meeting, the Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense served as the chairperson and a frank and constructive exchange of views was made on common security challenges in such fields as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, and peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Furthermore, experts and defense officials from Southeast Asian nations and Japan were invited to the first Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges, which was held for the general public, where such topics were discussed as: 1) security issues which could be shared within the

Vice-Minister of Defense Nakae giving a speech at the Japan–ASEAN Vice Defense Ministers' Meeting

region, 2) ways to promote regional cooperation toward common challenges, and 3) roles and responses of defense authorities for regional cooperation.

The second meeting was held in March 2010 with the participation of vice-ministerial-level officials from ASEAN member states and the ASEAN Secretariat where views were exchanged on nontraditional security issues —including maritime security, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, and peacekeeping and peacebuilding— as well as security architecture and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, at the Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges discussion was conducted on 1) climate change and the role of the armed forces, and 2) building an Asia-Pacific Architecture for security cooperation.
(See Reference 60)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Behind the Scenes at International Conferences

Katsuhisa Sato, International Policy Section, Defense Policy Bureau

Behind Every Classy International Conference is the Hard Work of Staff.

At the March 2010 Japan–ASEAN Vice-Ministerial meeting, there were many adjustments that had to be made by back-office personnel. As a staff of those operations, I faced truly trying circumstances.

Beginning from around October 2009 I spent nearly a month on setting an agenda, explaining the purpose of the meeting to ministers, and then sent invitations to the defense ministries of each nation. That was only the beginning of preparations. When it comes to inviting high-level officials from 11 nations and organizations, it is important to stay sharp for the more major details —coordinating with the relevant ministries and agencies for immigration and other procedures and welcoming at the airport— as well as detailed adjustments, such as those made with the hotel venue. Also, I took virtually every opportunity to ask ASEAN countries for the presentations of their vice-minister-level officials. We also had to prepare presentation materials for Japan to introduce policy suggestions to make the meeting fruitful. I worked closely with my boss to complete these materials.

Nevertheless, despite these hardships, after seeing all of the ASEAN members go home happy I was able to forget about all of the hard times and it motivated me to work hard again next year.

The reception of the Japan–ASEAN Vice-Ministers' meeting (Sato at center)

6. Other efforts

Defense Minister Kitazawa giving a speech at the 9th IISS Asia Security Summit

The IISS Asia Security Conference, an international conference held annually in Singapore under the sponsorship of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), a private institute, is the only conference in which a large number of defense ministers in the Asia-Pacific region participate. Minister of Defense Kitazawa participated in the 9th conference in June 2010, delivering a speech entitled "Japan's Policies Regarding the Ocean as a Global Commons". During the conference, bilateral meetings were held with the defense ministers of the United States, ROK, Singapore, and the United Kingdom, and the Japan–U.S.–ROK Defense Ministerial Meeting was held.

Also, in December 2009, Senior Vice-Minister for Defense Kazuya Shimba participated in the Sixth IISS Asia Security Conference (the Manama Dialogue), which was held in Manama, Bahrain. This marked the first time that a parliamentary-level official participated in the conference and Senior Vice-Minister Shimba gave a speech entitled, "Japanese Efforts for Nuclear Abolition." At the conference, Senior Vice-Minister Shimba individually exchanged views with India's National Security Advisor (NSA) to the Prime Minister, Mayankote Kelath Narayanan; Commander in Chief of Bahrain Defense Forces, Shaikh Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa; and Bahrain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa.

In addition, the Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) was organized for the first time in Japan in September 2007 and co-hosted with the U.S. Army Pacific Headquarters, with 91 participants from 28 countries and 2 organizations. In August 2009, the Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC) and Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) were held in Japan jointly with the GSDF and the U.S. Army. In particular, it was the first time for Japan to host the PACC, where army chiefs of staff from 22 countries all came together to discuss creating a multilateral cooperative framework related to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in the region based on the theme of international rescue activities in times of man-made or natural disaster.

(See Fig. III-3-3-1, 2) (See Reference 62–63)

Group photo of the Army Chiefs of Staff from each country that participated in PACC

Fig. III-3-3-1 Participation in Multilateral Exercises (Since Last Year)

Date	Exercises	Hosts	Participating Nations	Participation by Defense Ministry and SDF
February 2009	Cobra Gold 2009	U.S. and Thai militaries	Thailand, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, etc.	Participation of 78 personnel
March 2009	Exercise Aman 2009	Pakistani Navy	Pakistan, Australia, Bangladesh, France, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nigeria, China, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Japan	Participation of 2 P-3-C patrol aircraft and about 40 personnel
April 2009	Malabar 2009	Indian Armed Forces	U.S., India, Japan	Participation of 2 destroyers and 3 P-3C patrol aircraft
	Third WPNS Multilateral Sea Exercise	Singapore Armed Forces	Japan, U.S., Singapore, France, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand, Bangladesh, Malaysia	Participation of 1 destroyer
May 2009	ARF disaster relief field exercises	Philippines United States	Philippines, U.S., Australia, EU, Indonesia, ROK, Japan, etc.	Participation of 1 US-2 search and rescue amphibian, 2 C-130H transport airplanes and about 90 personnel
September 2009	Japan–U.S.–Australia joint military exercise	Japan	Japan, U.S., Australia	Participation of 2 destroyers and a P-3C patrol aircraft
February 2010	Cobra Gold 2010	U.S. Armed Forces, Royal Thai Armed Forces	Thailand, U.S., Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, ROK, etc.	Participation of approximately 100 personnel
June 2010	Japan–U.S.–Australia joint military exercise	Japan	Japan, U.S., Australia	Participation by 4 destroyers, 1 missile equipped vessel, 2 submarines, and several aircraft

Fig. III-3-3-2 Dispatch of Observers to Multilateral Joint Exercises (since 2009)

Date	Exercise	Overview
June 2009	Eighth Multilateral Cooperation program in the Asia Pacific (MCAP 2009)	An event hosted by the GSDF, service members from 14 Asia-Pacific nations and strategists from 14 civilian organizations were invited to exchange views on the theme, “Military and Military-Civilian Cooperation in Effective United Nations Peacekeeping Activities.”

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel Involved in Preparations for and Implementation of the PACC and PAMS

Colonel Amahiko Kudo, Ground Research & Development Command
(Currently assigned to the Defense Intelligence Headquarters)

The GSDF co-hosted jointly with the U.S. Army the two most major international conferences since the Force's establishment in Tokyo in August 2009, and I was given the lucky opportunity to be involved in the preparations and implementation of the conferences as the manager of the office of the GSDF.

These two conferences were the 6th Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC) and the 33rd Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS). Nearly 250 personnel participated in these, included top-level army personnel from 22 nations including the United States, Republic of Korea, Australia, and India, and they exchanged views on international relief activities during times of serious disaster.

The conferences presented the perfect opportunity to acquire the understanding of each country's participants regarding the strength of the Japan–U.S. Alliance, the high operational capacity of the GSDF, and about Japanese culture. For that reason, a total of over 3,000 support personnel and I worked in an organized and effective manner harnessing the close cooperation of the United States and Japan as professionals of battle. We took care to treat every guest carefully, paying respect to participants of different race, religion, and culture. As an example of using Japanese culture, a weeklong menu was created that took into consideration all of the preferences, allergies, and religious food restrictions of the participants and their spouses. For the guests from Islamic nations, we provided a room where they could quietly rest and pray during the afternoon, during the Ramadan period.



Keynote lecture by former U.N. Under-Secretary-General Yasushi Akashi at the joint opening ceremony of PACC and PAMS

Colonel Kudo (right) coordinating with the U.S. Army

After the conference many participants commented, "This was the best conference ever." I felt the greatest happiness to know that all of the participants had experienced a taste of Japanese culture. In conclusion, I would like to again thank everyone involved in these conferences.

Section 4. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

In recent years, the international community has firmly recognized the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials in the hands of terrorists and countries of concern. For this reason, efforts toward non-proliferation, which regulate and strictly control their export, have become pressing tasks for the peace and stability of today's international community.

From a humanitarian point of view, international public opinion demanding regulation of certain conventional weapons has also been rising. For this reason, responding to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons, while continuing to consider the balance between such humanitarian demands and defense necessity, has become an important challenge for each country.

As an effort to address these challenges, a regime dealing with arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation is being developed with the cooperation of all nations.
(See Fig. III-3-4-1)

Based on the above, Japan plays an active role in efforts to create a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic and step-by-step measures for disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as in international efforts related to the disarmament and non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and the missiles which serve as their means of delivery, and furthermore in those related to the issue of regulating certain conventional weapons.

Fig. III-3-4-1 Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regarding Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles, and Related Materials

<table>
<tr><th rowspan="2">Item</th><th colspan="4">Weapons of Mass Destruction and Others</th><th rowspan="2">Conventional Weapons</th></tr>
<tr><th>Nuclear Weapons</th><th>Chemical Weapons</th><th>Biological Weapons</th><th>Delivery Means (Missiles)</th></tr>
<tr><td>Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation-related treaties</td><td>Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</td><td>Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)</td><td>Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)</td><td>Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)</td><td>Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)
The Convention of Cluster Munitions
Restriction on Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons
U.N. Register of Conventional Arms</td></tr>
<tr><td>Export control system for non-proliferation</td><td>Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)</td><td colspan="2">Australia Group (AG)</td><td>Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)</td><td>Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)</td></tr>
<tr><td>New international efforts for non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction</td><td colspan="4">Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540</td><td></td></tr>
</table>

This section will explain the measures of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF toward efforts concerning arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation carried out by international organizations including the United Nations.

1. Efforts on Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Nuclear Weapons

(1) Related Treaties

Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, are shown in Reference 64.

(2) Japan's Efforts

From the perspective of reinforcing the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, Japan has been proactively participating in discussions for better implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as well as discussions in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), in addition to continuing its work aimed at the early enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and efforts for the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

2. Biological Weapons/Chemical Weapons

(1) Relevant Treaties

Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons are shown in Reference 65.

(2) Japan's Efforts

a. Since 1980, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have dispatched chemical protection specialists to the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) when required. As members of the Japanese delegation they assisted to draft the convention. Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to The Hague, the Netherlands, to implement verification measures stipulated in the convention. There is currently one GSDF officer serving in this capacity.

(See Reference 64)

At the GSDF Chemical School (Saitama City), small quantities of chemical substances which are subject to regulation in the convention, are synthesized for the purpose of protection research. Therefore, in accordance with the stipulations of the convention, inspections have been implemented a total of seven times since the initial establishment of the organization.

In addition, the government as a whole is working on projects to dispose of abandoned chemical weapons in China, according to the CWC. Based on results of investigations so far, it is estimated that even now up to approximately 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons of the former (Imperial) Japanese Army remain buried in Haerbaling District, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have sent six personnel including GSDF officers on loan to the Cabinet Office, which is responsible for the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with the CWC. Since 2000, GSDF chemical and ammunition specialists have been dispatched to the location for excavation and recovery projects a total of nine times. From August through September 2009, seven SDF personnel participated in excavation and recovery projects in Lianhuapao, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, China, conducted by the Cabinet Office, and carried out the

identification of shells, checked for the presence of pollution, and provided guidance for the safety, etc., of workers.

b. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), cooperation is being given to efforts to strengthen it by sending SDF officers who are pharmaceutical and medical specialists, to relevant meetings.

c. Personnel have been dispatched to the Australia Group (AG) Meeting every year since 1994, and they are collaborating to help make the group's regulations and agreements effective.

3. Delivery Means (Missiles)

(1) Relevant Agreements

International political agreements and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation of means of delivery (missiles) are shown in Reference 67.

(2) Japan's Efforts

The Ministry of Defense has been dispatching personnel to the assembly of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) every year since 1992, and they are collaborating to help increase the effectiveness of the MTCR's regulations and agreements.

2. Efforts on Arms Control-Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons

1. Related Treaties

Treaties and export control regimes for the purpose of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of certain conventional weapons recognized as being inhumane, are shown in Reference 68.

2. Japan's Efforts

(1) The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)

In recent years, negotiations and reviews have been conducted to reduce the humanitarian risks that may be brought about by explosive remnants of war (ERW) such as unexploded ordnance.

In the 2003 Conference of the State Parties to the CCW, the protocol related to ERW (called Protocol V) was adopted and came into effect in November 2006.

However, discussion regarding ERW continued, due to the necessity of responding to the problems brought about in particular by unexploded cluster munitions (munitions that have multiple sub-munitions in themselves). At the Conference of the State Parties in November 2007, it was decided to carry out negotiations for responding promptly to the humanitarian concern of cluster munitions. However, a final consensus has yet to be reached as of present.

With regard to the issue of cluster munitions regulations, Japan believes that in addition to contributing to the convention on cluster munitions, it is important for a protocol on cluster munitions to be established under the CCW framework in which major producers and possessors of cluster munitions, including the United States, China, and Russia, are participants. Japan therefore engages in active discussions with relevant countries by dispatching a delegation, including personnel from the Ministry of Defense, to the conferences of the State Parties and group of governmental experts, where discussion and negotiations are taking place for the purpose of the addition of the protocol.

(2) Convention on Cluster Munitions

Regarding the cluster munitions issue, the prohibition of cluster munitions outside the CCW framework has gained momentum. Later, as a result of negotiations (Oslo Process)[28] at a series of international conferences, the Convention on Cluster Munitions[29] was adopted by 107 countries, including Japan, at the Dublin Conference in May 2008. The Convention was signed by 94 states (including Japan) in Oslo in December 2008 and Japan submitted the acceptance of the treaty in July 2009.

In February 2010, the 30th ratification, which is required to make the convention effective, was received by the United Nations Secretary-General and the convention will go into effect on August 1 of the same year. Meanwhile, however, major producers and possessors of cluster munitions such as the United States, China, and Russia have not signed the convention to date.

The use of all cluster munitions possessed by the SDF will immediately be banned once the Convention enters into force in Japan in August 2010. Thus, from the viewpoint of national security, the Ministry of Defense and SDF are promoting the introduction of precision-guided equipment that immediately supplements part of the functions of cluster munitions.

Moreover, as a rule all cluster munitions that Japan possesses must be discarded within eight years of the treaty entering into force. Therefore, Japan plans to work safely and steadily to discard all cluster munitions.

(3) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)

International interest in anti-personnel mines skyrocketed at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1999, the Ottawa Treaty went into force and as of present the signatories of the treaty have climbed to 156.

As of February 2003, the destruction of all anti-personnel mines was completed by the Ministry of Defense and SDF, excluding the minimum necessary amount retained as an exception, recognized in the convention for the purpose of developing technology and training in landmine detection and clearance.

Meanwhile, in order to maintain the security of Japan, as an alternative that poses no danger of causing harm to civilians and does not fall into the category of anti-personnel mines banned in the convention, the acquisition of an anti-personnel obstacle system, which includes directional fragmentation charges[30], is proceeding.

Only 13 out of 26 ARF participating nations have concluded this convention. For this reason, until now the Ministry of Defense has been encouraging ARF participating nations who have not yet done so to conclude the convention.

What is more, the Ministry of Defense has been submitting annual reports to the United Nations on data such as exceptional possession, while also actively cooperating in international efforts on the issue of anti-personnel mines, by dispatching its staff from time to time to relevant international conferences where necessary[31].

(4) U.N. Register of Conventional Arms

Every year, the Ministry of Defense registers data on the amount of imported defense equipment with the United Nations, while also voluntarily providing information related to its holdings, domestic procurement of such equipment, and its domestic procurement of small arms and light weapons. It also dispatches its staff to expert meetings and so on where necessary, which are carried out to improve and strengthen this system.

3. International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of WMD

1. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

(1) Launch of the PSI

The United States was deeply concerned that countries such as North Korea and Iran were engaged in the development of WMD and missiles. Therefore, in December 2002 it announced the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and advocated the comprehensive three-pillared approach consisting of "non-proliferation," "counter-proliferation," and "dealing with the use of WMD."

As a part of this, the United States launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)[32] in May 2003, and called out to other nations to endorse it. As a result the PSI has developed into an international effort endorsed by over 90 countries, as of May this year, including Japan.

In support of this effort, there have been undertakings to improve the capability to prevent WMD proliferation. By the end of May 2010, PSI interdiction exercises were conducted 35 times, while meetings were held to discuss policy and legal challenges.

(2) Efforts by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF regard participation in PSI efforts as important and necessary to make efficient use of SDF capabilities in support of the PSI while working in harmony with relevant organizations and countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense began to send delegations consisting of MOD officials including uniforms to various PSI meetings as well as to take part in overseas PSI interdiction exercises in observer status in order to gather necessary information about PSI efforts after the third Paris Plenary Meeting (September 2003). Since 2004, the SDF has fully participated in PSI exercises continuously.

To date, Japan hosted PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercises on two occasions and the Ministry of Defense made commitments along with relevant organizations such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Agency, the Ministry of Finance, and the Japan Coast Guard. Moreover in October 2009, the Ministry dispatched a MSDF destroyer and P-3C aircraft to the PSI Maritime Interdiction Exercise in Singapore.

Given the current situation of proliferation around Japan, the Ministry of Defense considers that the PSI should be seen as a security issue which involves a wide range of domains including defense, diplomacy, law enforcement, and export control and it is necessary to constantly engage in prevention of the proliferation of WMD. Because of the necessity to improve SDF capability to deal with proliferation challenges, the Ministry will continue participating in or hosting various exercises and meetings, as well as commitment to activities to strengthen the comprehensive nonproliferation mechanisms, including the PSI.

(See Fig. III-3-4-2)

Fig. III-3-4-2 Defense Ministry Participation in PSI Interdiction Exercises (Since Last Year)

Date	Exercises	Exercise Location	Participation by Defense Ministry and SDF
October 2009	PSI Maritime Interception Exercise hosted by Singapore	Singapore	One destroyer vessel and two patrol aircraft (P-3C) participated

2. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted for the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1540 on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which aims to take appropriate and effective action because the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and their means of delivery pose a threat to the peace and stability of the international community. Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, its details include: 1) to refrain from providing support of any kind to non-state actors attempting to develop weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; 2) to adopt and execute appropriate and effective legislation to prohibit the production, etc., of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by terrorists in particular; and 3) to establish border controls and export control measures for the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Based on the danger imposed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the peace and stability of the international community, which includes Japan, the prevention of proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors such as terrorists, is an urgent task for the international community. Based on the recognition of this fact, Japan supports the adoption of this resolution, and hopes that all United Nations members will observe the resolution.

Notes:

1) Activities prescribed in Article 8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law (a miscellaneous provision) or supplementary provisions.
2) Missions defined in Article 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The primary mission is to defend Japan. The secondary missions are the preservation of public order, activities in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and international peace cooperation activities.
3) The Law concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations.
See <http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_J/data/law/law_data02.html>.
4) The Special Measures Law concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions.
See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anpo/houan/tero/index.html>.
5) The Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Replenishment Support Activities for Counter-Terrorism Maritime Interdiction Activities.
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/kyuuyu_sinpou.pdf>
6) The Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq.
See <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/iraq_h.html>
7) This is a system adopted by the United Nations in 1994 in order to make mobilized deployment possible for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The system aims for swift and smooth decision making by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the event of an actual peacekeeping operation deployment by having United Nations member nations inform the Department beforehand of their available scope of contribution to said operations.
8) Tires that allow vehicles to maintain mobility, even when punctured and deflated.
9) Conflict related activities carried out under the jurisdiction of the United Nations based on a U.N. Resolution to maintain international peace and stability including ensuring the observance of agreements between combatants regarding the prevention of the recurrence of armed conflict, support for the establishment of governing bodies through democratic means carried out following the end of conflict, and others.
10) Activities being conducted by the United Nations, other international organizations, or countries based on a humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military conflicts, and reconstruction activities in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are initiated in accordance with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
11) A general term that refers to functions that support combat, and that maintain and enhance the fighting capabilities of units, such as supply, equipment, retrieval, transport, hygiene, construction, real estate, labor and staff work.
12) The Law concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams.
See <http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S62/S62HO093.html>
13) As of April, 2010, 46 countries are participating in ISAF in support of the Afghanistan government by maintaining public security in Afghanistan to prevent it from becoming a nest for terrorism again.
14) Japan is pursuing various anti-terrorism measures with a central focus on such fields as immigration controls; collection and analysis of intelligence; measures to prevent hijackings and similar acts; measures against attacks using nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; security of important domestic facilities; and countermeasures against terrorist funding. Furthermore, the Government of Japan formulated an “Action

Plan for Preventing Terrorist Attacks" containing 16 specific measures in December 2004, and has been addressing such issues as the international exchange of information concerning lost or stolen passports, strengthening of immigration controls, introduction of the sky marshal program, strengthening of identity verification of foreign hotel guests, strengthening of controls of materials feared to be used for terrorism, and enhancement of information gathering capabilities.

15) Since January 2008, based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, support was limited to replenishment of military vessels of the countries performing anti-terrorist duties to stop terrorism on the ocean. Counter-terrorism maritime interdiction operations are activities undertaken by international militaries such as inspections, verifications, and other necessary measures to ships navigating the Indian Ocean in order to interdict and deter the transportation of terrorists, weapons, etc., through concerted efforts by the international community, as part of the activities contributing to the achievement of U.N. Charter objectives.

16) In November 2009, the government prepared the "New Strategy to Counter the Threat of Terrorism" (a new Japanese aid package for Afghanistan and Pakistan) in which it determined to provide up to US$ 5 billion over five years beginning in 2009 depending on future conditions in Afghanistan to replace the already promised total of US$2 billion in aid, while also providing ¥80 billion in urgently needed aid.

17) The results of replenishment support activities under the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law were reported to the Diet on April 2, 2010, based on the law.

18) The resolution recognizes the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and the United Kingdom as powers under unified command (the Authority). The Authority is requested to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of Iraqi territory until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq. The resolution also calls upon U.N. member states to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, help reconstruct Iraq, and contribute to the stability and security of Iraq.

19) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/press/youjin/2007/06/06d.html>

20) Official title: The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force

21) This is a multilateral meeting that gathers defense-minister-level officials from the Asia-Pacific region and it is held with the objective of discussing defense issues and regional defense cooperation. It began under the sponsorship of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a private research facility in the United Kingdom. Since the first meeting in 2002 it has been referred to as the Shangri-La Dialogue, after the name of the hotel where it is held every year in Singapore. See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/exchange/dialogue/iiss.html>.

22) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/m/update/youjin/2009/04/23b.html>.

23) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2009/11/09.html>.

24) Aside from Japan, the United States and India also participated.

25) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_abe/cn_kr_06/china_kpress.html>.

26) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2009/11/27b.html>.

27) The 27 ARF members include the 10 member countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia (from 1995), Myanmar (from 1996)), as well as Japan, Australia, Canada, China, India (from 1996), New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, ROK, Russia, United States, Mongolia (since 1998), North Korea (from 2000), Pakistan (from 2004), Timor-Leste (from 2005), Bangladesh (from 2006), Sri Lanka (from 2007), and the European Union.

28) Participating countries include Norway and other sponsors (Peru, Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, etc.) and many developing countries such as Latin American and African countries which were included in the NGO-centered process.
29) See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/pdfs/shomei_37.pdf>.
30) Explosives for use in anti-infantry combat, which obstruct the approach of enemy soldiers. So that civilians do not get indiscriminately hurt, personnel operate them with their target in sight. They are not designed to detonate in the presence, approach, or contact of people.
31) The Ministry of Defense recommended retired SDF members to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) between 1999 and December 2006, to provide support for anti-personnel mine removal activities in Cambodia. These retired SDF members were dispatched as maintenance and transport advisors for the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) under the JICA framework of long-term dispatched specialists.
32) The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an initiative to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials in accordance with existing international and domestic laws and at the same time considers steps which participating nations can take together. It also works toward the legislation of stricter related domestic laws wherever possible for each country.

Part III

Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 4

The Relationship between the Japanese People and the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities
Section 2. Acquisition Reform, Defense Production, and Technological Bases
Section 3. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens

Section 1. Sustaining Defense Capabilities

Defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantee of a country's security and no other means can replace this function.

One foundation upon which defense capabilities depend is that of organizational structure and human resources. The Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the core of our defense capability, is an organization specialized in the defense of this nation, the most basic role for the nation's continued existence, and are comprised of units and organs which possess various functions required for this purpose. Under the emerging security environment of recent years, missions have become more diverse and international in character, and equipment within the SDF has been improved. In response to this trend, the humanitarian base of the SDF should be enriched by securing and educating high-quality personnel as well as by necessary training.

It is essential that proper equipment reflects the changing environment. Thus various efforts are being carried out from the standpoint of establishing the material foundation through the expedient and appropriate acquisition of equipment.

Further, in order for the SDF which form the core of our defense capability to carry out the mission, it is essential not only to prepare our defense capabilities but to also obtain the understanding and support of the citizens.

This section explains the efforts to establish a human resources foundation such as in recruitment and employment of SDF personnel and daily education and training, in addition to describing the organization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.

1. Organization to Support Defense Capability

1. Organization of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF[1] consist of a number of organs that center on the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, which must fulfill their mission of defending Japan as armed organizations, and a number of other organs including the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, and the Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance.

(See Figs. III-4-1-1, 2)

2. Systems to Support the Minister of Defense

The Minister of Defense manages the affairs related to the defense of Japan (or the nation) as the head of the Ministry of Defense and is in charge of the overall control of the SDF in accordance with the provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The Minister is supported by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense and two Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense[2]. The Senior Vice-Minister of Defense can be authorized by the order of the Minister of Defense in advance to carry out the tasks of the Minister when the Minister is not present. There are also Special

The swearing in ceremony of Senior Vice-Minister of Defense Shimba

Advisors to the Minister of Defense who advise the Minister of Defense and the Defense Council to discuss basic policies of the affairs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. Further, there is an Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense who assists the Minister of Defense, organizes ministerial affairs, and supervises operations.

(See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3)

Fig. III-4-1-1 Organizational Chart of the Ministry of Defense



Fig. III-4-1-2 Outline of the Ministry of Defense

Organization	Outline
GSDF (see "Location of Principal SDF Units" at the end of the book)	❍ Regional Armies • Composed of multiple divisions and brigades, and other directly controlled units (such as engineer brigades and anti-aircraft artillery groups) • There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of their respective regions ❍ Divisions and Brigades Compared to the combat troops, composed of logistics support units which support combat units and others
MSDF (see above)	❍ Self-Defense Fleet • Consists of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (consisting of fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and such), and the Fleet Submarine Force • Responsible for the defense of sea areas around Japan primarily through mobile operations ❍ Regional Units The five regional units mainly guard their posts and support the Self-Defense Fleet
ASDF (see above)	❍ Air Defense Command • Composed of three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division • Primarily responsible for general air defense duties ❍ Air Defense Force Composed of key units such as air wings (including fighter aircraft and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units), and Air Defense Missile Groups (including surface-to-air guided missile units)
National Defense Academy of Japan (Yokosuka, Kanagawa)	❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF officers Conducts training and education for future SDF officers (including education that complies with the same university establishment standards as other universities) ❍ Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to master's or doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master's degree. Conducts education and training in order to impart a high level of knowledge and research capability
National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa, Saitama)	❍ An institution for the cultivation of future SDF medical officers Conducts education and training for future SDF officers who will serve as medical doctors (including education that complies with the School Education Act that universities with medical education also comply to) ❍ Offers a medical course that complies with university establishment standards for PhD programs for schools of medicine. Conducts education and training in order to impart a high ability of knowledge of advanced theoretics, application, and related-research capabilities
National Institute for Defense Studies (Meguro-ku, Tokyo)	❍ Organization that functions as a "think tank" of the Ministry of Defense • Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF • Conducts research and compiles data on military history • Educates SDF officers and other senior officials • Manages books and documents of historical value located in the connected library
Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)	❍ Central intelligence organization of the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyzes military data • Collects various military intelligence, including signal intelligence, images and other information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; comprehensively analyzes and assesses the information; and provides information to related organizations within the ministry • Consists of six communication sites and its headquarters
Technical Research and Development Institute (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)	❍ Central organization that conducts equipment-related research and development • Conducts R&D in response to the operational needs of each service of the SDF • Conducts R&D in a wide range of fields, from firearms, vehicles, ships, and aircraft used by each service of the SDF to equipment for responses to NBC weapons and clothing
Equipment Procurement and Construction Office (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)	❍ Central organization for affairs related to equipment procurement and a part of the construction work required by the SDF to accomplish its duties • Necessary equipment include firearms, explosives fuel, guided weapons, ships, aircraft, and vehicles • Within the construction work related affairs, the drafting of technical standards and evaluation of plans are conducted
Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo)	❍ With orders from the Minister of Defense, checks to ensure that the tasks of the Ministry of Defense and SDF are properly carried out across the entire ministry from an independent position as well as from the standpoint of compliance
Regional Defense Bureau (eight nationwide)	❍ Local branch office that provides defense administration in the regions • Conducts administrative work related to obtaining the cooperation of local public organizations and the local people, local equipment procurement, and administration related to facilities • Bureaus established in the following eight regions: Hokkaido, Touhoku, North-Kanto, South-Kanto, Central Kinki, Chugoku Shikoku, Kyushu, and Okinawa

Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kusuda giving instructions at the departure ceremony for replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean

Moreover, the Internal Bureau, Joint Staff and Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, and Air Staff Office are established as organizations to support the Minister of Defense. The Internal Bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the work of the SDF. The Directors-General of the Bureaus, as part of their own responsibilities, support the Minister of Defense when the Minister of Defense gives instructions and authorization to the Chief of Joint Staff and the Chiefs of Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff. The Joint Staff is a staff organization for the Minister of Defense concerning SDF operations. The Chief of Joint Staff supports the Minister of Defense by providing unified military expert advice on SDF operations. The Ground Staff, Maritime Staff, and Air Staff are the staff organizations for the Minister of Defense concerning their respective services except operations of the SDF, with the Chiefs of Staff for the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF acting as the top-ranking expert advisors to the Minister of Defense regarding these services.

3. Base of Defense Administration in Regional Areas

The relationship between the Ministry of Defense and local communities is increasing in importance from the standpoints of disaster response, efforts to protect the citizens, and the stable utilization of defense facilities. Consequently, in September 2007, the Ministry of Defense unified the local branch offices of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (the Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus) and the regional organizations of the Equipment Procurement Office at the time of the disbandment and integration of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and established Regional Defense Bureaus as local branch offices to create a base for comprehensive defense administration in regional areas, including coordination and consultation related to defense policies with local governments and municipalities.

The Regional Defense Bureaus provide explanations to the local communities regarding the policies of the Ministry of Defense and the reorganization of the U.S. Forces, and implement various policies including local coordination (activities to acquire local cooperation) to obtain the understanding and support of local governments and citizens in order to smoothly and effectively implement the overall administrative tasks of the Ministry of Defense.

2. Recruitment and Employment of Personnel in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF need highly qualified personnel in order to fulfill their missions. The recruitment and employment of SDF uniformed personnel and civilian personnel are carried out using various systems[3].

(See Reference 69)

1. Recruitment

At SDF Provincial Cooperation Offices, which are located in fifty locations throughout the nation (four in Hokkaido, and one in each prefecture), the Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct recruitment with the help of local governments, schools, private recruitment counselors and others. Also, local governments are stipulated to carry out part of SDF recruitment activities themselves[4], and the Ministry of Defense defrays their costs.



Recruitment at a Provincial Cooperation Office

Since recruitment of the SDF personnel is likely to become increasingly difficult with the declining birth rate in Japan, it is necessary to seek cooperation from the local public organizations that live closely with the local community.
(See Fig. III-4-1-3) (See Reference 71)

Fig. III-4-1-4 Trend in SDF Personnel Hires [by fixed and non fixed term]



Fig. III-4-1-3 Change in Male Population at the Ages Eligible for Recruitment of Males to the Short-Term Service



Sources: The data of prior to 2009 (excluding 2005): "Population Estimates of Japan 1920–2000" and "Annual Report on Current Population Estimates" by the Statistics Bureau of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
Data of 2005: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research made calculations based on the "Population Census" by the Statistics Bureau of Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, and made adjustments by proportionally distributing the population with unknown age.
Data of 2010 and after: "Future Estimate of Japan's Population" by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (based on average estimate as of December 2006).

2. Employment

(1) Uniformed SDF personnel

SDF uniformed personnel enlist of their own free will on a volunteer basis and are employed as General Officer Candidates, General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper)[5], or Candidate for Enlisted (lower), and others[6]. Because of the special nature of their duties, personnel management for SDF uniformed personnel is performed separately from that of general civilian government employees[7].

Personnel management of the uniformed SDF personnel differs significantly from that of general civilian government employees in that the former adopts an early retirement system and a short-term service system for some[8] to keep the strength of the SDF. Under the early retirement system, SDF uniformed personnel retire at a younger age than general civilian government employees. Meanwhile, under the short-term service system, the employment term is fixed at two or three years.

The SDF uniformed personnel who enlisted in each SDF service get basic education and training in a training unit or at a school of each SDF service, and are then assigned to units and positions nationwide. The occupational category they will follow after the initial educational stage is determined based on their preferences and aptitude by the time they complete their basic education.

It should be noted that for non-officer class, the Ministry of Defense is recently expanding the employment of "non-fixed-term" SDF personnel that are supposed to work continuously until retirement age (e.g. General Candidates for Enlisted (Upper)), distancing from its past personnel policy of mass employment and retirement of "fixed-term" SDF personnel. This change has resulted from the recognition that the Ministry of Defense must recruit qualified people stably, facing with the recent demographical trend where the target population for recruitment is shrinking by the declining birthrate and rising educational background. Although the scheme of "non-fixed-term" SDF personnel has existed since FY1975, the recent rapid expansion of this category has been enabled by replacing the number of lower enlisted classes (Shi) with that of upper enlisted classes (So) which possess higher skills in response to the diversification of SDF missions and the advancement in equipment. As a result, the recruitment of "Shi" almost halved from 23,000 in FY1989 to 12,000 in FY2006; meanwhile, the ratio of "non-fixed-term" SDF personnel in "Shi" skyrocketed from 6% to 49% between the same periods. In addition, for FY2009 worsened economic conditions from the year before caused a major drop in the number of "fixed term" SDF personnel retiring at term completion and "non fixed term" SDF personnel retiring midterm; the outsourcing of some of the SDF service accompanied by the administration's initiative in the total personnel budget reform led to the reduction of the SDF end strength (about 1,500 in FY2009), and the Ministry of Defense dealt with it by recruitment restraint on "Shi". This caused the number of its recruitment to drop to 6,701 persons in FY2009, the lowest level ever.

Induction ceremony for new enlistees

(See Fig. III-4-1-4) (See Reference 70–73)

(2) SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel

a. Purpose of Maintaining the Reserve Personnel System

Normally, the number of SDF uniformed personnel is kept to the minimum necessary for ordinary duties, thus it should be expanded promptly in time of crises to meet the requirement each contingency demands. To fulfill

such needs promptly and systematically, the Ministry of Defense maintains three systems[9]: the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, the SDF Reserve Personnel system, and the system for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel[10].

Among those, the system for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel, which is mainly for personnel without SDF experience, was established to develop and expand the defense basis, to maintain the stability of the SDF Reserve Personnel system, and to effectively use civilian expertise in fields such as medical practice and language skills.

There are two employment categories in the SDF Reserve Personnel system: general and technical. In the latter category, healthcare professionals and qualified personnel in such fields as languages and information processing are recruited.

Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel are appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel following completion of the education and training necessary to work as SDF personnel. Here are some exemplary cases in recent years: Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel with qualifications of healthcare professionals, once being appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel after the necessary training/education, have participated in general disaster prevention drills as medical officers; those candidates employed through their language qualifications, following their appointment as SDF Reserve Personnel, have been working as interpreters in Japan–U.S. joint armies of the GSDF post exercises.

(See Reference 74)

b. Cooperation from Corporations Employing Reserve Personnel

In addition to carrying out their normal duties, SDF Reserve Personnel and other reserve personnel are also expected to undergo training to maintain required skills, which require them to take leave or adjust their work schedules accordingly. From this viewpoint, the understanding and cooperation of the employers of the personnel are necessary to make this system function smoothly. Particularly, SDF Ready Reserve Personnel are supposed to attend training for 30 days per year, so their employers are requested for necessary cooperation such as allowing Ready Reserve Personnel to take a leave of absence.

To reduce the burden on such employers and remove the anxiety of reserves, the Ministry of Defense provides a special subsidy to companies employing Ready Reserve Personnel and allowing them to attend training sessions.

(3) Administrative Officials, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

There are approximately 22,000 civilian personnel — administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others — in addition to uniformed SDF personnel, in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. These civilians are mainly employed through the Recruitment Examination for National Public Officials Level I[11], or the Class I, II, or III Examination for Defense Ministry Civilian Personnel. After participating in the same training course, civilian personnel who have passed Level I and Class I and II undertake a wide range of work.

Administrative officials are engaged in policy planning in the Internal Bureau, analysis and research at the Defense Intelligence Headquarters as well as a variety of administrative work (budget, public relations, military facilities-related activities, etc.) at the SDF bases and the Regional Defense Bureaus throughout the country.

Technical and Engineering officials play a key role in constructing various defense facilities (headquarters, runways, magazines, etc.), and carrying out R&D of, and pursuing the effective procurement of equipment such as fighter aircraft and vessels.

Instructors conduct advanced research on defense-related issues and provide high-quality education to SDF personnel at the National Institute for Defense Studies, the National Defense Academy, and the National Defense

Medical College, and other organizations.

As of the end of March 2010, there were 648 Technical and Engineering Officials and Instructors with PhDs.

In addition, in various organizations where these civilian personnel are the main work force, uniformed SDF personnel of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF work together with these civilian personnel, in fields where the specialized knowledge of uniformed SDF personnel is required.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Connecting through Music — a MSDF Pianist —

Petty Officer Second Class Sawako Ohta, MSDF Tokyo Band

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF have programs to recruit personnel who have national qualifications and job experience, so they can be immediately effective. The technical petty officer program is one of such programs.

I had already been involved with the MSDF Tokyo Band in the past as I was invited as an instructor to the band and performed at concerts. Coming in contact with the members' sincere attitude toward music and their jobs, I had become more eager to become a member and work together with them. And so I decided that I would apply to be a technical petty officer. In October 2008 I was appointed as a petty officer second class and took my first step as an SDF member at the Yokosuka Recruit Training Center.

Before enrollment, I had centered my life on music performances from evening till night just as many other civil performers. Therefore, I was shocked by the daily life at the Center, where the training and education are scheduled in a matter of minutes. At the very beginning of the training, I didn't even have enough time to have take meals. I believe now that through that experience I was able to foster the foundation as a uniformed SDF personnel such as mental toughness and physical strength, which has been paying off in self-managing as a musical performer. I can also remember that I even managed to find time to practice the piano at the MSDF Yokosuka Band next to the place where I was assigned special training after designation as an unskilled swimmer, known as a "red hat."

After assignment to the MSDF Tokyo Band, I had more opportunities to perform with large scale wind orchestras in addition to the solo and small group ensembles I had experienced in my civilian years. Thus my scope as a performer widened, which is very satisfying. On the other hand, however, the job as Petty Officer Second Class also obviously requires tasks other than performing as well as directing subordinates, and I sometimes feel frustrated and terrible when I cannot achieve results required of my rank because of a lack in knowledge and experience as a SDF personnel. While this is a major challenge for me now, I will



Petty Officer Second Class Ohta performing at the FY2009 SDF Marching Festival

Practicing just before the Marching Festival (MAMOR)

definitely overcome it one day.

One of the missions of the MSDF Band is public relations activities. A lot of people attend our performances, and every time the hall is filled near or at capacity. Sometimes we even receive letters that warm our hearts. Also, when I was invited to perform in uniform at my alma mater, the Tokyo University of the Arts, I found our performance well received and the audience saying "this is the first time I had heard of the MSDF Band" and "seeing performers in uniform is a new experience." I realized the significance and the effect of our public relations activities. In this manner, I believe that the bond between the people and SDF officials is surely built when we establish rapport through music. This bond is indispensable for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. I will continue to strive, keeping this in mind.

3. Daily Education and Training

In order to accomplish its missions whose core is the defense of Japan, the SDF needs to keep its commanding officers and other members at high capacity as well as in a high state of readiness to fully exert their capabilities in any situation. This stand of high preparedness enables the SDF to deal with various situations immediately and appropriately, and works as deterrence to any country with intention to invade Japan.

Education and training [12] are crucial for the SDF to strengthen its capabilities to accomplish its missions by developing its human resources. For this purpose the SDF is making efforts under various constraints to educate/train its personnel and its units to make them strong, and to maintain and improve its readiness, while paying careful attention to safety.

GSDF personnel carrying out a marching training exercise

MSDF personnel carrying out a cutter training exercise in Etajima

ASDF personnel carrying out flight training exercises on a flight simulator

1. Education of Uniformed SDF personnel

(1) Present Status of Education

Enhancing the ability of each SDF uniformed personnel who compose SDF units is essential for the latter to perform their duties. At its schools and training units, therefore, the SDF provides opportunities for systematic phased education according to rank and duties in order to nurture necessary qualities and cultivate knowledge and skills of personnel.

For instance, pilots and air traffic controllers require education and training over a long period before they acquire their certification. Further, this requires considerable investment in terms of personnel, time, and funding on the part of the Ministry of Defense/the SDF such as provision of trainers with special skills/

equipment/educational facilities.

In case personnel need to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or it is difficult for them to acquire them within the SDF, they may study at external educational institutions,[13] including those abroad, as well as domestic companies or research institutes.

(2) Joint Educational Programs

In order to further improve the joint operational posture, knowledge and skills regarding joint operations are essential, and necessary education is required for that. Therefore, the three services of the SDF have enriched education on joint operations at their respective service educational facilities including Staff Colleges[14]. Additionally, a joint educational program system has been set up, mainly at the Joint Staff College[15], where SDF officers who will become senior unit commanders and senior staff can receive joint education[16].

(3) Educational Programs Meeting the Needs of the Times

There have been increasing opportunities for the SDF to take part in international activities and to develop active relationships with other countries; in addition to the programs mentioned above, the SDF are responding to this recent trend by providing its personnel with tuition in English, Russian, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, and other languages. Also, the SDF is accepting students from abroad for the purpose of understanding each other.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Human Resources Foundation for Defense Capabilities (Pilot Training)

The personnel who form the human resources foundation supporting defense capabilities comprise various occupations, each of which require diverse training exercises for each phase of development. As an example we describe the training of pilots who are required to have special qualifications, as follows:

The SDF chooses the most appropriate aircraft for each contingency to carry out missions in diverse situations, such as peace time surveillance operations, disaster relief activities in and around Japan, peacekeeping operations in Haiti, anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and full scale defensive counter measures.

Thus the SDF maintains a variety of aircraft to carry out these various missions. To begin with, aircraft are categorized into two types: fixed-wing aircraft and rotary-wing aircraft. Under the fixed-wing category there are fighter aircraft, patrol aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, transport aircraft, and early warning and control aircraft (AWACS); as for the rotary-wing aircraft this category includes attack helicopters, patrol helicopters, transport helicopters, mine sweeping and transport helicopters, and rescue helicopters. If the type of craft is different, so is the method of operation, as well as the mental and physical competency required of the pilot. For this reason, the SDF carries out its own pilot training, investing a great deal of time and money.

Included in pilot training are 1) the general officer candidate course (after graduating from the National Defense Academy or normal university), 2) the air student course (for Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces only, following high school graduation), and 3) the sergeant's air piloting course (Ground Self Defense Force only, selected from within the force after being promoted to third class).

Using the example of ASDF flight training, pilots are categorized into fighter pilots, transport pilots, and rescue pilots. At first all candidates go through the training process on the same training aircraft, after which they proceed to each course based on their individual qualifications. High level training using jet aircraft is

carried out in all courses, and the process takes about three years before the assignment to an actual unit. (See Fig. "Overview of the ASDF Pilot Training Course" below)

As mentioned earlier, the systematic and continuous training of a specific number of pilots within the force is extremely important for carrying out different missions. However, as the birth rate continues to decline in recent years, the recruitment environment is growing ever more challenging. Securing of personnel with the required mental and physical qualifications to be SDF pilots from among a small number of candidates is a significant challenge in addition to keeping up with the steady advancement in aircraft technology.

Overview of the ASDF Pilot Training Course



Furthermore, in order to conduct international peace cooperation activities in an expeditious and continuous manner, the GSDF International Peace Cooperation Activities Training Unit is carrying out professional education and training for GSDF personnel throughout the country (mainly for those who are supposed to become the core personnel at the time of dispatch).
(See Chapter 3, Section 1) (See Reference 71–72)

2. SDF Training

(1) Training by Each Self-Defense Force

There are two main types of training within units in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF: training for individual SDF

personnel to improve their proficiency in their respective fields, and training for units to conduct systematic operations.

Training for individuals is conducted one-on-one in stages based on occupational classification and individual ability. Training for units is conducted by size of unit, from small to large, and large-scale comprehensive training is also carried out to ensure that overall abilities can be exercised.
(See Reference 73)

In addition to such training for national defense, training is given on the diverse roles required for the SDF in recent years such as peacekeeping operations and large scale disaster relief operations.
(See Chapter 1, Section 2 and Chapter 3, Section 1)

(2) Joint Exercises

In order to exert defense capabilities most effectively in case of an armed attack on Japan, it is important for the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF to conduct joint exercises during peacetime. Therefore, the SDF has been conducting joint exercises involving two or more forces. Such joint exercises have been strengthened following the transition to a joint operations posture [17].
(See Reference 73)

GSDF HMVs being loaded on board a MSDF transport vessel during a joint exercise

(3) Restrictions on Education and Training, and Responses

SDF training is carried out under conditions that are as close as possible to that of actual fighting. A variety of facilities and equipment exist for this purpose, yet many restrictions are imposed on their usage [18].

Particularly, restrictions [19] in maneuver areas, waters and airspace, and firing ranges where training is carried out tend to have a major effect on the training, along with the modernization of equipment and other changes. Such areas are not sufficient in size, are unevenly dispersed across the nation, and are limited to certain time periods and times of day. Furthermore, training under an electronic warfare [20] environment —conducted as practical training— is limited by the need to avoid radio wave interference.

To deal with these restrictions, each SDF makes maximum use of its limited domestic maneuvering areas. They also strive to carry out more practical training by conducting live-firing training and Japan–U.S. joint exercises in the United States and waters off the United States where there are training conditions not available in Japan.
(See Reference 78)

3. Efforts and Issues for Safety Management

(1) Safety Management

Because the primary mission of the SDF is to defend Japan, SDF training and activities are inevitably accompanied by risk. However, accidents that cause injury or loss of property to the public or the loss of life of SDF personnel must be avoided at all costs.

Continuous safety reviews and improvements are vital, and must be jointly handled by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. The Ministry of Defense and the SDF take great care to ensure safety under normal conditions such as military vessel and aircraft traffic firing training during daily training, and prepare aeronautical safety radio facilities and equipment for prevention and rescue in the event of marine accidents.

(2) The Collision between the Destroyer *Atago* and the Fishing Boat *Seitoku Maru*

On February 19, 2008, the destroyer *Atago* collided with the fishing boat *Seitoku Maru* resulting in the deaths of two crew members of the *Seitoku Maru*. The SDF, which is responsible for defending the lives and property of the Japanese people, cannot be allowed to cause such an accident.

In order to prevent recurrence of a similar accident, the SDF must go back to basics and ensure that all assigned duties are carried out steadily. The Ministry of Defense is resolved to thoroughly implement preventive measures[21].

4. Working Conditions of Personnel, Measures on Personnel Matters, and Other Related Issues

The duties of the SDF make no distinction between night and day. The work assigned to uniformed SDF personnel can be extremely demanding, involving various operations onboard aircraft, long-term service on ships or submarines, or parachuting. To instill SDF personnel with pride and allow them to concentrate on their duties without anxiety, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF strive to provide salaries and allowances, medical care, welfare, and other benefits that reflect the special nature of their duties. (See Fig. III-4-1-5)

1. The Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform, etc., in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force

The Ministry of Defense has acknowledged the significance of maintaining high-quality human resources, and has implemented various measures for the new era[22]. However, given the rapidly declining birth rate in recent years and changes in lifecycles of SDF personnel, a wide range of reforms, which focus on the personnel field of the Defense Force, has become a pressing issue, in order to secure sufficient human resources in a stable manner and create a comfortable working environment where personnel can concentrate on their duties without anxiety. For this purpose, in September 2006, the Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reforms in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force was established. The panel is headed by the Minister of State for Defense (at the time), and includes top officials of the Defense Agency (at the time) and outside experts. Under their authority the panel has implemented various types of research projects and studies.

In June 2007, the panel produced a report[23] of its findings compiled in the following categories: “Recruitment Items,” “Service Period Items,” “Items on Outplacement and Measures for Post-Retirement,” and “Other Items.” In August of the same year, a new panel chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense was established (the “Panel to Implement Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force”) in place of the former panel to consider new items such as the establishment of new ranks for SDF personnel.

The Panel was renovated in January 2010 (the “Panel to Consider and Implement Comprehensive Measures in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force,” continuously chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense) to steadily implement the various measures considered until that time while carrying out comprehensive deliberations in consideration of a review of the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines and public servant policy reforms, etc.

2. Efforts for Further Utilization of Female SDF Personnel

The Ministry of Defense is making efforts to employ and promote more women (as SDF personnel, administrative officials, etc.) while giving due consideration to maintaining the strength of the SDF as well as to the capability, aptitude, and motivation of each individual. At the same time, the Ministry is improving the working environment to support a healthy work-family balance as well as eliminating the idea of fixed distribution of roles for work based on gender. Efforts are also being made to dispatch female SDF personnel to disaster relief and international

peace cooperation activities while a review of assignment restrictions of female SDF personnel is being carried forward. Restrictions on assignment to destroyers, minesweeping mother ships, and patrol helicopters were lifted in September 2008[24].

In addition, the system to recruit fixed-term substitute personnel take over the tasks of personnel taking childcare leave has been adopted for SDF personnel since 2007, and the total number of 40 personnel had been recruited through this system so far at the end of April 2010.

Further, to provide childcare assistance to SDF personnel, who work under a special working environment (irregular work patterns, etc.), childcare centers were established at the GSDF Camp Mishuku (Tokyo) in FY2007, at the GSDF Camp Kumamoto (Kumamoto Prefecture) in FY2009, and also in Yokosuka District (Kanagawa

Fig. III-4-1-5 Main Measures on Personnel Matters

Items	Measures by the Ministry of Defense and SDF	Related governmental activities
Discussions on Reform of the Public Servant System	❍ A partial amendment to the National Civil Service Law to be submitted to the Diet which includes the application to SDF personnel of measures in accordance with general civil personnel, in accordance with competency and performance based personnel management, centralized senior personnel management by the Cabinet, and reemployment regulations, etc.	Basic Act on Reform of National Civil Service System (2008)[1] Bill to Partially Amend the National Civil Service Law (submitted to the Diet in February 2010)[2]
Efforts for Gender Equality	❍ The Defense Agency Headquarters for the Promotion of Gender Equality was established in 2001, with the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. It has implemented various measures ❍ In 2006, the headquarters drew up the Basic Plan for Gender Equality in the Defense Agency and made other decisions to promote measures such as the expansion in the employment and promotion of female personnel, support for female personnel to balance work and family life, and the improvement of facilities and accommodation on ships and other work areas to fit situations where more and more female personnel are being placed	Gender-Equal Society Law (1999)[3]
Promotion of Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation	❍ The Defense Agency Committee for the Promotion of Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation was established in 2004 ❍ The Defense Agency drew up the “Action Plan to support a good work-family balance of the Defense Agency” in 2005 (In particular, encouraging male personnel to take child-care leave and special leave, and establishing day care centers on the premises of the Defense Agency and SDF) ❍ The Ministry of Defense drew up the “Action Plan to support a good work-family balance of the Ministry of Defense” in 2010 (In particular, encouraging male personnel to take child-care leave and special leave)	Law for Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation (2003)[4]
Efforts Related to Mental Health	❍ Since its establishment in 2003, the Defense Agency Headquarters for the Prevention of Suicide has discussed measures to prevent suicide and distributed referential materials on suicide prevention to garrisons and bases ❍ Efforts to enhance awareness among SDF personnel have been made through improvement in the counseling system, and the production and dissemination of educational videos ❍ In relation to mental health, measures on post-traumatic stress disorder and critical incident stress have been deliberated	
Active Utilization of Warrant Officers and Enlisted Personnel	❍ The GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF have assigned warrant officers and senior enlisted personnel new roles regarding giving instruction on service discipline to enlisted personnel. For example, the MSDF introduced the Command Master Chief System in April 2003, while the ASDF introduced the Command Master System in April 2008, and the GSDF introduced the Master Sergeant Major System on a trial basis in 2008.	
The Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field	❍ The Panel to Examine Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force was established in September 2006 with the then Defense Agency Chief then as chairman. They created reports on recruitment, items during one’s tenure, measures taken for backup and after one’s retirement, and on other items in June 2007.[5] ❍ In January of this year, the Panel to Consider and Implement Comprehensive Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field of the Defense Force was established, chaired by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense	

Notes: 1. See <http://www.gyoukaku.go.jp/siryou/koumuin/080613kihonhou_honbun.pdf>
2. See <http://www.gyoukaku.go.jp/koumuin/dai4/index.html>
3. See <http://www.gyoukaku.go.jp/9906kihonhou.html>
4. See <http://www.mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/koyou/jisedai/suisin.html>
5. In January 2007, the Panel to Implement Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in the Personnel Field was established, chaired by the Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, which steadily implemented items compiled in the reports.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of SDF Personnel using the Nursery at Yokosuka

Petty Officer Second Class Shiori Honda,
First Staff Office, Defense Division, Yokosuka District Headquarters, MSDF

I serve as an accountant at the Yokosuka District Headquarters in Kanagawa Prefecture, and I live with my husband, also serving as MSDF staff, and my one year old son. When serving as MSDF staff, one or both of us can be called away from home because of sudden departure when on ship duty or being called in for emergencies during shore duty, and there is also watch duty several times each month. Every day I worried about what to do in each case. Given this situation, a nursery was opened this April that provides an environment custom designed for our special working conditions allowing us to bring in our children at any time 24 hours a day so that we can focus on our job without worrying. My husband also says he can now focus on his job without worrying thanks to the nursery. We are able to leave our children at the nursery without worry because the teachers there are not only experienced but quite vigorous as well. This will allow us to raise our children better while balancing work and home.

The Hondas coming to pick up their son

Prefecture) in FY2010. There are also plans for establishment in GSDF camp Makomanai (Hokkaido) in FY2011 and in Asaka District (Saitama Prefecture) in FY2013.

3. The Promotion of Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation

In consideration of the continuing decline in the birth rate of Japan, the Law for Measures to Support the Development of the Next-Generation was enacted in 2003 to contribute to the development of a society where the children, upon whom the next generation of Japanese society will rest, can be born healthy and be educated decently.

In response, the Defense Agency (at the time) established the Committee to Promote Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation in 2004, and decided on the "Action Plan to support a good work-family balance of the Defense Agency" in 2005 to cover the period from April 1, 2005 through March 31, 2010.

With the expiration of the aforementioned action plan, a new plan to cover the period from April 1, 2010 through March 31, 2015 was decided upon (the "Action Plan to support a good work-family balance of the personnel of the Ministry of Defense"). The plan particularly promotes male personnel to take child care leave and other special leave.

4. Efforts to Prevent Suicide among SDF Personnel

In 1998, the annual number of suicides in Japan exceeded 30,000 and has since maintained a high level. This is a serious social problem in Japan. The same is true for the SDF, and while a record was set in FY2004 with 94 SDF Regular Personnel suicides, later figures were 83 suicides in FY2007, 76 suicides in FY2008, and 80 suicides in FY2009.

The suicide of any SDF personnel is truly a great tragedy for both the persons committing suicide themselves and their bereaved families, and it is also a great loss for the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to lose capable personnel. At the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Agency Headquarters for the Prevention of Suicides (at the time) was established in July 2003, headed by the Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (at the time), and took the following measures to prevent suicide. Much effort will be continued to be made for the prevention of suicide.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

About SDF Personnel Hired as Fixed Term SDF Personnel and Personnel on Child Care Leave Utilizing this System



Currently, personnel of the SDF (with the exception of part-time officials, etc.), can take child care leave up to the day when his/her child becomes three years old. During the leave, it is possible to recruit fixed-term substitute personnel to take over tasks of the personnel taking child care leave. For uniformed SDF personnel, a system to recruit substitute staff from retired SDF uniformed personnel ("Fixed Term Substitute SDF Personnel") exists, and the total number of personnel who have been recruited since the system was introduced is 40 as of April 2010.

[Seaman Mukai on duty as fixed term SDF personnel]

"In the past I served as uniformed MSDF personnel in charge of accounting. After leaving the SDF I wanted to get back into work as soon as possible after child rearing became less busy. My family told me of the program so I applied. Being back on duty has put some bounce in my life and I am taking better care of my health."

[Seaman Akiyama on Maternity Leave]

"I was concerned that taking maternity leave would put a burden on my coworkers, but this program has allowed me to do so without worry. I have heard that some people bring their children to the office to talk about recent happenings even during maternity leave. I think that brightens up the workplace, so I think it would be good if more people take advantage of this program."

Seaman Mukai on duty

Seaman Akiyama on maternity leave

1) Expanding the counseling system (inside counselors, outside counselors, mental health care officers, and a 24-hour telephone hotline for counseling).
2) Promoting education, to ensure that commanders feel signs of mental problems among subordinates, and that enlisted personnel are aware of their own mental health.
3) Setting a campaign period for measures regarding mental health in spring and summer, which is when personnel are transferred, to enhance the measures for example: having commanders closely monitor the mental condition of subordinates whose environment has been changed due to personnel transfer, providing various reference materials and providing lectures.

5. Measures against Drug Incidents

In 2005, there was a succession of drug related offenses in the SDF. Taking this very seriously, the SDF established the "Committee to Consider Measures for the Drug Problem" to collate the problems and preventive measures [25] and is steadily implementing those measures.

Despite these efforts, 10 personnel were arrested in 2009 on suspicion of violating drug related laws. The Ministry of Defense held its 17th committee meeting in January 2010 chaired by the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense. In consideration of the trend that the majority of recent drug cases have been committed by young personnel, the Ministry is determined to quickly carry out 1) education to prevent drug related offences, 2) inspections of personnel quarters, and 3) a review of drug tests, and to prevent and eradicate drug related crimes in addition to the aforementioned preventative measures.

6. Commemorating Personnel Killed in the Line of Duty

Since the establishment of the National Police Reserve in 1950, which has evolved through the National Safety Force and the Coastal Safety Force into the SDF today, SDF personnel have been striving to accomplish the noble mission of protecting the peace and independence of Japan. They have accomplished this by devoting themselves unstintingly to training, day and night, to live up to the expectations and trust of the Japanese citizens, regardless of danger, and with a strong sense of responsibility. During this time, however, more than 1,800 personnel have lost their lives in the line of duty.

At the Ministry of Defense and the SDF, funeral ceremonies are carried out by the SDF unit to which the personnel killed in the line of duty belonged, in order to express condolences to them. Memorial ceremonies are also carried out in order to eternally recognize the achievements of the SDF personnel killed and to express deep honor and condolences, and support is provided to the families of the deceased [26].

A memorial ceremony for an SDF member who died in the line of duty.

5. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel, and Related Issues

1. Retirement and Outplacement of Personnel

There is an early retirement system and a fixed-term service system for SDF uniformed personnel as aforementioned to keep the forces strong. Unlike private sectors and civilian government employees, many SDF uniformed personnel retire by their mid-50s (personnel serving under the early retirement system) or their 20s (most uniformed personnel serving under the fixed-term service system), and many must become reemployed after retirement in order to secure their livelihoods.

For this reason, it is the responsibility of the nation (the Ministry of Defense) as the employer to support this reemployment. In addition to resolving concerns that SDF uniformed personnel may have about their future so they can work diligently without any worries while in service, ensuring that they can lead stable lives after retirement is also understood to be essential for boosting morale and securing high quality human resources, and employment support measures such as training helpful to reemployment is being carried out for this reason[27].

Also, as the Ministry of Defense is not authorized to work on its own as an intermediary between job seeker and prospective employer, the SDF Personnel Support Association provides free job consultation to retired SDF personnel with permission from the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. As a severe employment environment is expected to continue, the further improvement and strengthening of employment support for retired SDF personnel is necessary.

Retired uniformed SDF personnel work in various sectors, including the manufacturing and service industries, and are also employed by local governments as staff charged with risk management, and disaster prevention. Retired SDF personnel are highly evaluated by their employers because of their general sense of responsibility, discipline, and other good qualities.

(See Fig. III-4-1-6)

Fig. III-4-1-6 Main Measures for Reemployment Support

Items	Description
Occupational aptitude testing	Testing aimed to provide guidance on the basis of individual aptitudes
Technical training	Provision of skills usable in society after retirement (large sized motor vehicle operation, large sized special motor vehicle operation, information processing, crane operation, motor vehicle repair, boiler maintenance, nursing care (home helper), etc.)
Disaster prevention and risk control training	Provide technical knowledge on disaster prevention administration and the Civil Protection Plan
Correspondence courses	SDF Regular Personnel scheduled for compulsory retirement or end of term retirement are provided with the capability to acquire public certification (certified social insurance labor consultant, health supervisor, real-estate transaction specialist, etc.)
Business management training	Cultivate social adaptability in SDF Regular Personnel who will take mandatory retirement as well as provide know-how to lead a stable life after retirement or reemployment
Career guidance	Prepare near-retiree SDF Regular Personnel to find new employment and provide them with know-how to choose new occupation

2. Regulations on Outplacement, etc., of Personnel after Retirement

There are restrictions on the outplacement, etc., of SDF personnel to ensure impartiality in public duties. With regard to existing regulations, if the prospective employer within the first two years after a person leaves the SDF is a private company that had a contract with the Ministry of Defense within five years before said person leaves the SDF, then the approval[28] of the Minister of Defense or other regulating personnel is required. In 2009, the Minister of Defense approved 83 individual cases (83 persons) of reemployment of SDF personnel at private companies.

A partial amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law was included as a part of revisions to the National Public Service Act submitted to the 174th Diet in 2010; the legislation stipulates regulations regarding reemployment of SDF personnel in parallel with that of other civilian central government workers, such as to act as an intermediary between retiring personnel and companies (reemployment mediation), to seek a job while in service (one's own job hunting), and to request a favor by reemployed former personnel (approaching backed by previous jobs).

3. Reappointment System

The reappointment system allows the reemployment of personnel who have the desire and capabilities to continue working as SDF personnel after they reach respective retirement age. The system enables the use of aged but valuable human resources, and secures their livelihoods after retirement before they receive a pension. Under this system, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have reappointed 497 personnel as of the end of March 2010. Furthermore, from the standpoint of building an environment in which SDF uniformed personnel reaching retirement earlier than general civilian government employees can focus on their duties with a sense of security, the reappointment system was revised, which could make it possible to expand the current appointment term of one year or less to three years or less when under 60 years of age.
(See Fig. III-4-1-7)

Fig. III-4-1-7 Overview of Reappointment System

Items	Administrative officials and others	SDF regular personnel
Basic approach	Present mandatory retirement age to remain in place; personnel in their early 60s who have the ability and desire to work in the public service to be reappointed	While maintaining present mandatory retirement age, personnel with the desire and ability to work as SDF regular personnel beyond the mandatory retirement age remains to be appointed to a position determined by the Minister of Defense
Job conditions	• Full-time • Shorter-time service	Limited to full-time service
Period of reappointment	One year, with the possibility of renewal	• Renewal is allowed within one year (term for personnel under 60 is within three years) • Extension is allowed for a certain period of time (between six months to a year) in the case of mobilization
Maximum age for reappointment	65 (Maximum age was 61 between FY2001 to FY2003. Subsequently, the age has been increased incrementally by one year, every three years)	
Salary and allowance	Fixed monthly salary is provided based on job level and rank. Allowances, such as a commuting allowance, are provided	

Section 2. Acquisition Reform, Defense Production, and Technological Bases

In order that our defense capabilities demonstrate their function sufficiently, not only are the organizational and human resource bases described in the previous section important; so too is constant review of the frameworks behind material bases (including the various types of equipment and the defense production and technological bases that support them) and the acquisition of equipment and materials that are intimately related to the efficient upgrading of defense capability.

This section will describe efforts to enhance and strengthen material bases of this kind.

1. Awareness of the Problems Relating to the Acquisition of Equipment and Materials

Appropriate and efficient acquisition of defense equipment is of extreme importance to improvement of the defense capability of Japan. It is also imperative for us as an independent state to always preserve an indispensable production and technological base for defense equipment in Japan, in order to secure the country's own security. With such a sense of purpose, the Ministry of Defense has previously addressed the consideration and implementation of important measures for the acquisition of equipment, in particular, from the perspective of streamlining and rationalizing procurement and supply of equipment and materials, as well as fairness and transparency in relation to acquisition.

Behind this is the fact that, due to recent changes in the acquisition environment in terms of increasing prices caused by the severe fiscal condition and increasing performance of equipment, we now find ourselves in a situation in which it is becoming ever more important to acquire equipment and materials with consideration to cost, and in which it is necessary to increase the suitability of procurement in order to fulfill our obligation of adequate accountability to the people with regard to the use of their taxes (as symbolized by discussions at the Government Revitalization Unit). To this end, it is vital to continue to maintain fairness and transparency in equipment acquisition, while continuing to drive acquisition reform in order to put effective measures in place to control risk and cost, and facilitate the acquisition of superior equipment.

In recent years, factors such as the trend toward restricting defense related expenditures have caused Japan's defense production and technological bases to run into a serious situation, with domestic defense-related companies having trouble securing business. It is envisioned that if such companies either withdraw from defense operations or become bankrupt in the future, there will be serious consequences to the improvement of Japan's defense capability. Hence, it is required when engaged in advancing future acquisition reform, to pay due consideration to the importance of our defense production and technological bases.

2. Main Efforts so Far Relating to Acquisition Reform

1. Strengthening Life-cycle Cost Management

The main equipment and materials are used for extended periods after procurement, so it is of extreme importance to promote efficient and rational management during the entire life cycle of such equipment, from concept, development, production, and operation (including maintenance, repair, and upgrades) through to disposal. Appropriate management of cost throughout the life cycle of equipment, beginning with decision-making based on judgment of cost effectiveness at the juncture of launching into development and production, contributes to the acquisition of effective and efficient equipment.

In March 2008, the Ministry of Defense commenced a trial of life cycle cost (LCC)[29] management. It established a uniform calculation standard for each class of equipment, and organized the results of estimates of

LCC for the main equipment subject to the trial[30] as an annual report. The results were reported to the Minister of Defense and publicly announced in August 2008 and August 2009.

From April 2010, based on the results of the trial so far, it gradually expanded the target equipment under management and implemented cost calculation and cost management, while continuing to advance the application of LCC management. The latter focused on areas such as consideration of cost comparisons for equipment selection and acquisition format, trade off studies between performance and cost, and cost reduction. Moreover, in April 2009, a life cycle cost management section was set up in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, and the management system within the Ministry improved in relation to LCC.

2. Expansion of Incentive Contracts System

When not enough data has been obtained relating to areas such as contract-specific production costs, during fixed price calculations performed by the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of contracting, it is not uncommon to use a contract method to decide the prices paid, after inspections have been carried out on performance figures based on the implementation of the contract. In such cases, even if cost-reduction is achieved by efficiency efforts in the contract execution process of the company, the results are not passed on to the company in question, because the contract is changed with the cost-reduced price deducted from the contracted amount. It furthermore leads to a decrease in future contracted amounts and profits, from the next contract onwards. Hence, it is difficult for the company to foster the desire to address the issue of cost reduction. On the other hand, if costs overrun, the contracted amount is not increased, which is also often displeasing to the company.

The Incentive Contracts System promotes proactive cost-reduction activities to the company, as an incentive to increase profit. It aims to decrease the procurement costs for equipment and materials. The cost-reduction activities of a company contribute to increased productivity, as well as a strengthening and promotion of low-cost operation. By extension, it is thought to lead to stronger defense production and technological bases. In European countries and the United States, cost reimbursement contracts are applied which contribute to profits in an additive manner when a company has achieved cost-reductions after having their incurred costs compensated, as are definitive contracts that expect autonomous efforts by the company.

The Ministry of Defense also introduced a price reduction proposal system in 1999, which in 2002, was enhanced, revised, and adopted as the Incentive Contracts System. However, during the nine years to 2008, it was used just twice, so one cannot say that it has achieved success in reducing the expense of procurement. Consequently, the Incentive Contracts System has been completely reviewed, the scope of targets expanded to companies' cost-reduction activities across the board, and a new system implemented to increase effectiveness, in areas including improvement of the examination procedures for business proposals. As of January 2010, it has already been used twice.

3. Efforts to Curtail Cost

In order to curtail expenditures related to the R&D, procurement, maintenance, and management of defense equipment, we are striving to apply a range of techniques including the short-term intensive procurement in an individual year, of equipment and such planned for procurement over multiple fiscal years, the lump-sum purchase of equipment for two or more Self-Defense Forces, the part commoditization and sharing of methods during development, promoting the use of commercial

Fig. III-4-2-1 Cost Reduction Conditions

FY	Cost reduction amount[1]	Cost reduction rate[2]
FY2007	Approx. 170 billion yen	Approx. 8.8%
FY2008	Approx. 160 billion yen	Approx. 8.3%
FY2009	Approx. 280 billion yen	Approx. 13.9%
FY2010 (provisional value)	Approx. 150 billion yen	Approx. 7.9%

Notes: 1. Cost reduction amount = amount required at the time (theoretical value before optimization measures) – actual total amount
2. Cost reduction rate = cost reduction amount ÷ (equipment and material purchase expenses + cost reduction amount)

items, private sector outsourcing, and the streamlining of maintenance and improvement costs. Since 2007, the results of such efforts have been compiled, and the performance in reduction compared to 2006 organized and published. The situation regarding cost reduction since 2007 is as shown in Fig. III-4-2-1.
(See Part II, Chapter 2, Section 5)

4. Efforts to Increase Fairness and Transparency

The Ministry of Defense aims to increase fairness and transparency in relation to the acquisition of equipment and materials, and has thus far implemented a variety of measures from the view of making contracts more appropriate, and strengthening checking functions.

Recently, as a part of the effort to make public procurement more appropriate across the whole of government, a number of measures are being tackled in the Ministry of Defense, including the introduction and expansion of a comprehensive evaluation bidding system[31], the increase of multiple-year contracts, making bidding procedures more efficient, and reviews of sole source contracts. Alongside these measures, in July 2006, a deputy chief in charge of auditing was established at the Equipment Procurement Office[32] (as it was then named), as was an auditing division in the Internal Bureau, working toward strengthening checking functions.

In 2008, based on cases such as Yamada Corporation's falsification of estimates by foreign manufacturers in order to overcharge the Ministry of Defense, the following steps have been taken as a response to general import procurement problems.

1) Special contract terms newly established for general import procurement, direct reference to foreign manufacturers with regard to estimates, etc., and doubling of the size of the penalty charge for overcharging.
2) Introduction of import procurement surveys which examine the management and accounting systems of commercial businesses.
3) Increase in the number of import procurement specialist officers resident in the United States affiliated with the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office from three to ten, in order to strengthen the function of on-location price surveying.
4) Establishment in 2009 of an Import Procurement Division in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, positioned to account for import procurement matters in a specialist manner.

On the other hand, cases of irregular bidding were identified in an FY2008 defense inspection, in the procurement of office supplies, such as office furniture by the ASDF 1st Depot. Hence, in May 2009, the Ministry of Defense notified the Japan Fair Trading Commission based on the Bid-rigging Consulting and Information Manual. In June of the same year, the Japan Fair Trading Commission carried out on-site inspections of the enterprises and ASDF, and in March 2010, issued a cease-and-desist order and an order to pay charges to the companies concerned based on the Anti-Monopoly Act, while demanding that the Defense Minister take steps toward improvement.

With circumstances such as these, the Ministry of Defense set up an "Exploratory Committee for Bid-rigging Issues in the ASDF 1st Depot for Office Supplies such as Office Furniture," with Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Daizo Kusuda as chief, and is advancing the investigation of problems and consideration of important steps.

5. Other

As central procurement, the Ministry of Defense is purchasing in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office, mainly warships, aircraft, weapons, vehicles, and other important equipment and materials, and items common to all forces. As regional procurement it is focused on purchasing mainly things closely associated with the execution of duties by units in each Self-Defense Force and other organizations.

Central and regional procurement differ in character in terms of the items dealt with and procedures. However, as part of review efforts, in order to increase the transparency of the procurement procedure further, since July 2008, the high price sole-source contracts of regional procurement (under the same criteria of 150 million yen and greater, as central procurement) became items requiring ministerial approval.

Furthermore, system-building was embarked upon in 1999 to manage data on central and regional procurement in a unified manner. Due to the referencing of similar cases of procurement, there are hopes for effects such as making it easier to see the benefits of considering bulk buying.

In addition, with a goal of enhancing and strengthening functions including the realization of efficient procurement, quality control and human resource development (all of which contribute to cost-reduction), in April 2010, the business segments of the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office were reorganized, and the Planning and Coordination Division, and Quality Control Division were abolished, to be newly replaced with the establishment of the Procurement Planning Division and Business Coordination Division.

3. Domestic Defense Production and Technological Bases that Support Defense Capability

1. Characteristics and Current Status of Defense Production and Technological Bases in Japan

Defense production and technological bases in Japan play an important role in the areas of acquisition of equipment and materials able to exhibit maximum capabilities, stable, mobile and efficient supply of acquired equipment and materials to front-line units, as well as the maintaining of these functions.

By maintaining defense production and technological bases domestically, not only does it become possible to acquire an operational concept suitable to the special characteristics of the Japanese land and its policies, and equipment and materials which possess the desired performance, but we can then secure independence in our security and demonstrate reduction effects in the form of potential defense capability, having benefits in a number of places, including effective and efficient acquisition of the above-mentioned equipment and materials in a short time, as well as maintenance and supply. Always maintaining and developing these bases has significance in areas such as ensuring bargaining power against other countries when procuring equipment and materials from abroad, and facilitating the acquisition of equipment and materials at terms beneficial to Japan. Furthermore, many cases can be observed in which the technologies cultivated in development and manufacturing of defense equipment has extended to other industries. For example, nuclear reactor turbine axles are manufactured by making use of manufacturing technology for gun barrels which increased their strength, useful life, and accuracy, resulting in a leading share in the world market. Areas such as these are significant in that they create economic and technological strength, as a part of the national strength of Japan.

On the other hand, for the main items of equipment, aircraft, warships, tanks, guided missiles and so on, the initial investment is generally large, a high degree of technical capability is required, and a great deal of time is necessary for the training of engineers; therefore the number of companies which are actually able to develop and produce defense equipment ranges domestically from just one to a handful. There is a danger that the withdrawal of even a single company would create an immediate obstacle to the acquisition and maintenance of equipment and materials. Indeed, recently, there have been some cases where subcontractors carrying out the manufacture of parts and components have withdrawn from the defense business, while in some fields, preservation of the specialist technical capability necessary for development and manufacture of defense equipment is becoming ever more difficult than it has been before.

The defense equipment and materials market in Japan is limited by domestic defense demands. Hence, due to reasons such as effectiveness measures not working, there are cases when the unit price for acquisition becomes high in comparison to similar equipment from abroad. Because of factors such as this and the severe fiscal conditions, there is a decreasing trend in the amount of main equipment procured, and it is feared that this trend may drive up the unit

price of acquisition still further, and lead to a vicious circle of ever-decreasing procurement amounts.

Moreover, with increasing levels of performance thanks to trends in the latest military science and technology, the price of equipment is on an increasing trajectory regardless of whether it is domestic or foreign. However, in many countries, European countries and the United States specifically, it is no longer the case that up-to-date equipment is developed and manufactured within a single country. Rather, the risk and cost is borne across multiple countries. International joint development and manufacturing is progressing, with more advanced equipment and materials being manufactured and developed. (See Reference 78)

2. Production and Technological Bases for Fighter Aircraft

Fighter aircraft are one of the main pieces of equipment of the SDF. Production of the F-2 fighter which has been manufactured since 1996 is going to end with the 2011 supply. After that, it is forecast that a blank period will arise in Japan, during which no fighters will be produced. The "Meeting on the Nature of Production and Technological Bases for Fighter Aircraft" was established in June 2009 in order to facilitate discussion between the government and the private sector (including experts) regarding the question of what kind of effects a period with no aircraft produced like this will have on the production and technological bases for fighter aircraft in Japan. After the 7th meeting, an interim report was published in December of the same year[33]. The outline of the report is as follows.

(1) Current Situation of Fighter Aircraft Production and Technological Bases

Due to the hitherto continuous production of fighter aircraft in Japan, as well as the R&D, improvement and repair necessary to use them, domestic production and technological bases have been maintained and improved, and three elements which are absolutely vital to the use of fighter aircraft, "maintaining a high rate of operation," "capability increase appropriate to use by Japan," and "maintaining safety" have been secured.

(2) Effects of Suspending Production

Suspending the production of fighter aircraft will mainly cause a loss of opportunity to use the technological capabilities developed during production and manufacture, a reduction in the number of engineers trained in R&D and the improvement and repair of fighter aircraft, and other issues such as withdrawal of subcontractors due to the fall in procurement numbers for fighters and other factors. As a result, there are fears of a decline in operational support for areas such as improvement and repair of fighter aircraft, and difficulty in maintaining and improving the level of technology required for R&D relating to future fighters.

(3) Facing the Future of Production and Technological Bases for Fighter Aircraft

Due to the effects on usage and future R&D of suspending production of fighter aircraft which are necessary in demonstrating the defense capability of Japan, an extremely important challenge is maintaining and developing the production and technological bases for fighter aircraft. It is necessary for the Ministry of Defense, while steadily advancing the aircraft-related business being implemented at present, to promote procurement and R&D that will enable it to consider development of fighter aircraft as an option. Based on such thinking, the following three challenges should be addressed.

Meeting on the Nature of Production and Technological Bases for Fighter Aircraft

1) Close examination of the bases which must be maintained domestically in the future for the use of fighter aircraft, from the perspective of maintaining domestically the vital bases behind the three elements, “maintaining a high rate of operation,” “capability increase appropriate to use by Japan,” and “maintaining safety.”
2) Basing fighter aircraft-related R&D in the future on factors such as “seeds and needs,” and the current situation regarding production and technological bases in Japan, and deciding on a vision based on the medium-to long-term.
3) Consideration and promotion of measures including the conversion for civil use of technology cultivated during the development of SDF aircraft, as something which will maintain and vitalize the bases shared across aircraft as a whole, given that some of the production and technological bases for fighter aircraft are maintained by the development and production of other aircraft.

4. Strengthening Relations with the Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) Technology Field

In regard to R&D at the Ministry of Defense, the National Defense Program Guidelines state that efforts should be made “by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, academic, and governmental sectors.”

In order to investigate and introduce superior technologies in the private sector Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI) has selected basic technology research themes, and introduced investigation and research projects that invite public participation by not only private corporations, but also various research organizations. Furthermore, technological information is exchanged between organizations such as the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), Information Technology Promotion Agency (IPA), and National Maritime Research Institute. Utilization of such projects is intended to push forward introduction of a wide range of superior technology from research organizations and corporations.

It is also important to spread the outcome of R&D at the Ministry of Defense into the private sector. Not only will the conversion of aircraft that have been developed as SDF aircraft for civil use (which is being considered by companies in charge of development) lead to the maintenance and strengthening of defense production and technological bases, it can also be expected to reduce the procurement prices for SDF aircraft. As such, the Ministry of Defense is cooperating and collaborating with the relevant ministries and agencies and promoting its consideration. In April 2010, the “Conference on the Civilian Use of Ministry of Defense Developed Aircraft” (which included experts) was established, and following five meetings and public comment procedures, a policy was compiled regarding such issues as how corporations that use such aircraft are to pay usage fees to the national government and the disclosure and use of technology-related materials possessed by the Ministry of Defense, in aim of establishing a concrete system design for converting aircraft to civil use by August 2010[34].

5. Research & Development of the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)

Researching advanced personal equipment

In order to introduce emerging technologies into R&D, and to conduct deeper analysis on operational needs, the Technical Research and Development Institute has adopted a number of new R&D methods[35]. A pilot research project has been underway since FY2009 allowing individual SDF personnel to communicate with each other and share information. In order to reflect the opinions of users concerning operational performance improvements and weight reduction in the research of this system technology, a wide range

of evaluation data is being obtained based on practical operation, resulting from the use of experiments[36] on C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) and cooperation between defense force units.

In view of joint operations to realize organizational combat through networking of forces, high-performance digital data link systems are being developed for loading fighter aircrafts.

From the perspective of optimizing the performance, schedule, and cost throughout the lifecycle of equipment, it is effective to thoroughly conduct comparison and analysis on a number of proposals in areas including performance and cost at the stage of concept, research, and development. Additionally, it is effective to continue with follow-up improvement after deployment of equipment.

6. Organization of Opinion Exchange Meetings by Minister of Defense Toshimi Kitazawa and Corporations Involved in Defense

Based on recognition of the recent problems pertaining to acquisition reform and defense production and technological bases, in January 2010, the Ministry of Defense, under the leadership of Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, implemented a new trial in order to engage in direct opinion exchange between parties including senior Ministry of Defense officials and the chief executives of companies involved in defense. This was hoped to serve as a foundation behind the vitalization of defense production and technological bases, through information sharing and policy dialogue between the government and the private sector. From the attending companies were opinions pertaining to a review of a contract system that rewards efforts by companies to become more efficient, and the necessity for medium-to long-term defense industry strategies to increase the predictability of directions in equipment procurement and R&D, due to the severe current situation in defense production (e.g., the ability for companies themselves to maintain defense production and technological bases is approaching its limit). In addition, with the current situation regarding the promotion of joint international development by the various advanced nations, the necessity was highlighted of ensuring that the technological strength developed by Japan thus far, is not left behind by advancing international technological levels.

Minister of Defense Kitazawa delivering an address at a meeting for an exchange of views

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Advanced Technology Demonstrator

Q: What are the trends in other countries regarding fighter aircraft?

A: The current trend is for fighters to be furnished with the stealth and high maneuverability typified by the American F-22, and with high-level avionics, the so-called fifth generation jet fighters, which boast overwhelming superiority in military potential. In other countries, R&D is progressing in relation to the key technologies required by these fifth generation jet fighters, such as stealth and high maneuverability.



Q: What kind of research is being carried out using advanced technology demonstrators?

A: By conducting actual flight experiments into the various advanced technologies (such as stealth, high maneuverability, and light-weight, high-strength materials), advanced technology demonstrators are thought to play a useful role in the consideration of air defense conditions for stealth aircraft, which have the potential to be deployed near Japan in the near future. Stealth fighters have a small radar cross section (RCS), making it difficult for them to be detected by radar. However, the actual appearance on radar depends not only on the size of the RCS. It can also vary widely due to factors such as the fuselage shape, direction of travel, and method of radar signal processing. Nevertheless, since we have yet to actually observe a stealth fighter with known RCS by radar in Japan, we have no real data on how stealth fighters appear on radar. Therefore, by using radar in advanced R&D, to observe the flight conditions of an advanced technology demonstrator (whose RCS has been measured beforehand), it will be possible to gather the necessary technical data required to acquire and pursue stealth fighters.



7. Regarding the Future Nature of Acquisition and Defense Production and Technological Bases for Equipment and Materials

Regarding the acquisition of equipment and materials, the Ministry of Defense, taking into consideration all the factors such as performance and price of equipment, the simplicity of maintenance and supply, education and training, and the necessity of Japan's unique improvement on acquired equipment, has made proper judgment about the method of acquisition, specifically including internal development, licensed domestic production, and import, on the basis of thorough examinations on cost-effectiveness. However, due to the severe fiscal conditions and increasing prices of equipment and materials, the Ministry of Defense cannot envision a large-scale increase in acquired amounts anytime soon. Therefore, in order to continue to acquire superior equipment and materials in terms of performance and cost-effectiveness, and to enhance and strengthen defense production and technological bases, the Ministry of Defense must utilize measures such as LCC management for cost reduction and efficient

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Even with the Three Ds (Dangerous, Dirty, Difficult), There is also a H, "Honor" —Voices of Skilled Workers at Submarine Shipyards—

Mr. Kenji Yoshida, Kobe Shipyard, Kawasaki Shipbuilding Corporation

Mr. Yoshida, a skilled welding engineer, and welding work (Kawasaki Shipbuilding)

More than anything, "high-level" welding work, which is performed in an environment which more than anything is "enclosed" and "hot," supports the construction of submarines which operate more than anything, "quietly" and "deeply." It requires more than five years after joining the company to acquire the ultra high-strength steel welding technology that is used in submarines. Just as a long time is taken to attain the completion of a submarine, so too is a long time taken for new welding engineers to attain the high-level techniques required to construct a submarine.

Mr. Naoki Kuroda, Kobe Shipyard & Machinery Works, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.



Mr. Kuroda, a skilled welding engineer, and welding work (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries)

When a newly built submarine has raised the Naval Ensign of Japan and left the dock at the shipyard to the sounds of the Warship March, I recall the faces of the new welding engineers that I have trained, and the parts of the vessel whose welding I had a hand in, and begin to well up. Once time has passed since the launch of my child (the submarine), and it returns back to its mother dock together with the signs of its being active on the maritime defense frontline (the damage and dirtiness), I think to myself, "you did well," and once again begin to well up.

acquisition, while at the same time, based on the principle of "selection and focus," it must clarify the defense production and technological bases which should be developed and maintained with emphasis on the security perspective. It is similarly vital to endeavor to increase the attractiveness of the defense market, with for instance, the establishment of contractual systems which award parties who have worked at cost reduction.

Based on this awareness, the study group on contract systems[37] has been held since June 2010. The meeting is attended by external experts and is a venue where energetic considerations are paid to the systematic aspects of contracts made between the Ministry of Defense and corporations as well as the various systems related to procurement of equipment and other goods from a wide range of perspectives including accounts, distribution and marketing, corporate legal affairs, and public procurement, in order to be able to produce new policies.

Furthermore, in addition to the above mentioned efforts, the departments within the Ministry concerned with equipment and materials acquisition should aim for close coordination at every stage of a project (from the planning stage, through R&D, mass production, maintenance and operation), within the cross-organizational framework of the Integrated Project Team (IPT) system in order to make the pursuit for the most appropriate choice in the acquisition process for individual equipment and materials more effective. Such efforts in acquisition such as this will maximize the cost-effectiveness of individual equipment and materials and by extension, is expected to enable optimization of resource allocation across the board.

(See Reference 79)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

A Role in the Defense Production and Technological Bases that Support the Security of Japan

Mr. Shu Komatsu, Group Manager
Mr. Daisuke Hosokawa, Engineer
1st Development Section, Technology Laboratory, Special Machinery Headquarters, Komatsu Ltd.

Our company has a proven track record for the manufacture of artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, and more. In doing so, we carry out research and development primarily of armored vehicles, such as the light armored vehicles which we deliver to the GSDF and ASDF.

The development of equipment generally requires multiple years, once the stage of devising and revision of the design drawings (some of which run to thousands of pages) has passed, then from the work to construct a concept car through to deployment to the troops, due to our goal of achieving mass production which incorporates the improvements elucidated through various experiments.

In contrast to this, was the extremely special case when the SDF units were dispatched to Iraq seven years ago, at which time, modifications to vehicles such as the light armored vehicle that we manufacture had to be conducted in a mere three months.

Due to the uncertainty in the region, we found ourselves in a situation of having to grope for the answers to everything we did, beginning with measures to strengthen our defense capabilities; for instance, we had to ask ourselves what kind of modifications would be made, and to what extent. Nevertheless, the entire was full of enthusiasm, believing that "We cannot allow defects in the equipment we develop and manufacture to be the cause of any deaths." However, in the limited time until the forces were dispatched, it was required that we solve the bare minimum necessary problems on a prioritized basis, such as the question of "How strong should we make the wire cutters used to protect troops from wire traps set across roads and similar threats?" We were immersed in a tense atmosphere, the likes of which those of us in the company had

never before felt. I feel that significant to our success in completing the modification work in around three months was our wholehearted dedication during the course of planning and development until that point. Our attention to detail went as far as analyzing the effect that each individual screw would have on the vehicle as a whole.

Accordingly, the mission was completed without a single person losing their life. This was due primarily to the exhaustive efforts of the dispatched forces. However, when viewing the success of the equipment being shown on the television, I could feel that we too, contributed to the security of Japan.

In our company at present, independent research is underway to use hybrid-electric drive technology to improve areas such as vehicle quietness, mobility, and extensibility, and vastly increase the performance of future armored vehicles. I feel that working toward the cultivation of each and every technological need like this, and enabling the swift supply of the necessary technology at the necessary time is of the utmost importance in support of the defense of Japan. With this in mind, I would like to continue to apply our past experience, and build upon this by daily study.

Group Manager Mr. Komatsu checking a design drawing

Engineer, Mr. Hosokawa drawing up a plan on the computer

The light armored vehicle dispatched to Iraq

Section 3. Interaction between the Ministry of Defense & the SDF, and the Local Community & Japanese Citizens

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the various activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF cannot be carried out by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF alone. They are only possible with the understanding and cooperation of each and every citizen, local governments, and other organizations.

In addition to the details explained in Section 1 of this chapter, the SDF is executing its duties with support and cooperation from the local communities and the Japanese people in a variety of forms. Likewise, the SDF has been making various cooperation activities to support the people's lives. Such activities are further deepening the mutual trust between the local community and the people, and the SDF, not only contributing to the enhancement and strengthening of the foundation of defense bases, but also instilling a sense of pride and self-confidence in SDF personnel.

To ensure full function of defense facilities[38], it is necessary to maintain a state of stable use by securing harmony with the local communities, and gaining the understanding and cooperation of local residents surrounding defense facilities. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF strive to minimize the impact of the presence and operation of defense facilities on the daily lives of local residents through various measures.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Volunteer Activities as a Sports Instructor for Disabled People

Sergeant Major (at the time) Yoshitaka Nishina, 11th Engineer Company, 11th Brigade

My wife and I have been sports instructors for disabled people for 15 years. The chance to start this activity was that we got to know a disabled person at a competition of archery, a sport we started together. The SAPPORO Association for Promotion of Sports for the Disabled invited us to a class to become a sports instructor for disabled people and since then we have obtained a variety of instructor's qualifications, and we have participated in a variety of events as volunteers up until now.

In particular, we could not hold back tears of joy and feelings of satisfaction when we saw guests break into tears seeing disabled athletes moving along sincerely with the Army Band of the GSDF, which took part in the attraction and performed music at a certain sports event. In addition, I participated as a manager of the flying disc team in the Hokkaido contingent to the 9th National Sports Festival for the Disabled in 2009 and it was a precious experience for me to instruct the disabled people, seizing each of their characters.

What I have learned through volunteer activities is that mutual trust is important, to say nothing of careful attention to details, and that is very helpful when I give instructions to subordinates in my daily work as a member of the SDF.

I feel gratitude to many people including my wife, I will keep three things in mind for normalization, "feelings of gratefulness, kindness, and independence," and I would like to contribute to building an environment where disabled people can enjoy sports in an uninhibited manner.

Mr. and Mrs. Nishina taking part in volunteer activities for disabled people in Sapporo

From the perspective above mentioned, this section explains the daily interaction between the Defense Ministry and the SDF, and the local communities and the people of Japan, and activities undertaken to gain public understanding and cooperation.

1. Cooperation from Local Public Organizations and Other Related Organizations for the SDF

1. Cooperation in Recruitment of Uniformed SDF Personnel and Support for Outplacement

As stated in Section 1, under the severe recruitment environment and employment situation, the cooperation of local public organizations and relevant organizations is vital to secure highly qualified personnel and to assist the outplacement of uniformed SDF personnel who retire at a relatively young age.

(See Section 1-2)

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Message from the Mayor of Chitose City, Hokkaido

Kotaro Yamaguchi
Mayor of Chitose City, Hokkaido
Chairman, Council for Improvement of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities, Association of City Mayors, Japan

Mayor Yamaguchi chatting with family members of SDF personnel

Hokkaido shares a border with Russia, and since the early stages of the SDF, the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces have been stationed in Hokkaido based on the concept of a northern defense, and now there are 51 SDF camps and bases with more than 40,000 SDF personnel guarding the north and performing international duties. There are 3 SDF camps and bases in Chitose City, and more than one third of the population of 93,000 consists of SDF related personnel. Chitose and the local municipalities in Hokkaido have grown and developed up to now along with the SDF, while creating a community in close cooperation and supporting each other. For that reason, the people of Hokkaido have warm feelings for the SDF.

In addition, half of all SDF facilities are located in Hokkaido (training areas, ammunition storage areas, etc.). The SDF in Hokkaido has used these training areas as a “dojo” to strengthen itself and fulfill, the roles of national defense and the safety and peace of mind of the people of Hokkaido, while having been engaged actively as a major force in international activities such as in Iraq and Haiti.

Currently, reduction in the SDF is just in process in Hokkaido. This move could not only break off the deep ties built over many years between the SDF personnel and the people of Hokkaido, and furthermore deprive the SDF of its valuable “dojo,” but it might also lead to the disintegration of the local municipalities that have developed along with the SDF.

We, the people of Hokkaido, expect that in the future, the SDF will continue to make Hokkaido, blessed as it is with a training environment, a key base for SDF activities inside and outside of Japan.

2. Support for SDF Activities

SDF camps and bases are located in all prefectures, and maintain close relations with the local communities. Various forms of cooperation and support from the local communities are indispensable for the SDF to conduct diverse activities. The SDF has also received words of encouragement from the people including local residents and relevant organizations.

In addition to this kind of support and cooperation from the local communities, many letters of encouragement are sent by the people to personnel engaging in international peace cooperation activities which raise the morale of personnel and reinforce their awareness of serving the people of Japan.

2. Activities in Civic Life and Contributions to Society

The SDF is carrying out support activities for residents in a number of fields linked with the people, based on requests from local governments and relevant organizations, in addition to its role set forth in the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines. For example, the GSDF still today handles unexploded ordnance found throughout Japan. In FY2009 there were 1,668 cases, about 66 tons in volume. In particular, the cases handled in Okinawa Prefecture accounted for 37.2% of the total. Furthermore, the MSDF handles underwater mines and other dangerous explosive materials. In FY2009 there were 2,241 instances, totaling about 26 tons.

These activities have deepened the mutual trust between the SDF and the people and contributed to expanding and strengthening the foundation of national defense. They also give SDF personnel a sense of pride and confidence in their constant contribution to the lives of the people.

(See Reference 80–81)

In addition, there are opinions of the local governments which accept camps or bases that the existence of the SDF supports local employment and economy. Furthermore, most of the camps and bases around Japan open their grounds and sports facilities, pools, etc., to local public groups or neighboring residents, unless their request interfere with unit activities. They, as a result, also contribute to the vitalization of local activities.

The very moment of an underwater mine being disposed of at Kobe port

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Antarctic Observation Expedition Supported by the Crew of the *Shirase*

Yutaka Katsuta, Second in Command, in charge of Summer Facilities,
Summer Team, 51st Antarctic Observation Expedition
(Currently a specialist in the Antarctic Observation Center, National Polar Research Institute)

Last year I participated in the 51st Antarctic Observation Expedition as the second in command of the Summer Team, primarily responsible for the transport of materials for the expedition. The expedition's materials are transported to Showa Base by sea on the Shirase once a year. This time we loaded about 1,300 tons of materials in Japan for the expedition, and the crew of the Shirase performed all tasks, including inspections during the voyage, unloading at the destination, transporting materials by helicopter, and loading materials we needed to bring back. One character of the 51st Expedition was that it was the maiden voyage

of the second generation Shirase, and the other one was that the new 12ft containers* were used for the first time. So there were many things to be concerned about, but with the cooperation of the crew in different sections, we were able to complete our transporting mission without any problems.

This was my sixth voyage to the Antarctic, and I have been impressed by the organizational strength of the Shirase crew every time. We could leave the materials for the expedition to them without anxiety. In addition, the voyage on the SDF vessel and exchanges with its crew were valuable experiences for the members of the expedition, and it was a very memorable experience for me as well.

* A type of container, which is the main type of railway container in Japan. The container is 12ft (3.6m) long.

In Antarctica

Expedition members unloading materials from the *Shirase*

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Air SDF Member Acts as a Leader in an Adult Football League Team

Staff Sergeant Teppei Kumagai, Materials Planning Section, 3rd Depot, ASDF

My job in the ASDF is to distribute parts correctly to ensure that communications and electronic equipment on aircraft and radar, etc., are operational at all times.

I started playing football when I was four years old, and after I graduated from college I played as a J League trainee, and then I gained valuable experience as a professional football player in the professional league in Singapore. I have been coaching an amateur league soccer team as a player-manager since I joined the SDF.

I learned that “effort is unending, the game is a moment” in the professional world. Daily effort is very precious for the important moment, and that is the same for the duties and mental readiness in the SDF. I am trying to convey this broadly to my colleagues and younger ones in the SDF. I think that could be a contribution to my organization and thus, a way to repay an obligation to football, which helped me to develop.

I hope in the future as well that through football, which is said to have the most players of any sport in the world, I can give courage and energy to supporters who cheer for their team, and to a lot of people in various regional exchange events, including football clinics for students, visits to nursing homes and to nursery schools, and cleanup activities in front of train stations.

Figure: History of team participation

Yorii High School Football Club, Saitama Prefecture — Football Club, Daito Bunka University — Yokohama FC (trainee) — Liaison Kusatsu (now Thespa Kusatsu) — Clementi Khalsa * — Senbawang Rangers* — Current affiliation: Sakado City FC (Saitama Prefecture Amateur Football 1st League

* Singapore professional football league

Staff Sergeant Kumagai playing in the SDF All Japan Football Meet

Staff Sergeant Kumagai at work

3. Measures for Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

1. Scale and Features of Defense Facilities

The uses of defense facilities can be extended in various ways such as maneuver areas, airfields, ports, and barracks[39]. Many defense facilities require large areas of land. Due to Japan's geographical characteristics, there are some cities and industrial facilities that must coexist with defense facilities on narrow plains. In particular, problems related to restricted presence and operations of defense facilities have emerged due to the urbanization of areas around many defense facilities as a result of economic development. Also, noise related to frequent takeoffs and landings by aircraft, firing, bombing, gunshots from artillery, tank operations, and so on, raise concern in the affected residential communities.

(See Figs. III-4-3-1, 2)

Fig. III-4-3-1 Situation of SDF Facilities (land plots)



Note: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Fig. III-4-3-2 Situation of Facilities and Areas of U.S. Forces in Japan (exclusively used facilities)



Note: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

2. Work on Various Measures Relating to Defense Facilities

Defense facilities, as bases which support the defense capabilities of Japan and the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, are indispensable to the country's security. The Ministry of Defense has been securing harmony between the defense facilities and surrounding areas in order to fully maintain those capabilities, and working to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the local residents, as it is necessary to constantly maintain conditions for stable utilization. For that purpose, the Ministry of Defense has taken the measures shown in Figure III-4-3-3, Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas since 1974 based on the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Law).

(See Reference 82)

Fig. III-4-3-3 Measures for Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

Purpose	Measures	Description of Measures
Prevention of Noise Problems	Subsidies to finance sound insulation work	• Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, and kindergartens; medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics; and welfare facilities such as nursery centers, day-service centers for the elderly, and special nursing homes for the elderly • Housing
	Compensation for relocations	• Compensation for relocating buildings • Land procurement • Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water-supply systems, and sewage facilities in the area where housing, etc., is to be relocated
	Improvement of green belts	• Tree planting, installation of grass fields
Prevention of Nuisance Other Than Noise	Subsidies to finance trouble-prevention work	• Canals, reservoirs, roads, river improvement, television broadcast community reception facilities
Reduction of Troubles Related to Living and Business	Subsidies to build facilities meant to stabilize people's lives	• Roads, radio broadcast facilities, nursing homes, fire departments, parks, waste disposal facilities, welfare centers for the elderly, public facilities for learning, etc. • Agricultural facilities, fishing facilities
Reduction of Impacts on Surrounding Areas	Provision of specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants	• Improvement of public facilities such as traffic facilities, recreation centers, and welfare facilities • Medical expenses, operating costs of community buses, assessment fees for earthquake resistance for school buildings, etc.

(1) Review of the Measures of the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Law)

The Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities (Living Environment Improvement Law) was enacted in 1974 from the viewpoint that it is unfair for only the local citizens living near defense facilities to bear the burden of the impacts of aircraft noise and other problems resulting from operations of defense facilities which include the activities of SDF and U.S. military forces or operations of airfields as described before, as well as the strong requests from related local public entities to take adequate measures for such negative impacts. The Ministry of Defense, based on the above law, has developed measures to prevent, reduce, and mitigate those impacts. (See Reference 83)

However, more than 30 years have passed since the Living Environment Improvement Law became effective, and as social conditions have changed and the lifestyles and a sense of value of Japanese nationals have diversified, there have been requests by related local public entities to review the current system for wider and more flexible application of the law for specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants and aid to public facilities for the stabilization of people's lives, and at the same time to expand the areas eligible for residential sound insulation works.

Meanwhile, in November 2009 the Government Revitalization Unit directed that the specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants and aid to public facilities for stabilization of people's lives be "reviewed to enhance the effectiveness of grants by improving flexibility in the use of grants and making the grants more convenient for local communities," and further that residential sound insulation works be given priority as much as possible.

Under the circumstances mentioned above, the Ministry of Defense reviewed the current system of the specified defense facilities environs improvement adjustment grants in the first place, in order to make the measures more effective and more convenient for the related local public entities. Regarding the grants, a bill partially revising the Living Environment Improvement Law was submitted to the 174th meeting of the Diet in February 2010, so that the grants can be applied to activities so-called soft projects such as aid for medical expenses besides the improvement of public facilities. (See Fig. III-4-3-4)

Fig. III-4-3-4 Partial Revisions to the Law Concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities



(2) Considerations for Future Harmonization of Defense Facilities and Surrounding Areas

The Ministry of Defense is fully considering ways to more effectively and efficiently develop measures to harmonize defense facilities and surrounding areas, in light of the severe fiscal situation, based on requests by related local public entities and directions from the Government Revitalization Unit.
(See Fig. III-4-3-3, 4, 5, 6) (See Reference 82, 83)

Fig. III-4-3-5 FY2010 Costs for Countermeasures in Areas Near Bases (Based on Expenditures)

(¥100 million)

Project	Mainland	Okinawa
Projects to prevent disturbance	126	11
Sound-insulation projects	441	83
Measures related to relocations	101	2
Subsidies to stabilize people's livelihoods	159	22
Road improvement projects	71	4
Environs Improvement Adjustment Grants	118	21
Other projects	20	1

Fig. III-4-3-6 FY2010 SACO-related Spending (measures to expedite implementation of SACO projects) (based on expenditures)

(¥100 million)

Project	Measures in the mainland	Measures in Okinawa
Projects to prevent noise problems	0	0
Sound-insulation projects	2	0
Measures related to relocations	5	0
Subsidies to stabilize civil life	0	1
Road improvement projects	0	0
Grants to improve surrounding areas	14	3
Other projects	2	0

Note: Other projects are those meant to improve green belts.

4. Public Relations Activities, Information Disclosure, and Related Activities

The activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF to protect the peace and security of Japan can not be carried out without the understanding and support of the people of Japan toward the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. For this reason, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have been making efforts to provide them with information[40] through active public relations activities, etc., from the perspective of responding to increased public attention to national defense and accountability to the public[41].

1. Various Public Relations Activities

As the scope of SDF activities has expanded both domestically and internationally, including international peace cooperation activities such as the operations against piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and disaster relief dispatches, the public attention to the SDF and defense issues has been increasing.

With the recognition that it is necessary to proactively promote publicity on defense policies and SDF activities on a regular basis, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct a variety of PR activities to ensure better understanding about the current situation of the SDF in consideration of the changing public awareness and needs as well as increasing overseas activities of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.
(See Reference 84)

The Blue Impulse performing exhibition flights at an air show

(1) Website, Pamphlets, and Others

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct PR activities using a wide variety of media, including providing information, gathering public opinions, distributing PR videos via the Internet, and broadcasting commercial films for each SDF service.

The Ministry of Defense has been making great efforts to provide accurate information on the SDF and the national defense more extensively to the public, in the form of creation and distribution of various pamphlets which explain the policies of the Ministry of Defense and the activities of the SDF, cooperation for media coverage, and assistance in editing the PR magazine *MAMOR*. Furthermore, as the SDF activities outside Japan have increased, oversea attention to the Ministry of Defense and the SDF has been enhanced. In order to address such a situation, the Ministry of Defense has been taking efforts to dispatch information overseas through such activities as publishing the English language quarterly newsletter Japan Defense Focus, promoting participation of foreign media in regular press conferences, expanding the English section of the Ministry of Defense website, creation of English defense white papers, various policy pamphlets and PR videos in English. The Ministry of Defense constantly works to make its website easy to use, and renewed it in April 2010. It strives to use its PR-related expenses actively, efficiently, and effectively.

Among those efforts, in particular, concerning such activities as anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, and the international peacekeeping cooperation activities in Haiti, which have attracted public attention, we have been advancing PR activities predominantly by posting the SDF's performance and movies on special pages on the Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff website and by publishing special issues of PR magazines, creating and distributing pamphlets. Furthermore, pertaining to anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden, various measures were taken, including publishing a manga version of the 2009 Defense White Paper, producing and PR video and advertising it in subway cars.

A fleet review

(2) Events, PR Facilities, etc.

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF conduct activities to extensively inform the people of the current situation of the SDF[42]. These activities include

the annual GSDF Fire Power Exercise conducted at the foot of Mt. Fuji; cruises for experience by vessels of the MSDF in each region; and demonstration flights and boarding experience on aircraft at open base festivals held at ASDF bases. In addition, at camps and bases throughout the country, events including equipment exhibitions, unit tours, and SDF band concerts are held on the anniversary of a unit's foundation. In some instances, they also hold parades through the city both in vehicles and on foot, with cooperation from the local community concerned. Furthermore, in commemoration of the anniversary of the foundation of the SDF, events such as a SDF Marching Festival, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are held.

Children participating in a SDF Life Experience Tour in Ichigayadai

The 2009 SDF Marching Festival was held at the Nippon Budokan attracting a total audience of approximately 41,000. Concerning annual reviews by the SDF, a troop review, a fleet review, and an air review are hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively, at which SDF equipment and results of daily training are

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Cooperation in Filming "*Saka no Ue no Kumo*" (Cloud Above the Slope)

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF cooperated in the filming of the special drama "*Saka no Ue no Kumo*" (Cloud Above the Slope), which NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) began to broadcast on November 29, 2009. It portrays the intense lives of people who lived in the tempestuous Meiji era, such as Saneyuki Akiyama, a Navy staff officer in the Combined Fleet during the Russo-Japanese War; Yoshifuru Akiyama, called the father of the Japanese Army cavalry; and Shiki Masaoka, who aimed to reform Japanese haiku and tanka poetry.

The MSDF facilities used in the filming (Kure Regional District Headquarters building, Officer Candidate School building, and the Suiko-kan at the First Service School) were built before the war, and helped to give the drama a feeling of authenticity. In addition, the GSDF and MSDF cooperated by inviting actors who appeared in the drama to gain experience by joining units and other steps to allow them to build roles based on specialized conduct and basic movements. In particular sailing a cutter, which is one of the MSDF's most representative basic trainings, was introduced in the drama's publicity program.

Masahiro Motoki and Takahiro Fujimoto being filmed at the MSDF First Technical School in Etajima [NHK]

Hiroshi Abe visits the Kutei-kan (Airborne Exhibition Hall, GSDF Narashino Camp) to prepare for his role [NHK]

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Fiftieth Anniversary of the Blue Impulse

The Blue Impulse marked its 50th anniversary this year. This is the only unit in the ASDF set up to fly for the purpose of public relations, and they show their acrobatic flight at air shows and at all kinds of events throughout Japan. The story about their amazing show at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics where they drew the five Olympic rings in the sky has been handed down from generation to generation.

In 2009 they performed at 21 events, including the 150th anniversary celebration of the opening of the Port of Yokohama, and the opening game for the Tohoku Rakuten Golden Eagles, a Japanese professional baseball team, and in 2010 they plan to perform at 26 events, including the Chiba National Sports Festival and the opening ceremony for the JR Kyushu Shinkansen.

This year in commemoration of the 50th anniversary there will be ceremonies at the Matsushima Air Base in August and at the Hamamatsu Air Base in October. Moreover, in addition to 40 acrobatic maneuvers they have ever performed, they have developed 3 new ones. "Sunrise" has them rising in a fan shaped display that looks like the rays of the sun, "Back-to-back" has two aircraft flying belly to belly, and in "Double Roll Back" a unit of 6 aircraft roll back in turn from the lead aircraft while rolling. They will make a splash in the skies throughout the nation in concert with a newly composed BGM.

The Blue Impulse will continue to fly for the entertainment of the Japanese people, and as the face of the ASDF.

Figure: History of the Blue Impulse

Date	Summary	Aircraft
April 1960	Founded as a flight research unit, the 2nd Squadron, First Air Wing (Hamamatsu)	F-86F
November 1960	Held the first public exhibition flight (North Hamamatsu Air Base, now the Hamamatsu Air Base	
October 1964	Exhibition flights at the Tokyo Olympics opening ceremony	
July 1982	Began flying the T-2 in public exhibitions (Matsushima Air Base)	T-2
April 1996	Began flying the T-4 in public exhibitions (National Defense Academy)	T-4
April 1997	Flew in exhibition overseas for the first time in the air show to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the U.S. Air Force	
February 2000	Flew in exhibition at the Nagano Olympics opening ceremony	

New maneuver "Sunrise"

New maneuver "Back-to-back"

exhibited to the public. In 2009 the MSDF held a fleet review. The newly constructed ships *Hyuga* and *Soryu* and the newly built US-2 aircraft participated in the review for the first time. People went on board the reviewed fleet, and the review was simultaneously broadcast on the Internet. With two rehearsals, about 26,300 people in total went on board the ships in this fleet review. The GSDF plans to have a review in 2010.

In addition, each of the Regional Defense Bureaus has organized seminars on defense issues to inform the public and gain their understanding of such defense policies and SDF activities as anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden and other defense activities, and has been also engaged in implementing Japan–U.S. exchange projects for sports and cultural exchanges between the local Japanese citizens near the U.S. facilities and areas in Japan and U.S. military personnel and their families.

In addition to such events, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF actively promote tours at PR facilities. For example, the PR facilities in the Ministry of Defense at Ichigaya including the Ichigaya Memorial Hall, are open to visitors on two guided tours each weekday; one each in the morning and afternoon. Since the tours were launched in June 2000, more than 250,000 people have visited the facilities so far. Each SDF service has also established its main PR facility and SDF camps and bases across Japan have PR stations and history museums open to the public.

(See Reference at the end of the book)

(3) Enlistment Experience Programs

The Ministry of Defense and the SDF offer SDF Life Experience Tours [43] and Enlistment Experience Programs [44] at the request of private companies, etc. These programs are intended to deepen public understanding of the SDF by offering them the opportunity to experience at first hand the daily life and training of the SDF as well

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Questions from Youth (GSDF)

Q: Why is the GSDF uniform green?
(Elementary school boy, Osaka Prefecture)

A: **Lieutenant Colonel Atsushi Ohara, Personnel Department, Ground Staff Office**

I will answer the question, "Why are the GSDF uniforms green?"

The current green (dark green) uniforms were made in 1991, about 19 years ago. We conducted a survey to collect the opinions of many citizens and the GSDF personnel. Taking the result into account, we chose the color of green which is a color thought to represent the Japan's abundant natural environment and image of preserving peace and safety.

We in the green uniforms are encouraged to face harsh training day and night, with a feeling of "We protect Japan's abundant natural environment and peace!"

as to have direct contact with SDF members, while staying at an SDF camp or base for two to three days. In FY2009, 140 persons participated in 4 SDF Life Experience Tours held by the Ministry of Defense targeting university students and women. A the request of the private sector, the SDF has conducted about 1,100 Enlistment Experience Programs in which about 17,300 employees participated and experienced SDF life.

2. Appropriate Operation of the Information Disclosure System and Personal Data Protection System

An information disclosure system[45] was established in the Ministry of Defense, in line with the enactment of the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 2001. The Ministry of Defense discloses administrative documents, and a personal information protection system[46] (in MOD) was also established in line with the Law for the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs of 2005. Along with

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Questions from Youth (MSDF)

Q: It was written that there were over 10,000 mines in the seas near Japan. Has it been possible to recover and remove all of those mines? (Male high school student, Kanagawa Prefecture)

A: **MSDF Lieutenant Commander Tomoaki Kato,**
Staff officer in the Mine Warfare Force Headquarters, MSDF

During World War II approximately 10,700 mines were laid in the seas surrounding Japan. This caused a significant increase in damage to ships, some of which sank as a result of contact with the mines, and the maritime traffic surrounding Japan was paralyzed.

After the war, the disposal or removal of these mines become imperative for the reconstruction of Japan, and work began to remove the mines in 1945 as part of shipping route development. The development concluded in 1985, but mines have still continued to be discovered, such as when dredging work is conducted in ports and bays. In such a case we remove and dispose of the mines.

Mines are extremely destructive yet low in cost, which makes them very cost-effective as a weapon. That is why a large number of countries still possess them even today. In 1991, the Mine Warfare Force of the MSDF was dispatched to the Persian Gulf to remove and dispose of mines that had been laid by Iraq during the Gulf War, thus making an international contribution as a precursor to overseas activities of the SDF.

In addition to mines, the Mine Warfare Force is engaged in such a mission as to remove and dispose of artillery shells and other objects discovered in the ocean in order to contribute to ensuring the safety of maritime traffic. Moreover, it also provides water supply and transports supplies in disaster relief activities.

A minesweeper conducting water supply assistance

[COLUMN]

Q&A

Questions from Youth (ASDF)

Q: How do you fly to people to rescue them? (3rd grade boy in an elementary school, Shizuoka Prefecture)

A: **ASDF Captain Akihiro Muchima, Niigata Rescue Unit**

I'll answer the question, "How do you rescue people by using aircraft?"

The ASDF operates U-125-A search-and-rescue aircraft to search for people who need to be rescued, and UH-60J rescue helicopters to actually rescue them. After the search-and-rescue aircraft confirms the location of the people that need help, the rescue helicopter then flies to the position above them. The rescue helicopter has crew members called medic (rescue personnel: crew members who actually do the rescuing) on board who descend by cable from the hovering helicopter (keeping the helicopter in one position in the air) over the site to rescue the people that need help; the medic, if necessary, can also use parachutes and jump from a high altitude, or jump into the ocean equipped with scuba gear (equipment that allows them to swim underwater), or descend into mountains where the temperature is minus 20°C and perform activities for extended periods. Under such extremely harsh conditions that could cost them their lives if they make a single mistake, they are devotedly committed to their mission in order to help people who have met with mishap or have been injured.

When people who need help are in a place that is difficult to get by land, the ASDF rushes to the scene by air. It is our duty to help people who are in trouble, even one minute, or one second faster.

ASDF Captain Muchima in the cockpit of a UH-60J

A hovering UH-60J

measures to ensure the security of the personal information under its jurisdiction, the Defense Ministry also discloses such information in response to requests for disclosure, revision and termination of use.

For this reason, the receipt and implementation of disclosure applications are instigated at the Ministry of Defense offices and each Regional Defense Bureau and branch [47].

(See Reference 85 and Reference at the end of the book)

3. Appropriate Operation of the Whistleblower Protection System

In order to develop a safeguard system to protect workers who disclose information in order to serve public interest, the Whistleblower Protection Act entered into effect in April 2006. In accordance with this act, the Defense Ministry set up a system to handle public interest-related information disclosures by Defense Ministry employees and outside workers on issues where the Defense Ministry has the legal authority to punish or issue recommendations. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense and the SDF have established an internal contact desk for

information disclosure in the public interest by Defense Ministry employees, and an external contact desk for related disclosure by outside workers. Through the contact desks, the Defense Ministry deals with information disclosure that is in the public interest and whistleblower protection[48].

4. Engagement in Policy Evaluation

In 2001, a system to evaluate government policies was introduced with the aim of improving the efficiency and quality of administration in the public's best interest, while the Government Policy Evaluations Act (GPEA) came into effect in 2002.

Based on this law, the Ministry of Defense is evaluating various policies designated to achieve the objectives of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF: to ensure the peace and independence of Japan and the security of the state. In addition to project evaluations, policy evaluations are primarily carried out using a comprehensive evaluation system[49] since the Ministry of Defense policy implementation involves analysis from diverse perspectives, such as domestic and overseas circumstances and technological innovation trends.

In FY2009, 63 policy evaluations were performed, including the participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations by the Ministry of Defense and the SDF. In addition, as of August 2010, 29 policy evaluations were performed, including on making the nurse training program into a four-year course.

Notes:

1) In January 2007, the Japan Defense Agency was upgraded to the Ministry of Defense. With this transition, the function of policy planning and capabilities for accurately and promptly responding to various emergency situations has been strengthened.
   Further, the SDF and the Ministry of Defense are parts of the same defense related governmental organization. "The Ministry of Defense refers to the administrative side of the organization with the mission to manage and operate the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, and the "SDF," refers to the side which represents the effective organization for carrying out unit operations with the mission of defending this nation.
2) With the change in regime, each Ministry established the council of the Ministry's top three politicians comprised primarily of the Minister, Senior Vice-Minister, and Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry, and at the Ministry of Defense as well, it is ensured that the politicians who were elected by the public have the responsibility for its operation both formally and practically.
3) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/jieikanbosyu/> for details on the recruitment of uniformed SDF personnel. For details on employment information, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/saiyou/>
4) Notification of the recruitment period, checking of qualifications for application, processing of application forms, issuance of examination admission tickets, notification of examination dates and locations, provision of locations and facilities necessary for examinations, public relations and related works.
5) Until FY2006, the SDF had two "enlisted (upper)" recruitment systems for candidates between the ages of 18 and 27: the "Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System" and the "Enlisted (Upper) Candidate System." In FY2007, the two recruitment systems were reorganized and unified into a new appointment system, the "General Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System". It adopts some elements of the "Student Candidate for Enlisted (Upper) System," which aims to raise awareness of candidates for the Enlisted (Upper), and of the "Enlisted (Upper) Candidates System," which emphasizes individual capabilities in personnel management.
6) For SDF Youth Cadets employed as Recruit (GSDF), Seaman Recruit (MSDF), or Airman Basic (ASDF) in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively, FY2007 was the final year for employment of MSDF and ASDF Youth Cadets and no recruitment or employment has been conducted since then. In addition, from 2010 recruitment, the status of GSDF Youth Cadets was revised from uniformed SDF personnel to the newly established "Students," not uniformed SDF personnel status and outside of the fixed number of SDF personnel. Fixed-term SDF personnel, prior to their formal employment as privates (GSDF)/ seaman apprentice (MSDF)/airman third class (ASDF), will be employed as candidates for uniformed SDF personnel and receive education and training to foster their sense of mission, responsibility, unity, discipline, and compliance. This system will be adopted from July 2010.
7) SDF personnel must perform duties such as defense operations as specified in the Self-Defense Forces Law. They are, therefore, designated as special national government employees under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law, and personnel management of SDF personnel is conducted independently from that of general civilian government employees.
8) The fixed term uniformed SDF personnel hired in FY2009 reached 5,574 individuals (41% of all new uniformed SDF personnel hires). Further, these fixed term personnel make up 11% of total personnel.
9) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/yobiji/index.html>
10) Many countries other than Japan also have reserve systems.

11) In the previous recruitment system, only administrative officials were employed through the Level 1 Examination for National Public Officials. However, it was decided that some technical and engineering officials whose main duties are administrative work would be recruited through the Level 1 Examination for National Public Officials from Apr. 2010. As a result, the Class I Examination for Defense Ministry Civilian Officials is used to employ officials engaged mainly in research.
12) Details on education and training can be found on each SDF website: GSDF at http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/, MSDF at http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/, and ASDF at http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/.
13) Such external educational institutions in FY2010 include the Tokyo Institute of Technology and Waseda University in Japan, and the National Defense University (United States) and California University (United States) overseas.
14) Institutes of each SDF service where SDF officers of each service and others receive training on security, defense strategy, and other subjects.
15) In addition to reviewing the educational content at the Staff College of each SDF service after clarifying joint educational needs, efforts were made to achieve effective joint education such as strengthening collaboration with the Joint Staff College.
16) The Joint Staff College is part of the Joint Staff Office and educates SDF officers on joint operations.
17) Training includes SDF Joint Exercises, Japan–U.S. Combined Joint Exercises, and Ballistic Missile Response Exercises to prevent and remove direct threats to Japan, training such as International Peace Cooperation Exercises and Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, in which the handling of prisoners is practiced, in preparation for international peace cooperation, and related activities.
18) For example, the GSDF has a Command Post Exercise Center for carrying out command and staff activities at the division/regiment level, and the Fuji Training Center and urban warfare training facilities for company-level training.
19) For example, some firing and launch training involving tanks, anti-tank helicopters, missiles, long-range artillery, surface-to-air guided missiles (improved Hawk and Patriot System), surface-to-surface missiles, torpedoes, and other weapons cannot be carried out at some firing ranges in Japan, or are prohibited in Japan as ranges exceed domestic limits. There are also various restrictions on exercises by large-scale units that require larger areas, minesweeping training, and submarine rescue drills that are carried out in relatively shallow sea areas, and early-morning and night-time flight training.
20) Activities to detect, exploit, and reduce or annul the effects of enemies' electromagnetic waves, while securing the use of electromagnetic waves by friendly forces.
21) The preventive measures prepared by the MSDF Ship Accident Review Committee chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff of the MSDF in May 2009 are the following.
    1) Strengthen watch and reporting/communication systems.
    2) Strengthen teamwork for safety navigations.
    3) Strengthen the navigational system by improving personnel capabilities.
    4) Thorough instructions by the commanding officer.
    * Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has already taken measures to try to prevent a recurrence, such as the formulation of basic guidelines for the use of autopilot equipment, the enhancement of simplified sound recording equipment for the bridge of the vessel, and the development of appropriate warning and communication systems.
22) For instance, efforts for gender equality and measures to support the development of the next generation are being promoted.
    See the next section, Efforts for Further Utilization of Female SDF Personnel, and <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/news/2006/07/12.html> for details on gender equality; and <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/

others/jinji/kosodate/index.html> for details on the promotion of measures to support the development of the next generation as well as Section 3, "The Promotion of Measures to Support the Development of the Next Generation."

23) See the following for the Report on Measures for the Comprehensive Reform in Personnel Field of the Defense Force:
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/report1_5.pdf>
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/report2_5.pdf>
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/report3_5.pdf>
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/report4_5.pdf>
<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/jinji/report5_5.pdf>

24) No restrictions have been imposed on assignments to patrol helicopters for the purpose of education or research and development.

25) It was determined to quickly and steadily implement as preventative measures 1) the enforcement of leading service disciplines and education, 2) the adoption of post recruitment drug testing (urine testing), and 3) the coordination of various counseling and reporting hot lines. Note that inspection regarding the use of drugs has been carried out at the time of recruitment since 2002.

26) The Monument for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty was constructed in 1962, and reinforced in 1980, due to aging through weathering. Later, when the headquarters of the then Defense Agency was moved to Ichigaya in 1998, the Memorial Zone in its current form was located on the east side of the memorial area with the Monument for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty and other monuments. A memorial ceremony for SDF members killed in the line of duty is held annually at the Memorial Zone. This ceremony is attended by surviving family members of the honored dead, and also attended by the Prime Minister and high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Defense and SDF including the Minister of Defense, former Directors-General of the Defense Agency, and others. At the Monument for SDF Members Killed in the Line of Duty in the Memorial Zone, there is an iron plate containing the names and other information of personnel killed in the line of duty. When foreign dignitaries such as Defense Ministers visit the Ministry of Defense, they make offerings of flowers, expressing their respect and condolences to personnel killed in the line of duty. Memorial ceremonies are also held at individual SDF posts and bases.

27) For further information on outplacement assistance, see <http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/retire/> (GSDF), <http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/formal/engo/engotop.html> (MSDF), <http://www.mod.go.jp/asdf/engo/index.html> (ASDF)

28) "Seclusion from private companies" is stipulated in Article 62 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

29) Costs incurred during the entire life cycle of equipment or materials, from the planning, development, mass production, and operation (including maintenance, repair, and improvement work) through to disposal

30) The fighter (F-2) and fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-1) were added to the list of target equipment for the trial in 2008. The Type-10 Tank, 2008 Minesweeper (MSC), and next transport aircraft were added in 2009.

31) A system which due to the importance of evaluating other factors such as technological, differs from automatic bidding systems based on price alone, by deciding upon successful bidders through a comprehensive evaluation of factors other than price in addition to price.

32) The Equipment Procurement Office was reorganized in September 2007 as the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office.

33) For the interim report of the "Meeting on the Nature of Production and Technological Bases for Fighter Aircraft," see <http:/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/sentouki/houkoku/houkoku.html>

34) For information regarding the "Conference on the Civilian Use of Ministry of Defense Developed Aircraft" see <http:/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/kaihatsukokuki/houkoku/houkoku.html>

35) 1) “Operational demonstration research” is introduced. In this type of research, the SDF service (the future operator) will evaluate the prototypes of the equipment. The evaluation will be reflected in later R&D, procurement, and related operations. 2) “Evolutionary development” is introduced. At the start of the development phase, the performance requirements to be achieved are left undecided. Even after the start of the development phase, the precision of required performance can be upgraded, and up-to-date military science technology can be newly introduced.

36) Experiments conducted by the GSDF using specific units, for the purpose of specifying the “New Way of Fighting based on Information Supremacy” and the effective development of command and communications equipment.

37) For an overview of the “Contract Management Meeting” see <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/keiyaku_seido/gaiyo.html>

38) The generic term for the facilities used by the Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Forces in Japan based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. It refers to maneuver areas, airfields, ports, communication stations, barracks, warehouses, ammunition depots, oil bunkers, and so on.

39) The land area of defense facilities, as of January 1, 2010 is approximately 1,399 km^2 (the sum of the land area of SDF facilities (approximately 1,085 km^2), the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. forces in Japan (approximately 310 km^2), and the land area of facilities other than SDF facilities which the U.S. forces in Japan are jointly using under the Status of Forces Agreement (approximately 4 km^2)), which accounts for approximately 0.37% of the country’s land. Of which, approximately 42% of the land area of SDF facilities is situated in Hokkaido. Divided by use, approximately 75% of which is maneuver areas. Meanwhile, 74 km^2 of the land area of the facilities and areas (for exclusive use) of the U.S. forces in Japan is jointly used by the SDF under the Status of Forces Agreement.

40) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/index.html>

41) From the viewpoint of security, etc., there is some information which is not suitable for release to the public (such as 1) information that may hinder the operation of units, 2) information that may impair the relationship of mutual trust with the other nations and 3) personal information). However, the Ministry of Defense will continue to retain its policy to make efforts to release information as much as possible in order to enhance public understanding.

42) For details on events, etc., see the Ministry of Defense website http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/events/index.html

43) Further information on the Summer Tour/Spring Tour for College Students, etc.; Ms. Parsley Tour (experiential tour for women in their 20s); and One-Day Visit to SDF for Women; is available on the MOD website.

44) Tours to experience the daily life of the Ground, Maritime, or Air Self-Defense Force (For tour information, refer to the above-mentioned website).

45) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/joho/index.html>

46) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hogo/index.html>

47) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/joho/johokokai06.pdf>

48) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/library/koueki_tuho/index.htm>

49) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/info/hyouka/index.html>

Part III

Measures for the Defense of Japan

Chapter 5

Reform of the Ministry of Defense

Section 1. Background/Process of the Ministry of Defense Reform
Section 2. Current Status of Deliberations

The Ministry of Defense has been committed to ministerial reforms which include preventing a recurrence of misconduct and reorganizing its central structures. Following the change of the government in September 2009, the Ministry of Defense has been deliberating how to realize its new reform of the Ministry under the new government, while also reviewing reforms undertaken during previous Administrations This Chapter describes the background and process of the reform of the Ministry of Defense, as well as the state of ongoing review under the new government.

Section 1. Background/Process of the Ministry of Defense Reform

Defense capabilities are the last resort to ensure the nation's security and cannot be substituted by other means. Nevertheless, these capabilities would not function effectively without the support of the public. Thus, Self-Defense Forces personnel strive on a daily basis to sustain public trust and expectations.

However, a number of incidents of misconduct have occurred in recent years that have shattered public trust in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.

In response to these issues, the Council for reforming the Ministry of Defense (the Reform Council) was established at the Prime Minister's Office to engage in a fundamental review of the issues related to the Ministry from the viewpoint of the public, with the participation of various experts. The first meeting of the Council was held in December 2007[1]. The Reform Council held 11 meetings, and a report was formulated in July 2008[2].

In order to follow the basic direction laid out in the report by the Reform Council (the report), the Ministry of Defense established the Ministry of Defense Reform Head Office (the Reform Head Office), headed by the Minister of Defense in July 2008. In August, the Reform Head Office compiled the Basic Policy for Organizational Reform of the Ministry of Defense[3] and the Implementation Plan for Realizing Reform of the Ministry of Defense (the Implementation Plan)[4].

The Ministry announced revisions of the Implementation Plan twice, in June and August 2009 respectively[5].

1. Report of the Reform Panel

1. Incidents of Misconduct — Identifying the Issues

As for the incidents of misconduct that had repeatedly occurred in the Ministry of Defense and the SDF in recent years, which left a considerable impact on society, the Reform Council paid attention to those cases including: mistakes in reporting the amount of refueling, information leakage via the Internet, leakage of special defense secrets related to the Aegis system, the collision between DDG *Atago* and the fishing boat *Seitoku Maru*, and the misconduct by the former Vice-Minister of Defense. The Reform Council points out that it is essential that continuous organization-wide efforts be made to identify goals and nurture a sense of duty, while making every effort to minimize mistakes in order to prevent a recurrence of the incidents of misconduct.

2. Reform Proposal (1) — Reform of the Awareness of Personnel and Organizational Culture

The Reform Council proposed the following three principles for reform:

(1) Thorough adherence to rules and regulations

(2) Establishment of professionalism (professional awareness)

(3) Establishment of a management of work that prioritizes execution of duties, with the aim of total optimization

(See Reference 86)

3. Reform Proposal (2) — Organizational Reforms for Modern Civilian Control

The Reform Council proposed organizational reforms of the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Defense so that the Ministry of Defense and the SDF can implement the above-mentioned three principles for reform steadily and effectively.

(1) Strategic level — Strengthening Command Functions of the Prime Minister's Office

The Reform Council proposed that the Prime Minister's Office should utilize the Security Council and other ministerial councils to strengthen the command functions by actively and comprehensively discussing the critical items for security.

(See Reference 86)

(2) Organizational Reforms to Strengthen Command Functions at the Ministry of Defense

The Reform Council proposed that while basically maintaining the current organization of the Ministry of Defense, a structure should be created through restructuring of its various functions and responsibilities, so as to prevent a recurrence of incidents of misconduct, enable civilian control to function and enable the Ministry of Defense to implement more effective defense policies.

(See Reference 86)

2. Major Commitments up to the Present

1. Commitments for Thorough Implementation of the Principle of Reform

(1) Thorough Adherence to Rules and Regulations

a. Workplace Education on Adherence to Rules and Regulations

For the purpose of ensuring the thorough adherence to rules and regulations, opinions were exchanged with personnel in charge of human resource management and education at each of its organizations to analyze the state of workplace education. Based on the results of these analyses, a checklist was compiled featuring notes to enhance workplace education and distributed to units and relevant parties.

b. Thorough Adherence to Rules and Regulations Related to Classified Information

Along with a thorough dissemination of rules and regulations related to information security, the Ministry established the SDF Intelligence Security Force in August 2009, based on the consolidation of the Intelligence Security Forces of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. In FY2010, the Ministry will also reorganize the Central Military Police, consolidating the special crime investigative functions (addressing leaks of confidential data; bribery, high technology measures, etc.) of the GDSF, MSDF, and ASDF into the GSDF Military Police.

c. Clarification of Responsibilities for Securing Transparency/Competitiveness in Defense Procurement

In April 2009, the Import Procurement Division that uniformly controls general import procurements was set up in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office and direct contracting with overseas manufacturers is being promoted. In addition, the Corporate Research Division was created in the Equipment Procurement and Construction Office on April 1, 2010, to enhance auditing capability for companies, cut costs, and improve procurement quality.

In March 2009, a notification was issued, stipulating the basic concepts relevant to the preparation and release of the minutes of major meetings of the Ministry of Defense as a measure to improve the transparency of the decision-making process.

Partial revision of the SDF Law was incorporated in the bill to partially revise the National Public Service Law , etc., submitted to the 174th Diet session in 2010, in order to introduce restrictions on re-employment, etc., of SDF personnel, subject to the restrictions applied to general national civil servants, with due consideration to the special nature of the specialized professional services performed by SDF personnel.

d. Strengthening Inspection

The Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance is committed to ensuring further stringency and effectiveness, by addressing the strengthening of the inspection structure such as manpower increase in connection with collusive bidding prevention, as well as by formulating the defense inspection plans annually based on the mid-term perspectives.

(2) Establishment of Professionalism (Professional Awareness)

In order to develop a sense of professionalism in the field of information communication, the Preliminary Report for Contingency Situations (notification) and detailed implementation procedures were disseminated to all staff. Furthermore, in order to develop a sense of professionalism in the field of information security, security education, which is currently strictly conducted, was examined in a timely manner to verify whether it is tailored to the characteristics of each individual organization.

Moreover, in order to enhance counter-intelligence measures[6], the Ministry of Defense Counter-Intelligence Committee was established in March 2009. The SDF Intelligence Security Force was organized in August 2009 to effectively collect and share data related to counter-intelligence.

(3) Establishment of a Management of Works that Prioritizes the Execution of Duties, with the Aim of Total Optimization

a. Establishment of a PDCA Cycle

In order to promote operational improvements covering from the central organizations of the Ministry of Defense to the SDF and forward forces in the field, the Ministry issued ordinances related to guidelines on operational improvements, based on surveys on excellent operational improvement measures in the private sector. The Ministry also thoroughly notified units and related parties to establish a plan, do, check, act (PDCA) cycle.

b. Promotion of the Integrated Project Team (IPT) Method in Defense Procurement

In order to enhance the life-cycle cost management of equipment, the Minister of Defense set up a Life-Cycle Cost Management Office in March 2009 in the Equipment Procurement Construction Office. The Ministry also holds liaison and coordination meetings for cross-organizational commitments utilizing the IPT method.
(See Part III, Chapter 4, Section 2)

c. Integrated Public Relations Activities of the Whole Organization

In order to ensure consistency in public relations activities of the whole organization, the Press Secretary at the Minister's Secretariat will grasp in an integrated manner details of all press conferences by senior personnel of the ministry and information released by the Ministry of Defense and each Self-Defense Force. At the same time, rules will be developed regarding responses to the media by central and local offices, and direct dialogue with the public will be promoted.

In March 2009, some improvements were made regarding the procedures to be taken when SDF personnel publicly express their personal views, including clarification of matters subject to notification and the details of notification, which were then issued as the Notice of the Minister of Defense and disseminated to all SDF personnel.

2. Organizational Reform in FY2009

In response to the enactment of the Law Bill, for partial amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law, the Ministry of Defense implemented organizational reform for FY2009 by strengthening the system to support the Minister of Defense; abolishing the advisory structure by Defense Councilors, which had lost its substance, with the aim of thoroughly ensuring civilian control; and introduced the measures set forth below:

(1) Establishment of the Defense Council by Law

The Defense Council was legally established as an organization where the Minister of Defense and other political appointees, civilian and uniformed SDF personnel deliberate on basic policies related to matters under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The Council comprises the Minister of Defense (chair), the Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Ministers of Defense, Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense, Vice-Minister of Defense, Deputy Vice-Minister/Directors-General, Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters.

(See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 and Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1)

(2) Establishment of Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense

Up to three Special Advisors can be politically appointed by the Minister of Defense to advise the minister with regard to important matters relating to the Ministry of Defense based on their own knowledge and experience.

(See Fig. III-5-1)
(See Part II, Chapter 1, Section 3 and Part III, Chapter 4, Section 1)

(3) Other

The Ministry of Defense Reform Promotion Office was established within the Policy Planning and Evaluation Division of the Minister's Secretariat in August 2009, as an office exclusively devoted to the reform of the Defense Ministry.

Fig. III-5-1 Strengthening Support System for the Minister of Defense



* Nine Civilian Defense Counselors, among which six were allocated to the Deputy Vice-Minister and Directors General

3. Other Efforts

(1) Fundamental Reform of the Maritime Self-Defense Force

In response to a number of cases of misconduct, including a leak of confidential information regarding the Aegis system and a mistake in reporting the amount of refueling during international peace cooperation missions, and in order to prevent a recurrence of such incidents and to improve organizational integrity in the medium and long term, in March 2008, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) established the Committee for the Fundamental Reform of the MSDF (the Fundamental Reform Committee), chaired by the Chief of Staff, MSDF. The Fundamental Reform Committee has exchanged a wide range of views with those on duty and other varied entities, about the mission, education, and organization of the MSDF. Based on these discussions, the MSDF presented all its units with the policy of reform as a Notification by the Chief of Staff, MSDF in December 2008.

To increase the effectiveness of its own fundamental reform and steadily promote various measures, the MSDF created the Committee to Promote Measures for Fundamental Reform of the Maritime Self-Defense Force in the MSDF in December 2008 to carry out further deliberations on the reform, promotion of implementation and supervision of measures.

(2) Efforts for Adherence to SDF Code of Ethics

In August 1999, the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act was established along with the National Public Service Ethics Act, and came into effect the following April. On the basis of this Act, the establishment of the Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Code was decreed by Cabinet Order.

In order to further improve legal compliance and ethics of personnel, the Ministry of Defense has implemented education on ethics, duties, and compliance [7] for SDF personnel, for example, implementing educational programs such as supervisor training and conducting defense inspections. To this date, more efforts are being made to improve education and training as well as utilizing fully the defense inspection system.

Section 2. Current Status of Deliberations

1. Commitment to Ministry of Defense Reform under the New Government

Reform of the Ministry of Defense is fundamentally aimed at securing the trust of the people and creating a Ministry of Defense and SDF that are capable of adequately performing missions expected of them.

In line with the change of government in September 2009, reform of the Ministry of Defense was a priority on the agenda in light of the new government. In this regard, at the fifth session of the Meeting of the Ministry of Defense Reform Head Office[8] in October 2009, a decision was made to scrap the plans of organizational reform at the Ministry of Defense scheduled to be implemented in FY2010 and also to discontinue the Reform Head Office (discontinued on October 22, 2009). The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense within the Prime Minister's Office was also discontinued on November 17, 2009[9].

The new administration is inspecting the proposals in the Council's report and continuously working on necessary measures. The legal establishment of the Defense Council, abolishment of the advisory structure by civilian Defense Councilors, and creation of the post of Special Advisor to the Minister of Defense are all playing critical roles in strengthening the structures to support the Minister of Defense and thoroughly ensuring civilian control. Measures such as the thorough adherence to rules and regulations and protection of classified information, as discussed in the previous section, are still being continued as beneficial commitments to preventing a recurrence of misconduct.

On the other hand, as mentioned previously, organizational reform of the Ministry of Defense is being reviewed continuously to ensure civilian control, from the view point of building a structure that allows the Minister of Defense to adequately supervise and direct all functions of the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.

2. Recent Status of Deliberations

1. Sessions with Experts on Defense Ministry Reform

The Ministry of Defense held sessions with experts to discuss the Ministry's reform as the Ministry's top three officials were able to benefit from hearing the opinions of experts as the Ministry promoted its new reform under the new government[10]. Major opinions expressed by the participating experts include the following:

1) Even though the SDF has established the spirit of adhering to civilian control, a number of recent cases have cast doubt on this position. Taking this situation into consideration, it is necessary to review the previously planned organizational reform.
2) The Ministry's internal bureaus and the Staff Offices must keep balance among themselves and cooperate with one another, as they support the Minister.
3) To address contingencies that develop rapidly and involve complex situations occurring in a wide range of areas, it is necessary to thoroughly prepare in advance, by means such as the employment of simulations, in order for the Ministry and the SDF to fulfill their missions while ensuring civilian control.
4) As for the Ministry's internal system to support the Minister, prudent discussions are necessary concerning the discontinuation of the Bureau of Operational Policy and integration of civilian and SDF personnel, taking into consideration the viewpoints of the internal bureaus and the Staff Offices and also the importance of civilian control.
5) Reform of procurement requires further discussion as part of the reform of the Ministry of Defense.

Defense Minister Kitazawa addressing the first session with experts

Discussions at the second session with experts

2. Creation of Guidelines for Reform under the New Government

Based on the discussions in sessions with experts, etc, the Ministry created the Directions by the Ministry of Defense ("the centerpiece of deliberation") to illustrate the policies of reform of the Ministry of Defense, to be addressed by the new government.

The outline of the centerpiece of deliberation is set forth below:

In promoting the reform of the Ministry of Defense, the new government must, of course, not only work from the perspective of preventing any recurrence of misconducts, but also further advance reform from the viewpoint of effectively and efficiently promoting defense administration in response to the environment surrounding the Ministry of Defense, while ensuring the effectiveness of civilian control.

(1) Reform of the Central Organizations

Civilian control is the foundation of the defense policy, and to secure this, support system is required in which the Minister of Defense, the principal of civilian control and a policy-maker, is supported by civil and SDF personnel, each of whom fully exploits their expertise for this mission. It is considered adequate in this light to employ a structure in which internal bureaus collect opinions of the Ministry, while the Minister listens to the opinions from the civilian and SDF personnel which reflect their expertise. Based on these grounds, new deliberations should be made concerning the unification of the internal bureaus and the Staff Offices, as well as the integration of civilian and SDF personnel, in the areas of operational and defense planning divisions.

Another focus for deliberation is the correction of defects derived from the double structure of the internal bureaus and the Staff Offices. In Operational divisions, the modalities of operations should be discussed with simulations for each circumstance, in order to avoid duplications of operations between the internal bureaus and the Joint Staff Office, and ensure a swift decision-making process under due cooperation between civilian and SDF personnel. In the defense planning division, the modalities of operations will be discussed to create truly effective defense capacity, while avoiding the inflexibility of budget allotments and seeking efficiency for defense development.

(2) Reform of Procurement

Comprehensive discussions should be held to ensure fair contracts and transparency of transactions, and moreover to duly consider the procurement and maintenance of equipment, and securing of infrastructure for the defense industry and technology base.

(3) Securing and Fostering of Human Resources

Deliberations should be focused on measures to secure high quality personnel and foster them to be equipped with an ethical mind, a broad viewpoint, and high levels of discipline.

(4) Handling of Measures Implemented in the Past to Prevent Recurrence of Misconduct

The measures to prevent a recurrence of misconduct implemented in the past should continue to be carried out. In addition, deliberations should also be made concerning the necessity of further measures based on recent cases of misconduct at the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.

(See Reference 89)

Notes:

1) Regarding the meetings of the Panel of Experts for Reforming the Ministry of Defense, see <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/bouei/index.html>.
2) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/bouei/dai11/11gijisidai.html>.
3) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/others/kaikaku/20080827a.html>.
4) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/approach/others/kaikaku/20080827c.html>.
5) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/approach/others/kaikaku/20090624a.html> and <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/approach/others/kaikaku/20090831b.html>.
6) To restrain information leaks and other related damage caused by espionage activities by foreign intelligence organizations against the Ministry of Defense and the SDF.
7) To adhere to laws and regulations.
8) See <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/rireki/2009/11/17am_siryou.pdf>.
9) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2010/03/12a.html> and <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2010/03/30d.html>.
10) See <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/j/approach/others/kaikaku/gijiyoushi05.html>.

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Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2010)

Reference 1. Number of Deployed Nuclear Warheads by Country and Their Major Means of Delivery

		United States	Russia	United Kingdom	France	China
Missiles	Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)	450 Minuteman III: 450	385 SS-18: 68 SS-19: 72 SS-25: 180 SS-27: 65	—	—	56 DF-5 (CSS-4): 20 DF-31 (CSS-9): 36
	IRBM MRBM	—	—	—	—	92 DF-3 (CSS-2): 2 DF-4 (CSS-3): 10 DF-21 (CSS-5): 80
	Submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)	336 Trident D-5: 336	236 SS-N-18: 80 SS-N-20: 60 SS-N-23: 96	48 Trident D-5: 48	48 M-45: 48	12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3): 12
Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles		14	14	4	3	4
Aircraft		94 B-2: 18 B-52: 76	79 Tu-25 (Bear): 63 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16	—	84 Mirage-2000N: 60 Super Etendard: 24	—
Number of warheads		2,702 (including 500 strategic)	4,834 (including 2,047 strategic)	160	300	186

Notes: 1. Data is based on Military Balance 2010, the SIPRI YEARBOOK 2009, and the NPR in the United States (2010).
2. In May 2010, the United States reported the total number of nuclear warheads possessed, including deployed, non deployed, strategic, and non strategic, as 5,113 warheads (as of September 30, 2009).
3. In May 2010, U.K. First Secretary of State Hague announced a policy to set the upper limit of nuclear warheads in the country's possession at 225 warheads, and to maintain a deployment of a maximum of 160 warheads.

Reference 2. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

Item	Country	Name	Maximum range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
ICBM	U.S.	Minuteman III	13,000	MIRV (170 KT, 335–350 KT or 300–475 KT × 10)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
		Peacekeeper	9,600	MIRV (300–475 KT × 10)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-18	10,500–16,000	MIRV (400 KT–20 MT × 4–10) or Single	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-19	9,000–10,000	MIRV (500 KT × 6 or 500–750 KT × 6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-25	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + Computer control	Three-stage solid
		SS-27	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + GLONASS	Three-stage solid
	China	DF-5 (CSS-4)	12,000–13,000	Single (1-3 MT) or MIRV (150–350 KT × 4–6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-31 (CSS-9)	8,000–14,000	Single (1 MT) or MIRV (20–150 KT × 3–5)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
SLBM	U.S.	Trident C-4	7,400	MIRV (100 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100 KT or 475 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-N-18	6,500–8,000	Single (450 KT) or MIRV (200 KT × 3 or 100 KT × 7)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Two-stage liquid
		SS-N-20	8,300	MIRV (200 KT × 10)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		SS-N-23	8,300	MIRV (100 KT × 4)	Inertial + Stellar reference + Computer Controlled PBV	Three-stage liquid
	U.K.	Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100–120 KT × 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	France	M-45	5,300	MRV (100 KT × 6)	Inertial + computer control	Three-stage solid
	China	JL-1 (CSS-N-3)	2,150–2,500	Single (20–500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid

Item	Country	Name	Maximum range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
IRBM MRBM	China	DF-3 (CSS-2)	2,400–2,800	Single (1–3 MT)	Inertial	One-stage liquid
		DF-4 (CSS-3)	4,750	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-21 (CSS-5)	2,150–2,500	Single (20–500 KT), HE, chemical, sub munition, EMP	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid
SRBM	China	DF-11 (CSS-7)	280–530	Single (2–20 KT), HE, sub munition, FAE, chemical	Inertial + GPS + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
		DF-15 (CSS-6)	600	Single (90 KT), HE, sub munition, EMP, chemical	Inertial + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
Cruise missile (long-range)	U.S.	Tomahawk (TLAM-N)	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Sea surface and underwater launched
		AGM-86B	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Air launched
Cruise missile (long-range)	Russia	SS-N-21	2,400	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Underwater launched
		AS-15	2,500–3,500	Single (200–250 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching	Air launched

Sources: Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 2009, etc.

Reference 3. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or Region	Ground Forces (10,000 persons)	Country or Region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of Vessels	Country or Region	Number of Combat Aircraft
China	160	United States	602.7	1,009	United States	3,470
India	113	Russia	210.9	986	Russia	2,160
North Korea	95	China	134.2	951	China	1,950
United States	66	United Kingdom	78.7	240	India	670
Republic of Korea	56	France	39.9	255	North Korea	590
Pakistan	55	India	35.0	158	Syria	560
Viet Nam	41	Indonesia	25.4	205	Turkey	540
Turkey	40	Turkey	21.9	197	Republic of Korea	530
Russia	40	Germany	21.2	128	Taiwan	530
Myanmar	38	Taiwan	20.7	327	Egypt	530
Iran	35	Spain	19.6	110	Israel	470
Egypt	34	Republic of Korea	18.0	191	France	450
Colombia	24	Italy	17.7	173	Pakistan	400
Indonesia	23	Brazil	16.8	93	Brazil	390
Taiwan	20	Australia	15.9	82	Libya	380
Japan	14.1	Japan	44.9	14.9	Japan	430

Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from Military Balance 2009 and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2009–2010 and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2009, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).
3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

Reference 4. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)

Country or Region	Military Service System	Regular (10,000 persons)	Reserves (10,000 persons)
United States	Volunteer	158	86
Russia	Volunteer	103	2,000
United Kingdom	Volunteer	18	20
France	Volunteer	35	7
Germany	Conscription	25	16
Italy	Volunteer	29	4
India	Volunteer	133	156
China	Conscription	229	51
North Korea	Conscription	111	470
Republic of Korea	Conscription	69	450
Egypt	Conscription	47	48
Israel	Conscription	18	57

Japan	Volunteer	Ground	14.1	3.2 (0.6)
		Maritime	4.2	0.08
		Air	4.4	0.07

Notes: 1. Data taken from Military Balance 2010 and other sources.
2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2009. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure.
3. Russia uses a personnel augmentation system which adds a contract employment system (a type of volunteer system) to the preexisting conscription system.

Reference 5. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan



Note: Data take from Military Balance, etc., of the respective years (Figures for Japan represent actual strength as of the end of the respective fiscal years.)

Reference 6. Basic Policy for National Defense

(Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957)

The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan's independence and peace, which are founded on democracy. In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows:

(1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.
(2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.
(3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation's strength and situation.
(4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

Reference 7. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005–

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

Stipulations regarding the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond are included in the reference.

Accordingly, the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1995 and Beyond (approved by the Cabinet on November 28, 1994) are discontinued as of the end of FY2004.

(See reference)

National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond

I. Purpose
II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan
III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy
IV. Future Defense Forces
V. Additional Elements for Consideration

I. Purpose

In order to ensure the peace and safety of Japan and peace and stability of the international community, given the current security environment surrounding our country, the Security Council and Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond. The Guidelines build on the December 19, 2003 Security Council and Cabinet decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures."

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States demonstrated that, in addition to such traditional problems as inter-state military confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today's security environment. Against a backdrop of increased interdependence and growing globalization, the international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter "new threats and diverse situations"). We need to bear

in mind that conventional forms of deterrence may no longer work effectively against international terrorist organizations, which have neither states nor citizens to protect.

Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Mutual cooperation and interdependence among major countries have deepened, as exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and the Russian Federation. Since a stable international environment serves the interests of all nations, greater efforts at international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community, including those within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations.

In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues to contribute significantly to international peace and stability by taking active measures to combat terrorism and to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict: Military force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the prevention of conflict and reconstruction assistance.

2. As a result of the further expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations in recent years, greater efforts are also being made to promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

   However, although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to modernize their military forces. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain. North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts. China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea.

   We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.

   The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. In light of the security environment surrounding our country, as outlined above, even though a full-scale invasion against Japan is increasingly unlikely, Japan must now deal with new threats and diverse situations in addition to regional security issues.

4. In considering Japan's security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; a high population density; the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan's geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country's prosperity and growth.

III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

1. Basic Principles

   The first objective of Japan's security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve

these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, and with the international community.

To this end, Japan will: support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces.

Based on the Constitution of Japan, and the ideas of maintaining the exclusively defense-oriented policy by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold the fundamental principles of developing modest defense forces of its own under civilian control and will continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles.

To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan also will play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles.

2. Japan's Own Efforts

(1) Basic Ideas

Based on the premise that any country's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts, Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner —the United States— Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats.

(2) Japan's Integrated Response

In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, and bringing together all relevant organizations. To this end, the Government will improve its ability to collect and analyze information which serves as the basis of the Government's decision-making. The Self-Defense Forces, police, Japan Coast Guard, and other relevant organizations will improve their close cooperation through increased intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and other activities, while appropriately sharing their roles, and improve their overall performances. In addition, the Government will establish national protection systems including those for responding to different types of disasters, by quickly issuing warning signals and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments.

(3) Japan's Defense Forces

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan's will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores.

Japan has developed its defense forces in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (Security Council and Cabinet decision on November 28, 1995) which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept espouses the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum. Combined with the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, this concept has been successful in preventing an armed invasion from occurring.

Given the new security environment, however, future defense forces should be capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense

Force Concept that remain valid. Because the peace and stability of Japan is inextricably linked to that of the international community, Japan should voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities").

In developing Japan's defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate.

From this standpoint, Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries. In building such a defense force, without expanding its size, the Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited resources that are available.

3. Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist.

Close cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent or to respond to new threats and diverse situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missiles attacks.

Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives.

In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of U.S. military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting such measures as: intelligence exchange; operational cooperation, including in "situations in areas surrounding Japan"; cooperation on ballistic missile defense; equipment and technology exchange; and, efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.

4. Cooperation with the International Community

In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan. Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.

In order to enable the international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world's only global and comprehensive international organization — the United Nations — to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal.

In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral frameworks for regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as multilateral efforts to deal with common agendas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, together with the cooperation with the United States, to promote a stable security environment in the region.

IV. Future Defense Forces

1. Role of the Defense Forces

Based on the recognition described above, Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in the following areas:

(1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

Japan will deal effectively with the new threats and diverse situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond quickly and appropriately in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. Japan's Self-Defense Forces posture to address the key elements of the new threats and diverse situations will be as follows:

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

We will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks. We will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons by doing so, in addition to relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence.

b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attacks

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces. We will also enhance readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and deal with such attacks in a flexible manner.

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan's offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner.

d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

We will maintain necessary defense force structure, including ships, aircraft and other assets, to carry out around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly to the violation of our territorial airspace, as well as combatant ships and other assets in order to respond to armed special-purpose ships operating in waters surrounding Japan, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan's territorial waters, and other similar vessels.

e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters

To deal effectively with large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters, where protection of life and property is desperately needed, we will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units, as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan.

(2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion

Since in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized Cold War-type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will significantly reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

(3) Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

In order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities, we will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and, make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.

We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organizations such as the United Nations.

2. Critical Elements of Our Defense Capabilities

Following are the critical elements for developing defense forces capable of carrying out the missions described above.

(1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to have the three services of the Self-Defense Forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order to employ our defense forces successfully to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to identify events at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately. For this purpose, we will strengthen our diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the Self-Defense Forces' intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters that supports our capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

We will incorporate the outcome of science and technological progress, in such areas as information and communications technologies, into our defense forces. In particular, we will develop the command and control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, in

tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas.

In addition, we will create advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.

(4) Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

We will take various measures to maintain high morale and firm discipline within the Self-Defense Forces. We will recruit, cultivate, train, and educate high-quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense Forces missions, and the need to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. In addition, we will promote activities related to research and education on security issues, and develop human resources.

The defense force level required to fulfill missions described above is indicated in the attached table.

V. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense forces as described in section IV, the following elements will be taken into consideration.

(1) Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, we will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. We will also work to make our defense forces successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government.

(2) We will make procurement and research and development (R&D) more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing lifecycle costs, including purchase price of defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations in carrying out R&D as well as by allocating R&D resources in a more focused manner; and, appropriately and timely reviewing various R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish defense production and technological bases, especially in core technological areas indispensable for our national security.

(3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities.

2. The National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade.

However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

(Attached Table)

Ground Self-Defense Force	Personnel Regular Reserve (Ready Reserve Personnel)		155,000 148,000 7,000
	Major Units	Regionally Deployed Units	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile Operation Units	1 armed division Central Readiness Force
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Major Equipment	Tanks Main Artillery	Approx. 600 Approx. 600
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Destroyer Units (for mobile operations) Destroyer Units (regional district units) Submarine Units Minesweeper Unit Patrol Aircraft Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat Aircraft	47 16 Approx. 150
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning and Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Transport Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne early-warning group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons 1 squadron 6 groups
	Major Equipment	Combat Aircraft Fighters	Approx. 350 Approx. 260
Major Equipment and Major Units that can be used for Ballistic Missile Defense		Aegis-equipped Destroyers	4
		Air Warning and Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups

Note: The numbers of units and equipment are already included in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces sections above.

Reference 8. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009)

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

Stipulations regarding the Mid-Term Defense Program covering the period of FY2005 through FY2009 are presented in the reference in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (authorized by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 10, 2004).

Accordingly, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–2005) authorized by the Cabinet on December 15, 2000, is discontinued as of the end of FY2004.

(See reference)

I. Policies for the Program

From FY2005 to FY2009, the Government of Japan (GOJ) will build-up Japan's defense forces based on the following plan, in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004; hereinafter the new NDPG).

1. In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations as well as to voluntarily and proactively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international

security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities"), the GOJ will efficiently establish multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multipurpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities, while maintaining the most basic capabilities to cope with large-scale invasion.

2. Under the new security environment, the GOJ will review current organs of defense administration, and transfer the major units and main equipment of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to the new defense forces prescribed in the new NDPG while reducing equipment and personnel earmarked for large-scale invasion.
3. In order to realize defense forces that are multi-functional, flexible and effective, the GOJ will advance the critical elements of defense capabilities; strengthening joint operation capabilities and intelligence capabilities while incorporating the progress in science and technology, and making effective use of human resources as well.
4. In building, maintaining and operating defense forces, the GOJ will promote measures that support the defense forces such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently; and improving cooperative ties with related administrative institutions and local communities.
5. The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the close cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts in security fields. The GOJ will promote measures to further strengthen the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relations with the United States based on the Arrangements.
6. Mindful of seriously deteriorating fiscal conditions, and with due consideration paid to other national measures, the GOJ will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces.

II. Review of the Organizations of Defense Agency and SDF

1. The GOJ will review organization of defense administration including the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency, and take necessary measures.
2. The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen the joint operations. The GOJ will continue to study on whether or not further organizational change is necessary for effective joint operations, and take necessary measures.

   The GOJ will place the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under direct control of the Minister of State for Defense.
3. Concerning the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the GOJ will: transform its five Divisions, one Brigade and two combined Brigades, converting one Division and two Combined Brigades into three Brigades, in order to improve readiness and mobility, while reducing number of tanks and artillery; and establish the Central Readiness Force that administrates and operates units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks. The authorized number of GSDF personnel will be around 161,000 persons (152,000 persons for regular personnel and 8,000 persons for reservists) at the end of FY2009. The actual number of GSDF regular personnel will be approximately 146,000 at the end of FY2009.
4. Concerning the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will consolidate the number of the Escort divisions of the Destroyer unit for mobile operations into eight, each of which is deployed four destroyers; and abolish one of the Escort divisions for regional deployment. The GOJ will also consolidate the number of divisions of the Submarine unit into five, Flight Squadrons of Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft unit into four, and Patrol Helicopter unit into five.

5. Concerning the Air Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will transform the Early Warning Group into one composed of two squadrons as well as establish the first Aerial Refueling Transport Unit.

III. Major Plans Related to SDF Capabilities

1. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

(1) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

The GOJ will improve the capabilities of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot surface-to-air missiles to enable them to respond to ballistic missile attacks. The GOJ will study the course of capability improvement for FY2008 and after, taking into consideration the status of BMD technology development in the United States, and take necessary measures. The GOJ will also improve the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE), and start to build up a new warning and control radar which can detect and track ballistic missiles. The GOJ will promote the joint Japan-U.S. technical research targeting the sea-based upper-tier system, consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.

(2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units

In order to effectively respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations units, the GOJ will improve the readiness and mobility of ground units, and strengthen the capability of infantries, and procure: light armored vehicles; multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J); and combat helicopters (AH-64D). The GOJ will also improve the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and/or chemical attacks.

(3) Response to Invasions of Japan's Offshore Islands

In order to effectively respond to invasion of Japan's offshore islands by improving transportation, deployment, and other capabilities, the GOJ will procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J), tanker transport aircraft (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and new transport aircraft that will replace C-1s. The GOJ will, based on actual operations and other matters, reconsider the total number of tanker-transport aircraft, and will take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve rescuing capability by attaching transport aircraft (C-130H) the in-flight refueling function for rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

(4) Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan's Airspace or the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Vessels

In order to patrol and survey in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously, and to deal properly with armed special-purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea, the GOJ will: procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH- 60K) and minesweeper-transport helicopters (MCH-101); modernize early warning aircraft (E-2C) and the air control and warning systems of the BADGE; procure new patrol aircraft that will replace P-3Cs; and initiate the project to modernize early warning and control aircraft (E-767).

The GOJ will also promote the modernization of fighters (F-15), and procure new fighters that will replace F-4s while restricting the total number of the procurement under the new NDPG.

(5) Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type Disasters

In order to effectively respond to large-scale and/or special-type disasters and other situations that demand protection of human lives and properties in cooperation with related institutions, the GOJ will take measures to help the SDF units improve necessary capabilities.

2. Preparations to Deal with Large-Scale Invasion of Japan

Since the likelihood of large-scale invasion of Japan is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, the GOJ will modify the current defense force building concept that emphasized anti-tank warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, and will downsize equipment and personnel earmarked for a

large scale invasion. At the same time, because reconstructing defense forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, while taking into accounts developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress, the GOJ will continue to procure tanks, artillery, mid-range surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircraft, fighters, and so on.

3. Voluntary and Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

(1) Appropriate Effort for International Peace Cooperation Activities

In order to send units quickly to international peace cooperation activities and sustain the operation, the GOJ will: establish a unit for education and research for international peace cooperation activities; expand and improve the current rotating standby posture; and procure equipment for international peace cooperation activities.

(2) Enhancement of Security Dialogue, Defense Exchanges and Co-Training/Exercises with Other Countries

The GOJ will promote measures for bilateral or multilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges by positively promoting defense exchanges of each level and participating in international peace cooperation activities such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and joint exercises for rescue and other objectives. The GOJ will also take part in efforts in the areas of arms control and disarmament led by international organizations including the United Nations (U.N.).

4. Critical Elements of Defense Capabilities

(1) Strengthening Joint Operation Capabilities

In addition to creating a new joint staff organization and reorganizing each service Staff Office as mentioned in section II above, the GOJ will reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct joint exercises, establish common information and communication infrastructure, and take other measures to build foundations for the joint operations.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

The GOJ will strengthen the capability of intelligence sections such as the Defense Intelligence Headquarters by securing and training able personnel and enhancing measures for gathering and analyzing various intelligence including signal and geospatial intelligence. The GOJ will modernize Electronic Intelligence Aircraft (EP-3), and start tentative modification for converting some of the F-15 fighters to reconnaissance aircraft.

In addition, the GOJ will take necessary measures, upon consideration, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicles of high altitude and endurance.

(3) Incorporation of the Progress in Science and Technology into Defense Forces

a. Strengthening Command and Control Capability, etc.

In order to have credible command and control and swift information sharing that are indispensable for joint operations and smooth implementation of international peace cooperation activities with enhanced operational and organizational efficiency, the GOJ will establish advanced command and communication systems and information and communication network in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas, thereby concentrating and circulating information through chains of command, sharing intelligence at the unit level, strengthening capability to respond cyber attacks and enhancing information sharing with relevant organizations and other entities.

b. Promoting Research and Development

The GOJ will promote development of next generation aircraft that will replace P-3Cs and C-1s, and next generation tank. The GOJ will promote, taking into account trends of science and technology, research and development (R&D) of various command and control systems, unmanned aerial

vehicles, and other equipments, with focused distribution of resources. In the meantime, the GOJ will make efforts for effective and efficient implementation of R&D by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental and academic sectors, using modeling and simulation methods, using the same parts or components for different equipment, and promoting cooperation with the United States and other nations.

Furthermore, the GOJ will review methods for focused investment in R&D, and the organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute, and take necessary measures.

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

a. Enhancement of Measures for Personnel, Education and Training

The GOJ will take various measures for maintaining high morale and strict discipline of personnel.

The GOJ will secure and raise SDF personnel of high quality through increasing young officers endowed with flexible judgment and other means, and also enhancing education and training so that the SDF can better respond to diversified and internationalized missions, advanced defense equipment and joint operations.

The GOJ will also consider effective ways of utilizing retired personnel in society, and take necessary measures.

b. Promotion of Research and Education Regarding Security Issues

The GOJ will improve the research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies regarding security policy. The GOJ will enhance human basis by personnel exchanges in security area.

5. Measures to Support Defense Capability

(1) Streamlined and Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

The GOJ will strengthen efforts to curb the lifecycle cost of equipments including cost of procurement, setting concrete targets. The GOJ will promote general procurement reform and take necessary measures, such as establishing an efficient procurement and replenishment posture which can cope with diverse situations and establishing the truly necessary defense industrial and technological basis, the center of which constitutes core technological areas indispensable for national security.

(2) Promotion of Cooperation with Relevant Administrative Organizations and Local Communities

The GOJ will improve coordination with the relevant organizations such as the police, fire department, and Coast Guard, and promote cooperation with local governments and local communities with the Civil Protection Law as its basis.

In addition, the GOJ will efficiently maintain and develop defense-related facilities. In order to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities, the GOJ will continue to promote measures for local communities surrounding those facilities under close cooperation with local governments.

IV. Measures to Strengthen the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Exchanges of Intelligence and Policy Consultations

The GOJ will promote exchanges of intelligence and views regarding international situations, and maintain strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and the military posture that includes force structure of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), bearing in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

2. Operational Cooperation and Bilateral Exercise/Training
   Based on the outcome of the strategic dialogue, the GOJ will make efforts to build an effective posture for operational cooperation, and expand bilateral exercise/training.
3. Promotion of Cooperation based on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
   The GOJ will strengthen Japan–U.S. bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, and promote cooperation with the United States in the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology.
4. Equipment and Technology Exchanges
   The GOJ will make efforts to enhance broad mutual exchanges including joint R&D projects with the United States in the area of equipment and technology.
5. Promotion of Efforts to Make the Stationing of the USFJ Smooth and Effective
   The GOJ will take measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and efficient, such as support to the stationing of the USFJ and realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, while engaging in strategic dialogue with the United States regarding force structure of the USFJ on its own initiative and continuously maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.
6. Enhancement of Japan–U.S. Cooperation concerning International Measures for Regional or Global Security
   The GOJ will take measures to closely cooperate with the United States and proactively participate in international activities to prevent or to tackle new threats and diverse situations such as the fight against terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

V. Size of Procurement

Regarding the size of equipment procurement as described in the preceding section III (Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities), specific numbers of main equipment procurement are shown in the attached table.

VI. Expenses Required

1. The limit of the total amount of defense-related expenditures needed for this program is approximately 24.24 trillion yen at the prices of FY2005.
2. In the annual budget formulation process, the GOJ will decide it within the framework of the expenditures required by this Program, while achieving harmony with other Government measures by seeking further efficiency and rationalization. In case of needs to respond to an unforeseeable situation in the future, extra budget, besides the defense-related expenditures shown in I, might be provided within the limit of 100 billion yen on the condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve. The GOJ will continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense build-up as stated in the "Program for the Future Build-up of Defense Capability" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on January 24, 1987).
3. Within the limit of the total amount of expenditures to this program, the program will be reviewed if necessary in three years, considering various factors in and outside Japan including international situations prevailing at that time, global trends in technology such as information and communication technology and Japan's fiscal condition.

VII. Others

1. The GOJ will review the modality of defense forces stated in the new NDPG to make necessary changes, in five years or when serious situational changes emerge, taking into account the security environment and technological trends at the time.

2. The GOJ will steadily implement projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The costs required for their implementation will be separately identified.

(Attached Table)

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks	49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortar)	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	104 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	7 aircraft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	11 aircraft
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	8 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of Aegis system equipped	3 ships
	Destroyers	5 ships
	Submarines	4 ships
	Others	11 ships
	Total number of self-defense ships to be built (tonnage)	20 ships (Approx. 59,000 tons)
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4 aircraft
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	23 aircraft
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 aircraft
Air Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided Patriot missiles	2 groups & for education, etc.
	Modernization of fighters (F-15)	26 aircraft
	Fighters (F-2)	22 aircraft
	New fighters	7 aircraft
	New transport aircraft	8 aircraft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	4 aircraft
	Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 aircraft

Reference 9. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary

(December 10, 2004)

1. The Government of Japan approved the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (the new NDPG) and the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009), at the Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting today.
2. In light of the new threats and diverse situations presented by today's security environment, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and other various situations that affect peace and security, the Government has developed the new NDPG in recognition of the need to set new guidelines for shaping Japan's future security and defense.
3. The new NDPG spell out both Japan's vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which underlie that vision. Japan has two basic security policy objectives: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel it; and (b) to improve the international security environment in order to prevent any threat from reaching Japan in the first place.

   The new NDPG make it clear that, in particular, improving the international security environment is one of the major pillars of the security policy of Japan, whose prosperity and growth depend heavily on the security of sea lines of communication.

   The new NDPG point out that it is necessary to achieve these goals by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, as well as with the international community. At the same time, we will continue to firmly uphold the basic principles of our defense policy that we have ascribed to in accordance with the Constitution of Japan.
4. In implementing this policy, the Government of Japan will employ all available means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. Should a threat reach Japan, the Government will take an integrated response, swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them

cooperate fully. The new NDPG have clearly stated that relevant organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard will utilize all available means and work closely together to protect Japan and its people. In addition, as a part of its own effort, Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any threats. Japan's defense forces —the ultimate guarantee of its national security— should be capable of effectively responding to any new threats and diverse situations, while inheriting the elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that still remain valid. Japan's defense forces should also be capable of actively participating in international peace cooperation activities in order to improve the international security environment. While roles that the defense forces have to play are multiplying and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate, Japan's future defense forces should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective while, at the same time, more rationalized and streamlined.

The Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan as well as the peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on the Arrangements, close cooperative relations between Japan and its alliance partner, the United States, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to effectively address new threats and diverse situations. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives in it.

Regarding its cooperation with the international community, Japan will utilize its Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategically and actively participate in international peace cooperation activities. The new NDPG have clearly defined these activities as part of our effort to improve the international security environment.

5. Regarding the future defense force, Japan will develop highly responsive and mobile defense forces capable of dealing effectively with new threats and diverse situations, and deploy them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Japan's future defense forces should be capable of coping with ballistic missile attacks, attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, and invasion of offshore islands. They should also be able to execute patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and respond to the violation of airspace, the intrusion of armed special purpose ships and other similar vessels, and large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles. In our judgment, the likelihood of a full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and will remain modest for the foreseeable future. Thus, based on a fundamental review, we have decided to reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with such a contingency. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion, and reconstructing these forces cannot be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress. In our effort to improve the international security environment, we will establish infrastructure and make necessary arrangements to engage in international peace cooperation activities. Japan will continue to strongly promote activities conducive to international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges.
6. We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based.

If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.

In addition, through the process by which the NDPG were developed, questions were raised regarding how to handle cases of joint development and production with the United States (other than those related to the ballistic missile defense system) as well as those related to support of counter-terrorism and counterpiracy.

Decisions will be made on the basis of individual examination of each case, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that aims at avoiding the escalation of international conflicts.

7. Based on the new NDPG, the Government will devise Japan's vision for international peace cooperation activities, and take legal and other necessary measures concerning Japan's security and defense policy, including placement of international peace cooperation activities in Self-Defense Forces' mission priorities, and operational issues pertaining to the ballistic missile defense systems.
8. To clearly indicate the target period in which the planned defense force level will be achieved, the new NDPG provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. In addition, in order to better adjust our defense policy to the changing security environment, we will review and, if necessary, revise the NDPG in five years.
9. The Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009) was formulated to achieve the defense forces level that Japan should possess as provided for in the new NDPG. We expect the total defense-related budget for the new Mid-Term Defense Program to be approximately 24,240 billion yen under FY2004 prices.
10. The Government of Japan will report today's decision to the Diet. I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision.

Reference 10. About the Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009)

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 20, 2008)

Content of the Review

In order to improve equipment more efficiently while adequately responding to the development, etc., of the technology level of foreign countries, the scale of modernization/upgrading of fighters (F-15) and improvement of other equipment/material indicated in the appendix of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–FY2009) shall be as shown in this appendix.

Expense Account

With the review of the improvement scale of the major equipments and other measures, the limit of the total defense-related cost of the plan shall be about 28,640 billion yen at the prices of FY2004.

Other

In addition to the above, the expense for measures to reduce the local burden concerning the realignment of U.S. Forces during the period of the plan is about 90 billion yen at the prices of FY2004. We shall continue to implement the measures adequately and swiftly in accordance with the "government efforts concerning the realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan, etc." (Approved by the Cabinet on June 30, 2006)

(Attached Table)

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks	49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortar)	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	96 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	4 aircraft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	9 aircraft
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	7 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of Aegis system equipped Destroyers	3 ships
	Submarines	5 ships
	Others	4 ships
	Total number of self-defense ships to be built (Tonnage)	8 ships
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	17 ships (Approx. 57,000 tons)
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	4 aircraft
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	17 aircraft
		3 aircraft
Air Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided Patriot missiles	2 groups & for education, etc.
	Modernization of fighters (F-15)	40 aircraft
	Fighters (F-2)	18 aircraft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	3 aircraft
	Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 aircraft

Note: For the modernization/upgrading of fighters (F-15), radar components, etc., for 38 fighters shall be (have been) obtained in addition to the improvement described above. How to improve the airframes using these components in concrete terms will be decided in the Mid-Term Defense Program after FY2010.

Reference 11. FY2010 Defense Capability Arrangements, etc.

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2009)

Regarding a revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond

1. National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond

The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (approved by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 10, 2004; hereinafter referred to as the "current guidelines") express the guidelines regarding the state of security and defense capability for Japan. They were prepared with the understanding that any necessary changes would be made in five years taking into account the security environment and technological trends at that time. As the revision of the current guidelines is an important issue for national security, and it is necessary, following the historic change in government, for the new government to make adequate deliberations, a conclusion shall be reached during 2010. The revisions will work toward the efficient preparation of effective defense capability while preparing Japan's basic security policy after analyzing and evaluating trends in international affairs, the security environment surrounding Japan, and the current state of Japan's defensive capability and the current conditions of the SDF.

Further, while the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–2009) (approved by the Security Council and Cabinet on December 10, 2004) stipulates the midterm development plans to achieve the level of defense capability established in the current guidelines and the limit for the total amount for defense related expenditure, the next midterm defense capability development plan will be prepared based on the conclusions of the revision of the current guidelines.

2. The Policy Forming the Basis for Formulation of the FY2010 Defense Budget

As the conclusions of the revisions, etc., of the current guidelines will take effect from FY2011, the policy forming the basis for the formulation of the FY2010 defense budget will be stipulated in a separate document to

clarify the relationship between the FY2010 defense budget and the current guidelines and policies to develop defense capability appropriately where a midterm defense capability development plan does not exist.

(Attachment)
The Policy Forming the Basis for the Formulation of the FY2010 Defense Budget

1. Environment Requiring Consideration

With regard to the security environment surrounding Japan, it is necessary to consider the new trends which can effect Japan's security such as the worsening of the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile problem and the expansion, modernization, and increased activity in military power in surrounding nations, balanced by the advancements in security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and efforts for peace and stability in the international community, as well as deepening security cooperation between Japan and the United States.

Further, with regard to financial conditions, it is important to understand that the Policy Forming the Basis for the Formulation of the FY2010 Defense Budget (approved by the Cabinet on September 29, 2009) stipulates that "to realize new measures under the Manifest, all budgets must be redesigned and new financial resources generated".

2. Basic Understanding

In FY2010, defense capability will be developed based on the policies of the current guidelines so that the role of defense capability stipulated in the current guidelines can be carried out effectively.

In that process, and with consideration for the security environment surrounding Japan, the general rule will be the efficient development of defense capability focusing on upgrading aging equipment and equipment that is growing obsolete, placing importance on the following items, while handling immediate pressing issues. Further, regarding the actual number of SDF personnel, optimization while be carried out as much as possible while improving the sufficiency of front line units as well as readiness and strength.

(1) Securing Deterrence against Various Contingencies as well as Ready and Effective Response Capability

The equipment necessary to handle ballistic missile attacks, special forces attacks, and incidents in island areas, for sustained surveillance operations and intelligence gathering under normal conditions, and to handle large scale or special disasters will be developed, and response capability for these contingencies will be secured.

(2) Further Stabilization of the Regional Security Environment

Various areas of cooperation such as humanitarian aid and disaster relief and bilateral and multilateral dialogues will be further advanced to make possible the further stability of the security in the Asia-Pacific region.

(3) Advancement of Efforts toward Improving the Global Security Environment

Participation in various exercises will be promoted and equipment required for use in international peace cooperation activities will be prepared in order to participate actively and with initiative in the various operations carried out through the cooperation of the international community such as the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, antiterrorism and antipiracy, and U.N. peacekeeping operations.

(4) Efforts toward Optimization and Streamlining

In order to carry out effective and efficient defense capability development under severe economic conditions, the priority of projects will be clarified and efforts will be promoted for the effective and efficient use of human resources and the efficient procurement of equipment, etc.

3. Responding to Ballistic Missile Attacks

In FY2010, under the arrangements stipulated in the current guidelines, ballistic missile defense capability will be improved among the ASDF surface-to-air missile air defense units that can be used in ballistic missile defense. Further, the system improvements necessary to maintain existing capabilities will be carried out for air defense units without ballistic missile defense capabilities.

4. Points for Consideration

In order to handle new trends in the security environment surrounding Japan, the following items will be given particular consideration.

(1) The state of Japan's long term defense production and technology foundation will be considered while strengthening effective and efficient cost performance based equipment procurement efforts through the promotion of the use of equipment lifecycle cost management.

(2) In addition to outsourcing operations that can be outsourced, efforts will be made to secure and train high quality personnel and improve training in order to make use of personnel effectively and efficiently, and personnel rank and age conditions capable of handling more diverse missions against the backdrop of a declining birth rate and rising education level will be considered.

(3) Unit optimization and streamlining will be considered from the standpoint of aiming for a structure in which the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces can exercise their capabilities effectively and efficiently as part of the whole, with consideration made for deepening relationships with the local populace and society.

(4) The joint operations structure will be strengthened so that the SDF may carry out its mission effectively with consideration made for operational performance record since the move to a joint operations structure.

5. Status of Expenses

The amount of expenditure and future obligation will be kept down as much as possible in consideration of the increasingly difficult economic conditions while maintaining the understanding that defense is one of the most fundamental activities for the nation.

Reference 12. The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.

The export of arms needs a license from the Minster of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949)* and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949).

* Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

1. The Three Principles on Arms Export

On April 21, 1967, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives' Audit Committee meeting.

(Summary)

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

(1) Communist Bloc countries

(2) Countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions

(3) Countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

2. The Government's Unified View on Arms Export

On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government's view at the House of Representatives' Budget Committee meeting.

(Full text)

(1) The Government's Policy

With regard to the export of "arms," the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export.

(i) The export of "arms" to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.

(ii) The export of "arms" to areas other than the areas subject to the Three Principles shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.

(iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109, etc.) shall be treated in the same category as "arms."

(2) Definition of Arms

The term "arms" is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation.

(i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on Arms Export are "those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat." Specifically "arms" are those that are listed in Items from No.197 to No.205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition.

(ii) "Arms" under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as "firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle." Such equipment as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying firearms, etc., for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered "arms." Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, "the item No.109" in (3) of 1) and "the items from No.197 to No.205" in (1) of 2) have been changed to "the Item No.1"

Reference 13. Japan's Vision for Future Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era: Toward a Peace-Creating Nation (Summary)

This report is written by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era. It proposes that Japan be a nation that contributes to the peace and security of the region and the world, while accomplishing its prime objectives to secure peace, promote prosperity and ensure the safety of Japan. In other words, the report propounds a proactive "Peace-Creating Japan."

CHAPTER ONE: Security Strategies

Section 1. Objectives

Japan's security objectives are: to ensure its safety and prosperity; to promote the stability and prosperity of the area surrounding Japan as well as the world; and to maintain a free and open international system. For Japan's safety and prosperity, it requires the maintenance and development of its economic capability, freedom to undertake economic activities, and freedom of movement. The safety of Japan includes that of Japanese nationals who live or stay abroad, ensured through international coordination. As for promoting the stability and prosperity of the area surrounding Japan and the world, maintaining access to markets and safety of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are common interests of both Japan and the world. To maintain a free and open international system, it is necessary for Japan to deepen cooperation with major powers in the interest of maintaining the world order and abiding by international norms. Universal and basic values such as freedom and dignity of the individuals should be upheld.

Section 2. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

The following trends can be discerned in the current global security environment: 1) economic and social globalization which created transnational security challenges and increased conflicts in the "gray zones" between peace and crisis; 2) the rise of emerging powers such as China, India and Russia and the relative decline in overwhelming superiority of the United States, resulting in a global shift in balance of power and deterioration of international public goods; 3) increasing risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means; and 4) continuing regional conflicts, failed states, international terrorism and international crimes.

In line with these broader trends, important issues for the areas surrounding Japan and Japan itself include challenges such as changing U.S. deterrence, continuing uncertainty in the Korean Peninsula, shifting regional balance of power brought about by the rising China, and continuing instabilities on SLOCs from Middle East and Africa to Japan and in the coastal states.

Section 3. Strategies and Instruments

Considering the above-mentioned trends and characteristics of Japan's economy and defense posture as well as geographic and historical constraints, Japan's identity, which should be translated into its foreign and security policies, can best be expressed as a "Peace-Creating Japan." Its basic idea is that the way to achieve Japan's own safety is by contributing to global peace and stability, and by adopting a basic posture of active participation in international peace cooperation, non-traditional security and human security.

A Peace-Creating Japan's security objectives can be attained by its own efforts and by cooperation with its ally as well as multi-layered security cooperation. Its strategies and instruments include: utilizing various diplomatic tools; building defense capability; enhancing interagency cooperation and cooperation between public and private sectors; achieving common strategic objectives with the ally; securing safety of global commons; upholding U.S. extended deterrence; promoting cooperation and engagement with partners and emerging powers,

and promoting cooperation within multilateral security frameworks, among others.

With the role of the military becoming diversified, the "Basic Defense Force" (BDF) concept, which has limited Japan's defense capabilities only for the purpose of rejection of external invasion, is no longer valid. Based on recognition that defense equipment cooperation or defense assistance could be effective tools for improving the security environment and international relations, defense cooperation and assistance should be carried out on the basis of a new set of principles, superseding the de facto export prohibition policy under the "Three Principles on Arms Export, etc."

CHAPTER TWO: Modality of Defense Capabilities

Section 1. Basic Concepts

Recent developments in military science and technology and decreased warning time before contingency, among others, have contributed to a change in characteristics of defense capabilities. These developments have increased the importance of "dynamic deterrence" through which a defense force demonstrates high operational performance in normal circumstances by conducting timely and appropriate operations, such as surveillance and preparation against airspace violation, in contrast to the traditional "static deterrence" focused on quantities and size of weapons and troops. It is time for Japan to depart from the BDF concept and to achieve necessary and in-depth reform of its defense posture that can adequately respond to complex contingencies in which various events may break out simultaneously. Although the SDF needs to prepare for various changes in the future and to consider maintaining minimum essential know-how in responding against major armed invasion, the SDF must not use the BDF concept as an excuse for preserving units or weapons of lesser importance in light of future trends in security environment.

Japan should be more attentive to the formation of credible dynamic deterrence, endorsed by response capabilities to various contingencies, while sustaining the target of "multi-functional, flexible and effective defense capabilities" stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines on and after FY2005.

Section 2. Response to Various Contingencies

The SDF will be likely to face various contingencies such as: 1) ballistic and/or cruise missile strikes; 2) attacks by special operations forces, terrorists, or cyber-attacks; 3) operations to maintain security of territorial waters/airspace and remote islands; 4) emergency evacuation operations of Japanese nationals; 5) armed conflicts in areas surrounding Japan; 6) a combination of the above contingencies (contingency complex); and 7) major disasters and pandemics.

Section 3. Securing Stability in the Areas Surrounding Japan

With the premise of close cooperation with the U.S. forces under the Japan–U.S. security arrangements, the MOD/SDF needs the following efforts, among others, for stability of the areas surrounding Japan: 1) enhancing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) activities; 2) promoting defense cooperation with the ROK and Australia and multilateral cooperation, and fostering defense exchanges and security dialogues with China and Russia; and 3) active engagement to regional security frameworks such as the ARF and ADMM Plus.

Section 4. Improving Global Security Environment

The SDF should display Japan's presence in the world through international peace cooperation activities. In collaboration with other agencies and organizations in Japan and overseas, the SDF should be involved in activities to improve global security environment such as: 1) assisting failed/fragile states and increasing participation in international peacekeeping operations; 2) countering international crimes including terrorism and piracy; 3) responding to major disasters; 4) dealing with proliferation of WMD/ballistic missiles, especially

enhancing collaboration in PSI arena; and 5) promoting global defense cooperation/exchange. Also, defense assistance funded by Japan should be made available as an option.

Section 5. Function and Arrangements of Defense Capabilities

With the above roles and missions in mind, Japan's building of defense capabilities should specifically aim at obtaining capabilities for: stabilization of regional/global order; effective response to a contingency complex in cooperation with the United States; and seamless reaction to an event that develops from peace time to emergency. To these ends, each of the SDF service branch should work together to enhance capabilities such as ISR capability, responsiveness, mobility, and Japan–U.S. interoperability, sustained by advanced technologies and information. Future building of defense capabilities should not concentrate solely on upgrade of weapons, but aim at an optimum combination of options based on an objective assessment of capabilities the SDF has of its own.

In light of a proper roles and missions sharing within the context of the Japan–U.S. alliance, the SDF should aim to enhance complementary capabilities vis-à-vis those of U.S. forces. It is also important for the SDF to expand the scope of missions that it carries out by its own capacity to include those requested in peacekeeping operations.

To appropriately respond to various and complex contingencies, the SDF needs to strengthen and expand its jointness. Each tri-service needs "selection and concentration," by enhancing required capabilities such as ISR, while reviewing less urgent weapons or arrangements. The SDF should also reinforce capabilities applicable to international missions such as long-distance mobility, as well as ensuring operational arrangements for unit rotation and logistic support that enable the SDF operations to be sustainable.

CHAPTER THREE: Infrastructure that Bolsters the Defense Force

Section 1. Personnel Infrastructure

The MOD should promptly design a new system that will address the SDF's challenges in personnel infrastructure of the SDF in a time of declining birth rates and long-life expectancy, and start building it. The design should be based on sufficient evaluation through comparisons of multiple options via simulation and other methods, and answer the purpose of securing personnel with needed skills, and providing incentives to SDF personnel. In doing so, special attentions should be paid to such aspects as: rebalancing of rank and age structure; effective outsourcing; and proper recruitment and fully-cared retirement and reemployment of SDF personnel.

Section 2. Materiel Infrastructure

Japan's domestic defense production and technology infrastructure are trapped in a vicious cycle of small-scale procurement, high-cost production, and decreased investment. To remedy this, the Japanese Government, in consultation with the private sectors, should promote selection and concentration in the fields of production and technology that are to be sustained in Japan. Hence, the Japanese Government must present a defense industrial and technology strategy.

At the same time, to save Japanese defense enterprises from being left behind in international technology innovation, the Japanese Government should allow these enterprises to participate in international joint development and/or production projects. With a careful design to contribute to international peace and improvement of Japan's security environment, it should revise current arms export prohibition policy.

For the MOD to acquire and maintain equipment while keeping the costs within a reasonable range, it should carry on its comprehensive reforms of defense acquisition. Especially, at the procurement stage, it should try harder to make long-term contracts that the defense enterprises also deem advantageous.

Section 3. Social Infrastructure

Neither the SDF nor the Japan–U.S. alliance can function effectively without the support of the Japanese public and the understanding and assistance of local residents in areas where defense facilities are situated. The Japanese Government is responsible for providing accurate information and appropriate explanation to the Japanese public. It must also undertake to communicate critical information in a contingency, making much of info-communication technology evolution.

The stationing of the SDF units must be reviewed constantly in consideration of defense requirement. At the same time, the importance of the SDF meeting expectations of local people should not be neglected. Because the existence of defense facilities could affect living conditions of locals, the Japanese Government needs to solicit their understanding and cooperation. Above all, it should pay particular attention to excessive burdens on Okinawa residents, and work on mitigating these burdens while cooperating with the U.S. Government. Both Governments should examine shared use of defense facilities which is tangible as a way of reducing burdens.

CHAPTER FOUR: Infrastructure that Bolsters Japan's Security Strategy

Section 1. Constructing Infrastructure for National Security Planning and Crisis Management at the Cabinet

Security organs subordinate to the Cabinet have augmented their functions through a series of structural reforms. One of remaining challenges is to conduct a government-wide extensive exercise bearing in mind a national emergency such as an "Armed Attack Situation" so as to verify whether the current security organs are functioning adequately and to make additional preparations. Another is to put into place an effective system that enables them to develop a security strategy.

Intelligence organs of the Cabinet have also made progress. Much needs to be improved, however, in such fields as: all-source analysis that makes full use of information gathered from all government organs; and efforts of rotating intelligence cycle of the cabinet-level more effectively. Other intelligence capabilities that should be strengthened include outer and cyber-space situational awareness and HUMINT (human intelligence), while envisioning a satellite system aiming at security and maritime domain awareness as mid- and long-term targets for improvement. Information security should be further enhanced to protect Japan's own intelligence and to work with foreign counterparts. It leads to a necessity of legislation of a secret protection law.

Important government policy guidelines such as the "National Defense Program Guidelines" require constant review. Though our council was formed to present a blue-ribbon-panel report to the Government, this format should be abandoned. Instead, we propose, as an option, that the Cabinet Secretariat or other organs establish a permanent council composed of experts from private sectors, who will continuously work on the security and defense policy through discussion. With this proposed change in format, we expect a security strategy will be further defined in a broader sense.

Section 2. Constructing Infrastructure for Integrated and Cooperative Relations among Domestic and International Actors

Inter-agency cooperation among government agencies, central and local government cooperation, and Government and private sector cooperation should be actively promoted to tackle agendas both domestic and international. A new forum for inter-agency cooperation needs to be created for the purpose of reconstructing failed states. In light of the increasing importance of private-sector exchanges in confidence-building, the Government should consider cooperative relations with the private sector in this field. In the field of international peace cooperation activities, the Government should promote civil-military cooperation with the NGOs in concrete terms, thereby promoting peace-building capabilities of Japan as a whole.

Agendas for a better-functioning Japan–U.S. alliance include those which relate to the Japanese Government's conventional interpretation of the Constitution concerning the exercise of the right of self-defense. The current official interpretation of Japan's Constitution does not allow Japanese defense forces to defend U.S. vessels against attack or to intercept ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. territory if such attacks were to occur prior to an armed attack situation against Japan. To prevent damage to the Japan–U.S. alliance arising from this situation, the Japanese Government must squarely tackle this issue responsibly. Of crucial importance is the question of the Government's political will concerning what Japan should do; reviewing the above official interpretation needs to be done with this question of political will foremost in mind.

As international peace cooperation activities are evolving into multi-functional ones, Japan's system to execute peace cooperation activities, which was formed just after the end of the Cold-War, is now partly outdated. The so-called "Five Principles on Japan's Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations" should therefore be revised constructively. Moreover, the SDF as their own mission should be authorized to conduct protection of foreign personnel and logistic support to units from other countries as its own missions since they have nothing to do with use of force which the Constitution prohibits. If necessary, the Government should change its interpretation of the Constitution. In addition, it is of great importance that Japan possesses a permanent law regarding international peace cooperation activities which should serve as a basic law for that area.

Section 3. Broadening and Strengthening Intellectual Infrastructure

While the field of security is widening its scope, scholars will have more opportunities of joining Government's decision making process related to security issue. At the same time, it is indispensable to improve international security environment with a range of expertise that are exchanged and shared among scholars and NGO activists as well as military and security officials. Japan should actively nurture people who can operate internationally in the field of security. Given the increasing importance of internal and international networks of think-tanks dedicated to security affairs, the modality of Japanese think-tanks and other non-profit organizations should be reconsidered so as to enable them to operate in financially stable conditions.

The Prime Minister must explain the Government's position and measures on security issues clearly and in a timely manner, even at a time of crisis. Structures that assist the Prime Minister for strategic communication should be reinforced. The outbound communication of the Government including via websites should also be improved. So far, Japanese private sector has exerted stronger communication power. Maintenance and enrichment of the Japanese intellectual infrastructure will be the key to strengthening Japan's communication power.

Reference 14. Cost of Major Programs in FY2010

1. Contents of Major Programs

(Unit: million yen)

Classification	Budget for FY2009	Budget for FY2010	Notes
1. Securing Japan's defense and safety through the deterrence of and effective response to contingencies			• Further improvement and strengthening of ballistic missile defense systems • Equipment capable of handling special weapon attacks, large scale and special disasters, and massive outbreaks of communicable diseases • Surveillance and guarding of important defense facilities in the event of attacks by special forces • Research and development of advanced equipment to deal with future threats • Improved fighter aircraft capability to secure air superiority • Strengthening anti-submarine capabilities, etc.
(1) Responding to ballistic missile launches	111,199	53,813	
(2) Responding to special weapon attacks and large scale or special disasters	85,397	65,755	
(3) Responding to attacks by special forces	95,383	91,244	
(4) Responding to cruise missile attacks	—	8,305	
(5) Securing air superiority	89,182	16,126	
(6) Securing maritime traffic security	213,660	205,697	
2. Further stabilization of the regional environment and order Expanded surveillance operations under normal conditions	20,665	104,225	• Improving a system to establish an intelligence advantage through intelligence gathering and surveillance operations
3. Improving the global security environment	16,993	10,926	• Reform and improvement of equipment related to international operations
4. Efforts toward space related projects and handling cyber attacks			• Promotion of the use of space in the defense domain, improvement of C4ISR capabilities, and carrying out research and development for advanced equipment
(1) The promotion of space related projects	63,281	51,189	
(2) Improved C4ISR capability	3,154	6,979	
(3) The promotion of advanced research and development	—	4,048	
5. Steady improvement of defense force (major equipment, materials, etc.)	684,984	626,083	
6. Efforts for U.S. Forces Realignment (measures for maintaining deterrence, etc.)	23,756	12,824	• Relocation of the GSDF Central Readiness Force Command to Camp Zama, relocation of the ASDF Command to Yokota Air Facility, and other relocations
7. Promotion of base provision, etc.	435,405	434,621	• Expense of measures for adjustment of the surroundings of bases, cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, rent for facilities, compensation cost, etc.
SACO related expenses	11,384	11,244	• Land return projects, exercise revision projects, noise reduction projects, projects for smooth SACO activities
Efforts toward U.S. Military restructuring (measures to reduce the local burden, etc.)	96,390	127,218	• Transfer of U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa to Guam, transfer of Futenma Air Station, the relocation of the carrier air wing, realignment grants, etc.

Notes: 1. Amounts are contract-based (The same applies hereafter).
2. Excluding initial expenses concerning the manufacture of equipment, materials, etc. (The same applies hereafter)

2. Enhancement of Equipment

(Unit: million yen)

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY2010 Budget	Future Obligation
Ground Equipment				
Type-10 tank	13	12,372		12,372
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	17	2,118		2,118
Type-99 155mm self-propelled howitzer	9	7,882		7,882
Type-87 reconnaissance vehicle	3	784		784
NBC reconnaissance vehicle	3	1,896	0	1,896
Light armored mobile vehicle	119	3,562	5	3,562
Other		8,304	66	8,238
Total		36,918	71	36,847

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY2010 Budget	Future Obligation
Guided Missiles				
Equipment and material for improvement of surface-to-air missile (Hawk)	—	2,082		2,082
Surface-to-air missile (Patriot)	—	8,160	37	8,122
Patriot system upgrade	6 units	61,860	37	61,823
Improving capabilities for surface-to-air missile (Patriot)	—	7,508	24	7,483
Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	1 company	19,475		19,475
Equipment for improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	—	945		945
Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	—	569		569
Type-91 man-portable surface-to-air missile (B)	22 sets	995		995
Type-88 surface-to-ship missile	—	2,025		2,025
Type-96 multi-purpose missile	1 set	2,149		2,149
Mid-range multi-purpose missile	13 sets	5,226		5,226
Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	39 sets	2,868		2,868
Other		2,325		2,325
Total		116,187	99	116,088
Aircraft				
GSDF				
Observation helicopter (OH-1)	4	7,840		7,840
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	3	9,487	1	9,486
Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	1	6,802	0	6,801
New trainer helicopter	1	300		300
Subtotal	9	24,429		24,427
MSDF				
Fixed wing patrol aircraft (P-1)	1	21,090	4	21,085
Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	3	17,911	90	17,821
Primary trainer (T-5)	4	957		957
Helicopter trainer (TH-135)	3	1,733		1,733
Subtotal	11	41,691	95	41,596
ASDF				
Modernization/upgrading of fighters (F-15)	(2) (—)	3,625	35	3,590
Improved fighter (F-15) self defense capability	(2) (1)	6,427		6,427
Improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability	(4) (—)	1,310		1,310
Addition of JDAM function to fighters (F-2)	(35)	4,668	60	4,608
Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	1	4,123	1	4,121
Improvement of early warning aircraft (E-2C)	(1)	809	81	728
Enhancement of the radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767)	(3)	11,139	557	10,582
Subtotal	1	32,101	734	31,366
Total	21	98,220	830	97,390
Vessels				
Destroyer (DDH)	1	113,855	337	113,518
Submarine (SS)	1	52,842	66	52,776
Replacement of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers	(1)	83	25	58
Total	2	166,780	428	166,352

Notes: 1. Monetary amounts in this table are rounded off and therefore totals are not exact.
2. The figures for the equipment and material for improvement of the improved missile (Hawk) are the expenses needed for the improvement of the guided missile.
3. The amount for the surface-to-air missile (Patriot), type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile, and type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile is the expense required for procuring training missiles.
4. The Patriot System upgrade refers to activities related to upgrading existing equipment.

5. As the modernizing/upgrading of fighters (F-15), improved fighter (F-15) self defense capability, improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability, addition of JDAM function to fighters (F-2), the improvement of early warning aircraft (E-2C), and enhancement of the radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767) are activities related to the improvement of existing aircraft, these are not included in the total number of aircraft.
6. Regarding the numbers for the modernizing/upgrading of fighters (F-15), improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability, and the addition of the JDAM function to fighters (F-2), the upper figure represents the number of improved aircraft while the lower number is improved equipment.
7. The replacement of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers is a project involving the upgrading of existing vessels and is thus not included in the total number of vessels.
8. Initial manufacturing costs, etc., for equipment, etc., is not included.

Reference 15. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY2010

Item	Counting Unit	Number Procured	
		FY2009	FY2010
Type-89 rifle	Gun	—	10,012
5.56-mm machine gun MINIMI	Gun	405	195
12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Gun	80	123
81-mm mortar L16	Mortar	10	5
120-mm mortar RT	Mortar	4	4
Type-99 155-mm self-propelled new howitzer	Vehicle	8	9
Type-90 tank	Vehicle	8	—
Type-10 tank	Vehicle	—	13
Light armored mobile vehicle	Vehicle	180	93
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	Vehicle	16	17
Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	Vehicle	1	3
Type-99 ammunition supply vehicle	Vehicle	4	2
Type-90 tank recovery vehicle	Vehicle	2	1
Type-91 tank bridge	Vehicle	1	1
Type-78 snow mobile	Vehicle	12	—
Type-10 snow mobile	Vehicle	—	12
Chemical protection vehicle	Vehicle	4	—
NBC reconnaissance vehicle	Vehicle	—	3
Anti-personnel sniper rifle	Gun	159	105
Observation helicopter (OH-1)	Aircraft	2	4
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	Aircraft	1	3
Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	Aircraft	4	1
New trainer helicopter	Aircraft	1	1
Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	Company	2	1
Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	—	—
Type-91 man-portable surface-to-air missile (B)	Set	19	22
Type-96 multi-purpose missile system	Set	1	1
Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	Set	43	39
Mid-range multi-purpose missile	Set	10	13

Item	Counting Unit	Number Procured	
		FY2009	FY2010
5,000-ton destroyer	Vessel	2	—
19,500-ton destroyer	Vessel	—	1
2,900-ton submarine	Vessel	—	1
570-ton minesweeper	Vessel	1	—
Cable repairing/laying ship (ARC)	Vessel	1	—
Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	Aircraft	2	3
Rescue amphibian (US-2)	Aircraft	1	—
Helicopter trainer (P-1)	Aircraft	—	1
Primary trainer (T-5)	Aircraft	5	4
Next helicopter trainer (TH-X)	Aircraft	3	3
Exchange of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers	Vessel	1	1
Modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15)	Aircraft	(22) (60)	(2) (—)
Improved fighter (F-15) self defense capability	Aircraft	—	(2)
Improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability	Aircraft	—	(1) (4)
Addition of JDAM function to fighters (F-2)	Aircraft	(—) (12)	(—) (35)
Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	Aircraft	—	1
Improvement of the early warning aircraft (E-2C)	Aircraft	(1)	(1)
Improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767)	Aircraft	(1)	(3)
Patriot system upgrade		—	(6)
Capacity improvement of the surface-to-air guided missile, Patriot	Group of items	—	—
Light armored mobile vehicles	Vehicle	23	26

Note: Regarding the numbers for modernization of fighters (F-15), improved fighter (F-2) air-to-air combat capability, and the addition of JDAM function to fighters (F-2), the upper line shows aircraft to be upgraded while the lower line shows equipment with improved capability.

Reference 16. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2010)

Type	Recoilless guns	Mortars	Field artillery	Rocket launchers, etc.	Anti-aircraft machine guns	Tanks	Armored vehicles
Approximate number owned	3,100	2,050	620	1,590	110	830	980

Note: Each type of gun, except those of tanks and armored vehicles, includes self-propelled guns.

Performance Specifications and Data

Type	Item	Artillery	Total Weight (ton)	Maximum Speed (km/h)	Capacity/No. of Operators (people)
Tanks	Type-90 tank	120-mm anti-tank gun	Approx. 50	70	3
Armed vehicles	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun or automatic grenade launcher	Approx. 15	100	10
	Type-89 armored combat vehicle	35-mm machine gun	Approx. 27	70	10
	Type-82 command and communication vehicle	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Approx. 14	100	8
	Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	25-mm machine gun	Approx. 15	100	5
Field artillery	155-mm howitzer FH70	155-mm howitzer	Approx. 9.6	16	9
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer	155-mm howitzer	Approx. 40	49	4
	203-mm self-propelled howitzer	203-mm howitzer	Approx. 28	54	5
Anti-aircraft machine guns	Type-87 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun	35-mm anti-aircraft machine gun	Approx. 38	53	3

Note: The weight of the 155-mm howitzer FH70 includes that of the supplementary power unit. The maximum speed indicated above is the maximum speed of the howitzer with the supplementary power unit activated.

Reference 17. Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2010)

Service	Model Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-1	Liaison and Reconnaissance	4	290	2 (5)	10	12	Turboprop, twin-engines
		LR-2	Liaison and Reconnaissance	6	300	2 (8)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	73	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
		OH-6D	Observation	108	140	1 (3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	30	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1H/J	Utility	148	120	2 (11)	12/13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	55	150/140	3 (55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-60JA	Utility	29	150	2 (12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		AH-64D	Combat	9	150	2	18	6	Turboshaft, twin-engines

Service	Model Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full (m)	Engine
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-3C	Patrol	90	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, four-engines
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	60	150	3	15	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		SH-60K	Patrol	32	140	4	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		MH-53E	Minesweeping and transport	9	150	7	22	6	Turboshaft, triple engines
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Combat	202	2.5 mach	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engines
		F-4EJ	Combat	70	2.2 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		F-2A/B	Combat	89	2 mach	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, one-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	13	2.2 mach/ 1.8 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		C-1	Transport	26	440	5 (60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engine
		C-130H	Transport	16	340	5 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, four-engines
		KC-767	Aerial refueling Transport	4	460	4–8 (200)	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engines
		E-2C	Transport	13	330	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	450	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	16	150	3 (55)	16	4	Turboshaft, twin-engines

Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2010.
2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.
3. F-4EJs include 63 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

Reference 18. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, with Performance Specifications and Data

Number of Ships

(As of March 31, 2010)

Class	Number (vessels)	Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)
Destroyer	52	220
Submarine	16	44
Mine warfare ship	30	27
Patrol combatant craft	7	1
Amphibious ship	13	29
Auxiliary ship	31	127
Total	149	449

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

Performance Specifications and Data

Class	Type	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry		
Destroyer	Kongo	7,250	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Aegis system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Atago	7,750	30	5-inch gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Aegis system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Shirane	5,200	32 (31)	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Short-range SAM system × 1 ASROC system × 1	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hyuuga	13,950	30	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] x 2	Vertical launching system x 1 set	Triple torpedo tube Patrol helicopter x 3
	Hatakaze	4,600 (4,650)	30	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Tartar system × 1 SSM system × 1 set	ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Takanami	4,650	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Murasame	4,550	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Asagiri	3,500 (3,550)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Hatsuyuki	2,950 (3,050)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Abukuma	2,000	27	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 1	SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set	Triple torpedo tube × 2
Submarine	Oyashio	2,750	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set		
	Souryu	2,950	20	Underwater launching tube x 1 set		
Minesweeper	Yaeyama	1,000	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Deep-sea minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
	Sugashima	510	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
	Hirashima	570	14	20-mm machine gun × 1	Minesweeping equipment × 1 set	
Missile ship	Hayabusa	200	44	76-mm gun × 1	SSM system × 1 set	
Amphibious ship	Osumi	8,900	22	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2	Landing craft air cushion [LCAC] × 2	

Note: Parentheses indicate that some ships have these standard displacements.

Reference 19. Guided Missile Specifications

(As of March 31, 2010)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System
Anti-ballistic	Patriot (PAC-3)	ASDF	Approx. 300	Approx. 5.2	Approx. 26	Program + command + radar homing
	SM-3	MSDF	Approx. 1,500	Approx. 6.6	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + Image + IR homing
Anti-aircraft	Patriot (PAC-2)	ASDF	Approx. 1,000	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 41	Program + command + TVM
	Improved Hawk	GSDF	Approx. 640	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 36	Radar homing
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx. 930	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 33	—
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (improved) (SAM-1C)		Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7/2.9	Approx. 16	Image + IR homing Radar homing
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)	GSDF/ ASDF	Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7	Approx. 16	IR homing
	Portable SAM (Stinger)		Approx. 10	Approx. 1.5	Approx. 7	IR homing
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)	GSDF	Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing
	Standard (SM-1)	MSDF	Approx. 630	Approx. 4.5	Approx. 34	Radar homing
	Standard (SM-2)		Approx. 710	Approx. 4.7	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)		Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-162)		Approx. 300	Approx. 3.8	Approx. 25	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)	ASDF	Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Sidewinder (AIM-9L)		Approx. 89	Approx. 2.9	Approx. 13	IR homing
	Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)		Approx. 91	Approx. 3.0	Approx. 13	IR homing
	Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)		Approx. 220	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing
	Type-04 air-to-air missile (AAM-5)		Approx. 95	Approx. 3.1	Approx. 13	IR homing
Anti-ship	Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)	GSDF	Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (SSM)	MSDF	Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (USM)		Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Harpoon (ASM)		Approx. 520	Approx. 3.9	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)		Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)		Approx. 510	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)	ASDF	Approx. 600	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)		Approx. 530	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing
Anti-tank	Type-87 anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx. 12	Approx. 1.1	Approx. 11	Laser homing
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile		Approx. 11	Approx. 0.9	Approx. 12	IR image homing
	TOW		Approx. 18	Approx. 1.2	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
Anti-landing craft and anti-tank	Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile	GSDF	Approx. 33	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance
	Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)		Approx. 59	Approx. 2.0	Approx. 16	Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM
	Hellfire	MSDF	Approx. 48	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 18	Laser homing

Reference 20. Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item / Fiscal Year	GNP/GDP (Original Estimates) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-Related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-Related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955	75,590	9,915	- 0.8	8,107	- 2.8	1,349	- 3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	- 0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	- 2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.86	0.959	6.65	11.2
1996	4,960,000	751,049	5.8	431,409	2.4	48,455	2.58	0.977	6.45	11.2
1997	5,158,000	773,900	3.0	438,067	1.5	49,414 49,475	1.98 2.1	0.958 0.959	6.39 6.39	11.3 11.3
1998	5,197,000	776,692	0.4	445,362	1.7	49,290 49,397	- 0.3 - 0.2	0.948 0.950	6.35 6.36	11.1 11.1
1999	4,963,000	818,601	5.4	468,878	5.3	49,201 49,322	- 0.2 - 0.2	0.991 0.994	6.01 6.03	10.5 10.5
2000	4,989,000	849,871	3.8	480,914	2.6	49,218 49,358	0.0 0.1	0.987 0.989	5.79 5.81	10.2 10.3
2001	5,186,000	826,524	- 2.7	486,589	1.2	49,388 49,553	0.3 0.4	0.952 0.956	5.98 6.00	10.1 10.2
2002	4,962,000	812,300	- 1.7	475,472	- 2.3	49,395 49,560	0.0 0.0	0.995 0.999	6.08 6.10	10.4 10.4
2003	4,986,000	817,891	0.7	475,922	0.1	49,265 49,530	- 0.3 - 0.1	0.988 0.993	6.02 6.06	10.4 10.4
2004	5,006,000	821,109	0.4	476,320	0.1	48,764 49,030	- 1.0 - 1.0	0.974 0.979	5.94 5.97	10.2 10.3
2005	5,115,000	821,829	0.1	472,829	- 0.7	48,301 48,564	- 1.0 - 1.0	0.944 0.949	5.88 5.91	10.2 10.3
2006	5,139,000	796,860	- 3.0	463,660	- 1.9	47,906 48,139	- 0.8 - 0.9	0.932 0.937	6.01 6.04	10.3 10.4
2007	5,219,000	829,088	4.0	469,784	1.3	47,818 48,016	- 0.2 - 0.3	0.916 0.916	5.77 5.79	10.2 10.2
2008	5,269,000	830,613	0.2	472,845	0.7	47,426 47,796	- 0.8 - 0.5	0.900 0.907	5.71 5.75	10.0 10.1
2009	5,102,000	885,480	6.6	517,310	9.4	47,028 47,741	- 0.8 - 0.1	0.922 0.936	5.31 5.39	9.1 9.2
2010	4,752,000	922,992	4.2	534,542	3.3	46,826 47,903	- 0.4 0.3	0.985 1.008	5.07 5.19	8.76 8.96

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995 onward, in each case based on original estimates.
2. The upper figures for defense-related expenditures for FY1997 and thereafter exclude SACO-related expenses (6.1 billion yen in FY1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY1999, 14.0 billion yen in FY2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010), while the lower figures include them.
3. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

Reference 21. Changes in Major Area of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item / Fiscal Year	Annual Expenditures on General Account	National Defense	Composition Ratio	Social Security	Composition Ratio	Education and Science	Composition Ratio	Public Works	Composition Ratio
2005	821,829	48,301 48,564	5.9 5.9	203,808	24.8	57,235	7.0	75,310	9.2
2006	796,860	47,906 48,139	6.0 6.0	205,739	25.8	52,671	6.6	72,015	9.0
2007	829,088	47,818 48,016	5.8 5.8	211,409	25.5	52,743	6.4	69,473	8.4
2008	830,613	47,426 47,796	5.7 5.8	217,824	26.2	53,122	6.4	67,352	8.1
2009	885,480	47,028 47,741	5.3 5.4	248,344	28.0	53,104	6.0	70,701	8.0
2010	922,992	46,826 47,903	5.1 5.2	272,686	29.5	55,860	6.1	57,731	6.3

Notes: 1. Public works expenses for FY1995 and thereafter include the amount of money from revenues other than the sale of relevant stocks for loan financed public construction projects implemented by FY1991 under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital," and also the amount of money to be paid or subsidized by the Government at the time of repayment of loans for public construction projects under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital."

2. The upper figures for defense expenditures exclude SACO-related expenses (26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009, and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community) (7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010), while the lower figures include them.

3. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

Reference 22. Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

Item / Fiscal Year	2001		2002		2003		2004		2005	
	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions	22,269	45.1 44.9	22,273	45.1 44.9	22,188	45.0 44.8	21,654	44.4 44.2	21,562	44.6 44.4
Materials	27,119 27,284	54.9 55.1	27,122 27,287	54.9 55.1	27,077 27,342	55.0 55.2	27,110 27,376	55.6 55.8	26,739 27,002	55.4 55.6
Equipment acquisition	9,178	18.6 18.5	9,206	18.6 18.6	9,028	18.3 18.2	8,806	18.1 18.0	9,000	18.6 18.5
R&D	1,353	2.7 2.7	1,277	2.6 2.6	1,470	3.0 3.0	1,707	3.5 3.5	1,316	2.7 2.7
Facility improvement	1,598	3.2 3.2	1,570	3.2 3.2	1,528	3.1 3.1	1,442	3.0 2.9	1,386	2.9 2.9
Maintenance	8,865	18.0 17.9	9,065	18.4 18.3	9,075	18.4 18.3	9,175	18.8 18.7	9,177	19.0 18.9
Base countermeasures	5,326	10.8 10.7	5,189	10.5 10.5	5,151	10.5 10.4	5,094	10.4 10.4	4,973	10.3 10.2
The cost for SACO-related projects	165	0 0.3	165	0 0.3	265	0 0.5	266	0 0.5	263	0 0.5
U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Others	798	1.6 1.6	815	1.6 1.6	825	1.7 1.7	885	1.8 1.8	887	1.8 1.8
Total	49,388 49,553	100.0	49,395 49,560	100.0	49,265 49,530	100.0	48,764 49,030	100.0	48,301 48,564	100.0

Item \ Fiscal Year	2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions	21,337	44.6 44.3	21,018	44.0 43.8	20,940	44.2 43.8	20,773	44.2 43.5	20,850	44.5 43.5
Materials	26,570 26,803	55.5 55.7	26,801 26,999	56.0 56.2	26,486 26,856	55.8 56.2	26,255 26,969	55.8 56.5	25,975 27,059	55.5 56.5
Equipment acquisition	8,594	17.9 17.9	8,663	18.1 18.0	8,125	17.1 17.0	8,252	17.5 17.3	7,738	16.5 16.1
R&D	1,714	3.6 3.6	1,445	3.0 3.0	1,728	3.6 3.6	1,198	2.5 2.5	1,588	3.4 3.3
Facility improvement	1,150	2.4 2.4	1,099	2.3 2.3	933	2.0 2.0	1,325	2.8 2.8	1,343	2.9 2.8
Maintenance	9,405	19.6 19.5	10,222	21.4 21.3	10,382	21.9 21.7	10,336	22.0 21.7	10,181	21.8 21.3
Base countermeasures	4,879	10.2 10.1	4,618	9.7 9.6	4,535	9.6 9.5	4,399	9.4 9.2	4,365	9.3 9.1
The cost for SACO-related projects	233	0 0.5	126	0 0.3	180	0 0.4	112	0 0.2	169	0 0.4
U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (reduction of burden on local communities)	—	—	72	0 0.2	191	0 0.4	602	0 1.3	909	0 1.9
Others	827	1.7 1.7	754	1.6 1.6	783	1.7 1.6	746	1.3 1.3	760	1.6 1.6
Total	47,906 48,139	100.0	47,818 48,016	100.0	47,426 47,796	100.0	47,028 47,741	100.0	46,825 47,903	100.0

Notes: 1. Personnel and food provisions expenses include personnel wage and food expenditures.
2. Equipment acquisition expenses include the purchase of arms, vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
3. R&D expenses include those of equipment.
4. Facility improvement expenses include those of airfields and barracks.
5. Maintenance costs include those for housing, clothing and training.
6. Base countermeasures expenses include those for areas surrounding base countermeasures and burden by the USFJ.
7. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
8. The upper figures for Budgets and Composition Ratio exclude the cost for SACO-related expenses (16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010), while the lower figures include them.
9. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

Reference 23. Trend of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries

Country \ Fiscal Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Japan (100 million yen)	47,906 48,139 - 0.8% - 0.9%	47,818 48,016 - 0.2% - 0.3%	47,426 47,796 - 0.8% - 0.5%	47,028 47,741 - 0.8% - 0.1%	46,826 47,903 - 0.4% 0.3%
U.S. (US$1 million)	499,297 5.3%	528,548 5.9%	594,632 12.5%	636,742 7.1%	692,032 (estimate) 8.7% (estimate)
U.K. (GBP 1 million)	34,045 2.7%	37,387 9.8%	38,579 3.2%	35,165 - 8.8%	36,702 4,4%
Germany (€1 million)	27,870 15.9%	28,783 3.3%	29,450 2.3%	31,179 5.9%	31,111 - 0.2%
France (€1 million)	36,061 9.5%	36,285 0.6%	36,780 1.4%	37,394 1.7%	39,178 4.8%
Russia (RR 100 million)	6,660.266 25.4%	8,220.360 23.4%	9,596.000 16.7%	12,160.356 26.7%	12,570.141 3.4%
China (100 million yuan)	2,807 14.7%	3,472 23.7%	4,099 18.1%	4,729 15.4%	5,191 9.8%

Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.
2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.
3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the historical table FY2011. Figures for FY2010 are estimated values.
4. The figures for the United Kingdom up to FY2009 are based on U.K. Defense Statistics published by Ministry of Defence. The figure for FY2010 and 2009 is the expected amount announced in the budget message.
5. The German defense expenditures rose sharply in FY2006 because the data began to include pension expenditures. The defense expenditures actually decreased by 0.7% in comparison with FY2005 when the pension expenditures are excluded.
6. Data for China is based on the Finance Budget Report to the National People's Congress.
7. As for Japan, the upper figures exclude SACO-related expenses (26.3 billion yen in FY2005, 23.3 billion yen in FY2006, 12.6 billion yen in FY2007, 18.0 billion yen in FY2008, 11.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 16.9 billion yen in FY2010) as well as U.S. Forces realignment-related expenses (portion meant to reduce the burden on the local community; 7.2 billion yen in FY2007, 19.1 billion yen in FY2008, 60.2 billion yen in FY2009 and 90.9 billion yen in FY2010), while the lower figures include them. The expenditures on the Security Council are not included in the defense-related expenditures since they are requested for rearrangement as other expenses from FY2008.

Reference 24. Basic Principles for Responding to Armed Attack Situations

Situations, etc.	Basic Principles
General	❍ National and local government and specified public institutions must mutually cooperate to take thorough measures, while obtaining cooperation of citizens ❍ Citizens' freedom and rights guaranteed by the Japan Constitution must be respected, and even if these are restricted, such restrictions are limited to the minimum required to respond to the armed attack situations, and must be expected through fair and proper procedures[1] ❍ Citizens must be informed in a timely and proper manner of the armed attack situations and situation concerning responses. ❍ While closely cooperating with the United States based on the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, must work to obtain understanding and cooperative action of the United Nations and the international community
Expected Armed Attack Situations	Must work to avoid occurrence of a military attack
Armed Attack Situations	Prepare for the military attack. If the military attack occurs, must work to bring it to an end while repelling the attack. However, if the military attack occurs, when repelling the attack, military force must be used within limits judged reasonably necessary corresponding to the contingency.

Note 1: In this situation, the Japan Constitution, Articles 14, 18, 19, 21, and other provisions concerning basic human rights must receive the maximum compliance.

Reference 25. Examples of Items Provided by Basic Response Plan

Basic Response Plan			
Armed attack situation	Situation where an armed attack is anticipated	Recognition of armed attack situation or situation where an armed attack is anticipated, and the facts that constituted the base of the recognition	
		Overall plan for the response to the armed attack situation	
		Important items regarding response measures	
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to dispatch a defense call-up order for SDF reserve personnel and ready reserve personnel for defense operations
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to dispatch a defense operation alert order
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to order defense facility construction
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to order the offer of service as action related measures provided in the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law
			Approval for the Minister of Defense to order detention inspections and cruising as provided in the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law
			Request for Diet approval on issuing a defense operations order
			Ordering defense operations

Note: The matter described to the Basic Response Plan may change according to situations, including armed attacks.

Reference 26. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Ministry of Defense

Civil Protection Plans are prepared by all designated administrative agencies based on provisions including Article 33, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Protection Law.

1. Basic Concept

The SDF shall take measures to protect civilians such as evacuation, relief of residents, and responses to armed attack situations, to the extent possible without affecting its main duty to repel an armed attack with full force in an armed attack situation.

2. Implementation Framework

a. An intra-ministry coordination system and emergency call posture of personnel shall be developed in peacetime.

b. In armed attack situations and anticipated situations, the Defense Minister shall instruct necessary responses with the advice of the Defense Council, to be held as necessary. To that end, a system assisting the Defense Minister shall be established through augmentation of personnel and others.

In addition, units shall be put on readiness in anticipation of implementing civil protection measures (enhanced service capabilities of personnel, inspection and maintenance of equipment and supplies, etc.).

3. Implementation Procedures for Civil Protection Measures

a. If the Defense Minster is requested by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is unavoidable, or is requested by the Task Force Chief, the Minister of State for Defense, with the approval of the Prime Minister, orders a civilian protection dispatch to implement civil protection measures.

b. If the Minster of State for Defense is requested for support by a prefectural governor and recognizes that it is required, the Defense Minister orders defense operations/public security operations to all or part of the forces to implement civil protection measures.

4. Contents of Civil Protection Measures Executed by the SDF

a. Evacuation of residents

The SDF, in coordination with related organizations, implements guidance and transportation of evacuated residents, as well as collection and provision of necessary information. In addition, it coordinates and manages procedures associated with traffic inside the SDF's posts and bases or on the premises of U.S. military installations in Japan, for the purpose of evacuation.

b. Relief of evacuated residents

The SDF implements lifesaving measures (such as search and rescue, and provision of first aid), and as appropriate, measures for livelihood support (such as preparation of hot meals, water supply, and transportation of aid supplies). In addition, it gives permission to use facilities of the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of relief.

c. Responses to armed attack situations

The SDF checks on the damage situation (including monitoring support), saves lives (including search and rescue, and provision of first aid), prevents the spread of damage (including evacuation support of surrounding residents, and firefighting), and removes hazardous substances caused by attacks using NBC weapons, etc. In addition, it implements support for securing safety of life-related facilities (including instruction/advice, and personnel dispatch).

5. Responses to Emergency Response Situations

The SDF implements protection measures for emergency responses pursuant to the measures for civil protection in implementation procedures and content.

Reference 27. Participation in Civil Protection-Related Joint Exercises by the National Government and the Local Public Entity (FY2009)

Types of Exercise	Date	Location
Field exercise	November 8, 2009	Ishikawa prefecture
	November 30, 2009	Hyogo prefecture
	December 22, 2009	Fukushima prefecture
	February 6, 2010	Tokushima prefecture
Simulation exercise	October 26, 2009	Tochigi prefecture
	November 5, 2009	Iwate prefecture
	November 10, 2009	Tokyo
	November 17, 2009	Yamanashi prefecture
	November 26, 2009	Akita prefecture
	November 27, 2009	Gunma prefecture
	January 20, 2010	Okinawa prefecture
	January 22, 2010	Fukui prefecture
	February 10, 2010	Kagawa prefecture
	February 16, 2010	Kochi prefecture

Note: Implemented in 5 prefectures in FY2005.
Implemented in 10 prefectures in FY2006.
Implemented in 15 prefectures in FY2007.
Implemented in 18 prefectures in FY2008.

Prefectures where Exercises were Implemented Multiple Times

Number of Times	Location
Twice	Ibaraki prefecture (2006, 2007) Saitama prefecture (2005, 2006) Nagano prefecture (2007, 2008) Yamaguchi prefecture (2007, 2008) Saga prefecture (2005, 2006)
Three times	Fukui prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008) Tottori prefecture (2005, 2006, 2007) Ehime prefecture (2006, 2007, 2008)
Four times	Fukui prefecture (2005, 2006, 2008, 2009)

Reference 28. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.

(Adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003)

(Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System)

1. On the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD), under the recognition that Japan should take active measures on the issue given the advancement of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001 to FY2005) (hereinafter "MTDP"), which was adopted by the Security Council of Japan and approved by the Cabinet on December 15, 2003, stipulates that "necessary measures will be taken upon the review of its technical feasibility." As recent tests of various kinds have confirmed the high technical feasibility of the BMD, development of the BMD system has become feasible upon the improvement of capacities and joint operation of the existing Aegis system equipped destroyers and the surface-to-air Patriot guided missile system. Thus, considering that the BMD system is inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and is the only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the system agrees with Japan's exclusively defense oriented policy. Consequently, the Government of Japan is determined to equip the nation with the same system.

(Review of Japan's Defense Capabilities)

2. Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats as well as diverse contingencies that are likely to have a negative impact on the peace and security of the nation (hereinafter "the new threats, etc.") has been urgently needed for the international community. For the peace and stability of the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible measures against such new threats, etc., through comprehensive and prompt responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to the conclusion that the whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed.

To this end, we will make effective measures against the new threats, etc., according to the specific features of each of the main threatening operations with regard to and locations, further developing cooperative relationship with the United States based on the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, and promoting cooperation with neighboring nations and international organizations. At the same time, the Government of Japan will review the whole defensive capacities of Japan in order to be prepared for various contingencies and will take necessary measures to protect

the peace and stability of the international community to which Japan belongs. In so doing, preparation of necessary schemes that can effectually deal with the new threats, etc., including terrorist attacks and ballistic missile attacks, will be prepared, and at the same time the current defense build-up concept and equipment system will be fundamentally reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made, while taking events of large scale invasion into consideration. These actions are to build defense forces that are capable of effectively responding to the new security environment.

Based on the views described above, when renewing the current system of the Self-Defense Forces into a new system, we will pursue the improvement of readiness, mobility, flexibility and multipurpose functions of the system as well as highly advanced technical and intelligence capabilities, and at the same time we will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations, equipment and other items concerned in order to improve their efficiencies. In so doing, the following items will be focused in order to establish an effectual system.

(1) The current organizations and alike will be reviewed, and new organizations, including an advisory organization to the Defense Minister, necessary for the operation of the Self-Defense Forces that centers on joint operation, will be formed.

(2) As for the major units of the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, new schemes, including a new organization, will be constructed in order that effectual measures may be taken in the event of new threats, etc.

(3) Necessary functions, organizations and equipments will be prepared in order to readily take actions that effectively contribute to the peace and security of the international community.

(4) In order to prepare for the unexpected change of the security situations in the future, while securely retaining the fundamental components to respond to events of large-scale invasion and concerning the security situations of the surrounding area of Japan, the following measures will be taken.

   a. Regarding the Ground Self-Defense Force, a defense build-up concept focused on anti-tank warfare will be developed, and a system that can promptly respond to the new threats, etc., will be prepared through improvement of mobility and other capabilities, while the current situation of tanks, artilleries and other weapons will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing will be made.

   b. Regarding the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the defense build-up concept will be altered to one that is focused on anti-submarine warfare, and preparation of a responding system to ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc., will be attempted, while the current situation of destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing will be made.

   c. Regarding the Air Self-Defense Force, the current defense force build-up concept focused on the anti-combat aircraft warfare will be modified to better prepare for ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc. At the same time, the current situation of combat aircraft and other equipment will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing and other measures will be taken.

(Defense-related Expenditures)

3. When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the Government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations and equipment of the Self-Defense Forces based on the items described above (see 2) in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, make efforts to reduce defense-related expenditures taking into consideration the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan. Based on such views, the government will lay down a new Mid-Term Defense Program that will replace the current program by the end of 2004 and determine the limit of the total amount needed for the same program.

(Formulation of New Defense Program Guidelines)

4. As a precursor to the formulation of a new Mid-Term Defense Program, the Government of Japan will formulate new National Defense Program Guidelines that will replace the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY1996 and Beyond (adopted by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995). The new Guidelines will be formulated to adopt the system to the new security environment and follow the concepts described above (see 1 and 2). We also aim to stipulate our visions for Japan's defense forces, including the position of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in activities to maintain the peace and stability of the international community.

Reference 29. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures"

(December 19, 2003)

1. The Government of Japan decided "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" at the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet today. This decision shows the thinking behind the introduction of a BMD system, and at the same time, indicates the direction of Japan's defense force review taking into account the introduction of a BMD system and the new security environment. Based on this decision, the Government of Japan will formulate a new National Defense Program Outline and a new Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of the year 2004.
2. The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of a BMD system is high, and noting that a BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defense-oriented policy, decided to introduce the multi-tier defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).
3. The technical feasibility of the BMD system has been confirmed with the results from interception tests and other capability tests carried out by the United States as well as with the Japan's original simulation experiments. Therefore, we concluded that technical reliability of such systems is considerably high and the technology has reached a sufficiently high level for practical use as we can see from the decision by the United States on the primary deployment.
4. A BMD system is the only purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect the lives and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of our exclusively defense-oriented policy. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect regional stability.
5. As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at the defense of Japan. It will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own sensors.
6. In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of ballistic missile attack is basically conducted as a defense operation that is undertaken in situations regarded as an armed attack against Japan. In addition, due to the nature of ballistic missiles and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable appropriate responses to each situation.

7. The joint Japan–U.S. technical research currently underway is not for the system being introduced this time, but it aims to improve the capability of future interceptors. It remains important to carry on the research in order to take all possible measures to ensure national defense. The future transition to the development and deployment stage will be decided separately, taking international situations of the time and other factors into consideration.
8. Japan will take all possible measures to ensure national defense and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by ensuring transparency and encouraging international understanding on BMD, and by promoting further cooperation with the United States on technology and operation.

Reference 30. Emergency-Response Procedures Concerning Measures to Destroy Ballistic Missiles or Other Objects as Stipulated under Article 82-2, Paragraph 3 of SDF Law

(Cabinet Decision on July 14, 2009)

In line with Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the SDF Law (No. 165 of 1954 law and hereinafter called the Law) and Article 104-2 of the Ordinance to Execute the SDF Law (No. 179 of 1954 ordinance and hereinafter called the Ordinance), emergency-response procedures concerning measures to destroy ballistic missiles and others (as stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-3 of the Law) are stipulated as follows.

These procedures are stipulated based on the current defense capability Japan has against ballistic missiles, arising from the deployment of a PAC-3 Patriot missile at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group of the Central Air Defense Force of the Air Defense Command of the ASDF (hereinafter called the 1st Air Defense Missile Group).

The procedures will be revised in the future if a revision is deemed necessary due to reasons including the enhancement of Japan's ballistic missile defense capability.

1. Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of "emergency" as stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (related to Article 104-2-1 of the Ordinance)

(1) Conditions for the Defense Minister to issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2

If either of the conditions shown below is met, the Defense Minister will issue an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2.

a. When a ballistic missile is suspected of having been launched in a foreign country or there is a possibility that one will launched in a foreign country, but it cannot be recognized at that time that the missile is expected to fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the purpose of a possible launch of the missile, its capability, and other factors

b. When there is a possibility that a satellite launch rocket or other objects besides aircraft launched in a foreign country, whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property, may fall due to an accident and other reasons, but it cannot be recognized at that time that the rocket or other objects may fly toward Japan due to an uncertainty over the location of the accident, the situation of the accident, and other factors

(2) Conditions which are required in order to certify the situation as a state of "emergency"

It can be certified that the situation is a state of "emergency" if Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system recognizes that a ballistic missile or other objects are flying toward Japan.

2. Scope of Ballistic Missiles and Other Objects Which Become Subject to Measures Stipulated Under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law and Means to Destroy the Missiles or Others (Related to Article 104-2-2 of the Ordinance)

(1) Scope of ballistic missiles and other objects

Any of the objects listed below that is recognized to be flying toward Japan, using its BMD system

a. Ballistic missile
b. Satellite launch rocket
c. Artificial satellite
d. Other objects besides aircraft whose possible fall may result in causing serious damage to human life and property

(2) Means to destroy ballistic missiles or other objects

Based on provisions stipulated under Article 93-3 of the Law, a PAC-3 Patriot missile deployed at the 1st Air Defense Missile Group will be launched with the aim of destroying an incoming ballistic missile or other objects over Japanese territory or over international waters in the vicinity of Japan (including the exclusive economic zone stipulated under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea).

3. Areas Where SDF Units Undertake Activities to Implement Measures Based on Provisions Stipulated Under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (Related to Article 104-2-3 of the Ordinance)

Areas where SDF units undertake activities following the issuance of an order by the Defense Ministry to implement measures based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law are in Japanese territory, international waters in the vicinity of Japan and over such waters.

Areas where SDF personnel belonging to the 1st Air Defense Missile Group undertake activities are limited to places where their activities are deemed necessary to prevent a possible fall of a ballistic missile or other objects from causing damage in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Such areas will be designated under an order to be issued by the Defense Minister based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law.

4. Matters Concerning Command of SDF Units Which Implement Measures Based on Provisions Stipulated Under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law (Related to Article 104-2-4 of the Ordinance)

SDF units which implement these measures are the 1st Air Defense Missile Group, the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing, and other units whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under certain situations. SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be placed under the Commander of the Air Defense Command.

The command of the Defense Minister with regard to operations of SDF units in charge of implementing the measures will be conducted via the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office. A Defense Minister's order regarding this matter will be executed by the Chief of Staff at the Joint Staff Office.

5. Matters Concerning Cooperation with Relevant Government Organizations (Related to Article 104-2-5 of the Ordinance)

When the Defense Ministry recognizes the flight of a ballistic missile or other objects toward Japan using its BMD system, it will immediately inform relevant government organizations (the Cabinet Secretariat, the National Police Agency, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Fisheries Agency, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Japan Coast Guard and other administrative organizations whose activities are judged by the Defense Minister to be necessary under

certain situations) of the detection of the missile or objects, areas where they are forecast to fall and an estimated arrival time.

When SDF units in charge of implementing measures to destroy the missile or other objects have taken such measures, the Defense Ministry will immediately inform the relevant government organizations of the situation regarding its destruction.

In addition, the Defense Ministry will conduct necessary cooperation with the relevant government organizations in response to their requests.

6. Matters Concerning Measures to be Taken When It is Recognized that a Ballistic Missile or Other Objects Stipulated Under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are Possibly Flying Toward Japan While an Order Issued Based on Provisions Stipulated Under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in Place (Related to Article 104-2-6)

When it is recognized that a ballistic missile or other objects stipulated under Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law are possibly flying toward Japan while an order based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law is in place, the Defense Minister, based on Paragraph 1 of Article 82-2 of the Law, will order SDF units to take the measures to destroy the missile or objects after receiving approval from the Prime Minister. The Defense Minister will then withdraw the order which has been in place based on provisions stipulated under Paragraph 3 of Article 82-2 of the Law.

Reference 31. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary "Japan–U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced SM-3 Missile for Ballistic Missile Defense"

(December 24, 2005)

1. The Government of Japan, through today's meetings of the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet, decided to initiate Japan–U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic Missile Defense.
2. The Government of Japan has started and promoted Japan–U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system since 1999 with the understanding that a BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese citizens against ballistic missile attacks and meets the principles of an exclusively defense-oriented policy, in an environment marked by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This research is not for the BMD system which Japan started to introduce in FY2004, but aims to improve the future capabilities of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan's national defense.
3. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005–2009)" states "the Government of Japan will consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures." Based on the results of Japan–U.S. joint technical research to date, the Government of Japan has sufficient prospect for solving the initial technical challenges. In the current international situation, taking into consideration the continuing fiscal constraint, we consider it appropriate to promote Japan–U.S. joint development of advanced SM-3 missiles efficiently in order to acquire the capability against future ballistic missile threats. Future transition to the deployment stage of the advanced missile will be decided based on the results of the joint development.
4. Regarding the relation with the Three Principles on Arms Export, "Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary" for National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and Beyond (approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004), states "if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles on Arms Exports will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan." We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based. Based on these, arms that need to be provided to the United States for the Japan–U.S. joint development will be provided under strict control after coordinating with the United States in the future on the framework for arms transfer.
5. Japan will continue to ensure the transparency and increase international understanding of its BMD system while further promoting cooperation in the areas of policy, operation, and equipment/technology with the United States. Through these efforts, Japan will strive to take all possible measures in ensuring its national defense and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Reference 32. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)	❍ Use of force (only if the case fulfils 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense) ❍ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation) ❍ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)
Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations is likely	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)[1] (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	❍ Establishment of positions and defense-purpose facilities in the intended deployment area ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order (Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a defense operation order is expected under a tense situation	(1) Authorized by: supplies —Minister of Defense or person— delegated authority by the Minister; services— Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies —not required; services— required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan)[1]	❍ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law ❍ Provision of services as an action measure ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation, etc., Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	❍ Measures concerning guidance of fleeing residents provided for in the Civil Protection Law, emergent measures, traffic control, etc. ❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (use of weapons)[2] ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons
Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance)	❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons ❍ Control over the Japan Coast Guard
Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns, or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission	❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty
Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	❍ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, etc.) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of Defense consults with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing opinions from the relevant prefectural governor	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control) ❍ Use of weapons
Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons
Counter-Piracy Operations (Article 82-2, Self Defense Forces Law and Anti-Piracy Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to combat acts of piracy	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (to be reported to the Diet when the Prime Minister has approved the counter-piracy operation or when a mission has been completed) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (the Minister of Defense submits the response procedures to the Prime Minister)	❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, etc.) ❍ Use of weapons
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc. (Article 82-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is anticipated that ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and the measures are deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the-fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response procedures approved by the Prime Minister)	❍ Use of weapons
Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea in the event of natural calamities or other disasters[3]	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense or those designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (evacuation, entry, etc.) (all only when police officers are not present) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation) ❍ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	❍ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ❍ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	❍ Same as in disaster dispatch
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a foreign aircraft enters Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	❍ The action necessary to make invading aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) (see Note 4)

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Type of Authorized Actions
Elimination of mines and other dangerous objects (Article 84-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	❍ Elimination and disposition of mines and other dangerous explosive objects found on the sea
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad (Article 84-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a disaster, commotion, or other emergency situation occurs in a foreign country	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to evacuate Japanese nationals whose lives and bodies are threatened	❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Rear area support (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Ship Inspections Operations Law)	When a situation that may seriously affect the peace and security of Japan occurs in an area surrounding Japan	(1) Authorized by: supplies —Minister of Defense or person delegated authority by the Minister; services/rear area search and rescue activities/ship inspection operations— Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior to taking any response measure, in principle) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (in accordance with the implementation guidelines formulated based on the Basic Plan)	❍ Provision of supplies and services for rear area support; rear area search and rescue activities; and ship inspection operations ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
International disaster relief activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Disaster Relief Law)		(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the government of the disaster-stricken country to dispatch international disaster relief teams, and consultation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs	❍ International disaster relief activities by units and the like or personnel of the SDF, and transportation of personnel and goods necessary for the activities
International peace cooperation activities (Self-Defense Forces Law Article 84-4, International Peace Cooperation Law)	When a request is made from the United Nations to take part in international peace cooperation activities compatible with the International Peace Cooperation Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required if units or other groups of the SDF implement so-called core operations of the peacekeeping force (prior consent required in principle) (3) Additional requirements: Request of the Chief of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters (Prime Minister)	❍ International peace cooperation activities by units and the like of the SDF, and transportation operations entrusted to Japan ❍ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty

(All authority referred to in the above table is prescribed by applicable law)

Notes: 1. If the Prime Minister gives approval to services in connection with defense facility construction, as well as U.S. military actions before a defense operations order is issued, such approval is specified in the Basic Response Plan and presented to the Diet for consent (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack).

2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. The law shall apply mutatis mutandis only when police officers are not present.

3. Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Ministry's facilities.

4. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions."

Reference 33. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Armed Force and Weapons by SDF Personnel

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Defense operation	Article 88, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel and units under defense operations may take necessary military action to defend Japan.
	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Civil protection dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including petty officers, are not present.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 26 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons in execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Counter-piracy operations	Article 8 (2), Anti-Piracy Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under counter-piracy operations.
		If any party perpetrating acts of piracy, including approaching excessively close to a ship or trailing around a ship, continues their acts despite the counter-piracy measures of the other party, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that no other means are available to stop the passage of the ship in question, the use of weapons is permitted to the extent that is considered reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.
Destruction of ballistic missiles	Article 93-3, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	The use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of making aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.[1]

Note: The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary actions"

Type of Operation	Provision	Content
Evacuation of Japanese nationals residing abroad	Article 94-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in evacuation of Japanese nationals and others overseas may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel engaged in the evacuation, or of Japanese and foreign nationals to be evacuated. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc., as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies and those of others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code. SDF personnel and others engaged.
Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments		SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives and bodies, those of other SDF personnel and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding weapons, etc.	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to person, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Panel Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.
Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, those of other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or of those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, said personnel may use their weapons within an extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain, etc.
Article 152, Prisoners of War Law		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Reference 34. Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches (Past Five Years)

FY	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Number of Dispatches	892	812	679	606	559
Personnel	34,026	24,275	105,380	41,191	33,700
Vehicles	5,660	4,130	36,980	9,585	3,909
Aircraft	1,271	1,009	1,972	1,410	885
Vessels	5	86	117	26	126

Reference 35. Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments (As of June 2008)

(As of April 30, 2010)

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Hokkaido	Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government	Obihiro City Government
			Chitose City Government (two persons)
			Bibai City Government
			Sapporo City Government (two persons)
			Hakodate City Government
			Shikabe Town Government
			Bihoro Town Government
			Tomakomai City Government
			Hokuto City Government
			Iwamizawa City Government (two persons)
			Asahikawa City Government
			Eniwa City Government (two persons)
			Kushiro City Government
			Kushiro Town Government
			Nayori City Government
			Kitami City Government
			Rumoi City Government
			Nanae Town Government
Tohoku	Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government	Hachinohe City Government
			Aomori City Government
			Hirosaki City Government
	Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government	Shiwa Town Government
			Takizawa Village Office
	Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government	Sendai City Government (three persons)
			Ishinomaki City Government
	Akita	Akita Prefectural Government	Daisen City Government
	Yamagata	Yamagata Prefectural Government	Higashine City Government
			Tsuruoka City Government
	Fukushima	Fukushima Prefectural Government	

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Kanto	Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government	Ushiku City Government
	Tochigi	Tochigi Prefectural Government (two persons)	Utsunomiya City Government
			Ohtawara City Government
	Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government	Maebashi City Government
	Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government	Soka City Government (two persons)
			Saitama City Government
	Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government	Urayasu City Government
			Ichikawa City Government
	Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (four persons)	Shinagawa Ward Office
			Itabashi Ward Office (two persons)
			Arakawa Ward Office (two persons)
			Adachi Ward Office
	Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government	Yokohama City Government (five persons)
			Kawasaki City Government
			Fujisawa City Government
Chubu	Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government	Joetsu City Government
	Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government	Toyama City Government
	Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government	Wajima City Government
			Komatsu City Government
			Kanazawa City Government
	Fukui		Fukui City Government
	Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government	
	Nagano		Ina City Government
	Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government	
	Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government	Ito City Government
			Gotenba City Government
			Hamamatsu City Government
			Oyama Town Government
	Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government	Seto Town Government
			Kitanagoya City Government
			Miyoshi City Government

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Kinki	Mie	Mie Prefectural Government	Ise City Government
			Kameyama City Government
			Nabari City Government
			Owase City Government
	Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government	Kusatsu City Government
			Takashima City Government
	Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government	
	Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government	Sakai City Government
			Ikeda City Government
			Osaka City Government
			Kawachinagano City Government
			Izumi City Government
			Shijonawate City Government
			Minoh City Government
	Hyogo	Hyogo Prefectural Government	Akashi City Government
			Toyooka City Government
			Miki City Government
	Nara	Nara Prefectural Government	
	Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government	Wakayama City Government
Chugoku	Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government	Tottori City Government
	Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government	Matsue City Government
	Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government	Kurashiki City Government
	Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government (five persons)	
	Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government	Yamaguchi City Government
			Iwakuni City Government
			Shimonoseki City Government
			Shunan City Government
			Hohu City Government

Area		Prefectural Government	Municipal Government
Shikoku	Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons)	Komatsushima City Government (two persons)
			Anan City Government
			Yoshinogawa City Government (two persons)
	Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government	Marugame City Government
	Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government (two persons)	Matsuyama City Government
			Saijyo City Government
			Imabari City Government
	Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government	
Kyushu	Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government	Iizuka City Government
			Tagawa City Government
			Nogata City Government
			Kasuga City Government
			Dazaifu City Government
			Nakagawa Town Government
	Saga	Saga Prefectural Government (two persons)	Karatsu City Government
	Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government (five persons)	Sasebo City Government (two persons)
			Omura City Government
	Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government	Kumamoto City Government
			Uki City Government
	Oita	Oita Prefectural Government	
	Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government (two persons)	Miyazaki City Government
			Miyakonojo City Government
			Nobeoka City Government
			Saito City Government
	Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government (three persons)	Satsuma-Sendai City Government
			Kirishima City Government
			Tarumizu City Government
	Okinawa		

* Part-time personnel included

Reference 36. Outline of a Bill Concerning Punishment of and Response to Acts of Piracy

1. Purpose of the Legislation

To establish matters necessary for the punishment of and proper and effective response to acts of piracy in order to maintain public safety and order at sea, in light of the importance of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation for the economy of Japan and the people's lives.

2. Definition of Acts of Piracy

Acts of Piracy: the following acts conducted by those who are crew members of or are aboard a vessel (excluding a war vessel, etc.) for private purposes on high seas (including exclusive economic zones) or Japan's territorial waters, etc:

(1) robbery of vessel/operation control, (2) robbery of the property, etc., on a vessel, (3) kidnapping of a person(s) on board, (4) taking of a hostage(s), or (5) for the purpose of (1) to (4); (i) invasion/destruction of a vessel, (ii) excessive access, etc., to another vessel, (iii) unlawful navigation with dangerous weapons

3. Punishment Concerning Acts of Piracy

A person who has conducted an act of piracy shall be punished as follows:

(1) 2 (1)–(4): imprisonment, with work, for life or for a definite term of not less than 5 years; imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 6 years when the person concerned causes injury; death penalty or life imprisonment, with work, when the person concerned causes death.
(2) 2 (5) (i) and (ii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 5 years
(3) 2 (5) (iii): imprisonment, with work, for a definite term of not less than 3 years

4. Response by the Japan Coast Guard to Acts of Piracy

(1) The Japan Coast Guard carries out necessary measures to respond to acts of piracy.
(2) Maritime safety officials may use weapons in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties. In addition, while they are in action to prevent 2 (5) (ii), as is currently conducted, if the pirates do not obey the preventive action and continue to attempt the act of 2 (5) (ii), and there is probable cause to believe there are no other means, maritime safety officials may use weapons to the extent that is found reasonably necessary in accordance with the situation.

5. Response by the Self-Defense Forces to Acts of Piracy

(1) When there is a special need to respond to acts of piracy, the Minister of Defense may order action against such acts upon approval by the Prime Minister. In order to obtain approval, the Minister of Defense shall create a response guideline and submit it to the Prime Minister (just notifying the outline of the action suffices when the situation demands expediency).
(2) The response guideline shall include the need and area of the action against pirates, size of the unit, period, and other important matters.
(3) The Prime Minister shall report to the Diet when he/she gave approval and when the action against pirates was concluded.
(4) Necessary provisions of the Japan Coast Guard Law, those of Article 7 of the Act concerning Execution of Official Police Duties and 4 (2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to SDF regular personnel.

Reference 37. Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century

(Tokyo, April 17, 1996)

1. Today, the Prime Minister and the President celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history. The leaders took pride in the profound and positive contribution this relationship has made to world peace and regional stability and prosperity. The strong Alliance between Japan and the United States helped ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. Our Alliance continues to underlie the dynamic economic growth in this region. The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and the United States are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

   The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the Alliance are due not only to the commitments of the two Governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their profound gratitude to those who sustain the Alliance, especially those Japanese communities that host U.S. forces, and those Americans who, far from home, devote themselves to the defense of peace and freedom.
2. For more than a year, the two Governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the Japan–U.S. security relationship. On the basis of this review, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy and respect for human rights. They agreed that the foundations for our cooperation remain firm, and that this partnership will remain vital in the twenty-first century.

The Regional Outlook

3. Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe.

   At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute sources of instability.

The Japan–U.S. Alliance and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries.

   In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the United States. They reaffirmed that the Japan–U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia- Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.

   (a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new National Defense Program Outline adopted in November 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination

of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan and the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security.

(b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S. military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan–U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the United States.

The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the United States reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.

(c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. Forces Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan's contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

Bilateral Cooperation under the Japan–U.S. Security Relationship

5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas.

(a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan–U.S. Alliance, both Governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both Governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both Governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements.

(b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States.

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.

(c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship.

(d) Noting the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the SDF of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two Governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the fighter support (F-2).

(e) The two Governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means

of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.

6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. Forces Japan, which is the core element of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities.

In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), and welcomed the far-reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996.

Regional Cooperation

7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two Governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that the engagement of the United States in the region, supported by the Japan–U.S. security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts.

The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. Russia's ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global stability, and merits continued encouragement and cooperation. The leaders also stated that full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to Japan and the United States and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every effort in this regard, in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed that the two Governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.

Global Cooperation

8. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the Japan–U.S. Alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will strengthen their cooperation in support of the United Nations and other international organizations through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

Both Governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two leaders agreed that cooperation in the United Nations and APEC, and on issues such as the North Korean nuclear

problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation process in the former Yugoslavia, helps to build the kind of world that promotes our shared interests and values.

Conclusion

9. In concluding, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that the three pillars of the Japan–U.S. relationship —security, political, and economic— are based on shared values and interests and rest on the mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.

Reference 38. Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation

(New York, September 23, 1997)

I. The Aim of the Guidelines

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan–U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan–U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by Japan and the United States will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the "National Defense Program Outline." In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward-deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements.

1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations

   Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures.

   Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings.

2. Various Types of Security Cooperation

   Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

   Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchange in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.

   When either or both Governments participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training.

   When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary.

3. Bilateral Programs

   Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an armed attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation.

   Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with the SDF and U.S. forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies.

IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan–U.S. defense cooperation.

When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an armed attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage.

1. When an Armed Attack against Japan is Imminent

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities, which could develop into an armed attack against Japan.

The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an armed attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place

(1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions

(a) Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.

(b) In conducting bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective forces' ground, maritime and air services. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. forces support SDF operations. U.S. forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(c) The United States will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments.

(2) Concept of Operations

(a) Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attacks against Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(b) Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations. U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(c) Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions.

U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations.

(d) Responses to Other Threats

(i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation.

(ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.

(3) Activities and Requirements for Operations

(a) Command and Coordination

The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command and control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.

(b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

(c) Communication and Electronics

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.

(d) Intelligence Activities

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.

(e) Logistics Support Activities

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

(i) Supply

The United States will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(ii) Transportation

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the United States to Japan.

(iii) Maintenance

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces' equipment in Japan. The United States

will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel as required.

Japan will also support U.S. forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.

(iv) Facilities

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.

(v) Medical Services

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that will Have Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated

When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.

(1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

(a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.

The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a low of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the low; the U.S. will provide appropriate support.

(b) Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operations in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

(c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arise with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

(d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.

(2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

(a) Use of Facilities

Based on the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports.

(b) Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.

In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

(3) Japan–U.S. Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the

peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the United States to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an armed attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures

   Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC.

   (1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning

   The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an armed attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

   Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

   (2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations

   The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an armed attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies.

   The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative

measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

(3) Establishment of Common Procedures

The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved.

They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan–U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

(The schedule omitted: See Reference 47)

Reference 39. Joint Statement U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee

(Washington, DC February 19, 2005)

1. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hosted Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno in a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, DC, on February 19, 2005. They addressed security and alliance issues facing the United States and Japan, as well as other aspects of the relationship.

Working Together on Challenges Facing the World Today

2. The Ministers noted the excellent state of cooperative relations between the United States and Japan on a broad array of security, political, and economic issues. They looked to expand that cooperation, recognizing that the U.S.–Japan Alliance, with the U.S.–Japan security arrangements at its core, continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability.
3. The Ministers underscored the importance of U.S. and Japanese leadership in providing international assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East — efforts that are already producing results. The Ministers lauded the successful cooperation between the United States and Japan with other countries

in extending wide-ranging assistance to those who suffered from the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean.

4. The Ministers recognized that cooperation and consultation between the United States and Japan have been pivotal in promoting nonproliferation, particularly through the Proliferation Security Initiative. They welcomed the success of multinational interdiction exercises hosted by the United States and Japan and by others.
5. The Ministers expressed their confidence that ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhances our ability to defend against and deter ballistic missile attacks and dissuade other parties from investing in ballistic missiles. Taking note of achievements in missile defense cooperation, such as Japan's decision to introduce ballistic missile defense systems and its recent announcement on its Three Principles on Arms Export, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.–Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.

Common Strategic Objectives

6. The Ministers discussed the new security environment in which new and emerging threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, have surfaced as common challenges. They recognized that deepening interdependence among nations in a global community means that such threats can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the United States and Japan.
7. While noting that these threats are also emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers also emphasized that persistent challenges continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty. Moreover, they noted that modernization of military capabilities in the region also requires attention.
8. The Ministers strongly urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks expeditiously and without preconditions, and to commit itself to complete dismantlement of all its nuclear programs in a transparent manner subject to verification.
9. Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the Ministers concurred that both Governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.–Japan security arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the alliance. Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires.
10. In the region, common strategic objectives include:
    - Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan.
    - Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
    - Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
    - Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.
    - Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.
    - Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs.
    - Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
    - Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.
    - Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia.

- Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and transparent regional mechanisms.
- Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology.
- Maintain the security of maritime traffic.

11. Global common strategic objectives include
    - Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community.
    - Further consolidate U.S.–Japan partnership in international peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
    - Promote the reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including through improved reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other regimes, and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.
    - Prevent and eradicate terrorism.
    - Coordinate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council by making the best use of the current momentum to realize Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member.
    - Maintain and enhance the stability of the global energy supply.

Strengthening of U.S.–Japan Security and Defense Cooperation

12. The Ministers expressed their support and appreciation for each other's efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan's new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasize Japan's capability to respond effectively to new threats and diverse contingencies, Japan's active engagement to improve the international security environment, and the importance of the Japan–U.S. Alliance. As a central component of its broad defense transformation effort, the United States is reorienting and strengthening its global defense posture to provide it with appropriate, strategy-driven capabilities in an uncertain security environment. The Ministers confirmed that these efforts will ensure and strengthen effective security and defense cooperation as both countries pursue common strategic objectives.
13. In this context, the Ministers underscored the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. This examination will take into account recent achievements and developments such as Japan's NDPG and new legislation to deal with contingencies, as well as the expanded agreement on mutual logistical support and progress in BMD cooperation. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.
14. The Ministers concurred that this examination should contribute to these consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. They decided to intensify these consultations in a comprehensive effort to strengthen the alliance as the bedrock of Japan's security and the anchor of regional stability. In this context, both sides confirmed their commitment to maintaining deterrence and capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan while reducing the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa. The Ministers directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results of these consultations.
15. The Ministers also stressed the importance of continued efforts to enhance positive relations between local communities and U.S. forces. They emphasized that improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including due attention to the environment, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report are important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

16. The Ministers, noting that the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) will expire in March 2006, decided to start consultations on future arrangements to provide appropriate levels of host nation support, bearing in mind the significant role of the SMA in supporting the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

Reference 40. U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future

(Washington, DC, October 29, 2005)

I. Overview

The U.S.–Japan Alliance, with the U.S.–Japan security arrangements at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. A close, cooperative relationship based on the alliance also plays an important role in effectively dealing with global challenges, and must evolve to reflect the changing security environment. Therefore, following the December 2002 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the U.S. and Japan intensified consultations on respective U.S. and Japanese security and defense policies in order to examine the direction of the U.S.–Japan alliance, and to develop options to adapt the alliance to the changing regional and global security environment.

At the February 19, 2005 meeting of the SCC, the Ministers reached an understanding on common strategic objectives, and underscored the need to continue examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces in pursuing those objectives. They also decided to intensify their consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results.

Today, the SCC members reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have surfaced as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the U.S. and Japan. They also reemphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this context, both sides reiterated their commitment to work closely together to pursue the regional and global common strategic objectives identified in their February 19, 2005 Joint Statement.

The SCC members approved findings and recommendations on roles, missions, and capabilities. They also approved recommendations for realignment, as reflected in this report. These measures are designed to enhance the alliance's capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies and, as a whole, will reduce burdens on local communities, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

II. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides recognized recent achievements and developments in security and defense policies related to the roles, missions, and capabilities of the U.S. and Japan, to include: bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and disaster relief following the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the earthquake in South Asia; Japan's December 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines; progress in ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation; Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies; the SDF's planned transition to a new joint operations posture; and the transformation and global posture realignment of U.S. forces.

1. Primary Areas

   In this context, the U.S. and Japan examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, particularly those of the U.S. forces and the SDF, for responding to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas:

— Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies;
— Efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities.

2. Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides confirmed several basic concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation. Related to defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, these concepts include:

- Bilateral defense cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region.
- Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands. For these purposes, Japan's defense posture will be strengthened in accordance with the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.
- The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan.
- U.S. and Japanese operations in the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.
- Japan will continue to provide host nation support including facilities and areas for U.S. forces (hereafter referred to as "U.S. facilities and areas"). Japan will also take appropriate measures to provide seamless support to U.S. operations as the situation evolves, including support based on Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies. Both sides will work with local communities to ensure stable support for the presence and operations of U.S. forces in Japan.
- U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.
- Both sides also confirmed several basic concepts relevant to roles, missions, and capabilities in the area of improving the international security environment, to include:
- Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, the U.S. and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture.
- Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and can benefit from close U.S.–Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities.
- The U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment.
- In addition, both sides emphasized that the increasing importance of addressing new threats and diverse contingencies and improving the international security environment compels both sides to develop their respective defense capabilities, and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

3. Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

Both sides reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened, consistent with relevant national security policies and laws, and with agreements between the U.S. and Japan. Through

their examination of roles, missions, and capabilities, they emphasized the importance of improving several specific areas of cooperation:

- Air defense.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Counter-terrorism.
- Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft.
- Humanitarian relief operations.
- Reconstruction assistance operations.
- Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.
- Protection of critical infrastructure, including U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
- Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD.
- Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).
- Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
- Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.

  Both sides emphasized that other areas of operations not explicitly listed above remain important to alliance capabilities; this list highlights key areas for further enhancement but is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation.

4. Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

   Based on the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities described above, both sides further identified the following essential steps that can be taken in peacetime to strengthen the posture of bilateral security and defense cooperation to deal with diverse challenges in the new security environment. Both sides also emphasized the importance of continuing examinations of roles, missions, and capabilities, based on the progress made thus far, to ensure effective bilateral cooperation.

   - Close and Continuous Policy and Operational Coordination.

     Both sides recognized that regular policy and operational coordination will improve the alliance's timely and effective response to future changes in the strategic environment and to contingencies. Close and continuous policy and operational coordination at every level of government, from unit tactical level through strategic consultations, is essential to dissuade destabilizing military build-ups, to deter aggression, and to respond to diverse security challenges. Development of a common operational picture shared between U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen operational coordination and should be pursued where possible. Closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation by streamlining their functions.
   - Advancing Bilateral Contingency Planning.

     Recalling that the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation provide a basis for bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning, both sides affirmed the continual requirement for

such planning while taking full account of the changing security environment. This planning will reflect Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies, which provides a strengthened basis for contingency use by U.S. forces and the SDF of facilities, including airports and seaports, in Japan. Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, conducting detailed surveys of civilian and SDF air and seaports, and validating their planning work through strengthened bilateral exercise programs.

- Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation.
  Recognizing that common situational awareness is a key to well coordinated cooperation, both sides will enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation in the whole range from unit tactical level through national strategic level. To facilitate this interaction, both sides will take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities.
- Improving Interoperability.
  To ensure smooth cooperation as the SDF transitions to a joint operations posture, U.S. forces and the SDF will maintain regular consultations to maintain and strengthen interoperability. Continued cooperation in planning for bilateral operations and exercises will strengthen connectivity between the headquarters of U.S. forces and the SDF and will benefit from improved secure communications capabilities.
- Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States.
  Both sides will expand opportunities for bilateral training and exercises to improve interoperability, improve capabilities, enhance readiness, more equitably distribute training impacts among local communities, and advance the effectiveness of bilateral operations. These measures will include increasing mutual use of U.S. and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan. The training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland will also be expanded.
  - In particular, the U.S. plan to expand its training infrastructure in Guam will provide increased training opportunities for the SDF in Guam.
  - Additionally, both sides recognized that U.S. forces and SDF participation in multinational training and exercises will enhance their contribution to a better international security environment.
- Shared Use of Facilities by U.S. Forces and the SDF.
  Both sides recognized that shared-use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF contributes to closer bilateral operational coordination and improved interoperability. Specific opportunities for shared use of facilities are described in the force posture realignment recommendations (see section below).
- Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).
  Emphasizing that BMD plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, both sides stressed the value of closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities. To support these BMD systems, they emphasized the critical importance of constant information gathering and sharing, as well as maintaining high readiness and interoperability in light of the minimal time available to respond to a ballistic missile threat. The U.S. will deploy additional complementary capabilities in and around Japan when appropriate, coordinating their operations to support Japan's missile defense operations. Close coordination between respective BMD command and control systems will be critical to effective missile defense operations.

Both sides committed to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation and, as appropriate, in additional areas not currently addressed by the Guidelines.

III. Force Posture Realignment

Both sides reviewed the posture of U.S. forces in Japan and related SDF forces, in light of their shared commitment to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, including those in Okinawa. Both sides recognized the importance of enhancing Japanese and U.S. public support for the security alliance, which contributes to sustainable presence of U.S. forces at facilities and areas in Japan.

1. Guiding Precepts

   In their review, taking full account of the examination of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, both sides established several precepts to guide force posture realignments in Japan.

   - The U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is a core capability that is indispensable to regional peace and security and critical to both the U.S. and Japan. Japan contributes capabilities that are additional and complementary to those provided by the U.S. forces, while taking the leading role of providing for its own defense. The presence of U.S. forces and the SDF must evolve as the regional and global security environment changes and as both sides assess alliance roles and missions.
   - Capabilities will be strengthened through realignment as well as adjustment of roles, missions, and capabilities; these capabilities underpin the credibility of U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan and peace and security of the region.
   - Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to the U.S. and Japan. In that context, both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.
   - Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces. When consistent with military missions and operational requirements, dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can have the ancillary benefit of reducing burdens of training on local communities.
   - Shared military use of both U.S. and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.
   - Adequate capacity of U.S. facilities and areas is necessary, and the capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements. This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
   - Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.
   - Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of U.S. facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.

2. Recommendations for Realignment

   Based upon intensive consultations conducted thus far and in keeping with these basic precepts, domestic and bilateral coordination should be conducted for the following initiatives in a timely manner, consistent with the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The Ministers committed themselves to completing local coordination, and directed their staffs to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006. These initiatives represent elements of a coherent package, which will begin to be implemented upon agreement on the overall package. Both sides emphasized the importance of taking necessary measures required for the prompt implementation of these initiatives.

   - Strengthening Bilateral and Joint Operational Coordination

Recognizing the Government of Japan's intention to transform the SDF into a joint operations posture, the Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan will establish a bilateral and joint operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base. The shared use of this center will ensure constant connectivity, coordination, and interoperability among U.S. forces in Japan and the SDF.

- Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

  The capabilities of the U.S. Army Japan's command structure in Camp Zama will be modernized to a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters element. The transformed command structure will provide an additional capability to respond rapidly for the defense of Japan and other contingencies. Adjustments to U.S. facilities and areas will be made to accommodate the new Army command structure and integral capabilities. The establishment of the headquarters of a Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command, which will operate units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks, will be pursued at Camp Zama, thereby strengthening the coordination between the headquarters. In relation to this realignment, possibilities of more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot will be explored.
- Collocation of Air Command and Control

  Japan's Air Defense Command and relevant units, currently located at Fuchu, will be collocated with the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, strengthening the coordination between air and missile defense command and control elements, and sharing relevant sensor data through the bilateral and joint operations coordination center described above.
- Yokota Air Base and Air Space

  Measures to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota air space will be explored, bearing in mind the planned expansion of nearby Haneda Airport in 2009. Possible options to study will include reducing the air space under U.S. control and collocation of Japanese air traffic controllers at Yokota Air Base. In addition, both sides will take into account development of the process of transferring the Kadena radar approach control. The specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use will be studied, while noting that dual-use must not compromise the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
- Missile Defense

  The optimum site for deployment in Japan of a new U.S. X-Band radar system will be examined. Through timely information sharing, this radar will support capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil defense and consequence management. In addition, as appropriate, the U.S. will deploy active defenses, such as Patriot PAC-3 and Standard Missile (SM-3) to support U.S. treaty commitments.
- Regional Realignment of U.S. Marine Forces for Flexible Crisis Response

  As part of its global posture realignment effort, the U.S. is making several changes to strengthen its force structure in the Pacific. Among these changes are a strengthening of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and a redistribution of those capabilities among Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa that will provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These changes will also enable increased theater security cooperation with countries of the region, thereby improving the overall security environment. In connection with this realignment, both sides identified an integrated set of interrelated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens in Okinawa.

  ○ Acceleration of Futenma Relocation: Both sides, bearing in mind the strong request from residents of Okinawa for early return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, as well as the preference that any Futenma replacement facility (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa prefecture, considered options

to satisfy these requests while maintaining the deterrence capabilities that will remain necessary in the future. They determined that the rapid crisis response capabilities provided by the presence of Marine Corps forces constitute a critical alliance capability that both sides desire to maintain in the region. Moreover, they recognized that sustaining those capabilities, which consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, remains dependent upon the interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises and operations. For this reason, both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis.

○ Both sides, recognizing the extensive delays in Futenma relocation resulting from the many problems related to the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) plan for relocation of Futenma Air Station to a civil-military facility located on a coral reef in deep waters, examined numerous other possible options for relocation within Okinawa prefecture that could accelerate return of Futenma Air Station while maintaining operational capabilities. Both sides considered several factors in this work, including:

- Safety of neighboring communities and military personnel.
- Noise impacts on local communities, taking into account future housing and commercial development patterns that might occur in the vicinity of the FRF.
- Minimization of adverse environmental impacts.
- Ability of the FRF to support operational and mission requirements in peacetime and in contingencies.
- Inclusion of necessary operational support, billeting and related facilities in the FRF, to avoid creation of traffic congestion and related irritants that might otherwise detract from the quality of life of local residents.

○ Bearing such factors in mind, both sides will locate the FRF in an “L”-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay. The runway portion of the facility will cross Henoko-saki, extending from Oura Bay into the water areas along the south shore of Camp Schwab. The lower section of the facility, oriented in a northeast-southwest direction will include a runway and overruns, with a total length of 1800 meters exclusive of seawalls. Hangers, maintenance, fuel supply pier and related infrastructure, and other aviation support activities required for the operation of the new facility will be located on the areas of the FRF to be constructed within Oura Bay. Furthermore, facilities in the Camp Schwab area will be reconfigured as necessary to accommodate the relocation of Futenma-related activities. (Reference: Initialed concept plan dated 26 October 2005.)

○ Both sides concurred that other capabilities now present at Futenma Air Station would be relocated and maintained as provided for in the SACO Final Report, with the following adjustments:

- With regards to the KC-130’s, which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station under SACO Final Report, alternative facilities will be considered with priority consideration given to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base. The final basing configuration will be determined by both sides based on ongoing operational and engineering studies.
- Strengthened contingency use of the Air SDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki will be provided for U.S. forces. Improvements to operational facilities at these bases will be made to support this contingency use. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the expanded bilateral training activities described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report.
- Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF will also be provided for U.S. forces.

- ○ Both sides recognized that early realization of the foregoing measures, in addition to enabling the long-desired return of Futenma Air Station, is an essential component of the realignment of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa.
- ○ Force Reductions: In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Pacific region outlined above, the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and other locations and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned and reduced into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). This realignment in Okinawa will include the transfer of approximately 7,000 Marine officers and enlisted personnel, plus dependents out of Okinawa. These transferred personnel will come from units in each of the elements of Marine capability (air, ground, logistics and command), including portions of the Marine Air Wing, the Force Service Support Group, and the 3rd Marine Division.
- ○ The Government of Japan, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocations be realized rapidly, will work with the U.S. Government to examine and identify appropriate financial and other measures to enable the realization of these relocations to Guam.
- ○ Land Returns and Shared-Use of Facilities: Recognizing that successful relocation of Futenma Air Station and the force reductions described above will make further consolidation of forces and return of land possible, both sides discussed the concept of consolidation of those Marine Corps units that remain in Okinawa into a smaller total land area. This would enable the return of significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base. The U.S. stressed its willingness to develop and implement a concrete program for this concept in cooperation with the Government of Japan.
- ○ Furthermore, recognizing the limited access that the SDF have to facilities in Okinawa, most of which are located in urbanized areas, the U.S. also underscored its willingness to implement shared-use of Kadena Air Base, Camp Hansen, and other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa in cooperation with the Government of Japan. Both sides consider that such shared use could facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between their forces, as described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report, and thereby strengthen overall alliance capabilities.
- ○ Steady Implementation of SACO Final Report: Both sides validated the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report unless otherwise changed by the recommendations in this document.

- ● Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station

  To ensure the viability of a long-term forward-deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier and its airwing, the carrier jet and E-2C squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station, which will have the necessary facilities and training airspace for safe and effective operation of the aircraft in a less intrusive manner after the current construction of the replacement runway is completed. To alleviate the impact of the increased operations at Iwakuni Air Station, the following related measures will be taken.
  - ○ Relocation of Maritime SDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni Air Station to Atsugi Air Facility.
  - ○ Adjustment of training airspace for all U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft to ensure adequate readiness levels are maintained.
  - ○ Identification of a permanent field-carrier landing practice (FCLP) facility. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements. The Government of Japan reiterates its commitment to provide an acceptable permanent FCLP facility for U.S. naval aviation forces.

- ○ Development of necessary facilities at the Maritime SDF Kanoya Base to accommodate KC-130 aircraft. These facilities will also be available to support rotations of additional SDF or U.S. C-130 or P-3 aircraft from elsewhere in Japan to increase alliance capabilities and flexibility.
- ○ Development of necessary additional facilities, infrastructure, and training areas required to support U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps units based at Iwakuni Air Station, as well as civil aviation operations.

- Training Relocation

  Consistent with the necessity of improving bilateral interoperability discussed in this report, and with reference to the goal of reducing the impact of training activity, renewed attention will be given to expanding the distribution of training from U.S. air facilities such as Kadena Air Base as well as Misawa Air Base and Iwakuni Air Station to other military facilities.
- Efficient Use of Capacity at U.S. Facilities in Japan

  Opportunities to strengthen U.S. cooperation with the Government of Japan and local communities regarding efficient use of capacity at U.S. facilities in Japan will be pursued when consistent with operational requirements and safety. For example, both sides will explore possibilities for utilizing the capacity of Sagami General Depot for meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and civilian consequence management.

  Future changes in U.S. facilities and areas and force structure not addressed elsewhere in this report will be addressed in accordance with existing practices under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

Reference 41. United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2006)

Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, "U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs "to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006." This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will finance their realignment-associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa
   (a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a "V"-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at ASDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not intend to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3rd Marine Division Headquarters, 3rd Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated $10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide $6.09 billion (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including $2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at $3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately $1 billion for a road.

(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
  - Camp Kuwae: Total return.

- Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
- MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
- Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
- Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging constructed at Urasoe).
- Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.

- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(d) Relationships among Initiatives

- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. FY2008. The headquarters of the GSDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan FY2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
- In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
  - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
  - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
  - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.

3. Yokota Air Base and Airspace

- ASDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan FY2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.

- A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared-use equipment and systems.
- The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
  - Establish a program in Japan FY2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
  - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
  - Develop procedures in Japan FY2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
  - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan FY2009.
- The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
  - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
  - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.

4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
   - The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
   - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate MSDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
   - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-l30 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
   - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
   - Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
   - A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.

- Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.

5. Missile Defense
   - As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
   - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as ASDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
   - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
   - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
   - Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan FY2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan FY2006 can be developed.
   - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities —Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni— will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
   - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
   - Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
   - In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1–5 aircraft for the duration of 1–7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6–12 aircraft for 8–14 days at a time.
   - At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
   - The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

Reference 42. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan and Others

(May 30, 2006 Cabinet Decision)

1. The Governments of Japan and the United States had a series of consultations regarding examinations of the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces, and of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. And at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting of October 29, 2005, recommendations on those issues were approved. The governments of the two countries continued consultations and at the SCC Meeting of May 1, 2006 the final report including specific initiatives for realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and other issues (hereinafter "realignment related measures") was approved.
2. In the new security environment, it is important to maintain and develop the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements to ensure the security of Japan and maintain the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in a continuous manner. Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan is at the core of the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements, and stable use of facilities and areas of the U.S. forces needs to be secured.

   Facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate on Okinawa, and areas around facilities and areas on the mainland are increasingly urbanized, hence these facilities and areas have great impact on the living environment of residents and regional development. In light of such conditions, it is important to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, in order to secure stable use of facilities and areas by gaining broader public understanding and cooperation as well as to maintain and develop the Japan–U.S. Security Arrangements.
3. The final report includes the following specific initiatives: relocation of approximately 8,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa where facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate; relocation of Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab; return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base which are densely populated (including total returns of Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha port facilities and other facilities); collocation of ASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units at Yokota Air Base to enhance coordination between the headquarters; transformation of the U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama; deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system for BMD at ASDF Shariki Base; relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station; return of some portions of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot; and relocation of trainings.

   These realignment related measures shall be steadily implemented based on the timeframe for implementation presented in the final report.
4. Ensuring security arrangements for maintenance of the peace and security of Japan is one of the most significant policies of the Japanese government; therefore, it is necessary for the government to address the issue with responsibility. Based on such recognition, in implementing realignment related measures that entail new burdens on the part of local authorities, the government will take requests from the local authorities that shoulder such burdens into consideration, and take measures for regional development and other in return for their contributions to the peace and security of Japan.

   In addition, the Government of Japan will continue to be totally committed to taking measures in promotion of the use of returned land and securing employment stability of workers at USFJ facilities and areas.
5. Relocation of Marine units in Okinawa to Guam is critical in reducing burdens on Okinawa where U.S. facilities and areas concentrate, thus it shall be rapidly implemented with required costs shared by Japan.
6. Based on such recognition, the Government of Japan shall properly and promptly implement realignment related measures including legal and budgetary aspects. Meanwhile, under the strained state of public finance,

the Government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and streamlining of defense-related expenses to implement an efficient defense program, in line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (for FY2005 to FY2009)" (approved by the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) shall be reviewed once estimates for the entire costs of realignment related measures become clear based on concrete contents of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others.

7. As to relocation of Futenma Air Station, it shall be implemented based on the plan approved at the SCC Meeting on May 1, 2006, with due consideration on the positions of the national government, the local government of Okinawa and relevant local authorities, as well as the course of discussions so far regarding the issues such as facilities related with relocation of Futenma Air Station, the basing agreement and regional development and others, through paying enough attention to removal of danger of Futenma Air Station, safety of lives of residents in the vicinity, preservation of natural environment and feasibility of the program. Also a construction plan for the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) shall be formulated in a prompt manner.

   The government shall establish a consultative body together with the Government of Okinawa and relevant local governments to have consultations about and address the issues of a concrete construction plan of the FRF, safety and environmental measures and regional development.

   In accordance with this, the Government Policy Concerning Relocation of Futenma Air Station (approved by the Cabinet on December 28, 1999) shall be abolished.

   However, in FY2006, the projects based on the "II Regional Development" stipulated in the above-mentioned government policy shall be implemented.

Reference 43. Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee U.S. Department of State

(Washington, DC, May 1, 2007)

Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation

I. Overview

The U.S.–Japan security relationship is the bedrock of Japan's defense and the keystone of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. The members of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) welcomed recent advances in bilateral security and defense cooperation, consistent with the vision laid out in SCC meetings and statements over the past two years. The North Korean provocations, including missile launches in July and a nuclear test in October 2006, serve as stark reminders of the importance of transforming the U.S.–Japan Alliance to ensure its continued effectiveness in an ever-changing security environment.

The SCC members recognized that, just as today's expanding U.S.–Japan cooperation was enabled by previous efforts to update and consolidate the alliance that began years ago, so too will investments that the two countries make in the alliance today enable and ensure effective alliance responses to future challenges to peace and security.

Additionally, the SCC members stressed the importance of the traditional role of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which has enabled a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan while providing U.S. security assurances to the Government of Japan. U.S. extended deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. The U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities — both nuclear

and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities — form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan.

In this context, the SCC members emphasized the need to expand and deepen bilateral intelligence cooperation and information sharing in order to respond more effectively to emerging security challenges. They also decided to strengthen mechanisms to protect classified materials.

President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met on November 18, 2006 and called for a review of U.S.–Japan bilateral security cooperation, especially in the area of ballistic missile defense (BMD), reiterating its importance during their April 27, 2007 summit meeting. The SCC members focused on this agenda today in the context of common strategic objectives and alliance transformation.

The SCC members also welcomed the elevation of Japan's defense organization from agency to ministry status and the redefinition of the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) international peace cooperation activities as part of their primary missions.

II. Common Strategic Objectives

The U.S. and Japan are committed to promoting fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the international community. On February 19, 2005, the SCC members identified common strategic objectives that provide a broad basis for advancing bilateral cooperation.

At today's meeting, the SCC members reconfirmed their commitment to these common strategic objectives, taking the current international security environment into account. In this context, they welcomed the "Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" adopted at the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks on February 13, 2007, and urged North Korea to expeditiously meet its commitments described in the statement.

During their discussions, the SCC members highlighted the following strategic objectives that advance the interests of both countries:

- Achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks and fully implementing the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005, which envisions progress in other areas, including: the normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and Japan, respectively; resolution of humanitarian issues, such as the matter of abductions; and commitment by all Six Parties to join efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
- Achieving swift and full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, noting that all United Nations Member States remain obligated to comply with the provisions of that Chapter VII resolution.
- Recognizing the importance of China's contributions to regional and global security, further encouraging China to conduct itself as a responsible international stakeholder, improve transparency in its military affairs, and maintain consistency between its stated policies and actions.
- Increasing cooperation to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum as the preeminent regional economic forum, recognizing its crucial role in promoting stability, security, and prosperity in the region.
- Supporting efforts made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to promote democratic values, good governance, the rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms, and a unified market economy in Southeast Asia, and building regional capacity and cooperation on critical non-traditional and transnational security issues bilaterally and through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
- Further strengthening trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Australia in the region and around the world, including in the areas of security and defense, based on shared democratic values and interests.
- Continuing to build upon partnerships with India to advance areas of common interests and increase cooperation,

recognizing that India's continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom, and security of the region.

- Ensuring Afghanistan's successful economic reconstruction and political stabilization, which is essential to securing broader regional security and to defeating terrorism. To that end, the United States and Japan are both committed to supporting Afghanistan's transition, which requires reconstruction, development, and security.
- Contributing to building a united, democratic Iraq capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, while remaining an ally in the War on Terror.
- Achieving swift, full implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747, aimed at bringing Iran into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements. Noting the international community's continuing concerns regarding Iran's activities in the Middle East, both countries share the view that Iran must play a more positive role in the international community by demonstrating responsible behavior on the issue of terrorism.
- Achieving broader Japan-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation, recognizing that NATO's global contributions to peace and security and the common strategic objectives of the U.S.–Japan Alliance are consistent and complementary.

III. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

On October 29, 2005, the SCC approved the document, "U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future," which outlined initiatives on roles, missions, and capabilities of U.S. and Japanese forces. Following through on the security agenda laid out in that SCC document is imperative to the alliance's ability to respond to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment.

The SCC members reviewed progress in updating roles, missions, and capabilities in line with this alliance transformation vision and highlighted:

- The redefinition of the SDF's primary mission to include international peacekeeping operations, international disaster relief operations, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, which reflects growing attention to the importance of Japan's contributions to improving the international security environment. In this context, the SCC members discussed the SDF's assistance for Iraq's reconstruction efforts as well as its support to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean.
- Sustained progress in developing more specific planning to reflect the evolving security environment and to better posture our two forces to operate together in a regional crisis. Because such planning requires further coordination in a wide range of functions and fields, active participation of relevant ministries and agencies in the bilateral planning process will remain vital.
- Substantive agreement between the two governments concerning security measures for the protection of classified military information, also known as a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). The GSOMIA will facilitate information exchange and establish a common basis of information security contributing to sharing of intelligence and defense program and operational information.
- Establishment of a bilateral Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense Working Group to make steady progress in improving readiness and interoperability of U.S. and Japanese forces against CBRN weapons, ensuring sustained operational capability in the event of an attack by weapons of mass destruction.
- Establishment of a flexible, bilateral interagency coordination mechanism to coordinate policy, operational, intelligence, and public affairs positions before and during crisis situations.
- Execution of joint, bilateral training exercises to strengthen interoperability and advance alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

The SCC members, recognizing the growing importance of the U.S. force presence to Japanese and regional security, stressed the requirement for appropriate resources to ensure the success of the alliance transformation

agenda. Both allies will also make best efforts to secure resources to improve alliance capabilities and to sustain the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

IV. Implementation of the Realignment Roadmap

The SCC members reaffirmed their resolve to steadily implement the realignment initiatives described in the May 2006 SCC document, "United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation." These initiatives, when implemented, will enhance U.S. and Japanese public support for the security alliance.

The SCC members reviewed and appreciated the progress made thus far with the initiatives described in the "Roadmap" including:

- The creation of a bilateral coordination mechanism in June 2006 providing implementation oversight for the realignment initiatives;
- Japanese Diet action on legislation and funding required to facilitate early implementation of realignment initiatives;
- Elaboration of the engineering and technical design for the Futenma Replacement Facility and the initiation of surveys in the water areas offshore of Camp Schwab;
- Significant cooperation toward relocation of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, including: The U.S. creation and funding of a Joint Guam Program Office to oversee planning and development of the facilities in Guam; The launch of the U.S. environmental impact assessment process, including Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement, for the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam; and Submission of the above-mentioned legislation to the Japanese Diet authorizing the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) to take appropriate measures under the direction of the Japanese government to fulfill a portion of Japan's financial commitments related to the relocation of III MEF personnel and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- Commencement of the aircraft training relocation program in March 2007;
- Implementation of flexible-use of Yokota airspace measures in September 2006, and agreement in October 2006 for return of portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008, and for collocation of SDF controllers at the Yokota Radar Approach Control (RAPCON). These measures will help facilitate the movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements; and
- October 2006 launching of the Study Group on the specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, as specified in the "Roadmap."

The SCC members reaffirmed that completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, in accordance with the "Roadmap" by the target date of 2014, is the key to successful and timely implementation of the overall realignment plan for Okinawa, including the III MEF relocation to Guam and subsequent consolidation of remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa. The SCC members acknowledged the significant progress on a detailed consolidation plan and directed their staffs to continue close consultations toward its completion.

The SCC members also appreciated continued progress in implementation of commitments under the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) final report, including return of the Senaha Communications Facility in September 2006, and the Sobe Communications Facility and the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield in December 2006, totaling more than 300 hectares/750 acres.

V. Strengthening BMD and Operational Cooperation

Alliance BMD capabilities, which contribute to the alliance's overall deterrence posture, are strengthened to the extent that U.S. and Japanese systems can operate together effectively. The SCC members confirmed that, as both countries develop and deploy capabilities, every effort must be made to ensure tactical, operational,

and strategic coordination. In that light, the United States and Japan will take appropriate measures, in close coordination, in response to ballistic missile threats against alliance interests.

In this context, the SCC members highlighted the following areas of operational cooperation:

- To strengthen operational cooperation, bilateral planning efforts must take into account missile defense capabilities, today and in the foreseeable future. To that end, the two sides' forces will clarify concepts, roles, and missions for each side in the conduct of missile defense and related operations in response to ballistic missile threats. At the same time, a policy-level forum will ensure that policy guidance for BMD operations is unambiguous and current.
- On October 29, 2005, the SCC directed the creation of a bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC). During the North Korean missile provocations of June–July 2006, the United States and Japan exchanged information in a timely manner, including through an interim coordination facility at Yokota Air Base with SDF liaisons. The success of this facility in ensuring that both sides had a common awareness of the evolving situation validated the importance of continuous enhancement of bilateral policy/operational coordination including through establishment of the BJOCC at Yokota Air Base.
- Recognizing the importance of improving the situational awareness of U.S. forces and the SDF, the two sides are committed to the routine sharing of BMD and related operational information directly with each other on a real-time, continuous basis. The two sides will also develop a bilateral common operational picture (COP).
- The two sides will establish a comprehensive information-sharing roadmap to identify broader operational information and data to be shared in support of alliance roles, missions, and capabilities.

VI. Enhancing BMD System Capabilities

The SCC members noted with satisfaction that past alliance decisions about missile defense, coupled with recent accelerated cooperation, have strengthened BMD capabilities in the region.

They highlighted key advances, including:

- The operational deployment of a U.S. X-Band radar system to ASDF Shariki Base, Japan, with associated U.S. delivery of radar data to Japanese forces.
- The operational deployment of a U.S. PAC-3 battalion to Kadena Air Base, Japan.
- The recent and continuing addition of Standard Missile (SM-3) defense capabilities to the forward-deployed naval forces of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
- Japan's decision to accelerate modification of its Aegis ships with SM-3 capabilities. Japan will complete modification of DDG Kongo by the end of 2007, and will expedite modification of DDGs Chokai, Myoko, and Kirishima.
- Japan's decision to expedite the deployment of PAC-3, which resulted in deployment of the first PAC-3 fire unit in March 2007 and its goal to deploy 16 PAC-3 capable fire units by early 2010.
- Priority focus on U.S.–Japan cooperative development of the next generation SM-3 interceptor. The basic agreement on a framework for technology transfer reached by the two sides will facilitate progress on this project as well as in future U.S.–Japan technology cooperation projects.

The SCC members confirmed that advancing the alliance transformation agenda for security and defense cooperation will contribute to regional and global peace and security.

Reference 44. Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Implementation of the Relocation of III Marine Expeditionary Force Personnel and Their Dependents from Okinawa to Guam

(Signed on February 17, 2009)

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America,

Affirming that Japan–United States security arrangements, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960, are the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives.

Recalling that, at the meeting of Japan–United States Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, the Ministers recognized that the implementation of the realignment initiatives described in the Security Consultative Committee Document, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" (hereinafter referred to as "the Roadmap") will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation, and reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance.

Emphasizing their recognition of the importance of Guam for forward presence of United States Marine Corps forces, which provides assurance of the United States' commitment to security and strengthens deterrent capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.

Reaffirming that the Roadmap emphasizes the importance of force reductions and relocation to Guam in relation to the realignment on Okinawa and stipulates that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (hereinafter referred to as "III MEF") personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity, and recognizing that such relocation will realize consolidation and land returns south of Kadena.

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam, the KC-130 squadron will be based at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities, and the aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime Self-Defense Forces Kanoya Base and Guam.

Reaffirming that the Roadmap stipulates that, of the estimated ten billion, two hundred seventy million United States dollar ($10,270,000,000) cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide six billion, ninety million United States dollars ($6,090,000,000) (in U.S. FY2008 dollars), including two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly.

Reaffirming further that the Roadmap stipulates that the United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam-estimated in U.S. FY2008 dollars at three billion, one hundred eighty million United States dollars ($3,180,000,000) in fiscal spending plus approximately one billion United States dollars ($1,000,000,000) for a road.

Recalling that the Roadmap stipulates that, within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected, specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam, and the III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. The Government of Japan shall make cash contributions up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. FY2008 dollars) to the Government of the United States of America as a part of expenditures for the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam (hereinafter referred to as "the Relocation") subject to Paragraph 1. of Article 9 of this Agreement.
2. The amount of Japanese cash contributions to be budgeted in each Japanese fiscal year shall be determined by the Government of Japan through consultation between the two Governments and reflected in further arrangements that the two Governments shall conclude in each Japanese fiscal year (hereinafter referred to as "the further arrangements").

Article 2

The Government of the United States of America shall take necessary measures for the Relocation, including funding for projects of the Government of the United States of America to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam subject to Paragraph 2. of Article 9 of this Agreement.

Article 3

The Relocation shall be dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap. The Government of Japan intends to complete the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap in close cooperation with the Government of the United States of America.

Article 4

The Government of the United States of America shall use Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest only for projects to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam for the Relocation.

Article 5

The Government of the United States of America shall ensure that all participants in the process of acquisition for projects to be funded by Japanese cash contributions for the Relocation shall be treated fairly, impartially and equitably.

Article 6

The Government of Japan shall designate the Ministry of Defense of Japan as its implementing authority, and the Government of the United States of America shall designate the Department of Defense of the United States of America as its implementing authority. The two Governments shall hold consultations at the technical level on implementation guidance to be followed by the implementing authorities, and on the specific projects referred to in Paragraph 1.(a) of Article 7 of this Agreement. Through such consultations, the Government of the United States of America shall ensure that the Government of Japan shall be involved, in an appropriate manner, in the implementation of the said specific projects.

Article 7

1. (a) Specific projects to be funded in each Japanese fiscal year shall be agreed upon between the two Governments and reflected in the further arrangements.
   (b) The Government of the United States of America shall maintain a United States Treasury account to which the Government of Japan shall provide cash contributions. The Government of the United

States of America shall open and maintain, under the said account, a sub-account for Japanese cash contributions in each Japanese fiscal year.

2. Japanese cash contributions and their accrued interest that is contractually committed to pay for specific projects shall be credited, based on the method of calculation using an index to be agreed upon between the implementing authorities referred to in Article 6 of this Agreement, to the total amount of Japanese cash contributions, which is up to the amount of two billion, eight hundred million United States dollars ($2,800,000,000) (in U.S. FY2008 dollars).
3. (a) In case there remains an unused balance of Japanese cash contributions after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for all specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year, the Government of the United States of America shall return the said unused balance to the Government of Japan, except as provided in Paragraph 3.(b) of this Article.
   (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, the unused balance for other specific projects funded in the same Japanese fiscal year.
4. (a) The Government of the United States of America shall return interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions to the Government of Japan, except as provided in Paragraph 4.(b) of this Article, after the completion of all contracts, as evidenced by receipt of documents releasing the Government of the United States of America from any further financial and contractual liability, for the last specific projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
   (b) The Government of the United States of America may use, with the consent of the implementing authority of the Government of Japan, interest accrued from Japanese cash contributions for projects funded by Japanese cash contributions.
5. The Government of the United States of America shall provide the Government of Japan with a report, every month, on transactions in the United States Treasury account, including all the sub-accounts related to Japanese cash contributions.

Article 8

The Government of the United States of America shall consult with the Government of Japan in the event that the Government of the United States of America considers changes that may significantly affect facilities and infrastructure funded by Japanese cash contributions, and shall take appropriate actions, taking Japanese concerns into full consideration.

Article 9

1. Japanese cash contributions referred to in Paragraph 1. of Article 1 of this Agreement shall be subject to funding by the Government of the United States of America of measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement.
2. United States' measures referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement shall be subject to: (1) the availability of funds for the Relocation, (2) tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility as stipulated in the Roadmap, and (3) Japan's financial contributions as stipulated in the Roadmap.

Article 10

The two Governments shall consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 11
This Agreement shall be approved by Japan and the United States of America in accordance with their respective internal legal procedures. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date when diplomatic notes indicating such approval are exchanged.

Reference 45. Statement by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of Japan and the United States of America

(January 19, 2010)

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of Japan and the United States of America was signed in Washington, D.C. on January 19, 1960 by delegates of Japan and the United States. Today marks the fiftieth anniversary of that day.

The U.S.–Japan security arrangements have greatly contributed to not only to the security of Japan but also the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. It is not an exaggeration to say that it was thanks to the U.S.–Japan security arrangements that Japan has maintained peace, while respecting freedom and democracy, and enjoyed economic development in that environment since the end of the last World War to this day.

Over the last half-century, the global security environment has changed dramatically, as exemplified by the end of the Cold War and the September 11th attacks. Nonetheless, the security environment surrounding Japan remains difficult, as can be seen by the nuclear and missile testing by North Korea. Under such circumstances, for Japan, which has declared not to acquire nuclear weapons nor to become a military power, the deterrence provided by the U.S. Forces based on the U.S.–Japan security arrangements, together with Japan's Self Defense Forces, serves, and will continue to serve, an essential role in the foreseeable future to maintain Japan's peace and security.

The U.S.–Japan security arrangements continue to be indispensable not only for the defense of Japan alone, but also for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region. Under a security environment in which there still exist uncertainty and unpredictability, the presence of the U.S. Forces based on the Treaty will continue to function as a public good by creating a strong sense of security to the countries in the region.

Based on the aforementioned recognition, in this memorable year commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the revision of the Treaty, we intend to work jointly with the US Government to further deepen the U.S.–Japan Alliance, with the U.S.–Japan security arrangements at its core, in order to adapt to the evolving environment of the twenty-first century. I would like to present the people of Japan with the results of this work before the end of this year.

Reference 46. Statement by the President on the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan was signed here in Washington fifty years ago today. On that day, President Dwight Eisenhower pledged to establish an indestructible partnership based on equality and mutual understanding. The enduring partnership between the United States of America and Japan has helped bring unprecedented prosperity and peace in freedom to our nations. Our alliance has secured extraordinary benefits for the entire Asia Pacific region and made possible the unparalleled progress of the past five decades.

Today, we commemorate the first half-century of this important alliance, which was founded on our shared values and our common interest in peace and security, and reflects the abiding ties between our citizens and institutions. America's commitment to Japan's security is unshakable, and our cooperation to meet common challenges is a critical part of our engagement with the world. And just as we honor the countless Americans and Japanese who have built the ties that bind our nations, we also look to the future with a determination to build upon the foundation of their progress.

As we celebrate the anniversary of the treaty, we pay tribute to its role in supporting regional security and prosperity, and strengthening our two democracies. Let us now undertake to renew our alliance for the 21st century and enhance the bonds of friendship and common purpose that unite our nations.

Reference 47. Joint Statement of The U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Signing of The U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

(January 19, 2010)

On this the Fiftieth Anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the Members of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) affirm that the U.S.–Japan Alliance plays an indispensable role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as regional peace and stability. The Alliance is rooted in our shared values, democratic ideals, respect for human rights, rule of law and common interests. The Alliance has served as the foundation of our security and prosperity for the past half century and the Ministers are committed to ensuring that it continues to be effective in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. The U.S.–Japan security arrangements underpin cooperation on a wide range of global and regional issues as well as foster prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers are committed to building on these arrangements and expanding into new areas of cooperation.

In the last half century, the global security environment has changed dramatically as exemplified by the end of the Cold War and the rise of transnational threats. Unpredictability and uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region continue, with new threats emerging in the international community as a whole, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their delivery systems. Given such a security environment, the U.S.–Japan security arrangements will continue to play an essential role in maintaining both the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers place particular importance on sustaining the high degree of public support for the Alliance. They endorse ongoing efforts to maintain our deterrent capabilities in a changing strategic landscape, including appropriate stationing of U.S. forces, while reducing the impact of bases on local communities, including Okinawa, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

The Alliance provides a context of peace and stability for East Asia that has enabled all nations of the region to develop and prosper. The Alliance will remain alert, flexible and responsive in the face of the full range of emerging twenty-first century threats and persistent regional and global challenges. The most important common strategic objectives within the region are to ensure the security of Japan and to maintain peace and stability in the region. The United States and Japan will continue to strengthen their ability to respond to contingencies that could threaten those objectives. The United States and Japan are working closely together and cooperating with their partners through various international fora including the Six-Party Talks to deal with the threat from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as well as to address humanitarian issues. The Ministers stress that the United States and Japan will work to advance cooperative relations with China, welcoming it to play a constructive and responsible role in the international arena. The United States and Japan also will enhance regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region. The United States and Japan will work together to respond to natural disasters and to provide humanitarian relief in the region and beyond. The United States and Japan will continue to deepen their cooperation, including that between U.S. forces and Japan's Self Defense Forces, in wide-ranging areas of common interest in the changing security environment.

Recognizing the significance of the Alliance in the global context, the Ministers reaffirm their commitment to closely cooperate in responding to global threats. The United States and Japan will strengthen their efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, while maintaining necessary deterrence. The United States and Japan are committed to cooperating closely to combat global terrorism. The United States and Japan's ongoing efforts and cooperation in combating piracy are vital for the continued maintenance of freedom of navigation and safety of mariners.

As the Treaty marks its Fiftieth Anniversary, the Ministers commit themselves to further building an unshakeable U.S.–Japan Alliance to adapt to the evolving environment of the twenty-first century, learning from the challenges the Alliance has faced in the past. For this purpose, the Ministers will intensify the dialogue which is underway to further promote and deepen security cooperation in wide-ranging areas.

The United States and Japan recommit themselves to internationally recognized standards of human rights, the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the objectives of the Treaty, namely to promote mutual cooperation and security, to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship that exist between them and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

Reference 48. Joint Statement of the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee

(Tokyo, May 28, 2010)

On May 28, 2010, the members of the United States–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) reconfirmed that, in this 50th anniversary year of the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the U.S.–Japan Alliance remains indispensable not only to the defense of Japan, but also to the peace, security, and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Recent developments in the security environment of Northeast Asia reaffirmed the significance of the Alliance. In this regard, the United States reiterated its unwavering commitment to Japan's security. Japan reconfirmed its commitment to playing a positive role in contributing to the peace and stability of the region. Furthermore, the SCC members recognized that a robust forward presence of U.S. military forces in Japan, including in Okinawa, provides the deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of regional stability. The SCC members committed to promote and deepen security cooperation in wide-ranging areas to enable the Alliance to adapt to the evolving challenges of the 21st century.

The Ministers reaffirmed the commitment to reduce the impact on local communities, including in Okinawa, thereby preserving a sustainable U.S. military presence in Japan. In this context, the SCC members expressed their shared commitments to relocate Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma and return the base to Japan as part of the Alliance transformation and realignment process.

The Ministers confirmed their commitment to implement steadily the realignment initiatives described in the May 1, 2006, SCC Document, "United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation," as supplemented by this SCC Statement.

The Ministers reaffirmed that, as provided for in the Guam Agreement of February 17, 2009, the relocation of approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on tangible progress toward the completion of the replacement facility. The relocation to Guam will realize the consolidation and return of most of the facilities south of Kadena.

Bearing this in mind, the two sides intend to verify and validate that this Futenma relocation plan appropriately considers factors such as safety, operational requirements, noise impact, environmental concerns, and effects on the local community.

Both sides confirmed the intention to locate the replacement facility at the Camp Schwab Henoko-saki area and adjacent waters, with the runway portion(s) of the facility to be 1,800 meters long, inclusive of overruns, exclusive of seawalls.

In order to achieve the earliest possible return of MCAS Futenma, the Ministers decided that a study by experts regarding the replacement facility's location, configuration and construction method would be completed promptly (in any event no later than the end of August, 2010), and that the verification and validation would be completed by the time of the next SCC.

Both sides confirmed the intention to locate, configure, and construct the replacement facility in such a manner as to ensure that environmental impact assessment procedures and construction of the replacement facility can be completed without significant delay.

The Ministers recognized the importance of responding to the concerns of the people of Okinawa that they bear a disproportionate burden related to the presence of U.S. forces, and also recognized that the more equitable distribution of shared alliance responsibilities is essential for sustainable development of the Alliance. Based on the aforementioned recognition, the Ministers directed that, as progress is made toward the replacement facility, concrete measures should be taken expeditiously in the following areas:

- **Training Relocation**

  The two sides committed to expand the relocation of the U.S. forces activities, to include both bilateral and unilateral training, outside of Okinawa. In this regard, utilization of Tokunoshima will be considered, subject

to development of appropriate facilities. Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) facilities and areas in mainland Japan may also be utilized. Both sides also committed to examine the relocation of training outside of Japan, such as to Guam.

- **Environment**
  In view of shared responsibilities on environmental stewardship, the Ministers instructed their staffs to discuss the potential for the United States and Japan to take a "Green Alliance" approach to our bases and the environment. U.S.–Japanese collaboration on a "Green Alliance" would consider ways to introduce renewable energy technology into U.S. bases in Japan and under development in Guam, including as a component of Host Nation Support. The Ministers instructed their staffs to consider promptly and seriously an agreement on the environment, including reasonable access to U.S. facilities and areas in cases of environmental incidents, and reasonable access to U.S. facilities and areas for environmental surveys prior to land returns.
- **Shared Use of Facilities**
  The two sides intend to study opportunities to expand the shared use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF, which would contribute to closer bilateral operational coordination, improved interoperability, and stronger relations with local communities.
- **Training Areas**
  The two sides decided on the partial lift of restrictions on the use of the "Hotel/Hotel training area" and committed to continue to consult on other measures.
- **Guam Relocation**
  The two sides confirmed that, in accordance with the Guam Agreement of February 17, 2009, the relocation of approximately 8,000 III MEF personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam will be steadily implemented. The relocation to Guam is dependent on tangible progress made by the Government of Japan toward completion of the replacement facility. The U.S. side will examine the unit composition of III MEF personnel remaining on Okinawa in the context of overall theater security, including deterrence, while accounting for the concerns of local communities.
- **Facilitation of the Return of Facilities and Areas South of Kadena**
  The two sides confirmed that the return of facilities and areas south of Kadena will be steadily implemented in accordance with the Realignment Roadmap. In addition, the two sides decided that the "Industrial Corridor" of Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) and a part of Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser) are priority areas for early return.
- **Noise Reduction at Kadena**
  The two sides affirmed their commitment to further noise reduction at Kadena through such measures as expansion of both bilateral and unilateral training outside of Okinawa, including improvements to the aviation training relocation program, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report.
- **Communication and Cooperation with Communities in Okinawa**
  The two sides affirmed their intention to intensify communication with communities in Okinawa on issues of concern related to the presence of U.S. forces. The two sides committed to explore cooperation in such areas as information technology initiatives, cultural exchanges, education programs and research partnerships.

As part of the effort to deepen security cooperation, the SCC members emphasized the importance of ensuring a shared understanding of the regional security environment and the role of the U.S.–Japan Alliance in advancing common strategic objectives. Toward this end, the SCC members committed to intensify the ongoing bilateral security dialogue This security dialogue will address traditional security threats, as well as focus on new areas for cooperation.

Reference 49. Current Government Efforts Pertaining to the Items Approved by the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee on May 28, 2010

(May 28, 2010, Cabinet Decision)

1. The governments of Japan and the United States will study the relocation to the Futenma Replacement Facility indicated in the United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (hereinafter called "Roadmap") approved by the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee on May 1, 2006, and make partial additions and supplementation to the Roadmap, and reconfirmed steady implementation of practical measures for the realignment of the structure of U.S. Forces in Japan as indicated in the Roadmap.

   Accordingly, the May 30, 2006 Cabinet Decision, "Government Efforts Pertaining to Realignment of U.S. Force Structure in Japan" is to be reviewed.

2. It has been 50 years since the signing of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, but reflection on recent developments in the security situation, particularly in Northeast Asia, shows that the Japan–U.S. alliance continues to be essential not just to the defense of Japan, but also to the peace, security and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. We must maintain and deepen cooperation for security in a broad range of fields in a manner that is appropriate for the Japan–U.S. alliance to meet the new issues of the 21st century. At the same time, it is important to lighten the burden on local communities, including Okinawa.

   For that purpose at the same time that the governments of both Japan and the United States move forward with necessary tasks to establish facilities in the area of Camp Schwab, Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas in order to relocate and return Futenma Air Station at an early date, from the perspective of the importance of balanced burdens of the responsibility for the alliance within Japan, along with the development of replacement facilities, the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee issued a joint statement that included the requirement to quickly find concrete measures to relocate training outside of Okinawa, environmental measures, and joint use of facilities between U.S. Forces and the JSDF.

3. Based on the above joint statement, the Government is moving forward to verify and confirm Futenma Air Station relocation plans. Furthermore, at the same time that Japan as a whole takes responsibility for the alliance to lighten the burden of bases that is concentrated in Okinawa, in order to further deepen the Japan–U.S. alliance, efforts will continue to reorganize or reduce bases of U.S. Forces to disperse the burden of bases in Japan from Okinawa, or outside Japan. Furthermore, concrete measures to relocate training outside of Okinawa, environmental measures, and joint use of facilities by U.S. forces and the JSDF will be implemented quickly. At that time additional effort will be made to obtain the understanding of related local public organizations, including in Okinawa.

Reference 50. Outline of 23 Issues

(As of March 31, 2010)

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remarks
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc., for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on September 30, 1994
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62			◎		Returned on November 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(21. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino–Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(21. Waste incineration facility site (Kurahama))	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
	(21. Area currently used by the GSDF)	58	○				Returned on October 31, 2006
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(19. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
	16 facilities, 18 issues	765	6	7	2	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendment agreed on April 22, 1999 and December 21, 2001 (to be returned upon formulation of the land utilization plan or reversion of the southern part, whichever comes first)
Camp Zukeran	20. Awase Golf Course	47			◎		Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (Construction of the new site completed and furnishing agreed on in order to return the land after the golf course is relocated to Kadena Ammunition Storage Area.)
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	21. Former Higashionna Ammunition Storage Area	43	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of the perimeter patrol road, etc.)
Futenma Air Station	22. A strip of land along the east side (Nakahara–Ginowan)	4		◎			Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of the perimeter patrol road, etc.)
Camp Hansen	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendments agreed on April 22, 1999; February 12, 2004; and January 15, 2010 (Release term was extended until the end of 2011 without relocation condition.)
	5 facilities, 5 issues	256	3	1	1	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the Area column, the value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.
2. A single circle mark in the Classification column expediently indicates that a scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.
3. The numbers in the Scope column were assigned only for classification purpose of 23 issues.
4. "SCC" in the Classification column indicates issues in which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues in which release was requested by the Council for promotion of dezoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues in which release of facilities and areas was requested to the U.S. government by then Governor Nishime of Okinawa. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

Reference 51. The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan–U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report. Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the yearlong SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time.

Return Land:

— Futenma Air Station — See attached.

— Northern Training Area

Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

• Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.

• Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.

— Aha Training Area

Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.

— Gimbaru Training Area

Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

— Sobe Communication Site

Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

— Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield

Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.

— Camp Kuwae

Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.

— Senaha Communication Station

Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.

— Makiminato Service Area

Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.

— Naha Port

Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).

— Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)

Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

— Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese FY1997.

— Parachute drop training
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.

— Conditioning hikes on public roads
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

— Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.

— Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.

— Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.

— Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.

— Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

— Accident reports
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996.

In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.

— Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

— Visits to U.S. facilities and areas
Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles
Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered

plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.

— Supplemental automobile insurance
Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

— Payment for claims
Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:
- Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
- A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
- In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. Government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

— Quarantine procedures
Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen
Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. forces in the United States.

— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction
   a. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
   b. On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

c. The SCC will establish a bilateral U.S.–Japan working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of its work.

2. Decisions of the SCC
   a. Pursue construction of an SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) — capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
   b. Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
   c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
   d. Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
   e. Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.
3. Guiding Principles
   a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
   b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
   c. The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
   d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables.

Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.

e. The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.

f. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.

4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods

Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.

a. Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules) — supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the sea bed.

b. Pontoon Type — platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.

c. Semi-Submersible Type — platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.

5. The Next Steps

a. The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.

b. The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation tests and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.

c. The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

Reference 52. Concept of Operations When an Armed Attack against Japan Takes Place

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Operations</th><th>Operations of Self-Defense Forces</th><th>Operations of U.S. Forces</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Operations to counter air attack against Japan</td><td>❍ Will have primary responsibilities for conducting operations for air defense</td><td>❍ Will support SDF operations
❍ Will conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Operations to defend surrounding waters and protect sea lines of communication</td><td>❍ Will have primary responsibilities for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters and for other operations</td><td>❍ Will support SDF operations
❍ Will conduct operations, including those which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan</td><td>❍ Will have primary responsibilities for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions</td><td>❍ Will primarily conduct operations to supplement SDF capabilities
(The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of invasion, and will support SDF operations)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Responses to other threats</td><td>Guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration of Japanese territory</td><td>❍ Will have primary responsibilities to check and repel such attacks at the earliest possible stage. In its operations, the SDF will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies</td><td>❍ Will support the SDF in appropriate ways depending on the situation</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Ballistic missile attacks</td><td colspan="2">❍ Will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to such attacks</td></tr>
<tr><td>❍ Will provide Japan with necessary intelligence
❍ Will consider, as necessary, use of forces providing additional strike power</td></tr>
</table>

Reference 53. Function and Fields and Examples of Items for Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Functions and Fields			Examples of Items for Cooperation
Cooperation in activities initiated by either Government	Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees		❍ Transportation of personnel and supplies to the affected area ❍ Medical services, communications and, transportation in the affected area ❍ Relief and transfer operations for refugees and provision of emergency materials to refugees
	Search and rescue		❍ Search and rescue operations in Japanese territory and in waters around Japan, and information sharing related to such operations
	Noncombatant evacuation operations		❍ Information sharing and communication with, and assembly and transportation of noncombatants ❍ Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports by U.S. aircraft and vessels for transportation of noncombatants ❍ Customs, immigration, and quarantine of noncombatants upon entry into Japan ❍ Assistance to noncombatants in such matters as temporary accommodations, transportation, and medical services in Japan
	Activities for ensuring effectiveness of economic sanctions for maintenance of international peace and stability		❍ Inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and activities related to such inspections ❍ Intelligence sharing
Japan's support for activities by U.S. Forces	Use of facilities		❍ Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for supplies and other purposes by U.S. aircraft and vessels ❍ Reservation of spaces for loading/unloading of personnel and materials by the U.S. and of storage areas at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ❍ Extension of operating hours for SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for use by U.S. aircraft and vessels ❍ Use of SDF facilities by U.S. aircraft ❍ Provisions of training and exercise areas ❍ Construction of offices, accommodations, etc., inside U.S. facilities and areas
	Rear area support	Supplies	❍ Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to U.S. aircraft and vessels at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ❍ Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) to U.S. facilities and areas
		Transportation	❍ Land, sea, and air transportation of personnel, materials and POL inside Japan ❍ Sea transportation of personnel, materials and POL to U.S. vessels on the high seas ❍ Use of vehicles and cranes for transportation of personnel, materials and POL
		Maintenance	❍ Repair and maintenance of U.S. aircraft, vessels and vehicles ❍ Provision of repair parts ❍ Temporary provision of tools and materials for maintenance
		Medical Services	❍ Medical treatment of causalities inside Japan ❍ Transportation of casualties inside Japan ❍ Provision of medical supply
		Security	❍ Security of U.S. facilities and areas ❍ Maritime surveillance around U.S. facilities and civilian airports and ports ❍ Security of transportation routes inside Japan ❍ Intelligence sharing
		Communications	❍ Provision of frequencies (including those for satellite communications) and equipment for communications among relevant Japanese and U.S. agencies
		Others	❍ Support for port entry/exist by U.S. vessels ❍ Loading/unloading of materials at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ❍ Sewage disposal, water supply and electricity inside U.S. facilities and areas ❍ Temporary increase of workers at U.S. facilities and areas
Japan–U.S. operational cooperation	Surveillance		❍ Intelligence sharing
	Minesweeping		❍ Minesweeping operations in Japanese territory and on the high seas round Japan, and intelligence sharing on mines
	Sea and airspace management		❍ Maritime traffic coordination in and around Japan in response to increased sea traffic ❍ Air traffic and airspace management in and around Japan

Reference 54. Record of Japan–U.S. Bilateral Exercises in FY2007

Joint Exercise

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	United States	
Japan–U.S. joint exercises (Command post exercise)	January 13–29, 2010	Camp Ichigaya, USFJ Yokota Base, locations, etc., of other units participating in the exercise	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Central Readiness Force, Regional Armies, Signal Brigade, Ground Material Control Command, Self Defense Fleet, Regional District Units, Communications Commands, MSDF Maritime Material Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, JASDF Air Communication and System Wing, Air Material Command, SDF Command and Communication Squadron, etc. Approx 1,400 personnel	Joint Staff Office, US Army Japan, US Naval Force Japan, U.S. Marine Corps in Japan, etc. Approx. 500 personnel	Training for bilateral actions

GSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	United States	
Japan–U.S. Joint Army Command Post Exercise (U.S.)	July 10–17, 2009	Fort Shafter in Hawaii, United States	GSDF Staff Offices, North Army, etc. Approx. 130 personnel	General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, U.S. Army Japan Approx. 100 personnel	Training for coordinate operations
Field exercise with U.S. Army in the United States	September 8–25, 2009	Yakima Training Center, etc., in Washington, United States	11th Division, etc. Approx. 350 personnel	Washington State, 593rd Sustainment Brigade Approx. 100 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training with U.S. Army	October 9–18, 2008	Aibano maneuver area, etc.	3rd Division Approx. 680 personnel	42nd Infantry Brigade Approx. 200 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training with U.S. Marine Corps	October 19 –November 1, 2009	JGSDF Sekiyama Training Area and JGSDF Camp Takada	1st Division Approx. 300 personnel	3rd Marine Expeditionary Force Approx. 250 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Japan–U.S. Joint Army Command Post Exercise (Japan)	December 1–14, 2009	JGSDF Camp Higashi-Chitose, etc.	GSDF Staff Offices, North Army, etc. Approx. 4,500 personnel	General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific; Headquarters, U.S. Army in Japan, etc. Approx 1200 personnel	Training for coordinate operations
Field exercise with the U.S. Army	January 19 –February 25, 2010	Camp Pendleton in California, United States	Western Army infantry Regiment Approx. 180 personnel	1st Marine Expeditionary Force Approx. 200 personnel	Training for response to outlier invasion
Field training with U.S. Army	February 10–18, 2010	Ojojihara Training Area, etc.	6th Division Approx. 150 personnel	218th Brigade ^ Approx. 150 personnel	Training for bilateral actions
Field training with U.S. Marine Corps	February 21 –March 7, 2010	Nihonbara Training Area, etc.	10th Division Approx. 300 personnel	3rd Marine Division Approx. 120 personnel	Training for bilateral actions

MSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	United States	
Special minesweeping training	Jul. 17–29, 2009	Mutsu Bay	Vessels: 25 Aircraft: approx. 11	Minesweeping personnel, etc. Approx: 10 Aircraft: 1	Mine sweeping training
Special training for case security	Nov. 17–19, 2009	U.S. Marine Yokosuka Base and Yokosuka Port	Yokosuka Regional Headquarters, etc. Approx: 170	U.S. Marine Yokosuka Base Military Police Approx. 40	Training for cooperation for base security
Special medical training	Nov. 18, 2009	U.S. Marine Yokosuka Base	Yokosuka District Unit Approx: 170	Yokosuka Naval Hospital, etc. Approx. 70	Medical training
Special minesweeping training	Nov. 21 –Dec. 1, 2009	Hyuganada	Vessels: 28 Aircraft: a few	Minesweeping personnel: 5	Mine sweeping training
Anti-submarine special training	Dec. 3–6, 2009	Ocean area around Okinawa	Vessels: 4 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 6 Aircraft: a few	Anti-submarine training
Transport special training	Jan. 26–28, 2010	Ocean area around Sasebo and Western Kyushu	Vessels: 2	Vessels: 1	Transport special training
Anti-submarine special training	Jan. 26 –Feb. 2, 2010	Ocean area from off Tokai to off Shikoku	Vessels: 13 Aircraft: approx. 20	Vessels: 1	Anti-submarine training
Command post experience	Feb. 16–26, 2010	Naval War College (U.S.)	MSDF staff, etc. Approx. 30	Command Headquarters, U.S. Naval Force Japan Approx. 50	Training in coordinate training

ASDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	United States	
Fighter combat training	Apr. 20–23, 2009	Western Hokkaido airspace and Easter Misawa airspace	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Jul. 25–31, 2009	Western Akita airspace and Easter Misawa airspace	Aircraft: 4	Aircraft: 4	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training Base air defense training	Sep. 23 –Oct. 22, 2009	Airspace around Elmendorf Air Force Base and Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, U.S.	Aircraft: 7	Aircraft: —	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Oct. 2–10, 2009	Airspace off Hyakuri	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 5	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training	Nov. 14–20, 2009	Airspace off Komatsu	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 12	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training, Air to ground attack training	Jan. 26 –Mar. 2, 2010	Airspace around Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, U.S., and Farallon de Medinilla Target Range	Aircraft: 10	Aircraft: 14	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training	Jan. 26 –Feb. 10, 2010	Airspace off Hyakuri	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 6	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training	Feb. 27 –Mar. 12, 2010	Airspace off Misawa	Aircraft: 8	Aircraft: 8	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills
Fighter combat training, Air defense combat training	Mar. 5–12, 2010	Airspace off Tsuiki	Aircraft: 12	Aircraft: 5	Enhancement of joint operation capability; Enhancement of combat skills

Reference 55. Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects

Item	Summary	Time of Conclusion, Agreed upon by the Japanese and U.S. Governments, on the Implementation of Japan–U.S. Joint Research and Development Projects	Time of Completion
Ducted Rocket Engine	Research into basic technology for the secondary combustion of solid liquid fuel through the injection of air from an external source	September 1992	January 1999
Advanced Steel Technology	Research into basic technology for the welding of extra-high-strength steel used in the pressure hulls of submarines and others	October 1995	January 2002
Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials	Research into basic technology related to diesel engine using ceramic materials	October 1995	October 2002
Eye-Safe Laser Radar	Research into basic technology related to LIDAR systems using eye-safe frequencies	September 1996	September 2001
Ejection Seat	Modification work to supplement combat aircraft ejector seats with pilot-restraint devices and seat-stabilizing equipment	March 1998	March 2003
Advanced Hybrid Propulsion Technology	Research into basic technology related to thrust-controllable propulsion devices made up of solid fuel and liquid oxidizers	May 1998	May 2005
Shallow Water Acoustic Technology	Research related to the analysis of characteristics of transmittance of sound waves in shallow sea regions, and the reflection of sound waves on the seabed	June 1999	February 2003
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology	Research related to principal missile components (infrared seeker, kinetic warhead, second stage rocket motor, and nose cone) for the Navy's Theater Wide Defense System (Current Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System)	August 1999	March 2008
Low-Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery	Research related to the development of gunpowder that avoids unintentional secondary explosions of the gunpowder at the time of bombing	March 2000	January 2004
Avionics Aboard the Follow-on Aircraft to the P-3C	Research into onboard avionics of the MSDF's next P-3C fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft (P-X) and the U.S. Navy's future Multi-purpose Maritime Aircraft (MMA) for better interoperability	March 2002	September 2006
Software Radio	Research into basic technologies of software radio, which enables primary radio functions through software	March 2002	March 2007
Advanced Full Material/ Structural Technology	Research into full system of vessels improved in its stealth feature and survivability by utilizing advanced materials/structural technology	April 2005	August 2010
Sea-Based Radar System	Research on the Phased Array Radar technology for ships that apply high-power semiconductor devices	April 2006	November 2009
Combat System for Ship	Research on improving the information processing ability by applying open architecture technology to the combat system for ships	April 2006	November 2009
New Guided Missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense	Development of new ship-based guided missiles for ballistic missile defense to improve the existing capability to counter threats caused by ballistic missiles and to deal with diversification of ballistic missiles with higher performance	June 2006	Ongoing
Effect on People by Aircraft Fuel and/or Engine Emission	Research on the effects aircraft fuel (JP-4 and/or JP-8) and/or engine emission on people	March 2007	Ongoing
Palm-sized automated chemical agent detector	Research on palm-sized automated chemical agent detector with simplified control and treating methods, and quick and accurate detection, and its test evaluation technique	March 2008	Ongoing
Image gyro for airborne applications	Research on Image-based positioning and navigation technology which will complement and enhance current navigation system and GPS	February 2010	Ongoing

Reference 56. The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

(As of June 30, 2010)

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq, etc.	January 2004 –July 2006	About 600	• Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities, etc.
	Kuwait, etc.	June–September 2006	About 100	• Operations required for evacuation of vehicles, equipment and others
MSDF	Persian Gulf, etc.	February 20 –April 8, 2004	About 330	• Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipment required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait, etc.	December 2003 –February 2009	About 210	• Transportation of materials for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	November 2001 –November 2007	About 320	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan, etc.		—	• Transportation of materials

(3) Replenishment activities based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Indian Ocean	January 2008 –January 2010	About 330	• Materials supplies for foreign vessels

(4) International Peace Cooperation Activities

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Ceasefire monitors	September 1992 –September 1993	8	16	• Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of ceasefire • Monitor observance of ceasefire at the border
	Engineering unit	September 1992 –September 1993	600	1,200	• Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure • Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups • Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities needed for work and medical care to UNTAC component personnel
United Nations operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 –January 1995	5	10	• Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at UNUMOZ Headquarters
	Transport coordination unit	May 1993 –January 1995	48	144	• Support customs clearance work and provide other transport-related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Humanitarian Relief Operation for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	September– December 1994	260		• Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
	Air transport unit	September– December 1994	118		• Airlift member of Rwandan refugee relief units and additional supplies between Nairobi (Kenya) and Goma (former Republic of Zaire and present Democratic Republic of the Congo) • Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Headquarters staff	February 1996 –February 2009	2	32	• Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters
		February 2009–	3		
	Transport unit	February 1996–	43	1,247	• Transport food and other supplies • Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow clearance

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Humanitarian Relief Operations in Timor-Leste	Air transport unit	November 1999 –February 2000	113		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR • Make use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR-related personnel
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	October 2001	138		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste (UNTAET) (United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMISET) from May 20, 2002)	Headquarters staff	February 2002 –June 2004	7 (10 for the first Headquarters staff)	17	• Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters
	Engineering unit	March 2002 –June 2004	405 (680 each for the first and second units, 522 for the third unit)	2,287	• Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities • Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations • Civic assistance
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	March–April 2003	50		• Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
Humanitarian Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	July–August 2003	98		• Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)	Arms monitors	March 2007–	6	24	• Monitor management of weapons of Maoist soldiers and those of the Nepalese government force
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Headquarters staff	October 2008–	2	8	• Coordination in UNMIS concerning overall logistics of the military sector • Database management
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Headquarters staff	February 2010–	2		• Facilities related administrative planning coordination including deciding priorities for engineering activities for military and civilian departments in the MINUSTAH headquarters, and overall logistical planning for acquisition and shipping of materials for military departments
	Engineering unit	February 2010–	Approx. 350		• Remove rubble, repair roads, construct simple facilities, etc.

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and Timor-Leste) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Timor-Leste, and Afghanistan).
2. And advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part of the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(5) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Honduras (hurricane)	Medical unit	Nov. 13–Dec. 9, 1998	80		• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics in the Republic of Honduras
	Air transport unit		105		• Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc., between Japan and Honduras • Air transport of equipment and other materials between the United States and Honduras
Transportation of Materials for International Disaster Relief Activities Disaster Relief Activities in Turkey (earthquake)	Maritime transport unit	Sep.23–Nov. 22, 1999	426		• Marine transportation of materials necessary for international disaster relief activities in the Republic of Turkey (e.g., temporary dwellings)
International Disaster Relief Activities in India (earthquake)	Material support unit	Feb. 5–11, 2001	16		• Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials
	Air transport unit		78		• Transport of aid materials and support units, etc.

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International Disaster Relief Activities in Iran (earthquake, tsunami)	Air transport unit	Dec. 30, 2003 –Jan. 6, 2004	31		• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities in Thailand (earthquake, tsunami)	Dispatched maritime unit	Dec. 28, 2004 –Jan. 1, 2005	590		• Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims around Thailand and its sea
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	Jan. 6–Mar. 23, 2005	22		• Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities • Communication and coordination with relevant organizations and foreign forces involved in the international disaster relief activities
	Medical/Air support unit		228		• Air transport of aid materials • Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Maritime transport unit		593		• Marine transportation of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Support for the activities of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams • Transport and aid materials
	Air transport unit		82		• Air transport of aid materials
International Disaster Relief Activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia	Maritime transport unit	Aug. 5–10, 2005	346		• Rescue of a Russian submarine
International Disaster Relief Activities in Pakistan (earthquake)	Air support unit	Oct. 12–Dec. 2, 2005	147		• Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114		• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Team
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia	Medical support unit	Jun. 1–22, 2006	149		• Medical treatment and prevention of epidemics
	Air transport unit		85		• Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams
International Disaster Relief Activities in Indonesia (earthquake)	Medical support unit	Oct. 5–17, 2009	12		• Medical treatment
	Joint liaison office		21		• Coordination with relevant Indonesian organizations and others
International Disaster Relief Activities in Haiti (earthquake)	Medical support unit	Jan.18–Feb.16, 2010	104		• Medical treatment
	Air transport unit		97		• Air transportation of International Disaster Relief Teams • Air transportation of victims from Haiti to the United States as part of international disaster relief activities on the return trips of said unit
	Joint liaison office		33		• Coordination with relevant Haitian organizations and others

Notes: 1. For international disaster relief activities in Iran, a fixing tram was sent to Singapore separately because of a mechanical problem with transport aircraft on the way to Iran.
2. Eleven officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

Reference 57. Results of the Replenishment Activities

This report is being made based on the provisions of Article 7 of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, and the report to the Diet pertaining to replenishment activities based on the provisions of Article 3 of the same law. A summary of the report follows below.

1. Results of replenishment activities
   - MSDF vessels replenished military vessels of 8 foreign nations engaged in maritime anti-terrorist activities in the Indian Ocean from January 17, 2008 to January 15, 2010, providing fuel for ships, for helicopters based on those ships, and water. In all, 14 ships (including ships to escort the replenishment vessels) and approximately 2,400 crewmembers were assigned to the task.
     Ship fuel: Replenished 145 times, providing approximately 27,005 kilolitres
     Helicopter fuel: 18 times, approximately 210 kilolitres
     Water: 67 times, approximately 4,195 tons
   - Areas where replenishment was conducted
     Replenishment was conducted 122 times in Sea of Oman, 19 times in the North Arabian Sea, 3 times in the Gulf of Aden, once in the Persian Gulf.
   - Expenses of the activities
     The total expenses incurred for the replenishment activities were approximately ¥10.5 billion.
2. Evaluation of the replenishment activities
   (1) Evaluation of the replenishment activities
      - Confirmed the reliability of MSDF replenishment technology.
      - Know-how and understanding of all types of tasks were accumulated and shared, improving capability to conduct maritime replenishment over the long term.

   (2) Notes for the future
      - When implementing international peace cooperation activities in the future, it is necessary to examine constancy and appropriate response pertaining to international cooperation, while utilizing JSDF capabilities and technology.
      - Full implementation of information collection capabilities pertaining to local situations, etc., and fundamental training and equipment are necessary.
      - It is necessary to consider measures for the welfare and mental health of the crewmembers and their families left behind.

Reference 58. The Prime Minister's Address at the Ceremony for the Return of the Maritime Replenishment Support Unit

(February 6, 2010)

Address at the homecoming ceremony for the 7th Replenishment Support Unit.

I appreciate the work of Captain Ryo Sakai, Commander of the Replenishment Unit, Captain Takashi Shinagawa, commanding officer of the replenishment ship Mashuu, Commander Tokihiko Umezaki, commanding officer of the destroyer Ikazuchi, and the approximately 340 crewmembers.

I hear that at sea the temperature rose to 40 degrees in the daytime, and it was sometimes 70 degrees on the metal decks. The tough and proud looks on the crews' faces tell me how well you performed your duties in that severe environment.

Throughout the period of the activities, the dispatched units showed their high operational abilities to the foreign navies. The logistical support for the dispatched units was also outstanding. As Prime Minister, I am proud of this kind of professionalism of the SDF and the Ministry of Defense. I also want to express my deep gratitude to the families and all related people of the dispatched personnel.

Replenishment activities have continued for 8 years since 2001, with a brief break, and achieved results including anti-terrorist measures. I would like to express my appreciation to the approximately 13,000 personnel who were dispatched for those activities during that time.

The Replenishment Support Special Measures Law expired on January 15.

In the future the Government will actively play an appropriate role, naturally in the defense of Japan, and in such activities as international peacekeeping activities, anti-terrorist activities, and humanitarian assistance.

The experiences you have accumulated over the past eight years will certainly be used in Japan's foreign relations and to guarantee Japan's security in the future. Today's homecoming is linked to the start of Japan's tomorrow. I would like you to believe in that with me, and push even further in your daily military service.

Reference 59. GSDF Activities Based on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (expired July 31, 2009), and Their Results

Activities	Description	Action	Results
Medical Activities From February 2004–July 2006	❍ Activities by GSDF medical personnel at four hospitals including Samawah General Hospital • Training and advice to local medical doctors regarding diagnosis methods and treatment policy • Training and advice on use of medical equipment supplied by Japan ❍ Technical training of ambulance personnel in Al-Muthanna Province ❍ Medical support including technical training for management of pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouses	Medical technique support provided a total of 277 times	★ Newborn infant mortality rates in Samawah reduced to one-third with development of basic medical infrastructure ★ Improved ability of emergency medical services
Water Supply Activities From March 2004 –July 2006	❍ Water purification and supply to water supply vehicles in Samawah camp Water supply activities by GSDF completed with start-up of water purification facilities installed close to the camp under ODA program on February 4, 2005	About 53,500 tons of water supplied to a total of about 11.89 million people	★ Stable access to clean water made possible
Public Facility Restoration and Construction From March 2004 –July 2006	❍ Repair of walls, floors, electric circuits, and others of schools in Al-Muthanna Province	Completion of 36 facilities	★ Improvement of facilities at about one-third of schools in Al-Muthanna Province, resulting in improved educational environment
	❍ Groundwork and pavement of roads to be used by local citizens	Completion of groundwork at 31 locations	★ Greater convenience with construction of major roads important for daily life
	❍ Repair works for other facilities • Medical clinic (Primary Health Center) • Nursing facilities and low-income residential housing in Samawah • Water purification facilities in Warka and Rumeitha • Uruk ruins, Olympic Stadium, and other cultural facilities	Completion of 66 facilities	★ Improvement of quality of life and culture for citizens of Al-Muthanna Province
Local Employment	❍ Local business mobilized for restoration and development of public facilities ❍ Local citizens recruited for interpreting and garbage collection at the base camp	Up to some 1,100 jobs created per day for total of 490,000 people	

Reference 60. Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years)

(April 1, 2005 – August 20, 2010)

Country	Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
Australia	Minister of Defense (May 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 07) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 05, May 08)	Minster for Defence (Jun. 07, Dec. 08, May 10) Chief of Defence Force (Jun. 07) Chief of Army (Mar. 07) Chief of Navy (May 05, Apr. 08) Chief of Air Force (Sep. 06, Apr. 10)	Japan–Australia politico-military consultations (Aug. 06, Feb. 08, Mar. 10) Japan–Australia military-military consultations (Sep. 05, May 06, Aug. 06, May 07, Sep. 08, Oct. 09)
ROK	Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Jun. 09) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Mar. 07, Feb. 10) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Jul. 05, Nov. 09) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Oct. 08, Apr. 10) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jul. 09, Oct. 09)	Minister of National Defense (Feb. 07, Apr. 09) Joint Chief of Staff Chairman (Apr. 08) Chief of Army Staff (Jan. 08, Aug. 09) Chief of Naval Staff (Jun. 07) Chief of Air Staff (Apr. 08)	Japan–ROK security dialogue (May 07, Oct. 07, Nov. 08, Dec. 09) Japan–ROK military-military consultations (Aug. 05, Dec. 06, Jul. 07, Jul 08, Oct. 09, Jul 10) Japan–ROK military-military working group (Dec. 07, Dec. 08, Oct. 09)
India	Minster of Defense (Aug. 07, Apr. 10) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (May 05, Aug. 07) Administrative Vice-Minster of Defense (Jul. 10) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 06) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 06)	Minister of Defence (May 06, Nov. 09) Vice Minister of Defence (Apr. 07) Chief of General Staff, Army (Apr. 07, Aug. 09) Chief of General Staff, Navy (Oct. 05, Aug. 08) Chief of Staff, Air Force (Jan. 07)	Japan–India politico-military consultation (Mar. 05, Feb. 06, Feb. 08, Feb. 09, Apr. 10) Japan–India military-military consultation (Mar. 05, Feb. 06, Feb. 08, Feb. 09, Apr. 10)
China	Minister of Defense (Mar. 09) Administrative Vice-Minster of Defense (Mar. 08) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Feb. 08) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Feb. 10) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jul. 09) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 09)	National Defense Minister (Aug. 07, Nov. 09) Deputy Chief of General Staff for the PLA (Feb. 09) Commander of the PLA Navy (Oct. 08) Commander of the PLA Air Force (Sep. 08)	Japan–China security dialogue (Jul. 06, Mar. 09) Joint working group between the Japanese and Chinese defense authorities for establishing a maritime communication mechanism (April 2008, July 2010)
Russia	Minister of Defense (Jan. 06) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (May. 05, Apr. 08) Chief of Staff, GSDF (May 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jun. 07)	Chief of Staff (Oct. 06) Ground Forces Commander-in-Chief (Mar. 08) Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Jun. 10)	Japan–Russia defense official consultations (Oct. 05, Apr. 06, Dec. 07, May 08) Japan–Russia security talks (Apr. 08, Jul. 10) Japan–Russia annual meeting based on the Japan–Russia Agreement on Prevention of Maritime Accidents (May 06, Apr. 07, Apr. 08, Jun. 09, Jun. 10) Japan–Russia working group meeting (Apr. 05, Oct. 05, Apr. 06, Dec. 06, May 07, Dec. 07, May 08, Dec. 08, Jun. 09)
Southeast Asian Nations	• Cambodia Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Aug. 07, May 10)	Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence (Mar. 08) Secretary of State for National Defence, Ministry of National Defence (Mar. 09, Mar. 10) Vice Minister of National Defence and Army Chief of Staff (Aug. 09)	Japan–Cambodia politico-military consultations and military-military consultations (Jun. 10)
	• Indonesia Minister of Defense (Aug. 06) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Jan. 10) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Jun. 10) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07)	Vice Minister of Defense (Mar. 10) Vice Minister of Defense (Nov. 06, Mar. 09) Military Commander (Aug. 06, Nov. 06) Chief of Army Staff (Aug. 09) Chief of Naval Staff (Feb. 08)	Japan–Indonesia military-military consultations (Mar. 07)
	• Laos (May 10)	Permanent Secretary, Ministry of National Defence (Mar. 09, Mar. 10)	
	• Malaysia Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Jan. 08, Jan. 10) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Nov. 06)	Minister of Defence (Mar. 07) Undersecretary for Defence (Mar. 10) Chief of Army Staff (Aug. 09) Navy Commander (Aug. 09)	
	• Philippines Minister of Defense (May 05) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (May. 09) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Nov. 05) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (May 08)	Undersecretary for Defense (Mar. 09, Mar. 10) Army Commander (Aug. 09) Air Force Commander (Dec. 08)	Japan–Philippines politico-military consultations and military-military consultations (Apr. 06, Dec. 07, Aug. 10)
	• Singapore Minster of Defense (Jun. 05, Jun. 06, Jun. 07, May 08, May 09, Jun. 10) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Jun. 07, May 08, May 09) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 10)	Minister of Defence (Nov. 07, Dec. 09) Permanent Secretary (Defense) (Apr. 08, Nov. 09) Chief of Defence Force (Sep. 09) Chief of Army (Aug. 09) Chief of Navy (Aug. 05) Chief of Air Force (Dec. 07)	Japan–Singapore military-military consultations (Aug. 05, Mar. 07, Sep. 08, Sep. 09)

Country	Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
Southeast Asian Nations	• Thailand Minister of Defense (Jan. 07) Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (Dec. 09) Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense (May 08) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 05)	Supreme Commander (Jul. 05, Jun. 08) Army Commander (Aug. 09) Air Force Commander (Jul. 05)	Japan–Thailand politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Mar. 06, Oct. 07, Sep. 09)
	• Timor-Leste Senior Vice-Minister of Defense (May 10)	Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Security (Mar. 09) Secretary of State for Defence (Feb. 09)	
	• Viet Nam Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (May 09) Administrative Vice-Minister (Jan. 10) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 07) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 10)	Vice Minister of National Defence (May 09, Mar. 10) People's Army Vice Chief of Staff (Aug. 09)	Japan–Viet Nam politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Dec. 07, Nov. 08, Apr. 10)
United Kingdom	Minister of Defense (Jan. 06) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun.05, May 09) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 07, May 10)	Defence Junior Minister (Oct. 09) Defence Ministerial Aide (Oct. 09) Chief of Army Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Naval Staff (Jan. 07) Chief of Air Staff (Oct. 05, Mar. 08)	Japan–U.K. politico-military consultations (Aug. 06, Jun. 07, Nov. 09) Japan–U.K. military-military consultations (Feb. 06, Jun. 07, Oct. 08, Nov. 09)
France	Ministerial Aide (May 10) Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense (Sep. 06) Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense (May 10) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 05, May 09) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jul. 05, May 10)	Minister for Defense (Mar. 07) Secretary General of National Defense (Nov. 06, Jul. 08) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Nov. 10) Chief of Air Staff (Jun. 08)	Japan–France politico-military consultations and military-military consultations (Feb. 06, Feb. 07, Apr. 08, Jun. 09)
Germany	Minster of Defense (Feb. 09)	Minister for Defense (Apr. 07) Chief of Staff Army (Mar. 09) Naval Inspector-General (Dec. 05)	Japan–Germany politico-military consultations (Jun. 06, Jul. 08, Jun. 10) Japan–Germany military-military consultations (Jun. 06, Jul. 08)
Pakistan	Minister of Defense (Aug. 07) Chief of Staff, Joint Staff (Sep. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 06)	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (Jun. 06)	Japan–Pakistan politico-military consultations (Sep. 06, Feb. 09, May 10) Japan–Pakistan military-military consultations (Sep. 06, Aug. 07, Feb. 09, May 10)
New Zealand	Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 07) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 05)	Minister of Defence (Jun. 05, Oct. 06, May 08) Chief of Defence Force (Mar. 08) Chief of Army (Aug. 09) Chief of Navy (Oct. 08) Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04)	Japan–New Zealand military-military consultations (Dec. 05, May 06, Oct. 07, Dec. 08, Oct. 09)
Canada	Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 10) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 06)	Minister of National Defence (Sep. 06) Deputy Minister of National Defence (Jun. 09) Chief of the Land Staff (Aug. 09) Chief of Air Staff (Mar. 06)	Japan–Canada politico-military consultations (Nov. 08, Mar. 10) Japan–Canada military-military consultations (Nov. 06, May 09)

Note: Politico-military consultation: Security talks among diplomatic and defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor-level Military-military consultation: Talks among defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor-level, "Minister of Defense" and "Senior Vice-Minister of Defense" on the Japanese side were called "Minister of State for Defense and "Senior Vice-Minister of Defense," respectively, until January 9, 2007. Likewise, "Chief of Staff, Joint Staff" was called "Chairman of Joint Staff Council" until March 27, 2006.

Reference 61. Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)

(Apr. 1, 2005 – Aug. 20, 2010)

	Dialogue		Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental	❍ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Ministerial Meeting • Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM) • Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF-ISG)	(Jul. 05, Jul. 06, Aug. 07, Jul. 08, Jul. 09, Jul. 10) (May 05, May 06, May 07, May 08, May 09, May 10) (Oct. 05, Mar. 06, Nov. 06, Mar. 07, Nov. 07, Apr. 08, Oct. 08, Apr. 09, Nov. 09, Mar. 10)
	Hosted by the private sector	• IISS Asia Security Conference	(Jun. 05, Jun. 06, Jun. 07, May 08, May 09, Jun. 10)
Security Dialogue hosted by the Ministry of Defense	❍ Meeting of senior defense officials on common security challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region		(Mar. 09, Mar. 10)
	❍ Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges		(Mar. 09, Mar. 10)
	❍ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)		(Jun. 05, Oct. 06, Sep. 07, Oct. 08, Oct. 09, Sep. 10)
	❍ Subcommittee of Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)		(Jan. 06, Jan. 07, Feb. 08, Jul. 09)
	❍ International Seminar for Military Science		(Jul. 05, Jul. 06, Jul. 07, Jul. 08, Jul. 09, Jul. 10)
	❍ International Conference of Cadets		(Mar. 06, Mar. 07, Mar. 08, Mar. 09, Mar. 10)

Reference 62. Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Ministry of Defense

Security Dialogue			Outline	Recent Situations
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	Internal Bureau and others	Meeting between Senior Defense Officials on Common Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this meeting has been held since 2009. Defense authorities at the vice ministerial level from ASEAN countries are invited to Japan to hold candid dialogues on regional security issues. The objective is to strengthen multilateral and bilateral relations by building close interpersonal relationships.	The second meeting was held in March 2010 and the participants were 10 countries in the ASEAN region and the ASEAN Secretariat. Frank and constructive views were exchanged over shared regional security issues, such as nontraditional security issues and a security framework and cooperation for the Asia-Pacific region.
		Tokyo seminar on common security challenges	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this seminar has been held since 2009. It is a seminar that is held open to the general public where experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas are invited to discuss themes such as policies for promoting regional cooperation over shared regional security issues.	Discussions were held in March 2010 with the participation of experts and defense authorities from Japan and overseas over climate change and the role of defense authorities, as well as security frameworks and cooperation for the Asia-Pacific region. This played a part in initiatives for improving the security environment, and contributed to promoting dialogue and cooperation in the region.
		Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchanges, all of who are from the Asia-Pacific region, participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote attention paid to each country's national defense policy.	The 15th forum was held in September 2010 and the participants were 22 ARF member countries (including Japan), the EU, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Opinions were exchanged over the role of major countries in security cooperation and the role of defense authorities in the region. The participants presented the view that regional security environment and the future direction of defense cooperation should be discussed continuously in the Forum.
		Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Subcommittee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Ministry of Defense, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with Director (colonel)-level working officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchange from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on defense issues including diversified military roles.	The 8th subcommittee was held in July 2009 and the participants were 24 ARF member countries (including Japan), the EU, the International Maritime Organization, and the Japanese Shipowners' Association. Opinions were exchanged over military functions, roles, and authority for organizational crosscutting initiatives for piracy and armed robbery at sea. The participants hoped that the awareness and discussions shared at the subcommittee will contribute to each countries' initiatives and international initiatives against piracy.
	GSDF	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks (MLST)	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting government officials in charge of logistics support from major countries in the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on logistic system.	The 13th MLST meeting was held in December last year and the participants were working-level officials in charge of logistics support, sent from the armies of Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the United States, and those from the U.S. Marines. Participation in international disaster relief operations.
		Army Command and General Staff College seminar	Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of army academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.	The 9th Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held in August last year and the participants were students, etc., of army colleges from eleven Asia-Pacific countries. Participants exchanged views over the theme of modalities for coordination between various countries' armies to accurately implement initiatives for large-scale disaster dispatches and international disaster relief activities.

Security Dialogue			Outline	Recent Situations
Hosted by Ministry of Defense	MSDF	Seminar of Naval Colleges in the Asia-Pacific Region	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with staffs of naval colleges from the Asia-Pacific region as participants. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on the roles of naval forces with a view to encouraging school education/research and contributing to the promotion of defense exchange between participating countries and mutual understanding.	The 13th seminar was held in February 2010 with participants from 14 countries. Participants exchanged views on the themes of modalities for information transmission concerning naval activities pertaining to maritime security and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), as well as the qualities required of high-ranking officers in order to realize this. As part of cooperation between ministries and agencies, observers from the Japan Coast Guard took part.
		Navy Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program (Western Pacific Naval Symposium Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation (WPNS SONG))	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2000 with junior naval men from countries of the Asia-Pacific region as participants. The seminar is designed to provide security and naval leadership with the aim of promoting the understanding among participants and helping them develop a clear understanding of the current state of MSDF and Japanese history, culture, etc.	The 9th seminar was held in October last year with junior naval men from 20 Asia-Pacific countries as the main participants. Participants exchanged views on naval leadership and how to evaluate such leadership, and recognitions of situations of each country regarding maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.
	ASDF	International Air Force Education Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with officials related to air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchange views on officer's education.	The 14th seminar was held in December 2009 by inviting six countries. Participants exchanged views over the main theme of leadership education at various countries' air force academies.
		Air Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air force academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating.	The 9th seminar was held in October 2009 and the participants were the students from air force academies in eight countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Participants exchanged views over the main theme of initiatives for and challenges of international peace cooperation activities by various countries' air forces.
	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with instructors of military academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchanged views on cadet education.	The 13th seminar was held in July 2008 and 13 countries were invited. Participants exchanged views on the "Expansion of the Role of Military Affairs in International Security and Education."
		International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with cadets from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The conference is designed to provide them with opportunities to exchanged views on militaries in the 21st century.	The 12th seminar was held in March 2009 and 16 countries were invited. Participants exchanged views on the "International Security Situation and its Changes in the 21st Century."
	National Institute for Defense Studies	International Security Symposium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this symposium has been held annually since 1999 with researchers and experts participating. The symposium is designed to provide opportunities to hold public debates and release reports on security for the purpose of promoting public understanding of current security issues.	In December 2007, eminent scholars were invited from the U.S., U.K., Australia, Germany and France, and views were exchanged on "Peace Building and Military Organization—Exploring the Model of Dispute Settlement in the 21st Century."
		International Security Colloquium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studied, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with officials at home and abroad knowledgeable about defense being invited. The seminar is designed to provide them with opportunities to hear advanced and professional reports and discussions on security issues.	In January 2009, scholars were invited from the U.S., U.K., Australia, Germany, and France. Together with experts from Japan, they exchanged views under the agenda of "Stabilization Operation and Contribution by Allied Countries" and the "Contribution of Allied Countries to Security Sector Reform."
		International Forum on War History	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with participation by military historians. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of its participants by making comparative studies of military history.	This forum was held in September 2008 and featured domestic scholars as well as scholars from the U.S., U.K., Australia, China, and Holland. The participants exchanged views on the "War in the Pacific and Allies' Strategy against Japan—Focusing on the Developments Leading to the Outbreak of the War."

Reference 63. Other Multilateral Security Dialogue

Other Multilateral Security Dialogue			Overview
Hosted by the Government	Internal Bureaus and others	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (ARMORS)	ARMORS is a forum held by Asia-Pacific countries on a rotational basis to exchange views on defense operations and research technology. Japan has participated on the forum since the second meeting in 1993.
	Joint Staff	Asia-Pacific Chief of Defense Conference (CHOD)	CHOD is an annual conference hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries on a rotational basis. Senior defense officials and others of Asia-Pacific countries meet to exchange views on security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1998.
		Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	PASOLS is a seminar hosted by an Asia-Pacific country on a rotational basis mainly to exchange information on logistic-support activities. Japan's participation in the seminar as an official member started in 1995 when the 24tj session was held. The 36th Seminar will be held in Japan with participation of nearly 30 countries.
	GSDF	Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every other year when PAMS is held. Army chiefs of Asia-Pacific countries and others meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1999. The conference was held in Japan for the first time in 2009.
		Pacific Armies Management Seminars (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993. The 33rd seminar was held in Japan in 2009 at the same time as PACC.
	MSDF	International Sea Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a symposium hosted by the United States every other year. Navy chiefs of member countries and others meet to exchange views on common issues for their navies. Japan has participated in the symposium since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	WPNS is a symposium hosted by a member country on a rotational basis every other year when ISS in not held. Senior navy officials and others of Western Pacific countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the symposium since the second meeting in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is hosted by a WPNS member country on a rotation basis to exchange views on minesweeping in a year when minesweeping exercises are not conducted in the Western Pacific. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 2000. Japan's MSDF hosted this seminar in Yokosuka in October 2007.
		Asia-Pacific Submarine Conference	Hosted either by the United States or jointly with other participating countries in the Asia-Pacific region on a rotational basis to exchange views on issues centering around submarine rescue. Japan has participated on the conference since the first meeting in 2001. The JMSDF hosted the conference in October 2006.
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a conference hosted jointly by the United States every other year with senior air force officials and others of member countries exchanging views on common issues. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 1989.
		PACRIM Airpower Symposium	This seminar is hosted jointly by the United States and a member country on a rotational basis every year (held twice in 1996 and 1997). Air force strategy-formulation chiefs from Pacific Rim countries meet to exchange views. Japan has participated in the seminar since the first meeting in 1995.
Hosted by the Private Sector	IISS Asia Security Conference (Shangri-la Dialogue)		Hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the United Kingdom, this conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers and others of the Asia-Pacific region and other areas participating to exchange views on issues centering around regional security. Japan has participated in the conference since the first meeting in 2002.
	Munich Security Conference		Started in 1962, this is one of the most authoritative international conferences concerning security in the West. Participants are: senior government officials, including ministers, diet members and top officials of the defense authority from NATO members, including the U.S., the U.K., and France, Russia and countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Germany, which is the host country. The Japanese Minister of Defense attended the 45th meeting held in 2009 as the first Defense Minister of Japan to do so.
	The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)		Organized mainly by the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, this dialogue is designed for participants —private-sector researchers and government officials from member countries (China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Russia and the United States)— to freely exchange their views on security situations and confidence-building measures in the region. Japan has participated in the dialogue since the first meeting in 1993.

Reference 64. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (nuclear weapons)

(As of August 20, 2010)

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[1]	• Nuclear non-proliferation The NPT recognizes five countries — the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France and China— as nuclear weapon states. It prohibits acquisition of nuclear arms by non-nuclear weapon states. • Nuclear disarmament The NPT obliges nuclear weapon states to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in good faith. • Peaceful use of nuclear energy The NPT recognizes the "inalienable" right of signatory to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Article 4-1). The NPT obliges non-nuclear weapon states to accept safe-guards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)[2] to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy for peaceful use to military technologies (Article 3). • The NPT entered into force in 1970 • There are 190 signatory countries to the NPT • Major non-member countries: India, Pakistan, Israel
	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)[3]	• The CTBT prohibits any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion by signatory states at any place in the world, including outer space, the atmosphere, underwater and under ground • The CTBT has been signed by 182 states and ratified by 151 states (Of 44 designated countries whose ratification is necessary for the treaty's enforcement, 35 countries have ratified it) • All of the 44 states need to ratify the treaty so that it can enter into force. But some states which have yet to ratify the treaty are uncertain if they will ratify it. As a result, the treaty has yet to enter into force. • Major non-member countries: United States, China, Iran, North Korea, India, Pakistan
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)[4]	• The NSG is a group of nuclear supplier countries which seeks to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling exports of materials, equipment and technologies that could be used for development of nuclear arms • The NSG was formed in 1978 following a nuclear test by India in 1974 • The group consists of 46 countries

Notes: 1. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/npt/index.html>
2. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/iaea/index.html>
3. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/ctbt/index.html>
4. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/nsg/index.html>

Reference 65. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (Biological and chemical weapons)

(As of August 20, 2010)

Classification	Treaties	Outline (Purpose and Others)
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)[1]	• The BWC aims to destroy biological weapons already in possession of some countries as well as prohibit development, production and stockpiling of such weapons • The BWC entered into force in 1975 • State parties: 163 countries • Major non-member countries: Israel
	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)[2]	• The CWC aims to abolish chemical weapons by prohibiting signatory states from developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring or using such weapons and obliging them to destroy the weapons if they own them. A strict verification system has been established to make the implementation of the convention effective. • The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established in The Hague, the Netherlands in 1997 in order to implement verification measures stipulated under the CWC following its enforcement • The CWC entered into force in 1997 • State parties: 188 countries • Major non-member countries: North Korea, Syria, Israel, Myanmar
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Australia Group (AG)[3]	• The AG has been trying to prevent proliferation of biological and chemical weapons by controlling exports of materials, manufacturing facilities and related technologies that could be used for making such weapons • The first meeting took place in 1985 • Participating states: 40 countries

Notes: 1. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/bwc/index/html>
2. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/cwc/index/html>
3. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/ag/index/html>

Reference 66. Dispatch of Ministry of Defense Personnel to International Organizations

(Last five years)

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
Jun. 9, 1997–Jun. 30, 2002, Aug. 1, 2004–Aug. 1, 2007	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General)[1]
Oct. 1, 2002–Jun. 30, 2007	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
Jul. 11, 2005–Jul. 11, 2009	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Jan. 9, 2009–	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
Dec. 2, 2002–Jun. 1, 2005	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
Nov. 28, 2005–Nov. 27, 2008	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Note 1: The OPCW Inspectorate Division Director served in office until July 2009 after his retirement from the SDF on August 1, 2007

Reference 67. Treaties Related to Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other Weapons (delivery means including missiles)

(As of August 20, 2010)

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)[1]	• The HCOC is a political agreement that mainly stipulates principles such as prevention of proliferation of ballistic missiles, and restraint on tests, development and deployment of such missiles, and confidence-building measures among member states • The HCOC was adopted in 2002 • Participating states: 131 countries
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)[2]	• The MTCR aims to control exports of missiles, which can serve as means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and general-purpose equipment and technologies that are capable of contributing to missile development • The MTCR was established in 1987 • Participating states: 34 countries

Notes: 1. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtcr/index.html>
2. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtcr/mtcr.html>

Reference 68. Treaties Related to Arms Control for Certain Conventional Weapons

(As of August 20, 2010)

Classification	Treaties	Outline
Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation Related Treaties	Convention on Prohibitions or Relations on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)[1]	• Protocol I: Protocol on non-detectable fragments; 110 state parties. Protocol II: Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices; 93 state parties. Amended Protocol II: Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby traps and other devices; 94 state parties. Protocol III: Protocol on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary weapons; 106 state parties. Protocol IV: Protocol on blinding laser weapons; 97 state parties Protocol V: Protocol on explosive remnants of war; 68 state parties Japan has signed Protocols I–IV. (State parties are as of August 20, 2010) • The CCW entered into force in 1983 • State parties: 112 countries • Major non-member countries: North Korea, Myanmar, Iran, Iraq, Syria
	Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty)[2]	• The convention categorically prohibits the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines while obligating state parties to destruct stockpiled mines within 4 years and remove laid mines within 10 years. It also stipulated international cooperation regarding the removal of anti-personnel mines and assistance for mine victims. • The convention entered into force in 1999 • State parties: 156 countries • Major non-member countries: United States, Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt
	Restriction on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons	The United Nations is currently studying ways to restrict illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and to reduce excessive accumulation of such arms.
	The U.N. Register of Conventional Arms	This register system has been in operation from 1992 to help increase the transparency of armaments, following a proposal made by Japan along with countries of the European Community (then). Under the system, each country is required to register to the United Nations the quantity of its annual exports and imports of defense equipment in seven categories[3] and the countries to which such equipment is imported or exported.
	Conventions on Cluster Munitions	• The conventions totally prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, transfer, etc., of cluster munitions, requires the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions within 8 years in principle removal of cluster munitions remnant, etc., within 10 years in principle and stipulates international cooperation/aid concerning removal of cluster munitions and the support of victims. • Signed by 108 countries and ratified by 38 countries (Went into effect on August 1, 2010) • Major non-member countries: United States, Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Brazil
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Wassenaar Arrangement[4]	• This arrangement is an international export control regime aimed at achieving the following objectives (1) To contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and grater responsibility in transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations (2) To prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organizations as part of global efforts in the fight against terrorism • The arrangement was established in 1996 • Participating states: 40 countries

Notes: 1. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/ccw/ccw.html>
2. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/mine/index.html>
3. The seven are 1) battle tanks, 2) armored combat vehicles, 3) large-caliber artillery systems, 4) combat aircraft, 5) attack helicopters, 6) warships, and 7) missiles and missile launchers. As a result of an institutional review in 2003, Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems was newly registered as equipment under a subcategory of the "missiles and missile launchers" category.
4. See <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/wa/index.html>

Reference 69. Personnel of the Ministry of Defense (Breakdown)

(As of March 31, 2010)

Personnel of the Ministry of Defense	Special Service	Minister of Defense			
		Senior Vice-Minister of Defense			
		Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense (2)			
		Special Advisors to the Minister of Defense (Up to Three People)			
		Authorized Strength	Private Secretary to the Minister of Defense		
			SDF Personnel	Administrative Vice-Ministers of Defense	
				Director General, and others	566
				Administrative Officials, and Others	21,869
				SDF Regular Personnel	247,746
		Non-Authorized Strength		Candidate for SDF Personnel[1]	
				Reserve Personnel	47,900
				Ready Reserve Personnel	8,467
				Candidate Reserve Personnel	4,260
				National Defense Academy students	
				National Defense Medical College students	
				GSDF High Technical School students[2]	
				Part-Time Officials	
	Regular Service	Authorized Strength		Administrative Officials, and Others	32
		Non-Authorized Strength		Part-Time Officials	

Notes: 1. Implementation for Candidate for enlisted began on July 1, 2010.
2. Implementation for GSDF High Technical School students began on April 1, 2010.

Reference 70. Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel

(As of March 31, 2010)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff, etc.	Total
Authorized	151,641	45,550	47,128	3,427	247,746
Actual	140,536	42,131	43,506	3,184	229,357
Staffing Rate (%)	92.7	92.5	92.3	92.9	92.6

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel				Fixed-Term Personnel
	Officer	Warrant Officer	Enlisted (upper)	Enlisted (lower)	Enlisted (lower)
Authorized	45,287	5,027	139,667	57,765	
Actual	42,283 (1,784)	4,694 (17)	138,506 (6,022)	21,316 (1,318)	22,558 (2,673)
Staffing Rate (%)	93.4	93.4	99.2	76.0	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.
2. Numbers of the authorized personnel are based on the budget.

Reference 71. Overview of Appointment System for SDF Regular Personnel



Notes: 1. Medical doctor and dentist Officer Candidates are promoted to First Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF/)/ Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF) upon passing the relevant national vocational examinations and completing the prescribed training courses.
2. Corresponds to Student candidate for enlistment (upper) and Enlisted (upper) candidate before 2008 recruitment.
3. In order to enhance initial education for SDF Personnel in short-term service, starting in July 2010 they will be non-SDF Personnel for the first three months of their enlistment, and will be engaged exclusively in fundamental education and practice as non-regular Ministry of Defense personnel.
4. They will receive a high school diploma through distance learning, etc.
5. For SDF students, starting from the FY2010 appointments they will be changed to students with a new non-regular status, rather than SDF Personnel status. The new students will also receive a high school diploma at the conclusion of a student course (three years) through distance learning.
6. ➡: Enrollment examination ⇨: Examination or non-examination screening

Reference 72. Status of Recruiting and Employing SDF Regular Personnel (FY2009)

Classification			Number Recruited	Number Employed	Multiple
Candidates for general, technical staff		GSDF	3,700 (510)	164 (16)	22.6 (31.9)
		MSDF	1,145 (150)	113 (14)	10.1 (10.7)
		ASDF	1,728 (270)	89 (7)	19.4 (38.6)
		Total	6,573 (930)	366 (37)	18.0 (25.1)
Non-commissioned officer	Technical Petty Officer	MSDF	162 (26)	18 (5)	9.0 (5.2)
	Technical Sergeant	ASDF	18 (3)	3 (2)	6.0 (1.5)
	GSDF personnel (Nursing)	GSDF	19 (15)	6 (5)	3.2 (3.0)
Aviation Students		MSDF	745 (60)	85 (5)	8.8 (12.0)
		ASDF	2,615 (175)	59	44.3
		Total	3,360 (235)	144 (5)	23.3 (47.0)
Nursing Students		GSDF	3,364 (2,512)	60 (57)	56.1 (44.1)
Candidates for Non-commissioned Officers		GSDF	27,451 (3,791)	2,777 (121)	9.9 (31.3)
		MSDF	5,957 (957)	627 (72)	9.5 (13.3)
		ASDF	10,231 (1,487)	772 (77)	13.3 (19.3)
		Total	43,639 (6,235)	4,176 (270)	10.4 (23.1)
Privates		GSDF	14,640 (2,131)	1,119 (250)	13.1 (8.5)
		MSDF	2,966 (503)	637 (79)	4.7 (6.4)
		ASDF	3,449 (602)	565 (57)	6.1 (10.6)
		Total	21,055 (3,236)	2,321 (386)	9.1 (8.4)
National Defense Academy students	Recommended	Social sciences	138 (44)	33 (5)	4.2 (8.8)
		Science and engineering	229 (24)	103 (4)	2.2 (6.0)
		Total	367 (68)	136 (9)	2.7 (7.6)
	General	Social sciences	5,719 (2,120)	73 (6)	78.3 (353.3)
		Science and engineering	8,923 (1,607)	329 (25)	27.1 (64.3)
		Total	14,642 (3,727)	402 (31)	36.4 (120.2)
National Defense Medical College students			5,791 (1,682)	82 (26)	70.6 (64.7)
Technical High School students		GSDF	4,689	310	15.1

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses indicate number of females.
2. The numbers are for SDF regular personnel recruited in FY2009.

Reference 73. Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Regular Personnel

Rank	Designation	Mandatory Retirement Age
General (GSDF), Admiral (MSDF), General (ASDF)	Sho	60
Major General (GSDF), Rear Admiral (MSDF), Major General (ASDF)	Shoho	
Colonel (GSDF), Captain (MSDF), Colonel (ASDF)	Issa	56
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF), Commander (MSDF), Lieutenant Colonel (ASDF)	Nisa	55
Major (GSDF), Lieutenant Commander (MSDF), Major (ASDF)	Sansa	
Captain (GSDF), Lieutenant (MSDF), Captain (ASDF)	Ichii	54
First Lieutenant (GSDF), Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF), First Lieutenant (ASDF)	Nii	
Second Lieutenant (GSDF), Ensign (MSDF), Second Lieutenant (ASDF)	Sani	
Warrant Officer (GSDF), Warrant Officer (MSDF), Warrant Officer (ASDF)	Juni	
Sergeant Major (GSDF), Chief Petty Officer (MSDF), Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Socho	
Master Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer First Class (MSDF), Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Isso	
Sergeant First Class (GSDF), Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF), Technical Sergeant (ASDF)	Niso	53
Sergeant (GSDF), Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF), Staff Sergeant (ASDF)	Sanso	
Leading Private (GSDF), Leading Seaman (MSDF), Airman First Class (ASDF)	Shicho	—
Private First Class (GSDF), Seaman (MSDF), Airman Second Class (ASDF)	Isshi	
Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), Airman Third Class (ASDF)	Nishi	
Recruit (GSDF), Seaman Recruit (MSDF), Airman Basic (ASDF)	Sanshi	

Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold the rank of General (GSDF and ASDF) or Admiral (MSDF), and serve as Chief of Staff of Joint Staff Office, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, or ADSF Chief of Staff is 62.
2. The mandatory age of retirement for SDF Regular Personnel who hold positions such as physician, dentist, pharmacist, or musician, security officer, information analyst, display geography or communications specialist, is 60.
3. The ranks of Recruit, Seaman Recruit and Airman Basic are to be eliminated as of October 1, 2010.

Reference 74. Overview of Systems Related to SDF Reserve Personnel

	SDF Reserve Personnel	SDF Ready Reserve Personnel	Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
Basic concept	❍ When defense call-up or disaster call-up is received, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel	❍ When defense call-up is received, or under similar conditions, they will serve as SDF Regular Personnel in a predestinated GSDF unit, as part of the basic framework of defense capability	❍ Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training
Candidate	❍ Former Regular Personnel, former SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, former Reserve Personnel	❍ Former Regular Personnel, former Reserve Personnel	(Same for General and Technical) ❍ Inexperienced SDF Personnel (includes those with less than a year of SDF experience)
Age	❍ Enlisted (Lower): 18–36 years old ❍ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under two years above the retirement age	❍ Enlisted (Lower): 18–31 years old ❍ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (Upper): Under three years below the retirement age for each rank	❍ General: 18–33 years old ❍ Technical: From 18 years old to 53–54 years old, depending on technical qualifications
Employment	❍ Employment on screening, based on application ❍ Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training	❍ Employment on screening, based on application	❍ General: Employment on examination, based on application ❍ Technical: Employment on screening, based on application
Rank	❍ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Personnel: Current specified rank ❍ Former Reserve Personnel: Rank at the point of retirement ❍ Candidate for Reserve Personnel • General: Private • Technical: Assignment based on skills	❍ Former Regular Personnel: As a rule, rank at the point of retirement ❍ Former Reserve Personnel: As a rule, designated rank at the point of retirement	❍ Not designated
Term of service	❍ Three Years/One term	❍ Three years/One term	❍ General: Maximum of three years ❍ Technical: Maximum of two years
Education/ Training	❍ Although the law designates a maximum of 20 days per year, actual implementation is 5 days per year	❍ 30 days per year	❍ General: 50 days within a maximum of three years (and equivalent to new recruitment education course (first term)) ❍ Technical: 10 days within a maximum of two years (training to serve as an SDF Regular Personnel by utilizing each skill)
Promotion	❍ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who have fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	❍ Promotion is determined by screening the service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days)	❍ Since there is no designated rank, there is no promotion
Benefits, allowances, and other terms	❍ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥8,100/day ❍ SDF Reserve Allowance: ¥4,000/month	❍ Training Call-up Allowance: ¥10,400–14,200/day ❍ SDF Ready Reserve Allowance: ¥16,000/month ❍ Continuous Service Incentive Allowance: ¥120,000/one term ❍ Special subsidy for corporations employing Ready Reserve Personnel: ¥42,500/month	❍ Education and Training Call-up Allowance: ¥7,900/day ❍ Allowance as Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel is not paid because defense call-up duty is not imposed on them
Call-up duty and other duties	❍ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	❍ Defense call-up, civil protection call-up, security call-up, disaster call-up, training call-up	❍ Education and training call-up

Reference 75. Outline of the SDF Educational System

1. SDF Officers and Officer Candidates



2. Enlisted SDF Personnel



Reference 76. Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY2009)

(Unit: persons)

Institution \ Country	United States	Thailand	Republic of Korea	France	Indonesia	China	Singapore	Viet Nam	Cambodia	India	Germany	Philippines	Pakistan	Mongolia	Sub total
National Institute for Defense Studies	3		1		1	1				1	1				8
National Defense Academy	6	7	7	4	3			3	2			1		2	35
Ground Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1	1	2				1		1				4	1	11
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		2	1							2					5
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		4	3												7
Joint Staff College		1	1							1					3
Total	10	15	15	5	4	1	1	3	3	4	1	1	4	3	69

Reference 77. Record of the Main Exercise of Each of the Self-Defense Forces (FY2009)

	Exercise	Period	Location	Main Participating Forces, etc.		Remarks
				Ministry of Defense/SDF	Outside Related Institutions	
Joint	SDF joint disaster prevention exercise (actual exercise)	Aug. 29 –Sep. 1, 2009	Camp Ichigaya, locations for forces conducting exercises, etc., Higashi Ogishima training grounds, Kanagawa Pref., and surrounding sea and airspace	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Eastern Army, Middle Army, Western Army, Central Readiness Force, Signal Brigade, Military Police Unit, Aviation School, Signal School, GSDF Medical School, GSDF Ground Material Control Command, Self Defense Fleet, Yokosuka District Unit, Communications Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Training Command, Air Development and Test Command, ASDF Air Communications and System Wing, Aero Medical Evacuation Squadron, SDF Central Hospital, Yokosuka SDF Hospital, Gifu SDF Hospital, and SDF Command and Communication Squadron Personnel: approx. 6,300 Vehicles: approx. 570 Vessels: 1 Aircraft: 33	Cabinet Office, Fire Department, National Police Agency, Japan Coast Guard, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba Prefectural Governments, Yokohama, Kawasaki, Saitama, Chiba City Governments, etc.	Exercise to sustain and improve joint disaster response capability in the event of an earthquake directly underneath Tokyo, by practicing in joint SDF operations with organizations in the affected region, and to test the SDF Tokyo earthquake response plan.
	SDF joint exercise (actual exercise)	Nov. 5–11, 2009	Japan's ports, airports, maneuver areas and surrounding sea area and air spaces	Joint Staff Office, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, SDF Command and Communication Squadron, Western Army, Central Readiness Force, SDF Fleet, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, and Air Training Command, etc. Personnel: approx. 41,800 Vehicles: approx. 1,170 Vessels: 6 Aircraft: approx. 300		Exercise to sustain and improve joint operation capability of the SDF by exercising integrated SDF operation in preparation for armed attacks, and similar situations
	International Peace Cooperation Exercise	Dec. 10, 2009	Camp Ichigaya	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Internal Bureau, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Eastern Army, Central Readiness Force Command, Central Transportation Management Command, Ground Material Control Command, SDF Fleet, Maritime Material Command, Air Support Command, and Air Material Command Headquarters Personnel: approx. 70		Tabletop exercise (TTX) conducting international emergency relief activities in the Republic of Indonesia to clarify results and identify areas for improvement or review, in order to improve the SDF joint operations capabilities and to review the basic plan.
	Japan–U.S. combined joint exercise (command post exercise)	Jan. 13–29, 2010	Camp Ichigaya	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, GSDF/MSDF/ASDF Staff Offices, Regional Armies, Central Readiness Force, Signal Brigade, Ground Material Control Command, SDF Fleet, Regional District Units, Communications Command, Maritime Material Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, Air Communication and System Wing, Air Material Command Headquarters, and SDF Command and Communication Squadron, etc. Personnel: approx. 1,400	Headquarters of USFJ, U.S. Army in Japan, U.S. Navy in Japan, U.S. Air Force in Japan, U.S. Marine Corps in Japan, etc.	Exercise to sustain and improve combined joint operation capability by exercising U.S.–Japan cooperation and SDF responses to various situations in areas surrounding Japan, and U.S.–Japan joint responses for the defense of Japan

Exercise		Period	Location	Main Participating Forces, etc.		Remarks
				Ministry of Defense/SDF	Outside Related Institutions	
Joint	SDF joint disaster prevention exercise (command post exercise)	Feb 2–18, 2010	Camp Ichigaya, location for forces conducting exercises, etc.	Joint Staff Office, Defense Intelligence Headquarters, Internal Bureau, GSDF/ MSDF/ASDF Staff Office, Regional Armies, Central Readiness Force, Signal Brigade, Military Police, Central Transportation Management Command, Central Air Traffic Control and Weather Service, Aviation School, Ground Material Control Command, SDF Fleet, Yokosuka District Unit, Communications Command, Staff College, 2nd Technical School, Material Command, Air Defense Command, Air Support Command, ASDF Communications Command, Material Command, SDF Command and Communication Squadron, North Kanto Defense Bureau, South Kanto Defense Bureau, National Defense Academy, and National Defense Medical College	Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office, National Police Agency, Fire Department, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Kanagawa, Chiba Prefectural Governments	Exercise to sustain and improve disaster response capabilities by practicing command activities for SDF joint operations in the event of a major disaster, and to test the SDF Tokyo earthquake response plan.
GSDF	Cooperative Long-Distance Mobility Exercise (1st cooperative long-distance mobility)	Jun. 15 – Aug. 7, 2009	Middle Army District-North Army District (Yausubetsu Maneuver Area)	10th Division, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 4,150 Vehicles: Approx. 1,400		Exercise to improve distance mobility using carious transportation methods including ground, sea and air, and also improve joint operation capability for divisions and under, by implementing cooperative training with the MSDF and ASDF
	Cooperative Long-Distance Mobility Exercise (2nd cooperative long-distance mobility)	Aug. 24 – Sep. 24, 2009	Middle Army District-East Army District (Higashi-Fuji Maneuver)	14th Division, Major Unit Personnel: Approx. 1,400 Vehicles: Approx. 560		Exercise to improve distance mobility using carious transportation methods including ground, sea and air, and also improve joint operation capability for divisions and under, by implementing cooperative training with the MSDF and ASDF
MSDF	MSDF Exercise	Actual exercise (Nov.10–18, 2009)		1. Self-Defense Fleet, Regional District Units 2. Vessels: Approx. 30 Aircraft: 60		Exercise of situational judgment, unit operations, cooperation and coordination for commanders at all levels in maritime operations
ASDF	Air Defense Command Comprehensive Exercise	Command Post Training (Sep 8–11, 2009)	Air Defense Command (ADC) (Fuchu), etc.	Air Defense Commands, etc. Personnel: Approx. 450		Exercise of situational judgment, unit operations, cooperation and coordination for commanders at all levels in air operations

Reference 78. Results of Fire Training and Related Training by Dispatch of Each of the Self-Defense Forces to the United States (FY2009)

	Name of Training	Date	Location	Dispatched Unit
GSDF	HAWK/Medium-range SAM unit level live-fire training	Sep. 7 –Nov. 18, 2009	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.A.	17 anti-aircraft companies
GSDF	Surface-to-surface missile unit level live-fire training	Sep. 25 –Nov. 18, 2009	Point Mugu Range in California, U.S.A.	6 surface-to-surface missile regiments and artillery training unit
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of destroyer and others	Jun. 9 –Jul. 30, 2009	Mid-Pacific area surrounding Hawaii, U.S.A.	1 destroyer
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of fixed-wing patrol aircraft	Jun. 15 –July 19, 2009	Mid-Pacific areas surrounding Hawaii, U.S.A.	4 P-3Cs * Including participating Rim Pack 2008 (Jun. 29–Jul. 31, 2008)
MSDF	Training in the area near Guam by dispatch of mine-laying ship	Oct. 16 –Dec. 8, 2009	Guam, U.S.A. area	1 mine-laying ship
MSDF	Training in the U.S. by dispatch of submarine	Aug. 27 –Dec. 8, 2009	Area near Hawaii and Guam, U.S.A.	1 submarine
ASDF	Annual practice by anti-aircraft units	Sep. 14 –Nov. 25, 2009	McGregor Range in New Mexico, U.S.A.	11 anti-aircraft/anti-aircraft training units
ASDF	Tactical Airlift Training	Dec. 27, 2009 – Jan. 15, 2010	Sierra Vista (Libby Army Airfield), Arizona, U.S.A., and surrounding airspace	1 C-130H

Reference 79. Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method

(Unit: 100 million yen)

Procurement Type / Fiscal Year	Domestic Procurement (A)	Imports			Total (E=A+D)	Domestic Procurement Ratio (%) (A/E)
		Commercial Imports (B)	Foreign Military Sales (C)	Subtotal (D=B+C)		
1994	17,349	1,195	1,056	2,251	19,600	88.5
1995	18,131	914	598	1,512	19,642	92.3
1996	18,725	938	541	1,478	20,204	92.7
1997	18,479	1,173	376	1,548	20,027	92.3
1998	17,344	1,127	348	1,474	18,818	92.2
1999	17,704	1,185	390	1,575	19,280	91.8
2000	17,685	1,249	439	1,687	19,372	91.3
2001	17,971	1,156	489	1,646	19,617	91.6
2002	17,218	1,326	1,101	2,427	19,645	87.6
2003	17,598	1,292	1,006	2,298	19,896	88.4
2004	18,233	1,334	979	2,313	20,546	88.7
2005	18,917	1,525	937	2,462	21,379	88.5
2006	18,818	1,158	1,047	2,205	21,022	89.1
2007	18,649	1,327	856	2,183	20,831	89.5
2008	19,382	1,153	642	1,795	21,177	91.5

Notes: 1. Figures for “Domestic Procurement,” “Commercial Imports,” and “Foreign Military Sales” are based on the results of the Survey of Equipment Procurement Contract Amounts for the year in question.
2. “Foreign Military Sales” refers to the amount of equipment procured from the U.S. Government under the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement.
3. Figures are rounded up or down, and may not tally precisely.

Reference 80. Activities in Civic Life

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Disposal of Unexploded Bombs[1]	❍ The GSDF disposes of such bombs at the request of municipal governments and others. ❍ Disposal operations in last fiscal year: a total of 1,668 disposal operations (average of 25 operations per week), weighing about 65.6 tons in total; in particular, the amount of unexploded bombs that were disposed of in Okinawa Prefecture totaled about 37.2 tons, (accounting for 37.2 % of such bombs removed across the nation). (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs, their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible foe disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Removal of Mines[2]	❍ The MSDF undertakes in minesweeping operations in waters designated as dangerous areas because underwater mines had been laid there during World War II. ❍ Minesweeping has been almost completed in the dangerous areas. At present, the MSDF has been removing and disposing of explosives after receiving reports from municipal governments. ❍ Disposal operations in the last fiscal year: a total 2,441 units were disposed of, weighing about 25.5 tons in total. (If unexploded bombs are chemical bombs their disposal is basically beyond the disposal capability of the SDF. However, the SDF is prepared to extend as much cooperation as possible for disposal of such bombs by identifying them and checking for attached fuses.)
Medical Activities[3]	❍ Medical services are provided to general citizens at the National Defense Medical College in Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture, and some hospitals affiliated with the SDF (five out of 16 such hospitals, including the SDF Central Hospital in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo). ❍ The National Defense Medical College runs an emergency medical center, which is in charge of providing emergency medical services to seriously injured patients and patients in critical condition. The center is designated as a medical facility providing tertiary emergency services. ❍ In the wake of a disaster, medical units belonging to major SDF units, acting on a request from municipal governments, provide emergency medical services and work for the prevention of epidemics. ❍ The GSDF Medical School (Setagaya Ward, Tokyo), MSDF Underwater Medical Center (Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture), and ASDF Aviation Medicine Laboratory (Tachikawa City, Tokyo and Sayama City, Saitama Prefecture) undertake study on outdoor sanitation, underwater medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. ❍ The National Defense Medical College Research Institute (Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture) undertakes study on emergency medicine.
Cooperation for Supporting Athletic Meetings[4]	❍ In response to support requests from concerned organizations, the SDF helps operations of athletic competitions such as the Olympic games and Asian games being held in Japan and national sports meetings in the fields of ceremonies, communications, transportation, music performance, medical services and emergency medical services. ❍ The SDF provides transportation and communication support to marathon events and *ekiden* road relays.
Exchanges with Local Communities	❍ Sports facilities such as grounds, gyms and swimming pools at many of the SDF garrisons and bases are open to general citizens in response to requests from local communities. ❍ Participation in various events sponsored by general citizens and municipal governments or taking part as sports referees and instructors on an individual basis.

Notes: 1. Supplementary provisions of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
2. Article 84-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
3. Article 27 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, Article 4-10 of Defense Ministry Establishment Law, and others.
4. Article 100-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, etc.

Reference 81. Activities Contributing to Society

Items	Details of Activities and Their Past Records
Offering of Education and Training on Consignment from Other Parties[1]	❍ The SDF, acting on requests from third parties, provides education and training to people other than SDF personnel ❍ Basic ranger training, underwater search and rescue training, education on chemical disasters response, and aircraft-maneuvering training are provided to police officers and Japan Coast Guard personnel. The National Institute for Defense Studies and the graduate school of the National Defense Academy offer education to employees at private-sector companies and personnel of other government ministries on a consignment basis.
Transportation Work[2]	❍ ASDF helicopters and government planes transport state guests and the Prime Minister. ❍ SDF units operate government planes which are used when the Emperor and other members of the Imperial Family make overseas visits or the Prime Minister makes overseas trips to attend international conferences. (Partial revision in July 2005 of ordinances of the Self-Defense Forces Law has enabled the use of an SDF plane for the transport of state ministers if doing so is deemed necessary for the execution of important duties.)
Ceremonial Work at National Events[3]	❍ The SDF provides support for state-sponsored ceremonial events involving the Emperor, other members of the Imperial Family, and state guests, with its personnel serving as an honor guard[4] forming a line for guests[5] and firing a gun salute for them[6] ❍ Honor guards and gun salutes are offered at welcoming ceremonies for state guests.
Cooperation in Antarctic Exploration[7]	❍ Since the seventh observation in 1965 Japan has lent its cooperation such as through the use of icebreaking ships. Japan has contributed significantly to South Pole observation projects, which mark their 50th anniversary in FY2009, and will continue to provide support for such projects in the future through the launch of the new *Shirase* in 2011. ❍ In terms of support for the 51st year of observations in the South Pole region, from November 2009 Japan has delivered observation team members and approximately 1,100 tons worth of supplies and provided support for the maritime observations planned by the observation teams through the *Shirase*, which sailed to the South Pole for the first time.
Other Cooperation	❍ Acting on requests from the Japan Metrological Agency, the SDF supports various meteorological observations, such as volcanic observation using aircraft and marine-ice observation in Hokkaido coastal regions. ❍ Acting on requests from a liaison council formulating anti-radiation measures, the SDF collects high-altitude floating dusts and makes radiation analysis of them. The SDF, also acting on requests from the Geographical Survey Institute, supports it in aerial measurement aimed at making maps. ❍ Entrusted by the state and municipal governments and others, the SDF undertakes civil engineering work. (Such support is provided only if doing so is deemed to serve training purposes)[8] ❍ Other support activities by the SDF include sea ice observation, support of flights of private chartered aircraft, and transportation of music bands to Iwoto.

Notes: 1. Article 100-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
2. Article 100-5 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.
3. Article 6 of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 13 of rules aimed at implementing the Self-Defense Forces Law and others.
4. Honor guard: Officers of the honor guard, salute guests while carrying a gun as a mark of state respect.
5. Formation of line: SDF officers form a line on the road to show respect to guests and salute them.
6. Gun salute: SDF officers fire a blank canon salute to show respect to guests.
7. Article 100-4 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
8. Article 100 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

Reference 82. Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities



Notes: 1. (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area
Areas around bases are classified according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise, as follows:
Class 1 Area: WECPNL is 75 or more
Class 2 Area: Area within Class 1 Areas in which WECPNL is 90 or more
Class 3 Area: Area within Class 2 Areas in which WECPNL is 95 or more
(2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.
2. In terms of loss sustained in running agricultural, fisheries, and forestry businesses resulting from USFJ activities, the Government of Japan compensates for loss based on the Law Concerning Compensation for Special Damages Incurred by Acts of the United States Forces Stationed in Japan (established in 1953).

Reference 83. New Measures to Promote Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities

New Measures	Description of Projects
Initiative to Integrate Various Projects Undertaken in Areas Surrounded by Defense Facilities	Various livelihood-improvement projects being planned separately by municipalities in designated areas where serious problems are caused due to installation and operations of defense facilities will be integrated with certain discretion given to concerned municipalities for project implementation.
Subsidies for Installation of Solar Power Systems	Monitoring will be conducted to study whether it is advisable to provide subsidies to households which have installed a solar power system as part of sound-insulation work so as to reduce their financial burden of electricity charges for air-conditioning equipment which has been also installed for sound insulation.
Promotion of Housing-Exterior Work for Sound Insulation	In order to improve the livelihood of affected households, sound insulation work covering the entire part of their houses will be promoted instead of room-based work as being applied previously.
Community-Building Support Projects	Subsidies and other support will be provided for an initiative by municipalities to promote community-building using surrounding assets (nearby airfields). Such support is meant to significantly contribute to the development of local communities as well as reducing negative effects of defense facilities to minimal levels.
Renovation of Existing Public Facilities	When public halls and other public facilities become unable to meet needs of local people because such facilities have become outmoded with the passage of time or the aging of the population, these facilities will be renovated using subsidies so that they are made barrier free with their safety being enhanced.
Active Use of Assets Near Airfields	The state will promote the use by the general public of surrounding assets it has established and managed, such as green zones, by installing benched and rest facilities and permitting municipalities to use them. The state will also permit municipalities to use farm areas so that they are open to citizens.

Reference 84. "Public Opinion Survey on the Self Defense Forces and Defense Issues" (excerpt) (Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office: as of January 2009)

Outline of the survey	Period: January 15–25, 2009 Respondents: 3,000 people aged 20 years or over throughout Japan Valid responses (rate): 1,781 (59.4%) Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel For details, refer to <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h20/h20-bouei/index.html>

1. Interest in the SDF and defense issues



Note 1: Total of "very interested" and "somewhat interested" until the survey of November 1984.

2. Impression about the SDF



Notes: 1. Total of "good impression" and "not bad impression" until the survey of February 2006.
2. Total of "not good impression" and "bad impression" until the survey of February 2006.

3. Anti-piracy measures



4. Necessity of education to nurture feelings of defending the country



Reference 85. Record of Information Disclosure by the Ministry of Defense (FY2008)

		Ministry of Defense	Regional Defense Bureaus and Branches
1. Number of disclosure requests		1,333	311
2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure		1,494	339
	Requests accepted	856	113
	Requests partially accepted	475	209
	Requests declined	163	17
3. Number of administrative protests		256	4
4. Number of lawsuits		1	1

Reference 86. Outline of the Report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense

I. Introduction

1. The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense was set up at the Prime Minister's Office in December 2007 in response to the frequent occurrence of incidents of misconduct in the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.
2. The Council will conduct continued examination to throw light on individual cases and the organizational problems that allowed them occur and indicate measures to prevent recurrence and a direction for reform. Functioning of the principles of the reform and effective action in line with the duties of the organization requires reconstruction of the organization and decision-making system of the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.
3. The Self-Defense Forces now face an era when multi-functional, flexible, and effective action is required. In addition to further enhancement of "safety from armed organizations" emphasized after the war, we need the perspective of "safety provided by an armed organization" in the future.
4. The council proposes a reform of the system so that it can effectively fulfill the security function while securing civilian control.

II. Cases of misconduct — Defining the problem

1. Confusion of the amount of fuel provided (breach of reporting duty): Press conferences by the Chairperson of the Joint Staff Council and the statement of the Defense Agency Director and the Chief Cabinet Secretary concerning the amount of fuel provided to the U.S. Navy vessels were held based on the erroneous figure reported by the Maritime Staff Office (MSO) Operations and Plans Department Director. Not correcting the error after the recognition thereof is a breach of reporting duty and indicates the lack of professionalism and is counter to civilian control. The organizational problem of ill-definition of the responsibility to correct errors shall be corrected.
2. Information Leakage case (communication information revolution and information security): Cases of leaking to the outside business data that included confidential information through file-sharing software installed in private PCs occurred one after another up until 2006. The cause was: (1) recognition by the Self Defense Forces failed to keep pace with the rapid evolution of communication information and; (2) their awareness of security concerning confidential information was not at a sufficient level.
3. Aegis information leakage case (learning of advanced technologies and information security): Case where Aegis information, which falls under the category of Special Defense Secrets, was used as a teaching material, without the regular procedure being followed, and it spread throughout the MSDF. This occurred

as a result of the combination of the willingness to learn about advanced technologies and the lack of awareness of information security.

4. Atago Collision case (Slackening of basic action discipline): MSDF destroyer Atago collided with a fishing ship. The case provided a lesson on what terrible consequences can follow the slackening of basic discipline, an epidemic disregard for rules across the organization and a lack of navigation skills. In addition, it revealed the problem in communications between the staff and the Internal Bureau in an emergency after the occurrence of the accident.
5. Betrayal by the former Vice-Minister of Defense, Moriya: The case where the former Vice-Minister of Defense is accused of receiving entertainment, money, and presents, and of using his influence for the procurement of defense equipment and materials. The pursuit of private profit in procurement is a hideous betrayal that is farthest from the professionalism expected from an official of the Internal Bureau. There is a problem also in the organizational environment that allowed such a grave transgression by a top-ranking officer to continue unchecked.
6. Comprehensive examination of the cases
   In order to control misconduct it is essential to make continual efforts to minimize errors while clarifying goals and mission awareness across the organization.

III. Reform recommendation (1)
—Reform of the thinking of the SDF personnel and organizational culture

1. Principle of reform
   Based on the examination/analysis of the misconduct cases, we propose the reform principles of: (1) complete compliance with rules, (2) Establishment of professionalism, (3) establishment of operation that gives the execution of duties top priority, aiming at total optimization.
2. Complete compliance with rules
   It is necessary to establish unprompted compliance awareness as an organizational climate. It is also necessary to organize rules to clearly define items to be conformed with.
   (1) Staff personnel themselves should understand the need for rules and show example by leadership.
   (2) Workplace education on compliance with rules, focused on necessity rather than formality
   (3) Rigid adherence to the rules concerning confidentiality and strict punishment for violation
   (4) Clarification of where the responsibility lies and creation/disclosure of proceedings records to ensure transparency in defense procurement
   (5) Strengthening of audit/inspection functions, including short-notice inspections
   (6) Examination and review of the need for rules
3. Establishment of professionalism
   Leadership of superior officers who have a strong commitment to professionalism shall nurture high ethical standards and a sense of mission.
   (1) Review education programs and how to build administrative experience in order to develop staff personnel with a wider vision.
   (2) Review the balance between the work load and personnel positioning at individual SDF departments and enhance basic workplace education, while reducing undue burden on the workplace.
   (3) Fostering professionalism in communication/information security that is essential for modern security guarantee
4. Establishment of operation that gives the execution of duties top priority, aiming at total optimization In addition to raising the awareness of individual personnel, units, etc., it is necessary to create an organizational culture that pursues total optimization focused on execution of duties.

(1) Establishment of a cooperation system by nurturing a sense of unity of civilian and SDF personnel and that of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces
(2) Establishment of an autonomous PDCA (Plan Do Check Act) cycle
(3) Improvement efforts shared by subordinates and their commanders, who lead basic units of the SDF, while taking reference to best practices in the private sector
(4) Expeditious response to policy issues through policy planning based on the IPT (Integrated Project Team) system
(5) Fully-fledged introduction of the IPT method to defense procurement
(6) Further promotion of the joint operations system led by Joint Staff
(7) Implementation of public relations keeping consistency among various interviews as well as between headquarters and individual units in order to prevent public distrust

IV. Reform recommendation (2) — Organizational reform for modern civilian control

1. Need for organizational reform
Organizational reform is necessary for the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces to implement the three reform principles described above more reliably and effectively.
2. Strategy level — Enhancement of the command tower function of the Prime Minister's Office
The command tower function of the Prime Minister's Office as well as that of the Ministry of Defense needs to be enhanced.
(1) Expressly provide a security strategy for the entire country on which defense policies should be based.
(2) Enhance meetings where cabinet members, including the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Minister discuss major issues concerning security routinely and expeditiously.
(3) Set up a meeting of related ministers for discussion of the government policies etc. concerning improvement of defense capabilities. Set up a permanent organ to support the meeting.
(4) Reinforce the staff of the Cabinet Secretariat to enhance the system to assist the Prime Minister with regard to security.
3. Organizational reform to enhance the command tower function at the Self-Defense Forces
(1) Enhancement of the policy decision mechanism that is led by the Minister of Defense
(i) Abolish the Defense Counselor System and set up the position of Advisor to the Minister of Defense.
(ii) Clearly position the Defense Council by law to assist policy decision and emergency response by the Defense Minster through deliberation of three parties: 1. statespersons, including the Senior Vice-Minister, the Vice-Minister and the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, 2. civilian personnel, and 3. SDF personnel.
(iii) Set up a center for consolidation of information and crisis management of the Ministry.
(2) Enhancement of the function of the Bureau of Defense Policy
Enhance the functions of planning, drawing up and publicizing defense policies. Enhance the functions based on the actual condition of operations by employing SDF personnel.
(3) Enhancement of the function of the Joint Staff
Abolish the Bureau of Operational Policy and implement operations under the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, on orders from the Minister. Important matters, such as operations by units and defense planning, shall be submitted for the approval of the Minister of Defense after deliberation at the Defense Council. Enhance the functions by employing civilian personnel.

(4) Unification of the defense capability improvement divisions
   (i) For total optimization of defense capability improvement, an improvement division shall be established that handles improvement projects, etc., in an integrated fashion by sorting out and restructuring defense capability improvement divisions of the Internal Bureau, GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Staff Offices. Its specific role shall be discussed further. The new system shall allow full fledged implementation of IPT-based procurement.
   (ii) Conduct a review to change local procurement to central procurement as far as possible. Strengthen a highly independent third-party check system.

(5) Measures in other priority areas
   (i) For administration staff, actively use uniformed SDF personnel who are familiar with the unit concerned while advancing integration as much as possible.
   (ii) Personnel affairs and education/training of uniformed SDF personnel shall be the responsibility of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Staff Offices, but the Internal Bureau shall also assist the Minister of Defense in these matters in system and policy aspects.

V. Closing Remarks

Execution plan of the reform recommended here should be promptly put together and implemented. In addition, multidimensional simulations should be conducted before the organizational reform. The Council raised various issues, such as how to facilitate a closer relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces on one hand and the Police and Japan Coast Guard on the other while ensuring the function of the entire country.

The Council expects the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces to recreate themselves as proud professionals.

Reference 87. Minister's Instructions on the Reform of the Ministry of Defense (Pillars of Examination)

(June 3, 2010)

A certain measure of results have come from the examinations to date on the reform of the Ministry of Defense, and hereafter reforms should be implemented in a continuous manner. In light of the change in administration, the decision has been made to reassess the examinations undertaken so far once again from the perspective of the new administration, which has received a mandate from the public.

The new administration accepts a viewpoint of preventing the reoccurrence of misconduct as a matter of course. Not only that, but its objective is to promote reform of the Ministry of Defense from the perspective of effectively and efficiently promoting defense administration that responds to the environment surrounding the Ministry of Defense, while ensuring the effectiveness of civilian control. The specific course of the reappraisals is as follows.

For the promotion of reforms, the necessary examinations must be conducted by creating a ministry-wide promotion structure and then quickly implementing reforms starting with what is feasible.

1. Central Organizational Reforms
   ○ Civilian control is the basis of our defense policy. In order to ensure this, it is essential to have an advisory structure for the Minister of Defense, a politician who is the main agent in this, which fully capitalizes on the respective specialties of uniformed and civilian personnel. For this reason, an arrangement in which the Internal Bureau will work to gather the opinions of the ministry, while at the

same time enabling the Defense Minister to hear the organizational opinions which capitalize on the respective specialties of uniformed and civilian personnel is thought to be valid.

From this perspective, the unification and intermixing of uniformed and civilian personnel into the internal bureaus within the Bureau of Operational Policy and the Bureau of Defense Policy, as well as the Staff Offices, will be reexamined.

○ Conversely, defects deriving from the dual organizational structure in the Bureau of Operational Policy and the Bureau of Defense Policy have been pointed out, and so examinations for correcting these must be undertaken.

— It is necessary to examine work modalities while carrying out simulations for each state of affairs in the aim of avoiding duplication between the work of the Internal Bureau and the Joint Staff, as well as to facilitate decision-making while securing the cooperation of uniformed and civilian personnel.

— For the Bureau of Defense Policy, it is necessary to examine work modalities in order to create truly effective defense capabilities while focusing on avoiding inflexibility in budgetary allocations and improving the efficiency of the maintenance of defense capabilities.

— A defense council comprised of the Ministry's top three politicians, civil officials, and uniformed personnel which serves as an advisory organ for the Minister of Defense will play a vital role when it comes to unifying the purpose of the Ministry of Defense, including the decision making within these two bureaus. But examinations are necessary on installing such a council with a view toward facilitating and improving the efficiency of this unification of purpose.

— In order to foster unity between uniformed and civilian personnel, examinations on uniformed and civilian personnel exchanges and training are necessary, focusing mainly on those who are still young.

2. Reform of Acquisitions

With regard to reform of acquisitions, we must pay thorough attention to ensuring fairness and transparency in our contracts. Not only that, but we must also comprehensively examine reforms in the areas of maintaining and improving equipment, as well as ensuring defense industries and technology bases.

3. Securing and Fostering Human Resources

With regard to securing and fostering uniformed and civilian human resources, we must secure superior group members, while also examining policies to foster group members who maintain excellent discipline while keeping an ethical mindset and a broad outlook. When it comes to making the nurse training course into a four-year program in particular, we must carry out ministry-wide initiatives in order to achieve this.

4. Handling of Policies for Preventing the Reoccurrence of Misconduct Implemented To Date

The decision has been made to continue implementing policies for preventing the reoccurrence of misconduct that have been implemented pursuant to the report by the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense. In light of recent cases of misconduct (inappropriate remarks by SDF top brass officials, case of collusion with ASDF suppliers, etc.), we must firmly examine whether or not additional countermeasures are required.

Defense Chronology

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1945			Aug. 15	World War II ends	Aug. 17	Republic of Indonesia declares independence
			Aug. 17	Higashikuni Cabinet formed		
			Sep. 2	GHQ established	Aug. 28	Provisional government of People's Republic of Vietnam established
			Oct. 9	Shidehara Cabinet formed		
			Oct. 15	General Staff Office and Military Command abolished	Oct. 24	United Nations established
			Nov. 30	Army and Navy Ministries abolished		
1946			Jan. 4	GHQ orders purge from public office	Jan. 10	First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14)
			Jan. 27	GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands		
			Feb. 26	Far East Commission formed	Mar. 5	Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech
			Apr. 5	First meeting of Allied Council on Japan		
			Apr. 24	Civil administration of Okinawa established		
			May 3	International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened	Oct. 1	International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg delivers verdicts
			May 22	Yoshida Cabinet formed		
			Nov. 3	Constitution of Japan promulgated	Dec. 19	First Indochina War starts (through 1954)
1947			May 3	Constitution of Japan takes effect	Mar. 12	Truman Doctrine announced
			Jun. 1	Katayama Cabinet formed	Jun. 5	Marshall Plan announced
			Dec. 17	Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)	Aug. 15	India and Pakistan gain independence
						First Indo–Pakistani conflict (through 1965)
					Oct. 5	Cominform established
1948			Mar. 10	Ashida Cabinet formed	Apr. 1	USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949)
			Apr. 27	Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated	May 14	Israel gains independence
						First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949)
					Jun. 11	U.S. Senate Vandenberg resolution
					Jun. 26	Berlin airlift starts
			Oct. 19	Yoshida Cabinet formed	Aug. 15	Republic of Korea (ROK) established
			Nov. 12	International Military Tribunal for the Far East delivers verdicts	Sep. 9	Democratic People's Republic of Korea established
1949					Jan. 25	Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON) established
					Apr. 4	North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) (NATO established)
					Apr. 21	Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive
					May 6	Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany)
			Jul. 5	Shimoyama incident		
			Jul. 15	Mitaka incident	Sep. 24	USSR declares possession of atomic bomb
			Aug. 17	Matsukawa incident		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1949					Oct. 1	People's Republic of China established
					Oct. 7	German Democratic Republic established (East Germany)
					Dec. 7	Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan
1950	Jul. 8	General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men	Jun. 21	John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan	Jan. 27	U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries
					Feb. 14	China-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed
	Aug. 10	National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect			Jun. 25	Korean War (ends July 27, 1953)
					Jul. 7	United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea
	Aug. 13	Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins				
	Aug. 14	Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the National Police Reserve			Sep. 15	U.N. troops land at Inchon
					Oct. 25	Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War
	Sep. 7	National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima	Nov. 24	U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan	Dec. 18	NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces
1951	Jan. 23	Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve	Jan. 29	First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations)	Apr. 11	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers dismissed
	Mar. 1	Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins	Sep. 8	49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan	Aug. 30	U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed
				Japan–U.S. Security Treaty concluded	Sep. 1	Australia–New Zealand–U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty
	Oct. 20	Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth	Oct. 26	House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councillors approval given November 18)		
1952	Feb. 28	Japan–U.S. Administrative Agreement signed			Jan. 19	ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line)
	Apr. 26	Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard	Apr. 28	Japan–Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded		
	Jul. 26	Japan–U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed		Japan–U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan–U.S. Security Treaty enter into force		
	Jul. 31	National Safety Agency Law promulgated		Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ abolished		
	Aug. 1	National Safety Agency established	May 1	May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza	May 26	U.S., U.K., and France sign peace agreement with Germany
		Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency Coastal Safety Force inaugurated	Jul. 21	Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force	May 27	European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed
	Oct. 15	National Safety Force inaugurated				
	Oct. 30	Kimura appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency			Oct. 31	U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test
					Nov. 1	U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
	Nov. 12	Japan–U.S. Ship Leasing Agreement signed				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1953	Jan. 1	Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated			Jan. 20	Eisenhower becomes U.S. President
	Apr. 1	National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established			Mar. 5	USSR General Secretary Stalin dies (Malenkov takes over March 6)
					Jul. 27	Truce signed in Korean War
	Aug. 1	Weapons, etc., Production Law promulgated				
		Yoshida and Shigemitsu talk			Aug. 12	USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
	Sep. 27	Ikeda–Robertson talks; joint				
	Oct. 30	statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength	Dec. 25	Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored	Oct. 1	U.S.–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed
1954	Mar. 8	Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed	Mar. 1	*Daigo Fukuryu maru* (Lucky Dragon V) incident	Jan. 21	U.S. launches world's first nuclear submarine (USS Nautilus)
	May 14	Japan and U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels			Mar. 1	U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll
	Jun. 2	House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas			Mar. 14	Khrushchev becomes Soviet Union Communist Party General Secretary
	Jun. 9	Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self-Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA			Jul. 21	Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed
					Sep. 3	Chinese People's Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time
	Jul. 1	Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated			Sep. 8	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact
	Dec. 10	Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 10	Hatoyama Cabinet formed	Dec. 2	U.S.–Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed
1955	Mar. 19	Sugihara appointed Minister of State for Defense	May 8	Protests begin at Sunagawa Base	Apr. 18	Africa–Asia conference held at Bandung
	May 6	Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to firing intensifies	Aug. 6	First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held at Hiroshima	May 5	West Germany formally admitted to NATO
					May 14	Signing of Warsaw Pact (WPO starts)
	Jul. 31	Sunada appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 31	Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty		
			Nov. 14	Japan–U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed		
	Nov. 22	Funada appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 19	Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated		
1956	Jan. 30	Japan–U.S. joint statement on reduction of Japan's share of defense spending	Feb. 9	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councillors, February 10)	Feb. 14	Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khruschev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West
	Mar. 22	Japan–U.S. Technical Agreement relating to sharing of knowledge on patents and technology signed in accordance with MDA			Apr. 17	USSR announces dissolution of Cominform
	Mar. 23	Defense Agency moved to Kasumigaseki			Jul. 26	Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal
	Apr. 26	First Japan-made destroyer *Harukaze* completed				
	Jul. 2	National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated			Oct. 23	Hungarian Revolution
			Oct. 19	Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese–Soviet relations	Oct. 29	Second Middle East War (Suez War; through November 6)
	Sep. 20	First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1956	Dec. 23	Prime Minister Ishibashi concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 18 Dec. 23	Japan joins the U.N. Ishibashi Cabinet formed		
1957	Jan. 31	Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense				
	Feb. 2	Kotaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Feb. 25 Mar. 15	Kishi Cabinet formed House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs		
	May 20	Basic Guidelines for National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet			May 15	U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test
	Jun. 14	First Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet				
	Jun. 21	Kishi–Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued	Aug. 6 Aug. 27	Japan–U.S. Security Council inaugurated Trial startup of reactor at Tokaimura	Aug. 26	USSR announces successful ICBM test
	Jul. 1	Tsushima appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct. 4	USSR launches the world's first man-made satellite, Sputnik 1
	Sep. 10	National Defense Council decision to produce 42 P2V-7 aircraft domestically, Cabinet report on September 17			Nov. 23	World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration
1958	Jan. 14	First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28)	Jan. 1	Japan becomes non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (through December 31, 1959)	Jan. 1	European Economic Community (EEC) starts
	Feb. 17	ASDF begins measures to counter invasions of territorial airspace	Apr. 18	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs	Jan. 31 Aug. 23	US successfully launches satellite Chinese People's Liberation Army attack on Quemoy intensifies
	Jun. 12	Sato appointed Minister of State for Defense concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense	Sep. 11	Fujiyama–Dulles talks (Washington); agreement on revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty	Oct. 23	Dulles talks with Chiang Kaishek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China
			Oct. 4	Commencement of Japan–U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty	Dec. 17	U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM
1959	Jan. 12	Ino appointed Minister of State for Defense	Mar. 30	Tokyo District Court ruled the stationing of U.S. forces to be unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case	Mar. 31	14th Dalai Lama is exiled to India
	Jun. 18	Akagi appointed Minister of State for Defense			Mar. 27	USSR General Secretary Khrushchev proposes complete military reductions at U.N.
	Nov. 6	National Defense Council decision to produce 200 F-104 aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet on November 10	Dec. 16	Original ruling in the Sunagawa case was reversed by the Supreme Court	Aug. 25 Sep. 27 Dec. 1	China-India border dispute U.S.–Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David Antarctica Treaty signed
1960	Jan. 11	Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho	Jan. 19	New Japan–U.S. Security Treaty signed (enters into force June 23)	Feb. 13	France conducts its first nuclear test
					Apr. 27	Rhee resigns as President of ROK
					May 1	U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1960	Jul. 19	Esaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 19	Ikeda Cabinet formed	Jul. 20	U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM
	Dec. 8	Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Dec. 20	Formation of the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front
1961	Jan. 13	National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20			Jan. 20	Kennedy becomes U.S. President
					Apr. 12	USSR successfully launches manned satellite
					May 16	Military junta seizes power in coup d'état in ROK
					Jul. 6	Soviet–North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed
	Jul. 18	Fujieda appointed Minister of State for Defense Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet			Jul. 11	China–North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed
					Aug. 13	Construction of Berlin Wall
1962	Jul. 18	Shiga appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul. 23	International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva International Conference
	Aug. 15	GSDF completes 13 division organization				
	Oct. 15	Type 61 tank first introduced			Oct. 20	China–India border dispute (through November 22)
	Nov. 1	Defense Facilities Administration Agency established			Oct. 24	U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20)
	Nov. 9	Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)			Oct. 28	USSR General Secretary Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba
1963	Jul. 18	Fukuda appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jun. 20	Agreement signed for U.S.–Soviet hotline
			Aug. 14	Japan joins Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	Aug. 8	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.–USSR–U.K. (enters into force on October 10)
					Sep. 16	Malaysian Federation established
					Nov. 22	President Kennedy assassinated, Johnson becomes President
					Dec. 17	ROK transits to civilian government, Park becomes President
1964	Jul. 18	Koizumi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun. 15	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty enters into force for Japan	Aug. 2	Gulf of Tonkin incident
			Nov. 9	Sato Cabinet formed	Oct. 16	China successfully carries out its first nuclear test
			Nov. 12	U.S. nuclear submarine (*Sea Dragon*) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time		Breshnev becomes USSR General Secretary
1965	Feb. 10	Diet debate on Mitsuya study			Feb. 7	U.S. starts bombing Viet Nam
	Jun. 3	Matsuno appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun. 22	Japan–ROK Basic Treaty signed	Sep. 1	Second India–Pakistan conflict (to September 22)
	Nov. 20	Icebreaker *Fuji* leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1966	Aug. 1	Kambayashiyama appointed Minister of State for Defense			May 16	Cultural Revolution starts in China
	Nov. 29	Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet			Jul. 1	France withdraws from the NATO command (rejoined April 4, 2009)
	Dec. 3	Masuda appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct. 27	China carries out its first successful nuclear missile test
1967	Mar. 13	Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan agreed by National Defense Council; adopted by Cabinet on March 14	Mar. 29	Sapporo District Court rules in Eniwa Case	Jan. 27	Outer Space Treaty signed
					Jun. 5	Third Middle East War (through June 9)
					Jun. 17	China carries out its first successful hydrogen bomb test
					Jul. 1	Formation of European Community (EC)
					Aug. 8	Formation of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
1968			Jan. 19	U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (*Enterprise*) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time	Jan. 16	Prime Minister Wilson announces withdrawal of U.K. troops east of Suez
			Feb. 26	New Japan–U.S. nuclear agreement signed	Jan. 23	Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel *Pueblo* by North Korea
					May 13	First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris
			Jun. 26	Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan	Jul. 1	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed
					Aug. 20	Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia
	Nov. 30	Arita appointed Minister of State for Defense			Aug. 24	France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific
1969	Jan. 10	National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet			Jan. 20	Nixon becomes U.S. President
					Mar. 2	Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island)
	Apr. 4	Japan–U.S. memorandum signed for Japanese production of F-4E			Apr. 15	North Korea shoots down U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane
					Jun. 10	South Viet Nam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government
			Nov. 21	Sato–Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)	Jul. 25	President Nixon announce Guam Doctrine (later the Nixon Doctrine)
1970	Jan. 14	Nakasone appointed Minister of State for Defense	Feb. 3	Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	Jan. 24	Formation of integrated Warsaw Pact forces (involving seven countries)
			Feb. 11	First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched	Mar. 5	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force
			Mar. 31	*Yodo* hijacking	Apr. 16	U.S. and USSR begin SALT I strategic arms limitation talks
			Jun. 23	Automatic extension of Japan–U.S. Security Treaty	Apr. 24	China successfully launches first satellite
	Oct. 20	Publication of "The Defense of Japan," the first white paper on defense	Nov. 25	Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya	Aug. 12	West Germany–USSR sign non-aggression pact

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1971	Jun. 29	Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed	Jun. 17	Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed	Feb. 11	Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes
	Jul. 5	Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense			Aug. 9	Indo–Soviet Friendship Treaty signed
	Jul. 30	All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (*Shizukuishi*)			Sep. 30	U.S. and USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war
	Aug. 2	Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct. 25	U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan
	Dec. 3	Ezaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 24	House of Representatives resolution on non-nuclear weapons	Nov. 27	ASEAN declares SEA neutrality
					Dec. 3	Third India–Pakistan conflict (through December 17)
1972	Feb. 7	National Defense Council adopts Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan, approved by Cabinet on February 8	Jan. 7	Sato–Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases	Feb. 27	President Nixon visits China; China–U.S. Joint Communiqué
					Apr. 10	BWC signed
	Apr. 17	National Defense Council decision on SDF deployment in Okinawa, presented to Cabinet on April 18	May 15	Return of Okinawa	May 26	SALT I and agreement to limit ABM signed during the visit of President Nixon to USSR
					Jul. 3	India–Pakistan truce signed
	Jul. 7	Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 7	Tanaka Cabinet formed	Jul. 4	South Korea and North Korea make a Joint Statement for peace
	Oct. 9	"Situation Judgment and Defense Concepts in the Fourth Defense Build-up Plan," National Defense Council determines key matters for inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan and measures to enhance civilian control, adopted by Cabinet	Sep. 29	Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China		
					Dec. 21	East–West Germany Basic Treaty signed
1973	Jan. 23	14th Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program)			Jan. 27	Viet Nam peace agreement signed (ceasefire takes effect on January 28)
					Feb. 21	Laos Peace Treaty signed
	Feb. 1	Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength			Mar. 29	U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Viet Nam
					Jun. 22	General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S.; convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed
	May 29	Yamanaka appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Jul. 1	Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa	Sep. 7	Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgment)	Oct. 6	Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25)
			Sep. 21	Japan–North Viet Nam establish diplomatic relations	Oct. 17	Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies
			Oct. 8	Japan–Soviet summit (Moscow)	Nov. 7	Pakistan formally withdraws from SEATO
1974			Jan. 5	Japan–China Trade Agreement signed	Jan. 18	Israel and Egypt sign agreement to pull back military forces
					May 18	India carries out its first underground nuclear test
	Apr. 25	National Defense Medical College opens	Apr. 20	Japan–China Aviation Agreement signed	Jul. 3	President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1974					Aug. 9	Ford becomes U.S. President
					Oct. 8	Eisaku Sato, former Prime Minister, receives Nobel Prize
	Nov. 12	Uno appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 13	Japan–China Marine Transport Agreement signed	Nov. 15	U.N. forces in Korea announce Tunnel Incident
					Nov. 23	President Ford visits USSR, makes joint statement on SALT II
	Dec. 9	Sakata appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 9	Miki Cabinet formed		
1975	Apr. 1	Director General instructs to create draft plan for defense forces after FY1977 (second instruction October 29)			Apr. 23	President Ford declares end of Vietnam War
					Apr. 30	South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally
					Aug. 1	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki)
					Nov. 17	First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through Nov. 17), held annually since
1976	Jun. 4	Publication of second white paper on defense, "The Defense of Japan" (henceforth published annually)	Jun. 8	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan	Apr. 5	Demonstrators and police clash in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China (1st Tiananmen Incident)
	Jul. 8	Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation (SDC)			Jul. 2	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (unified Viet Nam) proclaimed
	Sep. 6	MiG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport	Aug. 5	Sapporo High Court decides Naganuma Nike suit	Aug. 18	U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom
	Oct. 29	National Defense Council, Cabinet decision on Defense Plan for Defense Build-up beyond FY1977			Sep. 9	Death of Chairman of Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong
	Nov. 5	National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt Immediate-term Defense Build-up, National Defense Council, Cabinet decision on handling major items in preparations for defense forces			Oct. 6	Group of Four arrested (Cultural Revolution ends)
	Dec. 24	Mihara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 24	Fukuda Cabinet formed		
1977	Jan. 18	Type-75 self-propelled howitzer first introduced	Feb. 17	Mito District Court decides Hyakuri Base suit	Jan. 20	Carter becomes U.S. President
	Apr. 15	Establishment of systematic defense programs	Jul. 1	Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200-mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters	Mar. 1	U.S. and USSR implement 200 mile fishing zones
	Aug. 10	Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study			Jun. 30	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective)
	Sep. 26	ASDF introduces F-1				
	Nov. 28	Kanemaru appointed Minister of State for Defense			Aug. 1	North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea
	Dec. 28	National Defense Council decides on introduction of "F-15s and P-3Cs," approved by Cabinet on December 29			Sep. 24	U.S. and USSR make joint statement about SALT I
1978	Sep. 21	Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study	Aug. 12	Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China signed in Beijing	Apr. 12	Chinese fishing fleet infringes on waters around Senkaku Islands
					Sep. 7	Camp David Agreement

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1978	Nov. 27	(ASDF) First Japan–U.S. joint training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1) Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28			Nov. 3	Vietnam–Soviet Friendship Agreement signed
					Dec. 5	Afghanistan–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Good Relations and Cooperation signed
	Dec. 7	Yamashita appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 7	Ohira Cabinet formed	Dec. 25	Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia
1979	Jan. 11	Introduction of E-2C approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet			Jan. 1	U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations, U.S. notifies termination of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty after one year
					Jan. 7	Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced
					Feb. 11	Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran
	Jul. 17	Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980–FY1984)			Feb. 17	China–Viet Nam conflict (through March 5)
					Mar. 26	Egypt–Israel peace treaty signed
	Jul. 25	Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26)			Jun. 18	SALT II signed
					Oct. 26	Assassination of ROK President Park Chung Hee
	Nov. 9	Kubota appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 9	Second Ohira Cabinet formed	Dec. 27	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
1980	Feb. 4	Hosoda appointed Minister of State for Defense			Apr. 11	China–Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses
	Feb. 26	Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18)			May 18	China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific for the first time
	Jul. 17	Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 17	House of Councilors establishes special committee for Security Treaty, Okinawa, and Northern Islands issues	Aug. 21	Soviet nuclear submarine has accident off Okinawa main island
	Aug. 18	Interceptors begin to be armed with missiles				
	Aug. 19	Arming escorts with live torpedoes announced	Jul. 17	Suzuki Cabinet formed	Sep. 22	Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war
	Sep. 3	First meeting of the Japan–U.S. Systems and Technology Forum (Washington, through September 4)				
1981	Apr. 22	Defense Agency announces classification of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation	Jan. 6	February 7 decided as Northern Islands Day (Cabinet authorized)	Jan. 20	Reagan becomes U.S. President
			Jul. 7	Tokyo High Court decides Hyakuri Base suit		
	Oct. 1	(GSDF) First Japan–U.S. joint exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (through October 3)	Jul. 13	Hachioji branch of Tokyo District Court decides 1st and 2nd Yokota Air Base noise suits		
	Nov. 30	Ito appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 30	Reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet formed	Dec. 13	Poland declares martial law and establishes the Military Council of National Salvation

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1982	Feb. 15	(GSDF) First Japan–U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Takigahara, through February 19)	Jun. 8	BWC enters into force in Japan	Apr. 2	Falklands dispute (ends June 14)
	May 15	Use of some sections of land within installations and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law	Jun. 9	Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded	Apr. 25	Israel returns all of Sinai Peninsula
	Jul. 23	1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and approved by National Defense Council	Sep. 9	Supreme Court ruled on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case	Jun. 6	Israeli forces invade Lebanon
	Nov. 27	Tanigawa appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct. 20	Yokohama District Court decides 1st Atsugi Air Facility noise suit	Jun. 29	Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.–Soviet Union (Geneva)
			Nov. 27	Nakasone Cabinet formed	Jul. 9	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea formed
					Aug. 17	Joint statement by U.S. and China about U.S. weapons sales to Taiwan
					Oct. 12	China successfully tests SLBM water launch
					Nov. 12	Andropov becomes Soviet General Secretary
1983	Jan. 14	Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S.			Jan. 1	U.S. establishes new Command (Central Command)
	Jun. 12	Director Hasegawa first Defense Agency Director to inspect Northern Islands			Mar. 23	U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
	Nov. 8	Signed negotiation statement for sharing military technology with the U.S. based on the U.S. and Japan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement			Sep. 1	KAL airliner shot down by Soviet fighters near Sakhalin
					Oct. 9	19 ROK government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorist explosion
	Dec. 12	(ASDF) First Japan–U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Fuchu, through December 15)			Oct. 25	U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada
	Dec. 27	Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 27	Second Nakasone Cabinet formed		
1984	Jun. 11	(MSDF) First Japan–U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Yokosuka, through June 15)			Jan. 1	Brunei gains independence from the U.K. (joins ASEAN on January 7)
	Oct. 16	Defense Agency announces procedures, etc., of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in “Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies”			Feb. 13	Chernenko becomes USSR General Secretary
					May 23	Kim Il-sung visits USSR (through May 26)
	Nov. 1	Kato appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 1	Reshuffled second Nakasone Cabinet formed		
1985	Apr. 2	USAF begins to station F-16 fighters at Misawa			Feb. 1	New Zealand refuses to allow U.S. destroyer *Buchanan* to enter port
					Mar. 11	Mikhail Gorbachev installed as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
					Mar. 12	U.S.–Soviet Union arms control talks begin
					Jun. 4	China announces cut of one million personnel from the People’s Liberation Army
	Aug. 12	JAL aircraft crashes, rescue team dispatched				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1985	Sep. 18	Mid-Term Defense Program approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet, National Defense Council decision to introduce Patriots, Cabinet agreement			Sep. 29	Chinese PLA announces reorganization from 11-division districts to 7-division districts completed
	Dec. 27	Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded	Dec. 28	Reshuffled second Nakasone Cabinet formed	Nov. 19	U.S.–Soviet Summit meeting, Joint Statement (Geneva, through November 21)
1986	Feb. 24	First Japan–U.S. integrated command post exercise (through February 28)	Apr. 9	Tokyo High Court hears suit on Atsugi Air Facility noise for first time	Apr. 26	Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union
	Jul. 11	Security Council Establishment Law enacted	Jul. 22	Third Nakasone Cabinet formed		
	Jul. 22	Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 15	Japan, U.S., USSR open hotline operations	Aug. 10	U.S. announces suspension of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty in treaty talks (San Francisco, through August 11)
	Sep. 5	Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S.			Sep. 22	Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final documents (Stockholm)
	Oct. 27	First Japan–U.S. integrated field exercises staged (through October 31)			Oct. 11	U.S.–Soviet Union summit talks (Reykjavik, through October 12)
	Nov. 21	Disaster rescue teams dispatched for Izu Oshima volcano eruption			Oct. 15	USSR announces partial withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan
	Dec. 30	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet approve plans for dealing with the Immediate-term Defense Build-up Program authorized by the Cabinet on November 5, 1976 and included in the FY1987 budget				
1987	Jan. 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet agree on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity	May 27	Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas		
	Jan. 30	Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)				
	May 29	Director Kurihara first incumbent Director to visit China (through June 4)	Jul. 15	Tokyo High Court rules on 1st and 2nd Yokota Base noise suits	Jul. 20	UN Security Council adopts Iran–Iraq Conflict Cease Fire resolution (Number 598)
	Jul. 3	USAF completes assignment of F-16s to Misawa	Aug. 26	Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted		
	Oct. 21	Follow-on aircraft for F-1 study results decided and announced	Oct. 6	First Japan–U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7)		
	Nov. 6	Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense			Nov. 29	KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists while flying over the Bay of Bengal
	Dec. 18	Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas	Nov. 6	Takeshita Cabinet formed	Dec. 8	INF Treaty signed
1988	Mar. 2	Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)	Mar. 13	Aomori–Hakodate Undersea Tunnel opens	Mar. 14	Armed clashes between China and Viet Nam in the waters around the Spratly Islands

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1988	Apr. 12	Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries	Jun. 1	Supreme Court rules on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident	May 15	Soviet Army begins withdrawal from Afghanistan
	Jul. 23	Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka)			May 29	U.S.–Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged)
	Aug.21	Materials transported through Seikan Tunnel for first time (GSDF)			Aug. 17	First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada)
	Aug. 24	Tazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense			Aug. 20	Ceasefire agreement reached in Iran–Iraq War
	Sep.20	First Japan-made T-4 medium trainer introduced			Oct. 17	U.S. and Philippines sign negotiated agreement on revised Military Bases Agreement
	Nov. 29	Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development	Dec. 27	Second Takeshita Cabinet formed	Dec. 7	General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops
1989			Jan. 7	Emperor Showa dies	Jan. 19	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held 3rd follow-up meeting, and finished by adopting a final statement of agreement (Vienna)
					Jan. 20	G. H. W. Bush becomes U.S. President
	Jan. 27	Establishment of a commission for the study of defense capability	Feb. 24	Emperor Showa's funeral	Feb. 15	Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan
					Mar. 8	China declares martial law in Tibet Autonomous Region (lifted May 1, 1990)
					Mar. 9	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) started (Vienna)
			Mar. 15	Hachioji branch of the Tokyo District Court rules on the 3rd Yokota Air Base noise suit	Mar. 9	Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) started (Vienna)
	Mar. 30	New BADGE system begins operations	Apr. 1	Consumption Tax Law enforced	May 10	START-I reopened at U.S.–Soviet foreign ministers conference, agreement achieved (Moscow, through May 11)
					May 17	China-Soviet summit (Beijing): state-to-state and government-to-government relations normalized
					May 17	Gorbachev announces the reduction of the Soviet Far East forces by 120,000 (Beijing)
					May 20	Martial law declared in Beijing, China (lifted January 11, 1990)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1989	Jun. 3	Yamazaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun. 3	Uno Cabinet formed	Jun. 4	Chinese martial law units fire on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in Beijing (2nd Tiananmen incident)
			Jun. 20	Supreme Court rules on the Hyakuri Base suit		
			Jun. 22	Yokohama District Court decides on the Atsugi Air Facility suit	Jun. 24	Zhao Zhiyang relieved of post as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, and replaced by Jiang Zemin as General Secretary
					Jul. 30	International Conference on Cambodia held (Paris)
	Aug. 10	Matsumoto appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 10	Kaifu Cabinet formed	Sep. 26	Vietnam completely withdraws from Cambodia
					Nov. 9	GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall)
					Dec. 2	U.S.–Soviet summit talks (Malta, through December 3)
					Dec. 8	North Korea and Iran sign National Defense Cooperation Agreement
					Dec. 10	Dalai Lama receives Nobel Peace Prize
1990	Feb. 20	Joint Military Technology Commission decides to provide "military technology related to FS-x" to U.S.	Feb. 28	Second Kaifu Cabinet formed	Jan. 20	Soviet troops intervene in ethnic conflict in Armenia and Azerbaijan
			Mar. 3	Japan–U.S. summit meeting (Kaifu, Bush (father) Palm Springs, through March 4)		
	Feb. 28	Ishikawa appointed Minister of State for Defense	May 29	Naha District Court decides on administrative handling suit pertaining to Special Measures Law for USFJ Land	Feb. 13	U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers agree on upper limit of 195,000 U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe and 225,000 U.S. troops in Europe
	May 29	ASDF transports Imperial Throne and Canopy for Enthronement Ceremony (again on December 4)	Aug. 30	Government decides to donate U.S.$1 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region	Mar. 15	Gorbachev appointed first president of USSR
	Jun. 19	Japan–U.S. Joint Committee confirms moves to prepare necessary steps to return U.S. military facilities in Okinawa (23 items)	Sep. 14	Government pledges an additional U.S.$1 billion of economic aid toward efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region and U.S.$2 billion to countries adjacent to the conflict	Aug. 2	Iraq invades Kuwait
					Aug. 2	Bush (father) gives speech at Aspen
	Jun. 21	Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security	Oct. 16	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet	Oct. 3	German unification
					Oct. 15	President Gorbachev receives Nobel Peace Prize
			Nov. 10	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled	Oct. 24	USSR conducts nuclear tests underground in Arctic
	Dec. 20	Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet	Nov. 12	Coronation of Emperor		
			Nov. 23	Great Thanksgiving Festival	Nov. 26	CFE follow-on negotiations begun
	Dec. 29	Ikeda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 29	Reshuffled second Kaifu Cabinet formed		
1991	Jan. 14	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 17)	Jan. 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters	Jan. 17	Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm
	Jan. 25	Cabinet approves ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29, annulled April 19)	Jan. 24	Government pledges an additional U.S.$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1991					Feb. 24	Coalition forces ground troops advance on Kuwait and Iraq
	Feb. 28	First UH-60J rescue helicopter introduced			Feb. 28	Coalition forces cease combat action against Iraq
	Mar. 6	First EP-3 electronic data collection aircraft introduced			Mar. 31	Warsaw Pact structures dismantled
	Apr. 24	Security Council and Cabinet decide on "Sending minesweepers to the Persian Gulf)"			Apr. 11	Gulf War formally ended
					May 6	U.S. completes disposal of last Pershing II under the INF Treaty
	Apr. 26	Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf			May 12	Soviet Defense Minister announces disposal of last SS-20 under the INF Treaty
					May 28	NATO defense ministers announce establishment of emergency deployment force (Brussels)
	Jun. 3	Disaster relief dispatch with the eruption of Fugendake on Mount Unzen (through December 16, 1995)			Jun. 25	Croatian and Slovenian Republics secede from Yugoslavia
					Jun. 28	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) members signed decision to dissolve the organization at its 46th general meeting (Budapest)
					Jul. 1	Warsaw Pact (WPO) political advisory committee signs decision to dissolve the organization (Prague)
					Jul. 10	Russian President Yeltsin takes office
					Jul. 31	U.S. and Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow
					Aug. 19	Soviet Vice President Yanayev announced a state of emergency, formed the State Committee of the State of Emergency
					Aug. 21	Soviet State Committee of the State of Emergency dissolved
	Aug. 26	First SH-60J anti-submarine helicopter introduced			Sep. 6	Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states
					Sep. 7	International conference for peace in Yugoslavia (The Hague)
			Sep. 11	USS *Independence* enters Yokosuka to replace the aircraft carrier USS *Midway*	Sep. 17	U.N. General Assembly approves 7 member nations, including North and South Korea, and 3 Baltic nations
	Sep. 26	Aegis destroyer launching ceremony				
	Oct. 9	SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time			Oct. 23	Paris international conference for peace in Cambodia, comprehensive peace agreement signed
	Oct. 30	6 vessels including minesweepers return from Persian Gulf			Oct. 30	Middle East Peace talks (overall conference) (Madrid, through November 2)
	Nov. 5	Miyashita appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov. 5	Miyazawa Cabinet formed	Nov. 8	ROK President Roh Tae-woo announces "Declaration for a non-nuclear Korean peninsula and peace building"
			Nov. 5	House of Representatives establishes the Committee on National Security		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1991					Nov. 10	Sino-Vietnamese Joint Statement, declaring normalization of relations between both countries and both parties
					Nov. 26	Clark USAF Base formally returned to Philippines
					Dec. 5	Ukrainian independence declared by Supreme Council of Ukrainian Republic
					Dec. 8	CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at summit (Brest, Belarus)
					Dec. 9	EC Summit Meeting, agreed on Treaty of Maastricht to revise Treaty of Rome (Treaty on European Union) Maastricht, Holland; through December 10)
					Dec. 25	Soviet President Gorbachev resigns
1992					Jan. 30	Based on the NPT, North Korea signs the safeguards agreement agreeing to IAEA nuclear inspections
					Feb. 7	EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty)
					Feb. 20	Israeli army invades south Lebanon
					Feb. 25	China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China
					Mar. 8	United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) dispatch commences
					Mar. 15	Official inauguration of United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC)
					Mar. 24	Signing of the Open Skies Treaty
	Apr. 1	Custody of government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency			Apr. 27	Yugoslavia's federal parliament adopts a new constitution and announces the establishment of a new Yugoslav federation
	Apr. 1	First female students enter National Defense Academy of Japan			May 22	North Korean soldiers invade the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and fire guns
			Jun. 19	Announcement of "International Peace Cooperation Law" (enacted August 10), announcement and enactment of "Plan to Amend Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams"	May 23	START-I Treaty signed between the U.S. and four Soviet States including Russia
					May 25	IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities (through June 5)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1992					Aug. 24	China–ROK establish diplomatic relations
	Sep. 17	Departure of Maritime Transport Replenishment Unit together with dispatch of 1st Cambodia Dispatch Facilities Battalion (Kure)			Sep. 30	U.S. returns Naval Base Subic Bay (Philippines)
					Oct. 4	Peace treaty concluded in Mozambique
	Sep. 19	Departure of truce monitors to Cambodia (Narita)	Oct. 23	Emperor and Empress visit China (through October 28)	Nov. 19	CFE Treaty becomes formally effective
					Nov. 24	U.S. returns Air Station Cubi Point (Philippines) (withdrawal from Philippines complete)
					Dec. 3	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to allow military action by multinational forces in Somalia
	Dec. 11	Nakayama appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 11	Inauguration of the Miyazawa Cabinet		
	Dec. 18	Modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991–FY1995) adopted by Security Council of Japan and Cabinet	Dec. 21	Yokohama District Court judges in second Atsugi base noise suit	Dec. 16	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to deploy peacekeeping operations in Mozambique
1993			Jan. 13	Japan signs CWC	Jan. 3	U.S.–Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed
			Feb. 25	Supreme court rules in first Atsugi base noise suit, and first and second Yokota base noise suits	Jan. 20	U.S. President Clinton assumes office
	Mar. 25	Aegis ship (*Kongo*) enters service			Mar. 12	North Korea announces secession from NPT
			Apr. 8	Death of U.N. Volunteer (UNV) Atsuhito Nakata in Cambodia	May 4	Multinational forces deployed to Somalia move to United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II)
	May 11	Mozambique Dispatch Transport Coordination Unit begin departing for Mozambique (all 48 personnel arrive by May 17)	May 4	Death of Superintendent Haruyuki Takada, a civilian police officer in Cambodia		
					May 29	North Korea conducts ballistic missile test over the central Sea of Japan
	May 14	United Nations Operation in Mozambique headquarters staff depart for Mozambique	Jun. 9	Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince	Jun. 11	North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.–North Korea consultations
	Jun. 1	Along with full operation of the private government plane (B-747), Special Air Transport Squadron newly established				
					Jul. 1	Provisional government of Cambodia inaugurated
					Jul. 1	U.S. announces plan to close or shrink bases both at home and abroad (through July 2)
	Jul. 12	Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12)			Jul. 24	Adoption of joint statement incorporating the establishment of ASEAN ministerial meeting, "ASEAN Regional Forum" (Singapore, July 23–24)
					Jul. 26	ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (to July 28)
	Aug. 9	Nakanishi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 9	Hosokawa Cabinet formed	Aug. 4	Signing of peace treaty in Rwandan civil war
	Sep. 12	Exchange of notes concluded on the assignment of some equipment and provisions of Cambodia Dispatch Facilities Battalion to the provisional government of Cambodia			Sep. 1	U.S. Defense Department announces the Bottom Up Review
					Sep. 13	Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1993					Sep. 23	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to establish the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
					Sep. 24	Announcement of new constitution of Cambodia, and inauguration of new Cambodian government. U.N. Secretary-General Ghali declares the end of UNTAC mission
	Sep. 29	SDF joint exercise (through October 12)			Oct. 1	IAEA Meeting, resolution adopted to request that North Korea cooperates with the IAEA to ensure fulfilment of safeguards agreement
					Oct. 3	Armed clashes between UNOSOM II and armed Somali factions result in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and a number of casualties
					Oct. 4	Russian President Yeltsin uses military force to conquer the Parliament building in which Vice President Rutskoy and colleagues are holed up
					Oct. 5	China conducts underground nuclear test
					Oct. 5	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to dispatch United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
	Oct. 13	Japan–Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed			Oct. 19	China and Vietnam both sign agreement on basic principles relating to resolution of national borders and territorial dispute
					Nov. 1	U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to encourage North Korea's fulfilment of safeguards agreement with IAEA
					Nov. 1	Maastrict Treaty comes into effect; European Union established
					Nov. 15	UNTAC military component completes withdrawal of all units
	Dec. 2	Aichi appointed Minister of State for Defense			Dec. 3	IAEA general board meeting, chairman's statement adopted to again request IAEA inspections of North Korea
1994	Feb. 23	"Advisory Group on Defense Issues" inaugurated under the Prime Minister			Jan. 1	North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
					Jan. 11	NATO summit adopts the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
	Feb. 25	Defense Agency's "Defense Posture Review Board" inaugurated			Feb. 10	United States Secretary of Defense William Perry publishes National Defense Report
	Mar. 1	First Japan–China security dialogue (Beijing)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1994					Mar. 3	IAEA nuclear inspection team starts inspections of seven nuclear facilities declared by North Korea (through March 14)
					Mar. 21	IAEA special board meeting, decision to send North Korean nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council
	Mar. 23	First female aviation students join MSDF				
	Mar. 24	First female aviation students join ASDF			Mar. 25	U.S. forces dispatched to Somalia complete their withdrawal
			Mar. 30	Tokyo High Court judges in third Yokota base noise suit (decision April 14)	Mar. 31	U.N. Security Council adopts a chairman's statement to urge North Korea to complete nuclear inspections
					Mar. 31	COCOM dissolved
	Apr. 28	Kanda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Apr. 28	Hata Cabinet formed	May 18	IAEA, commencement of inspections of nuclear facilities declared by North Korea
					Jun. 1	China conducts underground nuclear test
					Jun. 8	U.S. Department of Defense submits "Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation" pertaining to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons
					Jun. 10	IAEA board meeting, resolution adopted with details including partial cessation of cooperation with North Korea
					Jun. 14	North Korea, notifies the U.S., deposit country under IAEA charter, of its withdrawal from the IAEA
					Jun. 18	Joint U.S.–Russian naval training, by Russian Pacific Fleet and U.S. Navy 7th Fleet (performed at the coast near Vladivostok, mainly by Russian Navy infantry and U.S. Marine Corps)
					Jun. 23	U.S. Department of Defense submits report on "Gulf War Syndrome"
					Jun. 23	Due to U.N. Security Council Resolution 929 (adopted June 22), Multinational forces led by the French begin deployment into Rwanda
	Jun. 30	Tamazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun. 30	Murayama Cabinet formed		
					Jul. 8	Death of North Korean President Kim Il Sung
					Jul. 19	New government of Rwanda inaugurated. Unilateral ceasefire by RPF
					Jul. 25	First ASEAN Regional Forum (Bangkok)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1994	Aug. 12	Report to Prime Minister Murayama after the conclusion of the "Advisory Group on Defense Issues"			Jul. 31	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution to grant authority to member states to establish "multinational forces" in Haiti
	Aug. 23	Air transport of Prime Minister Murayama in a private government plane for his visit to Southeast Asian countries			Aug. 30	Russian troops complete withdrawal from the former GDR and three Baltic countries
	Sep. 17	Air transport unit (ASDF) dispatched to Kenya			Sep. 22	U.S. Department of Defense announces "Nuclear Posture Review"
	Sep. 30	GSDF troops (260 persons) dispatched to Zaire			Oct. 21	At the 2nd session of the 3rd round of U.S.–North Korea talks, both sides sign "Framework Agreement" relating to areas such support for North Korean light water reactors, and provision of substitute energy
	Oct. 2	Operations by the air transport unit commences				
	Nov. 9	First Japan-ROK working-level defense policy dialogue (Seoul)				
	Dec. 1	First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17)			Dec. 1	Commander of U.S.–ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces
			Dec. 26	Nagoya High Court Kanazawa Branch judges in first and second Komatsu base noise suit (no appeal to either accuser or country)		
	Dec. 20	First visit to Japan by Korean naval training vessel (Harumi, through December 23)			Dec. 5	START-I comes into force
					Dec. 18	Russia starts military operations against Chechnya
1995	Jan. 17	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (through April 27)			Jan. 1	CSCE name changed to OSCE
					Feb. 27	U.S. Department of Defense publishes the EASR
	Mar. 20	SDF personnel dispatched teams to carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23)			Mar. 2	Full withdrawal of United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNISOM II) complete
					Mar. 9	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established
	May 9	Prime Minister gives approval for use of procedures to obtain rights to land usage under Special Measures Law for USFJ Land			May 11	NPT extended indefinitely
					Jun. 13	Semi-official-level U.S.–North Korea talks, agreement that light water reactors provided to North Korea shall be type selected by KEDO (Kuala Lumpur, to June 20)
	May 19	Enactment of "Act on Special Measures Incidental to Reversion of Lands in Okinawa Prefecture Offered for Use by United States Forces in Japan" (effective June 20)			Jun. 16	U.N. Security Council, resolution adopted in order to create rapid reaction forces of maximum 12,500 persons
	Jun. 5	The defense authorities of Japan and South Korea both issue an agreement to prevent accidental clashes between SDF and South Korean military aircraft			Jul. 11	U.S. President Clinton announces the normalization of U.S.–Viet Nam relations
					Jul. 11	NATO, aerial bombing of Serbian forces which continue to attack the U.N. Safe Area in Bosnia, Srebrenica
	Jun. 9	Security Council of Japan meets for the first time to discuss the state of future defense capabilities (total of 13 meetings through December 14)			Jul. 28	Vietnam officially joins ASEAN
					Aug. 1	1st KEDO Meeting (Japan–U.S.–South Korea) held (New York)
	Aug. 8	Eto appointed Minister of State for Defense				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1995	Sep. 29	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture refuses to implement part of the procedure for the acquisition of useable land under the Special Land Lease Law	Sep. 4	Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa		
			Sep. 15	Ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention		
					Oct. 17	South Korean military shoot dead one North Korean soldier who had invaded the vicinity of the "Freedom Bridge" over Imjin River
	Oct. 27	Announcement of "Law Relating to the Treatment of Defense Agency Personnel Dispatched to International Organizations" (effective January 1, 1996)	Nov. 16	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) (Osaka, through November 19)	Nov. 21	U.S. President Clinton announces Bosnia Peace Accord
	Nov. 28	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996	Nov. 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa	Dec. 5	NATO, approves plan to dispatch IFOR (Peace Implementation Force) (December 20, operations officially commence)
	Dec. 7	Suit filed ordering the execution of duties relating to procedures to obtain rights to land usage under Special Measures Law for USFJ Land	Nov. 19	Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO)	Dec. 5	France announces regular participation in NATO Military Committee
	Dec. 14	Security Council of Japan adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996–FY2000) (Cabinet Decision of December 15)			Dec. 14	Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris
					Dec. 15	10 Southeast Asian nations sign the South East Asia Non-Nuclear Zone Treaty at ASEAN summit meeting
	Dec. 14	Security Council of Japan makes decision "Regarding upgrading of Next-Generation Support Fighter" (December 15, Cabinet approval) Model of Next-Generation Support Fighter "F-2" decided	Dec. 26	Tokyo High Court makes decision in first Atsugi base noise suit referred appeal (judgment decided January 1, 1996)	Dec. 20	IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations in Bosnia
1996	Jan. 11	Usui appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan. 11	Hashimoto Cabinet formed	Jan. 26	START-II ratified by U.S. Senate
	Jan. 31	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)			Mar. 8	China carries out missile firing exercises, naval and air force live-fire drills and integrated ground, naval and air force exercises in the waters close to Taiwan on a total of three occasions March 8–25
	Mar. 29	Application for a court order for the Prime Minister to authorize the use of land for U.S. bases as part of the procedure for the acquisition of useable land under the Special Land Lease Law	Apr. 12	Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied)	Mar. 23	Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected
	Apr. 1	Lease expires on part of land being used for Sobe Communication Site				
	Apr. 15	Signing of Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements (effective October 22)	Apr. 15	SACO Interim Report approved by Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee	Jul. 3	President Yeltsin re-elected in Russian presidential election run-off
	Apr. 17	Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued	Apr. 16	Cabinet approves the promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture	Jul. 12	Inaugural meeting of Wassenaar Arrangement (Vienna)
	Jul. 26	First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30, Russian Navy's 300th anniversary naval review)	Jul. 20	U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan	Jul. 29	China conducts underground nuclear test (its 45ths), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1996	Aug. 28	Supreme court judges in suit ordering the execution of duties	Aug. 28	Supreme Court ruled on suit ordering the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to execute his duty to sign by proxy under the Special Land Lease law for use by the stationing forces	Sep. 10	U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
	Sep. 2	First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6)			Sep. 18	North Korean minisubmarine runs aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory
	Sep. 18	Governor of Okinawa carries out notification and inspection procedures in accordance with the Special Land Lease Law (through October 2)			Sep. 26	Hong Kong protest vessels (*Baodiao*) and so on invade seas near the Senkaku Islands
					Sep. 27	Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of a provisional government
	Oct. 29	First Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (through October 31, Tokyo)			Oct. 3	Russia-Chechnya ceasefire agreed
	Nov. 7	Kyuma appointed Minister of State of Defense	Nov. 7	Second Hashimoto Cabinet formed	Nov. 5	Clinton reelected U.S. President
			Dec. 2	SACO final report approved by Japan–U.S. Joint Security Council	Nov. 18	Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina
	Dec. 24	Security Council and Cabinet approve responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters				
1997	Jan. 2	Disaster dispatch for Russian Nakhodka Shipwreck and Oil Spill Disaster (through March 31)			Jan. 15	Israel and the Palestinian Authority agree on the withdrawal of Israeli military from Hebron
	Jan. 20	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters			Feb. 12	Hwang Jang-yop, secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, applies for asylum at South Korean Embassy in China
	Apr. 23	Partial amendment to the Special Land Lease Law promulgated and enters into force			Feb. 19	Deng Xiaoping dies
					Mar. 14	China enacts National Defense Law
	Apr. 25	Provisional use of part of Sobe Communication Station land starts			Apr. 29	CWC enters into force
					May 12	Russia–Chechnya peace treaty signed
	May 15	Provisional use of part of the land belonging to 12 facilities including Kadena Air Base starts	Jul. 3	First artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa carried out on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji, through July 9)	Jul. 1	Hong Kong reverts to China
					Jul. 16	North Korean soldiers cross the military demarcation line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops
	Jun. 9	Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) is dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (to June 2002)			Jul. 30	U.N. Security Council decides on four month extension of presence of "United Nations Support Mission in Haiti" (UNSMIH) (through November 30) and name change to "United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti" (UNTMIH)
					Aug. 19	KEDO holds a ceremony to mark the start of work on the light-water reactors to be provided to North Korea
			Sep. 11	Second Hashimoto Cabinet inaugurated		
	Sep. 23	New Japan–U.S. defense cooperation Security Consultative Committee (SCC)				
					Oct. 8	North Korean Labor Party Secretary Kim Jong Il assumes the post of General Secretary
			Nov. 5	Plans for the construction of a sea-based heliport presented to the local authority and residents		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1997					Nov. 10	China–Russia summit talks: China–Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China–Russian eastern border declared
			Dec. 3	Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty		
			Dec. 3	Final Report of the Administrative Reform Committee		
	Dec. 19	Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996–FY2000) approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet	Dec. 25	Nago City mayor formally announces the acceptance of the sea-based heliport	Dec. 4	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty signing ceremony in Ottawa (121 nations)
1998	Mar. 26	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters Introduction of a system of SDF ready reserve personnel	Feb. 6	Governor of Okinawa refuses to accept the seabased heliport	Feb. 23	U.N. and Iraq sign a memorandum of understanding on the agreement by Iraq to allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to inspectors
	Apr. 28	The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan–U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement			Apr. 6	U.K. and France ratify CTBT
	Jun. 12	Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force enters into force July 12)	Jun. 12	Announcement and enactment of Basic Act on Central Government Reform	Apr. 10	Agreement reached in Northern Ireland peace negotiations
			Jun. 28	Peruvian President Fujimori visits Japan (through July 1)	Apr. 16	Death of Pol Pot
			Jul. 12	18th House of Councillors Election	May 11	India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13)
	Jul. 29	Combined search and rescue operation exercise between MSDF/ASDF and Russian Navy—the first large-scale combined exercise between Japan and Russia			May 28	Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30)
					Jun. 6	U.N. Security Council, resolution adopted to condemn nuclear tests by India and Pakistan
	Jul. 30	Nukaga appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 30	Obuchi Cabinet formed		
	Aug. 31	North Korea launches missile over and beyond Japanese airspace	Aug. 31	Government refuses to sign Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) resolution on cost sharing after North Korean missile launch	Jun. 11	Government of Pakistan announces unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests
	Sep. 3	Former Director-General of Central Procurement Office arrested on suspicion of breach of trust; compulsory investigation to Defense Agency Based on Okinawa Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee decision of use on May 19, usage of most land of 12 facilities, including Kadena Air Base, begins			Jun. 22	North Korean submarine trespasses in waters off east coast of ROK and arrested by ROK military forces
			Sep. 1	Temporary freezing of Japan–North Korea normalization talks	Jul. 12	Bodies of armed North Korean special forces found in waters off ROK east coast
			Sep. 2	Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented	Jul. 22	Iran fires MRBM *Shahab 3*
			Sep. 24	Japan–South Korea Fishing Agreement concluded (Takeshima Issue shelved)	Jul. 27	China publishes its first comprehensive defense white paper, "Defense of China"
	Oct. 22	Establishment of Defense Procurement Reform Office Headquarters	Sep. 30	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty concluded	Aug. 5	Iraq, complete freeze in cooperation with UNSCOM and IAES inspections
	Nov. 13	Decision to dispatch SDF units as part of International Disaster Relief Team to Honduras, GSDF dispatch units depart from Komaki in order to transport equipment and materials	Oct. 21	Japan lifts freeze on cooperation with North Korea and signs KEDO	Aug. 20	U.S. military attacks terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan
	Nov. 14	Departure of GSDF dispatch units to Honduras (operations in region November 18–December 1, return to Japan December 5)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1998	Nov. 15	First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima)				
					Dec. 17	U.S. and U.K. forces initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20)
	Nov. 19	Announcement of the Basic Policy of Defense Procurement Reform				
	Nov. 20	Norota appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 22	Cabinet decision on the introduction of information-gathering satellite		
	Dec. 25	Security Council approves Japan–U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies	Dec. 22	Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of SACO)	Dec. 18	North Korean semisubmersible infiltrates ROK southern coastal waters and is attacked and sunk by ROK Navy
1999	Jan. 21	First Important Incident Response Conference				
			Mar. 1	Entry into force by Japan of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty	Mar. 1	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force
	Mar. 23	Discovery of a spy ship off the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24)				
	Apr. 2	Announcement of Concrete Measures of Procurement Reform	Apr. 1	Establishment of Committee for the Promotion of Information Gathering Satellites (Cabinet)	Apr. 8	India test launches ballistic missile
	May 24	Agreement between Japan and U.S. to amend the "Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement" (adding cooperation for operations to respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan (effective September 25)			Apr. 11	Pakistan test launches ballistic missiles on two consecutive days
					May 7	NATO forces mistakenly bomb Embassy of China in Yugoslavia
					May 20	U.S. inspection team enters North Korean nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni
	May 28	Announcement of "Act Concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan" (enacted August 25), announcement and enactment of the "Law on the Partial Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law" (enables the use of ships and helicopters based on them for the transport of Japanese and other people abroad)			May 27	Philippines ratifies the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
			Jul. 8	Establishment of the "Law on the Improvement of Laws Relating to the Administrative Structure of the Country for the Reform of Central Government" and the "Decentralization Reform Promotion Law"	Jun. 4	Government of the Yugoslav Federation accepts Kosovo conflict peace plan submitted by U.S., EU and Russia
					Jun. 10	U.N. Security Council adopts peace resolution which includes deployment of an international security force (KFOR), including operations in Kosovo
			Jul. 23	Tokyo High Court judges in second Atsugi base noise suit (decision August 7)		
	Aug. 5	First Joint Exercise of Search and Rescue Operations between MSDF and ROK Navy (waters west of Kyushu)	Aug. 9	Establishment of the "Law Regarding the National Flag and National Anthem" (enacted August 13)	Jun. 15	Shooting incident between North Korean coast guard ship which had crossed the Northern Limit Line and South Korean coast guard ship
	Aug. 16	Signing of a memorandum relating to a basic structure for developing dialog and exchange between the Japanese Defense Agency and Russian Ministry of Defense (Moscow)			Aug. 17	Major earthquake in Turkey
	Aug. 16	Exchange of official documents and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Japan and the U.S. on Japan–U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1999	Sep. 23	SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22)	Sep. 30	Critical accident at a private uranium processing facility in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture	Sep. 2	North Korea announces the invalidation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and the establishment of a new military demarcation line on the sea
	Sep. 30	Disaster dispatch for the accident at a uranium processing facility in Tokaimura (through October 3)	Oct. 5	Second Obuchi Cabinet inaugurated	Sep. 4	Referendum in East Timor results in an overwhelmingly large number of rejections of proposed autonomy (supporting independence)
	Oct. 5	Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct. 12	Tokyo District Court passes guilty judgment in former Central Procurement Office officials breach of trust charges	Sep. 29	Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya
	Nov. 22	SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for East Timor Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000)	Nov. 22	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station	Oct. 1	China holds 50th anniversary military parade
	Dec. 17	The Security Council approves the Investigation of Functions Related to In-flight Refueling	Dec. 1	Former Prime Minister Murayama and his Mission leave for North Korea. This Mission and the Workers' Party of North Korea sign a joint announcement (through December 3)	Oct. 12	U.S. Senate rejects ratification of CTBT
	Dec. 27	Decision with the Japan Coast Guard on the "Joint Response Manual for Suspicious Ships"	Dec. 27	Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station	Oct. 25	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution for the establishment of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
			Dec. 28	Cabinet decision on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station	Dec. 17	U.N. Security Council adopts a comprehensive resolution relating to the Iraq issue and establishes UNMOVIC in place of UNSCOM
					Dec. 20	Rule over Macao transferred to China
					Dec. 31	Russian President Yeltsin resigns
2000	Jan. 17	Anti-personnel mine disposal begins	Jan. 24	Science and Technology Agency homepage hacked, and content rewritten (ultimately, 19 ministries and agencies get unauthorized access)	Jan. 4	Italy establishes diplomatic relations with North Korea (first of the G7 to do so)
	Mar. 29	Disaster relief dispatch for the eruption of Mount Usu begins (through July 24) (March 31, establishment of Government Countermeasures Headquarters)	Feb. 16	First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17)	Feb. 6	Acting Russian President Putin declares the conclusion of operations to capture cities in the Chechen Republic
	Apr. 1	Enactment of the "Self-Defense Forces Personnel Ethics Act"			Mar. 18	"Presidential" elections conducted in Taiwan; Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party elected
	May 8	Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building	Apr. 5	Mori Cabinet formed	Apr. 14	Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START-II)
	Jun. 16	The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force			May 7	Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President
	Jun. 27	Disaster relief dispatch conducted in response to the eruption of Mount Miyake (through October 3, 2001)			Jun. 13	North–South Korean Summit (through June 15, Pyongyang)
	Jul. 4	Kazuo Torashima appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 4	Inauguration of second Mori Cabinet	Jul. 21	U.S.–Russia summit meeting held, Cooperation on Strategic Stability announced
	Sep. 8	Active MSDF official arrested for leaking secret documents to military attaché of the Russian Embassy	Jul. 21	Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23)	Aug. 12	Russian nuclear-powered submarine *Kursk* sinks
			Aug. 25	Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Futenma Air Station established	Aug. 23	Secretary-General of the U.N. publishes a report on U.N. peace operations

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2000	Sep. 11	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 1, 2001)			Sep. 25	ROK and North Korea hold Defense Ministers' Talks (through September 26)
	Sep. 13	SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in Beian, China				
	Oct. 2	MSDF takes part in West Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise			Oct. 10	Bill established in U.S. to provide China with permanent most favored nation status
	Oct. 27	Defense Agency finishes report on Review and Reinforcement of Classified Security System				U.S. and North Korea announce U.S.–North Korea Joint Communiqué
		52 individuals punished	Nov. 20	The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF	Oct. 12	Terrorist attack on the U.S.S *Cole*, an American destroyer, in Yemen
	Dec. 4	Revision of agreement between Defense Agency and National Public Safety Commission relating to public security operations				
	Dec. 5	Toshitsugu Saito appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec. 5	Mori Cabinet reshuffled		
	Dec. 15	Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001–FY2005)				
2001	Feb. 5	SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11)	Jan. 6	Reorganization of Government ministries and agencies into Cabinet Office and 12 ministries and agencies	Jan. 26	George W. Bush becomes president of the U.S.
	Feb. 9	Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC (through March, 2005)	Feb. 10	Collision between *Ehime Maru* and U.S. submarine		
	Mar. 1	The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect	Mar. 7	Former Maritime Self-Defense official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy	Apr. 1	Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes
					May. 14	Diplomatic relations established between North Korea and EU
			Apr. 1	Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force	Jun. 15	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established
	Apr. 26	Gen Nakatani appointed Minister of State for Defense	Apr. 26	Koizumi Cabinet formed	Sep. 11	Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur
			Sep. 19	Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S.	Sep. 12	U.N. Security Council passes resolution condemning the terrorist attacks
	Aug. 8	Disaster dispatch for submarine rescue ship *Chihaya* to cooperate in raising the *Ehime Maru* (returned December 16)			Oct. 1	U.S. announces Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
			Oct. 8	Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the first meeting	Oct. 2	In response to the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty
	Sep. 21	First Meeting of the Committee to Consider the Modality of National Defense				
	Oct. 6	International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12)			Oct. 7	U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan
			Oct. 29	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councillors plenary session	Oct. 19	(October 19, U.S. Forces sends special operation forces, first ground fighting)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2001	Nov. 2	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law (guarding operations, strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy (defense secrets)) are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002)				
	Nov. 9	SDF warship dispatched to the Indian Ocean for information-gathering	Nov. 16	A Cabinet decision is made for a basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law		
	Nov. 25	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities				
	Nov. 29	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ASDF begins aerial transportation between USFJ bases				
	Dec. 2	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, MSDF replenishment ships begin refuelling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean	Dec. 1	Her Imperial Highness Princess Aiko is born to Their Imperial Highnesses the Crown Prince and Crown Princess		
	Dec. 3	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ASDF begins cooperation and support activities in the form of international airlift to Guam			Dec. 3	U.S. is successful in missile defense testing
					Dec. 5	U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START-I
					Dec. 13	U.S. gives Russia notice of its withdrawal from ABM Treaty
	Dec. 14	A bill is introduced to partially amend the Law Concerning Cooperation for U.N. PKOs and Other Operations (the absolution of the freeze on Peacekeeping Force headquarter activities, etc.)			Dec. 20	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
			Dec. 22	Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu	Dec. 22	Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman
		Security Council approves the Selection of In-flight Refueling Transportation Aircraft Type			Dec. 29	Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba
2002	Mar. 2	680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Engineering Group to East Timor (through June 25, 2004)	Feb. 15	Cabinet decision on international cooperation execution plan for East Timor	Jan. 8	U.S. Department of Defense submits the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress
			Mar. 6	Kanazawa District Court judges in third and fourth Komatsu base noise suit	Jan. 25	India test launches ballistic missile *Agni*
	Mar. 27	Introduction of Candidates for Reserve Personnel			Jan. 29	U.S. President Bush depicts "Axis of Evil" in the State of the Union Address
	Apr. 1	Establishment of the Labor Management Organization for USFJ Employees, Incorporated Administrative Agency				
	Apr. 22	2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2)			May 4	Russian Army returns Cam Ranh Naval Base to Viet Nam

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2002					May 20	Independence of East Timor The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in East Timor (UNMISET)
					May 24	Signing of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
					May 25	Pakistan test launches *Gauri*
					Jun. 13	U.S. officially withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
					Jun. 29	Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL
	Jun. 11	Publication of investigative report due to the case of the Defense Agency collecting a list of people requesting disclosure of information	Jul. 29	Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed	Jul. 16	U.S. government issues the "National Security Strategy"
			Sep. 11	Suspicious ship raised from the sea floor (offshore Amami Oshima Island)	Sep. 16	Iraq declares unconditional acceptance of U.N. weapons of mass destruction inspections
			Sep. 17	Japan–North Korea Summit held Kim Jong-Il, the North Korean President, admits and apologizes for abductions	Sep. 20	U.S. Government announces the National Security Strategy
					Oct. 16	U.S. Government announces that North Korea admitted the fact that they had a uranium enrichment plan for nuclear weapons during Assistant Secretary of State Kerry's visit
	Sep. 30	Ishiba appointed Minister of State for Defense	Sep. 30	Koizumi Cabinet reshuffled		
	Oct. 1	One personnel dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (as an Operation and Planning Director) (through June 07)	Oct. 13	First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay)		
			Oct. 15	Five of those abducted return to Japan	Nov. 14	KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December
			Oct. 16	Yokohama District Court judges in third to fifth Atsugi base noise suit		
	Nov. 1	Introduction of stricter penalties in order to protect classified information (defense secrets)	Oct. 31	Fukuoka High Court Naha Branch judges in relating Sobe Communication Site land vacation suit	Nov. 21	NATO Summit decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe, announces the Prague Declaration, and agrees to establish its high-readiness unit
	Nov. 18	First SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido				
	Dec. 2	One person dispatched to Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO)			Nov. 29	IAEA Board of Governors decides to request North Korea to accept nuclear inspection
	Dec. 16	*Kirishima*, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (Dec. 5) in Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law			Dec. 7	Iraq submits a report to the U.N. on its plan for development of weapons of mass destruction
					Dec. 12	North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities
	Dec. 19	Joint Staff Council (JSC) reports on Study of Joint Operations to Minister of State for Defense			Dec. 17	U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2003					Jan. 10	North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
			Jan. 28	Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility concerning Futenma Air Station Replacement	Jan. 24	U.S. Department of Homeland Security established
	Feb. 8	Disposal of antipersonnel landmines complete (with some exceptions)			Mar. 14	President George W. Bush announces the lifting of economic sanctions against Pakistan
	Mar. 30	International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee relief returns to Japan on April 2)			Mar. 15	China's National People's Congress elects Hu Jintao as its President, while Ziang Zemin remains as chairman of the Central Military Commission
	Apr. 21	ASDF in-flight refueling training Meeting (through May 1)			Mar. 20	U.S. and U.K. forces begin military operations in Iraq
			May 8	Tokyo District Court judges defendant Ueno guilty of breach of trust	May 1	U.S. President Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq
			May 13	Tokyo District Court Hachioji Branch judges in fourth and eighth Yokota base noise suit		U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declares termination of major military operations in Afghanistan
			Jun. 6	Three Armed Attack Situation Response related laws are passed at the Upper House plenary session and enacted	May 22	Resolution adopted for U.N. member states enabling support in Iraq reconstruction
			Jul. 4	Cabinet approval for "Implementation Plan for International Peace Cooperation Assignment for Iraqi Afflicted Persons"	May 31	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by U.S. President for the first time
	Jul. 17	International peace cooperation activities are conducted for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18)	Jul. 26	Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq passed the House of Councillors plenary session	Jun. 1	U.S.–Russia leaders talk, enforcement of Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
					Aug. 6	Shanghai Cooperation Organization holds joint antiterrorism military maneuvers (through August 12)
	Sep. 11	Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Memorial Zone	Sep. 30	Cabinet decides to newly establish, in its decoration system, an award for people engaged in dangerous activities	Aug. 19	Suicide bombing at U.N. headquarters in Baghdad
					Aug. 25	Terrorist bomb attacks in Mumbai
					Aug. 27	First Six-Party Talks held (through August 29)
	Oct. 10	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years	Oct. 7	Joint communiqué signed for the first time at Japan–China–ROK Summit meeting	Sep. 12	First joint naval exercise held in the Coral Sea off the northeastern coast of Australia under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (through September 14)
	Nov. 3	Former SDF officials decorated for their engagement in dangerous activities	Nov. 19	Second Koizumi Cabinet		
			Nov. 29	Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq		
	Nov. 15	SDF special research group dispatched to Iraq	Dec. 9	Cabinet decision made on basic plan for Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (period of dispatch until December 14, 2004)	Oct. 2	North Korean Foreign Ministry announces it has finished reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods
					Oct. 15	China launches its first manned spacecraft *Shenzhou 5*
					Dec. 4	Australia decides to participate in missile defense program

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2003	Dec. 18	Defense Agency establishes implementation outline based on the Law concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq			Dec. 13	U.S. forces capture former President Hussein in Iraq
					Dec. 18	Iran signs IAEA agreement
	Dec. 19	Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and Cabinet meeting)			Dec. 19	Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program
	Dec. 26	ASDF advance team leaves for Kuwait				
	Dec. 30	Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (1–2 January)				
2004	Jan. 9	Dispatch order issued to GSDF advance team (departs January 16) and ASDF main detached airborne unit (departs January 22)	Feb. 9	Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet	Feb. 4	Pakistani government admits Dr. Khan's involvement in suspected nuclear technology proliferation issues
	Jan. 26	GSDF main unit dispatch order (1st Iraq Reconstruction Support Group dispatch, departs February 3)			Feb. 25	Second Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through February 29)
					Mar. 11	Series of terrorist bomb attacks in Madrid, Spain
					Mar. 14	Russian presidential elections, Putin re-elected
		MSDF unit dispatch order (departs February 9)	Apr. 20	Council for security and defense capabilities established (first meeting held on April 27)	Mar. 22	EU General Affairs Council agrees upon development of the structure and organization of EU rapid response capabilities
			May 22	Japan–North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang) Five abductees return to Japan	Apr. 28	UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
			Jun. 14	Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in Upper House plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed	Jun. 1	Interim Iraqi Government inaugurated, and Iraqi Governing Council dissolved UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq
					Jun. 23	The Third Six-Party Talks (Beijing, through June 26)
			Jun. 18	Cabinet agreement for SDF's activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces)	Jul. 20	In the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, patrols commence by the navies of three countries, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia
	Jun. 25	End of duties by engineer group dispatched to East Timor				
					Sep. 1	Chechen's armed pro-independence rebels seize a school in Beslan of the Russian Republic of North Ossetia
	Sep. 8	Defense Agency/ SDF 50th anniversary (commemorative) ceremony	Aug. 13	U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa		
	Sep. 27	Ono appointed Minister of State for Defense	Sep. 27	2nd Koizumi reshuffled Cabinet formed	Sep. 19	President Hu Jintao assumes the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party
			Oct. 4	Final report of Council on Security and Defense Capabilities		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2004	Oct. 20	Disaster dispatch due to damage caused by Typhoon No. 23 (through October 26)			Oct. 6	The U.S. and ROK announce a plan of three-stage reduction of 12,500 U.S. forces stationed in the ROK by 2008
	Oct. 23	Disaster relief dispatch for Niigata-Chuetsu Earthquake (through December 21)			Oct. 29	EU leaders sign the EU Constitution
	Oct. 25	PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, through October 27)				
	Nov. 10	Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan's territorial waters–Maritime security operations order issued (through November 12)			Nov. 16	Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine's intrusion into Japan's territorial waters
	Dec. 10	"National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005" and the Cabinet "Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005–FY2009" adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet				
	Dec. 28	MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand's Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia's Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (through January 1, 2005)			Dec. 26	Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster
2005	Jan. 4	SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in the international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (All units returned home by March 23)	Jan. 19	The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged Chinese nuclear submarines in Japan's territorial waters	Jan. 20	U.S. President George W. Bush assumes office (second term)
	Feb. 19	Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington) —common strategic objectives confirmed	Feb. 17	Naha District Court Okinawa Branch, fourth Kadena base noise suit	Jan. 30	Iraqi National Assembly elections
			Mar. 14	A Japanese boat attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew abducted (Released on March 20)	Feb. 10	North Korean Foreign Ministry claims that the country has already manufactured nukes (May 11, announces the unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods
			Mar. 16	Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry announces the grant of test-drilling rights to Teikoku Oil for gas fields in the East China Sea	Mar. 8	South Korean government protest over Asahi Shimbun aircraft approaching Takeshima without authorization
			Mar. 25	Cabinet decision made on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians	Mar. 14	National People's Congress adopts "Anti-Secession Law"
					Apr. 9	Large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations occur in Beijing
					Apr. 16	Large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations occur in Shanghai
	May 2	SDF officially takes part for the first time in the multilateral joint exercise "Cobra Gold 05" conducted in Chiang Mai Thailand (through May 13)	Jul. 14	Minister of Economy, Trade and industry announces permission granted to Teikoku Oil for trial drilling in East China Sea	Apr. 28	The Iraqi Transitional Government sworn in
					Jul. 26	The first phase of the Fourth Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through August 7) (September 19, joint declaration adopted)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2005	Aug. 5	Dispatch of an MSDF vessel to conduct international disaster relief activity in connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (through August 10)			Aug. 18	First-Ever China–Russia Joint Military Exercises, dubbed "Peace Mission 2005," are conducted (through August 25)
	Sep. 12	Disaster dispatch for avian influenza (Ogawa, Ibaraki, through September 30)			Sep. 9	MSDF's P-3C patrol aircraft identifies that five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class, are navigating in the sea area surrounding "Kashi" gas field near the median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea
	Oct. 12	Dispatch of SDF units to Pakistan to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the great earthquake in Pakistan etc. (All units returned home by December 2)	Sep. 21	Third Koizumi Cabinet inaugurated	Sep. 19	Joint declaration adopted at Fourth Six-Party Talks
					Oct. 15	Iraq conducts a national referendum for the draft constitution (December 15, national assembly elected based on permanent constitution)
	Oct. 20	GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attacks for the first time	Oct. 31	Third Koizumi reshuffled Cabinet inaugurated. Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year)		
	Oct. 29	Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington) announces "U.S.–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future"	Nov. 11	The Cabinet approves "the government's actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan–U.S. Security Consultation Committee held on October 29, 2005"	Nov. 9	The first phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through November 11)
					Nov. 22	Basic agreement between Japan, U.S., South Korea and EU on suspending light-water reactor construction in North Korea by KEDO
	Oct. 31	Nukaga appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Dec. 24	The Security Council and the Cabinet approve "Japan–U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense"	Nov. 27	Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture	Dec. 14	The first East Asia Summit is held (Kuala Lumpur)
					Dec. 16	U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution criticizing the human rights situation in North Korea
2006	Jan. 23	The "New Special Measures Agreement on Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ" is signed (Effective on April 1, 2006)	Jan. 23	Yamaha Motor premises searched on suspicion of illegally exporting an unmanned helicopter to China capable of being used by the military	Jan. 18	Iran begins uranium enrichment experiments
	Jan. 30	Senior officials of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency were arrested on charges of interruption of bidding procedures	Feb. 4	Japan–North Korea negotiations concerning abduction issue, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/missile issues are held (through February 6)	Feb. 3	The United States issues the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
	Feb. 28	MSDF and Japan Coast Guard conduct joint training in responding to a suspicious vessel (off Maizuru)	Mar. 6	At the Japan–China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (through March 7)	Mar. 16	The United States announces the National Security Strategy
	Mar. 27	Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture			Mar. 31	The new Hamas cabinet is formed in the Palestinian Authority
			Apr. 7	The Mayor of Nago City agrees to the proposed relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station to the site off Henoko	Apr. 4	Thai Prime Minister Thaksin announces resignation

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Apr. 23	Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ	May 11	The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine and Minister of State for Defense Nukaga sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ	May 5	Peace agreement between Sudanese government and certain rebel forces in Darfur Conflict
	May 1	The Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington) announces the "United States–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"	May 30	The Cabinet approves the "Government's Actions to Be Taken in Connection with the Force Posture Realignment of USFJ, etc."	May 15	U.S. rescinds designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism
	May 29	First P-3C visit to Australia	Jun. 20	The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces	May 20	New Iraqi government is formed
	Jun. 1	Dispatch of SDF units to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java (All units returned home by June 22)	Jul. 19	Decision made to transfer weapons and their technologies to the U.S. to jointly develop a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, and the memorandum concluded with the U.S.	May 27	Large-scale earthquake takes place in the middle part of Java, Indonesia
	Jul. 31	A part of the partial amendment (strengthening of facilities administration function of the internal organizations, establishment of the Equipment headquarters, reorganization of the Prefecture Liaison Offices into the Provincial Cooperation Offices, and so on) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law enforced	Aug. 16	A Russian patrol boat fires on a Japanese fishing boat, killing one of its crew members. The Government files a strong protest to Russia	Jun. 16	Nepalese government and Maoists sign peace accord
			Aug. 29	U.S. Navy deploys *Shiloh*, an Aegis cruiser with SM-3 missiles, to Yokosuka base	Jun. 27	Israeli army attacks Gaza to recover soldiers abducted by Palestinian armed groups (ceasefire takes effect on November 26)
				The Council Meeting on Measures for Relocation of Futenma Air Station established, and its first meeting held	Jul. 5	North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan
	Sep. 26	Kyuma appointed Minister of State for Defense	Sep. 26	Abe Cabinet formed	Sep. 19	Military coup d'etat occurs in Thailand
			Oct. 13	Sanctions implemented against North Korea, which announced that it had conducted a nuclear weapon test	Sep. 20	Chinese Navy performs joint search and rescue exercises with U.S. Navy (near San Diego)
			Nov. 1	Partial amendment (extension of the term for one year) of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law enforced	Oct. 9	North Korea announces that it has conducted an underground nuclear test
					Dec. 18	The second phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held (Beijing, through November 22)
					Dec. 19	U.S. General Assembly, resolution adopted criticizing abduction of foreign citizens by North Korea
					Dec. 30	Former Iraqi President Hussein executed
2007	Jan. 9	Law to Partially Amend the Defense Agency Establishment Law enacted (includes change from Defense Agency to Ministry of Defense, and stipulation of the SDF's international peace cooperation activities as a primary mission)			Jan. 12	China conducts an anti-satellite test
					Jan. 23	U.N. Security Council decides to set up the U.N. Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to oversee disarmament in Nepal
					Feb. 8	The third phase of Fifth Six-Party Talks held. February 13, agreement "Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" published (Beijing, through February 13)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007	Mar. 23	Emergency response procedures to destroy ballistic missiles prepared	Mar. 5	An aircraft training relocated from Okinawa to Tsuiki for the first time as part of the U.S. Forces realignment (through March 8)		
	Mar. 25	Disaster relief dispatch for the Noto Peninsula Earthquake (through April 8)	Mar. 13	Australian Prime Minister Howard visits Japan, and the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed	Mar. 19	The first phase of sixth Six-Party Talks held (through March 22)
	Mar. 28	Establishment of the Central Readiness Force, and so on				
	Mar. 30	A Patriot PAC-3 system is deployed at the ASDF Iruma Base				
		SDF personnel dispatched for the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) as military observers			Apr. 10	The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it agrees to unfreeze North Korean accounts in a Macau bank
	Apr. 16	Japan–U.S.–India naval drill conducted for the first time				
	May 1	Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2," Washington) announces the joint statement "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States–Japan Security and Defense Cooperation"				
	May 18	ASDF controllers positioned at the Yokota RAPCON facility				
	Jun. 2	Japan–U.S.–Australia defense ministers' meeting held for the first time (Minister of Defense Kyuma, U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates, and Minister of Defense Nelson, in Singapore)			Jun. 14	Hamas in virtual control of the Gaza Strip
	Jun. 6	Japan–Australia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations held for the first time ("2+2," Tokyo)			Jul. 14	Russian President Putin signs presidential order on the termination of the execution of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
	Jul. 4	Koike appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul. 20	Enactment of the "Basic Act on Ocean Policy"		
	Jul. 16	Dispatch of disaster relief unit in the wake of Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (through July 29)	Aug. 7	Minister for Foreign Affairs Aso and U.S. Ambassador Schieffer sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)	Jul. 18	6th Ministerial Meeting (Beijing, through July 20)
	Aug. 27	Koumura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul. 31	The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1769 on the dispatch of the UN/AU Joint PKO Unit (UNMID) to the Darfur region in Sudan
	Sep. 1	Local Cooperation Bureau, Equipment and Facilities Headquarters, Inspector General's Office of Legal Compliance, and Local Defense Bureau created	Aug. 10	Conclusion of the General Security of Military Information Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States (GSOMIA)	Sep. 25	The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 1778 to deploy PKO forces (MINURCAT) and EU forces to Chad and the Central African Republic
	Sep. 26	Ishiba appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug. 29	Enactment of the USFJ Realignment Special Measures Law		
	Oct. 17	Japan–U.S.–Australia joint exercises (MSDF, U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force)	Sep. 26	Fukuda Cabinet is formed	Sep. 27	Sixth Six-Party Talks, second round (Beijing) (through September 30) (October 3, Sixth Six-Party Talks Agreement "Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" published)
	Nov. 1	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law expires	Nov. 8	Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office arrests former senior managing director of Yamada Corp. on suspicion of crimes including embezzlement		
		Order issued on termination of response measures based on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2007	Nov. 28	Chinese naval vessel visits Japan for the first time (through December 1)	Nov. 28	Tokyo District Public Prosecutor's Office arrests former Vice Defense Minister Moriya on suspicion of bribery involving the procurement of defense equipment and materials		
			Dec. 3	The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense holds first meeting		
			Dec. 13	Russia seizes four Japanese fishing vessels off Kunashiri Island		
	Dec. 18	Review of USFJ Local Employee Wages (Abolishment of USFJ Differential, etc.)	Dec. 19	Front headquarters of 1st Corps headquarters of U.S. forces formed at USFJ Camp Zama in line with the USFJ realignment		
		Aegis vessel MSDF *Kongo* conducts a successful test on counter-missile by ballistic missile	Dec. 24	Cabinet decisions on "Improvement of next fixed-wing aircraft," "Important issues among contents of Defense Capability Build-up in FY2008," "Changes of emergent response measures on destruction measures by ballistic missiles"		
2008	Jan. 16	Enactment of the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law (units depart for Indian Ocean on January 24, 25)			Jan. 18	Israeli forces blockade the Palestinian authority
	Jan. 25	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the Cost Sharing on the Stationing of U.S. forces in Japan signed				
	Feb. 19	Collision between destroyer and fishing boat			Feb. 20	U.S. Navy Aegis ship succeeds in shooting down out-of-control satellite outside the earth's atmosphere with an SM-3
	Feb. 21	Based on the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, MSDF replenishment ships resume refuelling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean				
	Mar. 26	Partial revision of the Defense Ministry Establishment Law Implemented (re-organization of the Self-Defense Forces Command and Communication Unit, etc.)	Mar. 18	Cabinet approval for the "Basic Plan on Ocean Policy"	Mar. 14	Demonstration by Buddhist monks in the regional capital of Lhasa in the Tibet Autonomous Region, China
					Apr. 24	Announcement by U.S. Government that North Korea assisted with the construction by Syria of nuclear facilities destroyed in an air attack
	Mar. 28	Announcement of the project team report for the Comprehensive Reform of Defense Equipment Procurement				
					May 12	M7.8 earthquake occurs in Sichuan Province, China
	Jun. 14	Disaster relief dispatch for the 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Inland Earthquake (through August 2)	Jun. 18	Agreement reached between the Government of Japan and Government of China on the joint development of natural gas in the East China Sea	May 14	U.S. President Bush visits Israel
	Jun. 24	First visit of SDF vessel to China (through June 28)			May 20	Taiwanese President Ma appointed

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2008	Jul. 15	The Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense publishes report	Jul. 7	G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit (through July 9)	Jul. 12	Publication of the Press Communique of the Heads of Delegation Meeting of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks
	Jul. 17	Ministry of Defense Reform Headquarters established				
	Aug. 2	Hayashi appointed Minister of Defense	Aug. 2	Fukuda Cabinet general resignation	Aug. 7	Military clash between Georgia and South Ossetia
					Aug. 10	Armed groups attack public security facilities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China
	Aug. 29	TRDI receives prototype of next-generation fixed-wing patrol aircraft XP-1 no. 1	Aug. 27	Basic Space Law enters into force	Aug. 15	President Saakashvili of Georgia signs 6-point peace agreement (President Medvedev of Russia signs 6-point peace agreement)
	Sep. 17	Joint fire prevention exercises				
		Defense Posture Review Board established			Sep. 9	U.S. President Bush announces reduction of U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and increase of troops in Afghanistan
		ASDF successfully carries out Patriot PAC-3 test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico				
	Sep. 24	Hamada appointed Minister of Defense	Sep. 24	Aso Cabinet inaugurated	Sep. 25	China launches manned spacecraft *Shenzhou 7* and conducts successful extravehicular activity for the first time
	Sep. 25	Commissioning of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS *George Washington*				
					Oct. 3	U.S. Department of Defense informs Congress of sale of PAC-3s, AH-64Ds, attack helicopters, etc., to Taiwan
					Oct. 10	U.S. removes North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism
	Oct. 24	SDF personnel dispatched to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)	Oct. 19	First identified passage of Chinese surface combatants through Tsugaru Strait: four Chinese naval vessels, including a Sovremenny-class destroyer	Oct. 14	Additional Sino-Russian Border Line Agreement takes effect, officially marking the borders of the two countries
	Nov. 20	MSDF destroyer *Chokai*'s SM-3 test off the coast of Hawaii (failed to intercept target)			Oct. 17	Elections for nonpermanent members of U.N. Security Council
			Oct. 22	Japan–India Summit Meeting: Japan–India Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership, and Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed		
	Nov. 21	SDF Instructors dispatched to Egypt PKO center (through November 30)			Nov. 26	Coordinated terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India
					Dec. 2	U.N. Security Council adopts resolution 1846 on countering piracy off the coast of Somalia
	Dec.12	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law extended for a year				
	Dec.18	Japan–Australia Defense Ministers' Meeting	Dec. 3	Convention on Cluster Munitions signed	Dec. 8	Anti-piracy EU NAVFOR Somalia Operation Atalanta commences
	Dec.20	Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009) adopted by Security Council of Japan and Cabinet				2 Chinese oceanographic research ships enter territorial waters of Japan near Senkaku Islands
	Dec.23	Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift Squadron returns home based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq				Six-Party Talks (through December 11)
					Dec. 26	Chinese naval fleet of 3 destroyers sets off to Somalia for escort mission
					Dec. 27	Israel begins large-scale attack on Gaza

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2009	Jan. 8	ASDF deploys F-15s to Okinawa (Hyakuri)	Jan. 5	171st Ordinary Diet Session	Jan. 1	Enforcement of U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement
	Jan. 15	Ministry of Defense decides on "Basic Policy Relating to the Development and Use of Space"	Jan. 9	"The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities" held	Jan. 17	Israel announces temporary ceasefire in the Gaza Strip
	Jan. 28	Preparation order issued for anti-piracy measures off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden	Jan. 22	Recurrence prevention and improvement recommendation issued to MSDF 3rd Destroyer Unit by Yokohama District Marine Accident Tribunal	Jan. 20	U.S. President Obama assumes office
			Jan. 23	Foreign Minister Nakasone holds telephone meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Clinton	Jan. 26	Complete withdrawal of Ethiopian Forces stationed in Somalia
			Jan. 27	Japanese fishing boat *No. 38 Yoshimaru* caught by Russian Coast Guard in Sea of Japan	Jan. 31	Regional assembly elections in Iraq
						Provisional government in Somalia, Ahmed elected as new president
					Feb. 11	Collision between U.S. and Russian satellites
	Feb. 7	45th Munich Security Conference	Feb. 2	Mount Asama erupts	Feb. 17	U.S. President Obama decides to increase the number of troops dispatched to Afghanistan by approximately 17,000
	Feb. 10	Order issued relating to the conclusion of withdrawal duties for the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group by the redeployment group	Feb. 17	Signing of the "Agreement on the Relocation of USMC in Okinawa to Guam"		
			Feb. 18	Japan–Russia summit meeting	Feb. 18	Japan–Russia summit meeting (Sakhalin)
			Feb. 24	Japan–U.S. summit meeting, opinions exchanged on areas including the further strengthening of the Japan–U.S. Alliance, ensuring peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific Region based on that Alliance, and the steady implementation of realignment of U.S. Forces including agreement regarding the move to Guam of USMC stationed in Okinawa	Feb. 25	Iran starts test operation of its Bushehr nuclear power plant
	Feb. 17	Defense Minister Hamada meets with U.S. Secretary of State Clinton			Feb. 26	U.N. Security Council extends UNMIT (East Timor) by one year
	Feb. 19	Receipt of first mass-produced US-2				U.S. issues Budget Message (outline)
	Feb. 26	Patriots (PAC-3) deployed to 4th Air Defense Missile Group 13th Air Defense Missile Unit (Gifu)			Feb. 27	U.S. President Obama announces Iraq troop withdrawal schedule
					Mar. 2	Gaza Reconstruction Support Council (Egypt)
	Mar. 9	Defense Minister Hamada meets with East Timor Prime Minister Gusmão			Mar. 4	International Criminal Court (ICC) issues arrest warrant for Sudanese President Bashir
	Mar. 13	SDF mobilization order issued for maritime security operations as part of anti-piracy measures off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden	Mar. 13	Cabinet approval for Anti-Piracy Measures Law	Mar. 5	China publishes its national defense budget, year-on-year increase of 15.3%, or 7.930 trillion yen
	Mar. 14	Departure of destroyers *Sazanami* and *Samidare*			Mar. 6	U.S.–Russia Foreign Ministers' Meeting, agreement to "reset" bilateral relations (Geneva)
	Mar. 17	Meeting of Senior Defense Officials on Common Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region			Mar. 12	International Maritime Organization (IMO) contacts Japan and other IMO members to inform them that North Korea had provided prior notification of the launch of its "test communications satellite" (*Kwangmyóngsóng-2*)
		First Tokyo-Seminar on Common Security Challenges				
	Mar. 18	Helicopter-carrying destroyer *Hyuga* received	Mar. 19	Former professor of the National Defense Medical College judged guilty of bribery (Tokyo District Court)		
	Mar. 20	Japan–China defense ministers meeting (Hamada and Guangli, Beijing)				
					Mar. 24	NATO resumes anti-piracy operations off the Coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden
	Mar. 27	SDF mobilization order for implementation of destruction measures for ballistic missiles and other weapons			Mar. 27	U.S. President Obama announces "A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan"
	Mar. 30	Submarine *Soryu* received				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2009	Apr. 1	Draft Environmental Impact Statement submitted concerning the future relocation of U.S. Futenma Air Station			Apr. 1	International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan U.S.–Russia summit meeting, agreement to start negotiations on strategic offensive reductions (London)
	Apr. 3	Meeting between Minister of Defense Hamada and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Youssouf of Djibouti	Apr. 3	Foreign Minister Nakasone signs Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti	Apr. 3	Clash between armed forces of Thailand and Cambodia which had been in conflict over the Temple of Preah Vihear
	Apr. 6	Order issued to SDF for termination of destruction of ballistic missiles, and other objects			Apr. 5	North Korea launches a missile which flies over the skies of Japan President Obama speech in Prague
					Apr. 9	EU–U.S. summit meeting
			Apr. 10	Supreme Court rejects an appeal lodged by local residents regarding night flights and other disturbances at U.S. Yokota Air Base	Apr. 10	Incumbent president of Algeira elected for third time
					Apr. 11	Cancellation of ASEAN Summit due to invasion by protestors in Thailand. State of emergency declared in Bangkok on the 12th
	Apr. 17	Minister of Defense issues instructions and order for the SDF to ready P-3C aircraft			Apr. 13	U.N. Security Council adopts chairman's statement in relation to North Korea
	Apr. 23	Japan–ROK defense ministers meeting (Hamada and Lee, in Tokyo)			Apr. 18	Provisional government in Somalia decides on the introduction of Islamic law by unanimous agreement
	Apr. 28	Patriots (PAC-3) deployed to 4th Air Defense Missile Group 12th Air Defense Missile Unit (Aibano)	Apr. 28	Declaration of outbreak of novel influenza	Apr. 23	Chinese Navy 60th Anniversary Fleet Review (Qingdao, China)
	Apr. 30	About 30 doctors and nurses dispatched to Narita airport to provide quarantine assistance to deal with the new swine influenza virus			Apr. 24	WHO announces confirmation of human-to-human infection of novel influenza in U.S. and Mexico
					Apr. 30	Resolution adopted to extend United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) mandate
	May 1	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting (Hamada and Gates, in Washington, D.C.)			May 4	1st ARF Disaster Relief Training (Philippines)
	May 15	Order issued for P-3Cs to be dispatched to Djibouti international airport	May 19	Agreement Concerning the Relocation of Marine Corp Personnel from Okinawa to Guam comes into force		Nepalese Prime Minister Prachanda resigns
	May 22	Dispatch of instructors to Egypt PKO Center (through June 6)	May 21	Citizen Judge System enacted	May 7	U.S. issues Budget Message
	May 30	Minister of Defense Hamada attends 8th Asian Security Summit (hosted by IISS, in Singapore)		Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated	May 25	North Korea announces that it has conducted a second underground nuclear test
			Jun. 2	Basic Plan for Space Policy formulated	Jun. 11	WHO declares a pandemic of novel influenza (global scale outbreak)
					Jun. 12	Iran presidential elections
	Jun. 11	Commencement of warning and surveillance flights in the Gulf of Aden by P-3Cs			Jun. 16	Provisional government of Somalia declares a state of emergency due to outbreak of fighting
	Jun. 16	Meeting on the Nature of Production and Technological Bases for Fighter Aircraft established (1st meeting held June 17)			Jun. 26	South Korean Ministry of National Defense announces "National Defense Reform Basic Plan"

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2009					Jun. 29	SNMG commences Somalia anti-piracy measures "Operation Shield"
					Jun. 30	U.S. Forces complete withdrawal from Iraqi cities
					Jul. 4	North Korea launches a total of seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan
					Jul. 5	Uprising in Xinjiang, China in the Uighur city of Urumqi
					Jul. 6	Agreement reached in U.S.–Russia summit meeting, on the framework for treaty to succeed START I (Moscow)
			Jul. 14	Ratification of Convention on Cluster Munitions		
Jul. 17	Japan–U.S.–South Korea Working Level Talks on Defense (Tokyo)		Jul. 17	Announcement of Law Concerning the Prohibition of Manufacture of Cluster Munitions and Regulation of their Possession		Joint military exercises by U.S. and Australia "Talisman Saber 2009" (through July 25)
Jul. 18	U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC)				Jul. 17	Indonesia, terrorist bomb attacks on foreign-owned hotels
Jul. 21	Disaster dispatch for heavy rain in the Chugoku and Northern Kyushu regions (through July 31)		Jul. 21	Dissolution of the House of Representatives Heavy rain in the Chugoku and Northern Kyushu regions leads to isolated and lost victims, water outages, and other problems in Fukuoka and Nagasaki Prefectures	Jul. 22	Sudan, Permanent Court of Arbitration determines the boundaries of the Abyei area
Jul. 24	Anti-Piracy Measures Law enacted Order issued for anti-piracy operations					Joint military exercises by China and Russia "Peace Mission 2009" (through July 26)
Aug. 1	Part of the Law for the Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law (includes establishment of Defense Councils and assistant to the Minister of Defense, and abolition of the Defense Councillors System) Abolition of Defense Posture Review Board				Jul. 31	Completion of withdrawal of non-American multinational forces from Iraq
					Aug. 4	Former U.S. President Clinton visits North Korea (through August 5)
			Aug. 9	Excessive rain due to Typhoon No. 9 leads to problems including isolated and lost victims in Hyogi and Okayama Prefectures	Aug. 17	Joint military exercises by U.S. and South Korea "Ulchi-Freedom Guardian" (through August 27)
Aug. 9	Disaster dispatch for 2009's Typhoon No. 21 (through August 23)				Aug. 20	Presidential elections in Afghanistan, Karzai re-elected
			Sep. 1	Consumer Affairs Agency inaugurate	Sep. 3	North Korean U.N. Ambassador sends letter to U.N. Security Council Chairman explaining that reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods is in final stages, and that uranium enrichment experiments are complete
Aug. 21	SDF personnel dispatched to work in the excavation and recovery of abandoned Chinese chemical weapons (through September 24)					
Aug. 28	Dispatch of two SDF personnel as instructors to PKO Center in Mali (through September 5)		Sep. 14	Abolition of vice-ministers meeting	Sep. 17	U.S. President Obama announces review of MD deployment in Eastern Europe
Sep. 16	Defense Minister Kitazawa assumes office Successful test launch of ASDF Patriot (PAC-3) at U.S. White Sands Missile Range		Sep. 16	Formation of Hatoyama Cabinet	Sep. 24	U.N. Security Council Summit Meeting on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Sep. 20	Disaster dispatch for recovery of driftwood in Osumi-kaikyo (through October 2)				Sep. 25	Iran confirms the presence of a second uranium enrichment facility
Sep. 25	Defense Minister Kitazawa visits Okinawa (through September 27)				Sep. 30	M7.6 earthquake occurs off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2009	Oct. 5	SDF units dispatched to aid international disaster relief activities after the Padang earthquake in Indonesia (though October 17)			Oct. 1	China 60th Anniversary Military Parade
					Oct. 4	Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits North Korea
			Oct. 10	Japan–China–South Korea summit meeting (Beijing)	Oct. 13	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) mandate extended
	Oct. 6	14th Tokyo Defense Forum (through October 9)	Oct. 17	4th meeting of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (Hiroshima, through October 20)	Oct. 16	Pakistan military commences cleanup operations against armed Islamic insurgents in Waziristan in the northwest
	Oct. 13	Working-level defense dialog between Japan and South Korea (Seoul)				
	Oct. 20	1st Ministry of Defense Policy Meeting				
	Oct. 21	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting (Tokyo)			Nov. 4	Israel announces the capture of a ship carrying weapons off the coast of Lebanon
	Oct. 22	Abolition of Ministry of Defense Reform Headquarters	Nov. 11	Government Revitalization Unit "project screening" (through November 27)	Nov. 10	North Korean and South Korean ships engage in firefight in the Yellow Sea
	Oct. 25	Naval review (Sagami Bay)				
	Oct. 28	Destroyer *Kurama* collides with South Korean cargo ship Carina Star in the Kammon Straits	Nov. 12	Celebration of the 20th Anniversary of the Emperor of Japan's coronation	Dec. 1	U.S. President Obama announces review of the Afghanistan strategy
		Aegis ship *Myoko* test launches SM-3 off the coast of Hawaii (hits target)	Nov. 13	U.S. President Obama visits Japan (through November 14)		Lisbon treaty comes into effect
					Dec. 5	START I expires
	Nov. 9	Patriots (PAC-3) deployed to 2nd Air Defense Missile Group 5th Air Defense Missile Unit (Ashiya)	Nov. 17	Abolition of the Council for Reforming the Ministry of Defense	Dec. 8	Philippine government and "Moro Islamic Liberation Front" (MILF) resume peace negotiations
		Japan–India Defense Ministers' Meeting (Tokyo)	Dec. 3	Tokyo High Court rejects appeal by MSDF Lieutenant Commander in Aegis information leakage case (appeal to Supreme Court)		U.S. special representative Bosworth visits North Korea (through December 10)
	Nov. 17	Establishment of the Cabinet Level Working Group on the Futenma Replacement Facility				South Korean Ministry of National Defense announces its dispatch of military units to Afghanistan
	Nov. 23	Anti-piracy units receive IMO bravery award				
	Nov. 27	Japan–China Defense Ministers' Meeting (Tokyo)			Dec. 16	Resolution adopted to extend UNDOF mandate
	Dec. 4	Japan–South Korea security dialog (Saishu Island)			Dec. 25	Attempted bombing of a U.S. aircraft
	Dec. 8	Defense Minister Kitazawa visits Guam (through December 10)			Dec. 28	Yemen "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP) declares responsibility for the attempted bombing of a U.S. aircraft incident
	Dec. 16	Nissei Defense Conference (Tokyo)				
2010	Jan. 13	45th Meeting of the MOD and SDF Senior Personnel			Jan. 11	China announces that it has performed missile interception test
	Jan. 15	Replenishment Support Special Measures Law expires (February 6, units return)				Statement by North Korean Foreign Ministry. Insists on conclusion of peace agreement as premise for returning to Six-Party Talks
	Jan. 18	After massive earthquake hits Haiti, decision to provide air transport by C-130H for JICA international disaster relief medical teams and earthquake victims, as a part of international disaster relief operations	Jan. 18	174th Ordinary Diet Session	Jan. 12	M7 earthquake occurs in Haiti
	Jan. 19	"2+2" joint announcement on the 50th anniversary of U.S.–Japan Security Treaty				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2010	Jan. 20	After massive earthquake hits Haiti, decision to dispatch Disaster Relief Medical Assistance Team as part of international disaster relief operations				
	Jan. 23	After massive earthquake hits Haiti, commencement of medical operations by Medical Assistance Team (through February 14)				
	Jan. 26	First flight by Next-Generation Support Fighter XC-2 (Gifu)			Jan. 29	First test flight of Russian fifth-generation fighter PAK FA
	Feb. 5	Decision to dispatch SDF units to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (February 6, deployment commences)			Feb. 1	U.S. announces "Quadrennial Defense Review" (QDR) and "Ballistic Missile Defense Review" (BMDR)
	Feb. 24	Patriots (PAC-3) deployed to 2nd Air Defense Missile Group 8th Air Defense Missile Unit (Kouradai)			Feb. 5	Russia publishes new Navy doctrine
			Feb. 18	"Council on the Future of National Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era" held	Feb. 17	Number of nations ratifying the Convention on Cluster Munitions reaches 30. This results in the Convention coming into force on August 1
	Feb. 28	Response to earthquake off the coast of Chile			Feb. 27	Chile earthquake occurs
	Mar. 5	ASDF 1st Consultation on Replenishment Office Equipment			Mar. 5	China publishes its national defense budget. Year-on-year increase of 9.8%, or 7.270 trillion yen
	Mar. 8	First Investigation and Study Commission on the ASDF 1st Consultation on Replenishment Office Equipment				
	Mar. 12	Experts Committee on Reform of the Ministry of Defense (First)	Mar. 11	ASDF Hyakuri Base, joint civilian use of runway		
	Mar. 15	Interview between East Timor President Ramos-Horta and Defense Minister Kitazawa				
	Mar. 24	Experts Committee on Reform of the Ministry of Defense (Second)				
	Mar. 25	Second Japan–ASEAN Meeting of Senior Defense Officials (Tokyo)				
		Defense Minister Kitazawa visits Okinawa (through March 26)				
		Second Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges				
	Mar. 26	Law for the Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law enacted (includes new organization of 15th Brigade, and reorganization of the Youth Technical School)			Mar. 26	South Korean Navy patrol ship Cheonan sinks in Yellow Sea
					Mar. 29	Moscow subway suicide bombing incidents
	Mar. 30	Request for steps to improve involvement in bid rigging etc., with regard to equipment and materials ordered by 1st ASDF Replenishment				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2010	Apr. 1	Part of Law for the Partial Amendment of the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law enacted (new establishment position for school pupils in GSDF) enacted			Apr. 2	In Thailand, Thaksin supporters occupy the center of cities such as Bangkok. On April 10, they clash with Thai government security forces (through May 19)
	Apr. 10	Dispatch of instructors to Egypt PKO Center (through April 17)			Apr. 6	U.S. announces "Nuclear Posture Review" (NPR)
	Apr. 25	Patriot (PAC-3) mobile deployment training (Shinjuku Gyoen)			Apr. 8	Ten Chinese warships pass between Okinawa's main island and Miyako Island before heading into the Pacific Ocean
	Apr. 26	Patriots (PAC-3) deployed to 2nd Air Defense Missile Group 6th Air Defense Missile Unit (Ashiya)			Apr. 12	First Nuclear Safety and Security Summit (Washington, through April 13)
	Apr. 30	Japan–India. Defense Ministers' Meeting (India)			Apr. 29	Resolution adopted to extend UNMIS mandate
	May 1	Disaster dispatch for foot and mouth disease in Miyazaki Prefecture (through July 27)	May 4	Prime Minister Hatoyama visits Okinawa	May 3	NPT Review Conference (United Nations Headquarters, May 28)
	May 19	Japan–Australia 2+2 (signing of Japan–Australia ACSA) Japan–Australia "2+2" Defense Ministers' Meeting (Kitazawa and Faulkner, Tokyo)			May 10	Philippine President elected
					May 20	Release of inspection results indicating that the ROKS *Cheonan* sank due to a torpedo attack from a North Korean submarine
	May 23	Participation in Pacific Partnership 2010 (through July 15)	May 23	Prime Minister Hatoyama visits Okinawa	May 25	North Korea announces that it renounces all forms of North-South relations
			May 26	Establishment of Low Water Line Conservation Law		
	May 25	Japan–U.S. Defense Ministers' Meeting (Kitazawa and Gates, Washington)	May 28	Cabinet approval for "Government efforts in areas relating to items approved in the Japan–U.S. Security Consultative Committee on May 28 2010"	May 27	U.S. announces "National Security Strategy" (NSS)
	May 28	"2+2" joint Japan–U.S. announcement			Jun. 9	United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1929 regarding additional sanction on Iran
	May 29	Launch of operations of the new runway at JMSDF Iwakuni Air Base			Jun. 10	Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers (Brussels, through June 11)
	Jun. 5	Defense Minister Kitazawa participates in 9th Asia Security Summit (held by IISS) (Singapore)	Jun. 8	Formation of Kan Cabinet	Jun. 17	EU Summit (Brussels, through June 18)
			Jun. 25	Conclusion of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the Security of Information and Materials (Japan–NATO Information Protection Agreement)	Jun. 24	U.S.–Russia Summit (Washington, D.C.)
		Japan–U.S.–ROK Defense Ministers' Meeting (Kitazawa, Gates, Kim; Singapore)			Jun. 26	G8 Summit, submission of declaration by leaders criticizing the attack that sank the ROKS *Cheonan*
	Jun. 9	Administrative project review disclosure process (through June 11)			Jul. 9	U.N. Security Council issues a presidential statement condemning the attack that sank the ROKS *Cheonan*
	Jul. 6	First Japan–India Vice-Ministerial 2+2 Dialogue (Delhi)	Jul. 4	Enforcement of the Cargo Inspection Act		
	Jul. 7	Second Japan–India Defense Policy Dialogue (Delhi)			Jul. 21	U.S.–ROK Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting (Seoul)
	Jul. 16	Prime Minister's authorization of anti-piracy activities			Jul. 25	U.S.–ROK joint military exercises (Sea of Japan, through July 28)
	Aug. 4	United Nations Secretary-General Bang Ki-moon visits the Ministry of Defense	Aug. 27	Report submitted by the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era	Aug. 1	Coming into effect of the Convention on Cluster Munitions

* Listed in detail for two most recent years (2007-2008) as targeted in this white paper.

Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces

(As of March 31, 2010)

- **Minister of Defense**
  - **Chief of Staff**
    - **Joint Staff Office**
  - **Chief of Staff, GSDF**
    - **Ground Staff Office**
    - **Northern Army**
      - 2nd Division (Asahikawa)
      - 5th Brigade (Obihiro)
      - 7th Division (Higashi Chitose)
      - 11th Brigade (Makomanai)
      - 1st Tank Group (Kita Eniwa)
      - 1st Field Artillery Brigade (Kita Chitose)
      - 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Higashi Chitose)
      - Northern Engineer Unit (Minami Eniwa)
      - Others
    - **Northeastern Army**
      - 6th Division (Jinmachi)
      - 9th Division (Aomori)
      - Northeastern Combined Brigade (Sendai)
      - 2nd Field Artillery Group (Sendai)
      - 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Hachinohe)
      - 2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka)
      - Others
    - **Eastern Army**
      - 1st Division (Nerima)
      - 12th Brigade (Somagahara)
      - 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo)
      - 1st Engineer Brigade (Koga)
      - 1st Training Brigade (Takeyama)
      - Others
    - **Middle Army**
      - 3rd Division (Senzo)
      - 10th Division (Moriyama)
      - 13th Brigade (Kaitaichi)
      - 14th Brigade (Zentsuji)
      - 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara)
      - 4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo)
      - Middle Combined Brigade (Otsu)
      - Others
    - **Western Army**
      - 4th Division (Fukuoka)
      - 8th Division (Kita Kumamoto)
      - 15th Brigade (Naha)
      - Western Field Artillery Unit (Yufuin)
      - 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka)
      - 5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori)
      - 3rd Training Brigade (Ainoura)
      - Others
    - **Central Readiness Force**
      - 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino)
      - 1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu)
      - Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya)
      - Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit (Omiya)
      - Special Operation Group (Narashino)
      - Others
    - Signal Brigade (Ichigaya)
    - Ground Research & Development Command (Asaka)
    - Ground Material Control Command (Jujo)
    - Other units and organizations
  - **Chief of Staff, MSDF**
    - **Maritime Staff Office**
    - **Self-Defense Fleet**
      - **Fleet Escort Force**
        - 1st Escort Flotilla (Yokosuka)
        - 2nd Escort Flotilla (Sasebo)
        - 3rd Escort Flotilla (Maizuru)
        - 4th Escort Flotilla (Kure)
        - Others
      - **Fleet Air Force**
        - 1st Fleet Air Wing (Kanoya)
        - 2nd Fleet Air Wing (Hachinohe)
        - 4th Fleet Air Wing (Atsugi)
        - 5th Fleet Air Wing (Naha)
        - 21st Fleet Air Wing (Tateyama)
        - 22nd Fleet Air Wing (Omura)
        - 31st Fleet Air Wing (Iwakuni)
        - Others
      - **Fleet Submarine Force**
        - 1st Submarine Flotilla (Kure)
        - 2nd Submarine Flotilla (Yokosuka)
        - Others
      - Mine Warfare Force (Yokosuka)
      - Fleet Research Development Command (Yokosuka)
      - Oceanographic Command (Yokosuka)
      - Fleet Intelligence Command (Yokosuka)
      - Others
    - **Yokosuka District**
    - **Kure District**
    - **Sasebo District**
    - **Maizuru District**
    - **Ominato District**
    - Air Training Command (Shimofusa)
    - Training Squadron (Kure)
    - Communications Command (Ichigaya)
    - MSDF Maritime Materiel Command (Jujo)
    - Other units and organizations
  - **Chief of Staff, ASDF**
    - **Air Staff Office**
    - **Air Defense Command**
      - **Northern Air Defense Force**
        - 2nd Air Wing (Chitose)
        - 3rd Air Wing (Misawa)
        - Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Misawa)
        - 3rd Air Defense Missile Group (Chitose)
        - 6th Air Defense Missile Group (Misawa)
        - Others
      - **Central Air Defense Force**
        - 6th Air Wing (Komatsu)
        - 7th Air Wing (Hyakuri)
        - Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Iruma)
        - 1st Air Defense Missile Group (Iruma)
        - 4th Air Defense Missile Group (Gifu)
        - Others
      - **Western Air Defense Force**
        - 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru)
        - 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki)
        - Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Kasuga)
        - 2nd Air Defense Missile Group (Kasuga)
        - Others
      - **Southwestern Composite Air Division**
        - 83rd Air Wing (Naha)
        - Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Naha)
        - 5th Air Defense Missile Group (Naha)
        - Others
      - Others
    - **Air Support Command**
      - Air Rescue Wing (Iruma)
      - 1st Tactical Airlift Group (Komaki)
      - 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma)
      - 3rd Tactical Airlift Group (Miho)
      - Air Traffic Control Service Group (Iruma)
      - Air Weather Service Group (Fuchu)
      - Others
    - **Air Training Command**
      - 1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu)
      - 4th Air Wing (Matsushima)
      - 11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama)
      - 12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita)
      - 13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya)
      - Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami)
      - Others
    - **Air Development and Test Command**
      - Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu)
      - Electronics Development and Test Group (Iruma)
      - Aero-Medical Laboratory (Tachikawa, Iruma)
    - Air Communications and System Wing (Ichigaya)
    - Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki)
    - Air Material Command (Jujo)
    - Other units and organizations

Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2010)